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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis explores the content and implications of Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) for 
monopolization enforcement, as applied to predatory pricing, tying, and bundled discounts in 
both the United States and the European Union.  When considering the foundations to 
monopolization enforcement, many authors have found distinct schools of antitrust thought, each 
featuring distinguishable legal and economic principles.
1
  Such principles support varying 
degrees of monopolization enforcement, with a ratchet effect upwards from Chicago, to Harvard, 
to Post-Chicago.  I attempt to demonstrate a superseding claim, namely that the economic and 
legal principles embodied in NPT have influenced, above all other considerations, the 
development of predation, tying, and bundling law in both jurisdictions.  Courts have 
constructed and altered that law from the following core concepts of NPT: rationality, 
competition, efficiency, and the rule of law. 
I further set-out to prove that NPT by itself does not support low levels of monopolization 
enforcement, or any particular level.  Rather, it identifies the most relevant economic factors that 
determine price levels, efficiency, and consumer welfare more generally. 
This thesis is timely because it assesses both the theoretical and practical validity of NPT at 
a juncture in history when the EU Commission has issued a Guidance Paper on monopolization 
enforcement drawn principally from its precepts,
2
 and when the judiciary in both jurisdictions is 
considering expanding, or has expanded, cost tests to other price-based abuses. 
  
                                                 
1
 Compare Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 928 (1979),with, 
e.g., William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The 
Chicago / Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
2
 Ioannis Lianos, “Lost in Translation?” Toward a Theory of Economic Transplants, Jean Monnet Working Paper 
08/09 (2009) at 31, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1485378. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
At a time when the U.S. Supreme Court was enjoining mergers and attaching liability to 
predation claims with little regard for the market power of the alleged dominant 
undertaking,
1
 Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) quickly gained traction among academics and 
judges.  It did so by providing relatively simple and logical principles that explained 
economic activity reasonably well,
2
 thereby infusing a degree of certainty into an area of 
jurisprudence previously administered ad hoc.  Combined with (1) an independent political 
desire to promote investment and innovation, (2) a faith in the recuperative power of markets 
to trend toward competitive equilibria, forged by many years of price-controls, high inflation, 
and low economic growth, and (3) a lack of confidence in the judicial process to reach better 
decisions than even a debilitated market process — NPT curtailed enforcement levels, at 
least in the predatory pricing context.  Notably, while also adopting NPT as the theoretical 
foundation for predatory pricing claims, as reflected in the test for liability, EU Institutions 
have not implemented the other three factors discussed above to the same extent.   
After the U.S. judiciary reached an agreement on the threat to competition that predatory 
pricing poses, it inspired judges and academics to expand predation doctrine to other areas of 
monopolization law, particularly to other price-based exclusionary practices.  Because of 
stare decisis, or the controlling authority of case precedent, legal reasoning naturally lends 
itself to analogical reasoning, or trying to establish that an accepted point of law covers a 
new fact pattern.  The process involves “mapping similarities in the relational structures from 
a base domain (the analog) to a target domain to project inferences from the base to the 
target.”3  This process has proceeded apace in the U.S. monopolization context, as cost tests 
have expanded from predatory pricing to predatory bidding and to single and multiple 
product rebates.  The EU Commission similarly has recommended applying cost tests to 
evaluate loyalty rebates
4
 and bundled discounts.
5
  While EU Courts have not ruled upon any 
                                                 
1
 See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 692, 87 S.Ct. 1326, 1330 (1967) (White, J.). 
2
 For instrumentalism and the predictive value of NPT, see Ioannis Lianos, “Lost in Translation?” Toward a Theory 
of Economic Transplants, Jean Monnet Working Paper 08/09 (2009) at 15, available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1485378. 
3
 Sean P. Gates, Antitrust By Analogy:  Developing Rules for Loyalty Rebates & Bundled Discounts, 79(1) 
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 99, 120 (2013). 
4
 Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive 
Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings (2009/C 45/02) at ¶¶ 37-45 [“Guidance”]. 
5
 Id. at ¶¶ 59-61. 
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bundling cases, they stalwartly have resisted determining liability in single-product rebate 
cases based exclusively on the application of cost tests.
6
 
An unwillingness to expand the predation framework to other pricing abuses does not 
contravene NPT, which recognizes and explains the various influences that interact with 
price to produce anticompetitive effects, moving market conditions away from the perfectly 
competitive paradigm.  Cost tests are not a proxy for NPT, though they derive from its tenets.  
Rather, rationality, competition, and efficiency embody NPT.  Throughout the thesis, I 
attempt to demonstrate how these principles have influenced the development of 
monopolization law, and how they do not compel any particular level of enforcement. 
I. Summary of Research Question 
I attempt to answer the following research question: To what extent does Neoclassical 
Price Theory (NPT) conceptually support existing monopolization standards and 
enforcement levels?  I conclude that NPT mostly explains the relevant economic factors at 
issue in monopolization cases, and that judges mostly have relied on its tenets, which include 
the rule of law, to formulate controlling legal tests.  Incorporating other NPT principles could 
improve the accuracy of certain legal tests.  Particularly in the bundling context, NPT 
supports a more expansive inquiry into pro- and anticompetitive effects than a simple cost 
test permits. 
Legal tests do not always determine enforcement levels.  In the predation context, for 
example, different liability tests in the U.S. and EU have not altered similarly lax 
enforcement.
7
  Administrative costs and a common desire to protect the incentive to lower 
price, even by dominant undertakings, has curtailed enforcement more effectively than a 
strict evaluation of predation based on rationality, competition, and efficiency. 
NPT focuses on consumer welfare as the primary goal of enforcement.  Price levels have 
provided the most important metric to the analysis, at least partially due to their objectivity.  
The EU Commission has included innovation, quality, and variety as additional determinants 
                                                 
6
 See, e.g., Wouter P.J. Wils, The Judgment of the EU General Court in Intel & the So-Called ‘More Economic 
Approach’ to Abuse of Dominance, 37(4) WORLD COMPETITION 405 (5) n.12 (forthcoming Dec. 2014), available at: 
http://ssrn.com/author=456087 (discussing Case T-286/09 Intel v. European Commission, Judgment of the Court, 
Seventh Chamber, ¶¶ 145-146, 151-152 (12 June 2014), on appeal to the Court of Justice, Case C-413/14 P Intel v. 
European Commission); see also Case C-549/10 P Tomra Systems ASA v. European Commission, Judgment of the 
Court, Third Chamber, ¶¶ 73-74, 80 (19 Apr. 2012); Case 322/81 Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie-Michelin v. 
Commission [1983] ECR 3461 ¶¶ 81-86. 
7
 Thanks to Professor Lianos for helping me to realize this point. 
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of consumer welfare.
8
  To the extent that NPT more extensively incorporates such factors 
into the competitive effects of challenged practices, they could provide additional causes for 
enforcement.  Except for innovation in certain contexts, however, quality and variety 
unlikely will out-weigh lower prices and efficiency when a direct conflict exists, certainly 
under existing U.S. precedent.
9
  At this juncture, non-price factors have surfaced in the EU 
and U.S. case law on tying, bundling, and predation only when the dominant undertaking has 
removed price from consideration, as Microsoft did in the tying context.
10
 
II. Defining Neoclassical Price Theory 
A. Components 
1. Price Theory 
Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) dates back to the forebears of classical economics such 
as Adam Smith, and reflects faith in individual autonomy and the welfare-generating capacity 
of self-interest.  Smith posited that, particularly in economic affairs, self-interest motivates 
human interaction, and when directed into market mechanisms, individuals pursuing self-
interest will promote societal welfare, primarily by generating wealth.
11
  NPT also assumes 
that, in any particular market exchange — given complete knowledge of alternative options 
and given that individuals bear the full societal cost of each option, meaning no externalities 
exist — individuals know best how to advance their own welfare.  Following from these 
assumptions, the prices of various goods reflect the relative production costs to society.  If 
prices function properly, then buyers “will cast an informed vote” when purchasing goods, 
thereby ensuring the most desirable combination of consumption choices available to 
society.
12
  Suppliers will respond to the votes cast by consumers and produce the most 
popular goods, thereby maximizing their utility. 
Another principle tenet of NPT is rationality and its offspring, profit-maximization.  NPT 
assumes that, when the market presents a choice, individuals actually will have perfect 
knowledge about how to decide — both concerning the ends desired and the least-cost means 
                                                 
8
 Guidance (2009/C 45/02) at ¶ 11. 
9
 I make this point given my review of the case law.  See also Lianos, supra n.2 at 37, 41. 
10
 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam); Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp. v. 
Commission, Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Grand Chamber) (17 Sept. 2007). 
11
 STEVEN G. MEDEMA, THE HESITANT HAND 18-19, 25 (2009). 
12
 JAMES R. HACKNEY JR., UNDER COVER OF SCIENCE 113 (2007). 
11 
 
of achieving those ends.  Individuals, therefore, have clearly defined preferences
13
 and will 
choose the option that they prefer, the appropriate option or means that maximize their utility 
or happiness, which are ends motivated by self-interest.
14
  A fundamental attribute of the 
market and the price mechanism, therefore, is that their interaction reveals both the wants and 
desires of consumers and the scarcity of inputs.
15
  On the demand-side, consumers face 
budget constraints, and NPT assumes that consumers accurately calculate the financial 
strictures of those constraints when purchasing goods.
16
  On the supply-side, rationality 
translates into maximizing profits.  In mixing labor and capital to produce products, and in 
deciding how much of a good to produce and at what cost, suppliers focus exclusively on 
maximizing profits; otherwise, competitors will drive them from the market.
17
  The rationality 
principle converts individuals, either consumers or suppliers, in any situational model into 
abstractions that behave how “any” intelligent person would behave in that situation, ignoring 
psychological predilections, beliefs, values, tastes, and “the effect of social institutions”.18 
The theory of supply and demand counts as another principal pillar of NPT.  Prices act as 
the catalyst for the interaction between supply and demand.  NPT generally assumes upward-
sloping supply curves and downward-sloping demand curves for most markets that interact to 
produce stable equilibria.  Under NPT, price incorporates consumer value or consumer utility, 
as measured by the willingness of consumers to pay.
19
  Higher prices signal to firms that 
consumers value goods (or services) more highly and that firms should produce more of that 
good, but because of the inverse relationship between price-charged and quantity-demanded, 
as prices go up, consumers will purchase less of the good.  Firms will increase production 
until the marginal cost of producing the good equals the marginal revenue secured through 
sales, because if marginal revenue exceeds marginal cost, producing an additional unit will 
                                                 
13
 Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives:  Behavioral Economics And The Case For “Asymmetric 
Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L.R. 1211, 1214-1215 (2003). 
14
 ROGER E. BACKHOUSE, THE PUZZLE OF MODERN ECONOMICS 169 (2010); Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality 
Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L.R. 261, 266 (2010). 
15
 NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:  CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, & PUBLIC POLICY 
260 (1994). 
16
 GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 56 (3d ed. 1966). 
17
 Leslie, supra n.14 at 266. 
18
 Ioannis Lianos, Judging Economists: Economic Expertise In Competition Litigation: A European View, in 
TOWARDS AN OPTIMAL COMPETITION LAW SYSTEM 185, 215 (Ioannis Lianos & Ioannis Kokkoris eds., 2009). 
19
 See generally Hackney, supra n.12 at 110; William H. Page, The Chicago School And The Evolution Of Antitrust:  
Characterization, Antitrust Injury, And Evidential Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1233 (1989) (“Consumers, for 
example, will not pay more than the value they assign to the product, and will substitute other products at higher 
prices.”). 
12 
 
generate revenue above costs.  If marginal cost exceeds marginal revenue, on the other hand, 
producing an additional unit will cost more than the revenue generated.
20
  Conversely, a 
falling price signals to firms that consumers value a good less highly and that firms should 
produce less of that good, but as price falls, consumers will purchase more of the good.  Firms 
likewise will decrease production until marginal cost equals marginal revenue, which 
achieves equilibrium: “[P]rices will adjust so as to make the demand for every good equal to 
the amount that suppliers want to sell, and the resulting allocation of resources will be 
efficient in the sense that any departure from it would make at least one person worse off.”21 
NPT critically distinguishes between levels of efficiency achieved in perfect competition 
and monopoly.  Perfect competition constitutes the paradigm, the societal objective, and that 
economic model hinges on three additional assumptions — price-taking, product 
homogeneity, and free entry and exit.
22
  When many firms operate in a competitive market, 
each individual firm produces a relatively small percentage of market output and thus cannot 
influence the market price.
23
  Such price-taking generally occurs absent product 
differentiation.  In perfect competition, firms produce nearly identical, and thus perfectly 
substitutable, goods, and “no firm can raise the price of its product above the price of other 
firms without losing most or all of its business.”24  The third assumption, the absence of entry 
barriers, means that rivals can procure, at reasonable cost, the financing and inputs necessary 
to enter an industry and compete with the market leader.  The absence of entry barriers also 
means that no special costs inhibit rivals from exiting an industry if profits prove allusive. 
If all three assumptions hold, consumers easily can switch back and forth between 
suppliers.
25
  In this highly idealized state of perfect competition, the demand curve facing 
each individual firm is flat, signifying that each firm cannot influence the market price: The 
marginal revenue of each additional sale consequently equals the price of the good sold.  Each 
firm will produce output where the market marginal cost curve intersects a flat marginal 
revenue curve.  Competition ensures that the lowest-cost provider supplies the market 
marginal cost curve. 
                                                 
20
 ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 284-85 (8
th
 ed. 2012). 
21
 Backhouse, supra n.14 at 47. 
22
 Pindyck & Rubinfeld, supra n.20 at 280. 
23
 Id. 
24
 Id. 
25
 Id. at 280-81. 
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By contrast, entry barriers and product differentiation weaken competition in 
monopolistic markets, affecting the slope of the demand curve facing the monopolist.  Rather 
than a flat demand curve, the monopolist now can control the price at which it sells the 
product and thus faces a downward sloping demand curve, the market demand curve.
26
  To 
sell more goods, the monopolist must lower the price, but it must lower the price on all goods 
sold, so while it gains additional revenue from selling more items, it loses revenue from goods 
that could have been sold at the higher price.  Marginal revenue no longer equals price, as in 
perfect competition, but is less than price: the monopolist’s marginal revenue curve falls more 
steeply underneath the market demand curve.  Although the monopolist also prices where 
marginal revenue equals marginal cost, because price no longer equals marginal revenue, at 
that output level the monopolist can charge a price greater than marginal cost.  In perfect 
competition, suppliers would produce more output at that marginal cost. 
The difference between the outcomes in perfect competition and monopoly defines the 
NPT concept of efficiency.  In perfect competition, the price of the product represents not 
only the utility that consumers derive from the good, or value, as measured by their 
willingness to pay, that consumers place on the good.  The price also represents the cost to 
suppliers, the societal cost, to produce the good.  The net effect is that suppliers produce 
goods at the lowest cost to society, and all consumers who value the good at that cost and 
price can purchase it. 
Monopoly yields inefficiency because the monopolist operates at a price above marginal 
cost.  At that output level, allocative inefficiency results because a subset of consumers would 
have been willing to purchase the product at marginal cost but now must buy other products 
valued less highly, whether from the monopolist or from suppliers in other markets.  
Moreover, the extra resources necessary to produce the extra output in perfect competition 
now go either to producing less-valued products or to rent-seeking.  Rent-seeking involves 
protecting monopoly profits by, for example, investing in spare capacity or lobbying 
governments to strengthen entry barriers.  Potential suppliers often cannot produce the extra 
output desired by consumers because of entry barriers and higher costs.
27
  Additionally, at the 
                                                 
26
 See generally Stigler, supra n.16 at 195. 
27
 Thanks to Professors Kokkoris & Jones for asking that I clarify this paragraph.  
14 
 
monopoly output level, productive inefficiency generally results because the monopolist faces 
less pressure to lower costs.
28
 
The outcome in perfect competition, on the other hand, is Pareto efficient, in that society 
cannot reallocate resources and make anyone better off without making someone else worse 
off.
29
 
Pareto efficiency is a modest goal: It says that we should make all mutually 
beneficial exchanges, but it does not say which exchanges are best.  Pareto 
efficiency can be a powerful concept, however.  If a change will improve 
efficiency, it is in everyone’s self-interest to support it.30 
NPT promotes the perfectly competitive paradigm because it represents a position of 
maximum satisfaction for society
31
 reached by individuals and firms responding to price 
signals.  Prices reduce the amount of information that individuals and firms must know to 
maximize utility and profits.
32
   
Smith believed that if society adopted appropriate legal rules and generally promoted 
competition, it would neutralize the abject excesses of self-interest,
33
 not least by forcing 
firms to implement the most efficient technologies.  Absent entry barriers and market power, 
high profits induce suppliers to compete for market share by producing new products or 
producing old products more cheaply — the competition spurring innovation and maximizing 
consumer surplus.
34
 
2. Neoclassical Economics 
Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) as an approach to law and economics owes a substantial 
intellectual debt to neoclassical economics.  Thorstein Veblen coined the term “neoclassical” 
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to describe an approach to economic thought that splintered from classical economics.
35
  
Classical economics holds that market economies operate under particular laws of the normal 
or the natural that economists can discover by exercising common sense, and then reformulate 
as authoritative economic principles.
36
  The process of deriving the normal case distinguishes 
neoclassical from classical economics.  Instead of formulating normality purely from common 
sense or experience, neoclassical economists derive the normal case “at the level of the actual 
course of events.”37  The normal case must conform to empirical regularities.38  Classical 
economists thus have more freedom in crafting hypotheses.   
Professor Lawson has argued that, above all other defining characteristics, neoclassical 
economics represents a method of reasoning and classification that proceeds down a closed, 
deductive path.
39
  After identifying an economic principle from perceived correlations, a 
neoclassical economist then tests the hypothesis by comparing it to observed permutations, 
thus authenticating the hypothesis by induction.
40
  Under such a method, the “normal” case 
represents the fulcrum of analysis, as policy prescriptions follow from how closely observed 
results track anticipated results.
41
  When accurate, the deductive method produces a “body of 
logically consistent propositions concerning the normal relation of things ― a system of 
economic taxonomy.”42 
B. By Comparison 
1. Old Institutionalism 
Professor Lawson distinguishes the taxonomic method of classical and neoclassical 
economics from the evolutionary method of old institutionalism, whose adherents strictly 
subscribe to the “test of causal relation or quantitative sequence.”43  This competing approach 
seeks answers at every level of analysis “in terms of cause and effect”.44  By contrast, the 
taxonomic economist requires an additional analytical step above merely identifying cause 
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and effect, which involves systematizing knowledge and discovering a “natural law[] or an 
association of phenomena”.45  In attempting to make sense of economic workings, taxonomic 
economists apply insights “external to the events unfolding”.46  While potentially heavily 
empirical, the neoclassical approach does not involve comparing historical events to reality to 
trace cause and effect; rather it seeks explanations based on the similarity of existing facts to 
carefully constructed event regularities drawn from the available evidence.
47
 
2. Neoclassical Economics versus Old Institutionalism 
While likely beyond the scope of his study, Professor Lawson does not explicitly discuss 
why neoclassical economists have adhered to the taxonomic method of analysis.  A likely 
reason is that the taxonomic method works better when formulating policy prescriptions and 
thus when advising governments on how to structure and regulate their economies.  A strict 
cause and effect approach considers only historical data, and while that data might narrow the 
range of subsequent developments, the immediate future unlikely will repeat historical events, 
if only because the future always involves distinct circumstances.  A theory of economic 
analysis that permits greater generalization based on recurring principles or fact-patterns 
enables greater analytical and predictive power.  Neoclassical economics has retained its 
perch atop the economics profession because politicians and regulators are more interested in 
analytical tools that can help predict future events compared to reasoned explanations of past 
events.  The taxonomic method brings greater influence with politicians and industry and thus 
greater funding for research. 
Take the rationality assumption.  Developing theories that assist in predicting individual 
behavior in certain common circumstances helps companies to make money and politicians to 
govern better.  Indeed, “the primary purpose of any rationality axiom is just to fix individual 
behavior in some way to render it atomistic and so tractable.”48  The precise set of 
assumptions applied matters less than the ability to isolate a variable for measurement.
49
  
Given the diversity inherent to the human experience, tracing historical data to predict how 
even a material subset of individuals, let alone all individuals, will react to various economic 
circumstances is both impossible and beyond the budget of any government or institution.  
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Instead, neoclassical economists have toiled in generalizations that capture an aspect of 
human nature, or a relevant indicator that might anticipate the direction of economic activity, 
all to inform policy-making.  They wisely have not attempted to explicate fully the varied 
causes of historical events, as a prelude to explaining the shifting causes of future events.  In 
that way, the profession has gained in relevance. 
3. Neoclassical Price Theory versus Neoclassical Economics 
While neoclassical economics attempts to explain economic phenomena, judges 
associated with the Chicago School of antitrust analysis advanced Neoclassical Price Theory 
(NPT) as a method to assist the judiciary in maximizing wealth, efficiency, and consumer 
welfare when deciding cases.
50
  A subcategory of law and economics, rather than economics, 
NPT integrates the taxonomic method of neoclassical economics with the basic substantive 
principles of microeconomics and industrial organization, both to improve legal reasoning and 
to provide an objective lodestar for legal analysis.  Basic microeconomic principles constitute 
the “normal” case, or first principles from which judges attempt to predict whether 
intervention in the market will maximize wealth.
51
  NPT obviously has the greatest relevance 
in cases where society wants judges to maximize wealth, and in no other area of legal analysis 
is that objective more important than competition law, which sets the legal boundaries of 
economic interaction in a free market economy. 
The greatest weakness to this mode of analysis thus stems from the applicability of the 
normal case, based on very basic economic principles, to the varied and complex exclusionary 
and exploitative actions that sophisticated undertakings can adopt.  The link between cause 
and effect may not always hold if the normal case does not fit reality.   
Similarly, by contrast to macroeconomic policy-making ― which by its nature requires 
forward-looking analyses yet involves intensive quantitative number-crunching ― the judicial 
and administrative processes in the competition law context critically rely on an historical 
evaluation of facts and evidence for legitimacy.  An evidential focus is important not least 
because judges and many administrators generally lack both the economic training and the 
quantitative tools to justify economic predictions in the legal context.  NPT undoubtedly will 
provide the best mode of analysis when evaluating many alleged abuses, if for no other reason 
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than that even basic economic principles provide greater insight into the economic 
consequences of challenged acts relative to simplistic analogies of current fact patterns to a 
limited number of previous opinions.  Yet an unyielding faith in the normal case, despite the 
existence of evidence weakening its applicability, exalts theory over reality, thereby 
weakening both the accuracy and the legitimacy of the judicial process. 
4. Ordoliberalism versus Neoclassical Price Theory 
Ordoliberalism has greatly influenced the development of EU competition standards, 
particularly in the early case law of the EU Court of Justice, though many such standards 
remain good law today.  Led by Walter Eucken, the Freiburg School in Germany crafted the 
governing principles of ordoliberalism,
52
 which at least partially evolved as a resistance 
movement against Hitler and Nazi Germany.
53
   
In planning to transition away from the war economy, the Freiburg School took note of 
the tremendous concentration of private capital prior to, and during, the war years.  A timid 
approach to monopolization law after that period would have institutionalized the 
concentration of economic power in the hands of a few undertakings.  Aside from propagating 
inefficiency and reducing the supply of goods, such an economic structure suppressed the 
“dependent masses”54 by limiting their ability to start businesses and create new markets in 
vast swathes of the economy. 
In another sense separate from the principle tenets of Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT), 
ordoliberals viewed competitive markets as “privilege free” and “non-discriminating,” where 
“economic actors meet as legal equals.”55  While NPT promotes competition as a means to 
achieve efficiency and generate wealth, therefore, and while ordoliberals valued efficiency 
and wealth as well, they independently valued the competitive process because it most 
effectively achieves a humane economic order.
56
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As another distinctive characteristic that separates ordoliberalism from NPT, ordoliberals 
viewed competition policy as a meta-principle, defined at the level of constitutional economic 
policy.  Specifically, ordoliberals distinguished between two types of market interventions: 
one that occurred directly to remedy an undesirable economic outcome, and another that 
occurred indirectly at an institutional or constitutional level, “in the sense of defining the 
general terms under which market transaction[s] are carried out.”57 
Ordoliberals advanced the indirect method, and thus sought to reform the rules of the 
economic game by attempting to “create conditions under which economic actors[,] in 
seeking to further their own interest[s,] also promote the common interest.”58  Such a 
competition policy intangibly seeks to protect the process of competition.
59
  By constraining 
the unilateral actions of dominant undertakings, the competitive process enables many more 
economic actors to participate productively in the market.
60
 
Ordoliberalism functions less effectively at the sub-constitutional or adjudicative level, 
where judges must assess “the welfare consequences of alternative options”.61  At that level, 
NPT exhibits significant advantages.  By focusing on promoting consumer welfare and 
efficiency, judges can examine price levels, the most tangible measure of consumer benefit, 
and cost levels in relation to price levels, the most immediate measure of efficiency — rather 
than attempting to identify more tenuous damage to the competitive process. 
Nevertheless, ordoliberalism does not differ unrecognizably from NPT.  At the sub-
constitutional or adjudicative level, ordoliberalism favors the process of competition because 
of a conviction that it promotes consumer sovereignty.
62
  Competition can manifest in two 
forms: either in terms of improving performance to better serve consumer interests, or in 
terms of preventing competition, which bolsters profitability by weakening or restraining 
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competitors.
63
  A healthy competitive process strengthens performance competition while 
inhibiting prevention competition.   
Ordoliberals viewed consumer sovereignty as the sole viable objective of competition 
policy.  And the process of competition achieves that objective by aligning the earning of 
profits with serving consumer interests.
64
  “Referring to Adam Smith’s view that the impulse 
of human selfishness loses its anti-social aspects under the impact of competition,” Franz 
Böhm, another leading ordoliberal, argued that performance competition provided the “moral 
backbone” of a profit-based economy.65  In a famous passage, Professor Böhm asserted that 
competition does not merely represent a mechanism to align incentives, but more profoundly 
“the most magnificent and most ingenious instrument of deprivation of power in history.”66   
Consumer sovereignty is a by-product of competition.  In the NPT sense, perfect 
competition does not describe any functioning market; rather, it represents an ideal standard 
against which policy-makers can judge “the institutional-legal frameworks of existing 
markets”.67  In that ideal state of economic affairs, consumer sovereignty dictates market 
outcomes, since consumers ultimately determine the success and failure of producers.
68
 
Heinz Rieter and Matthias Schmolz, in characterizing various methods of economic 
analysis, have considered ordoliberalism as a sub-category of neoclassical economics, rather 
than of historical economics or socialism.
69
  The association with neoclassical economics at 
least partially resulted from ordoliberals’ “persistent faith” in the ability of perfect 
competition to advance societal welfare.
70
  Ordoliberals further promoted a healthy 
competitive order so as to allow the price system to function robustly.  Economic actors need 
accurate price signals to operate efficiently and to allocate resources optimally.
71
 
Despite such similarities, NPT and ordoliberalism differ in material respects.  Even while 
acknowledging the value of the efficiency principle developed by neoclassical economists, 
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ordoliberals established an alternative notion of efficiency.  Rather than targeting productive 
and allocative efficiency, ordoliberals derived a concept of efficiency more directly from the 
model created by Pareto, which further anticipated the model created by Coase.  Specifically, 
ordoliberals stated that economists could measure efficiency viably only by observing 
“voluntarily agreed-on transactions”.72  This argument follows from Pareto’s assertion that 
efficiency meant improving the lot of someone without detracting from the lot of someone 
else.
73
  Focusing on voluntary transactions further supports Coase’s claim that, absent 
transaction costs, free exchange will maximize wealth, as resources gravitate to their highest 
valued-uses.
74
 
Economists could assume that, if parties agree to contract, they perceive that the contract 
improves their welfare, or at least does not lower their welfare, otherwise the parties would 
not have agreed.  Similarly, given zero transaction costs (including zero information costs), 
the party that values a particular resource the most, or could put that resource to the most 
productive use, would be willing to pay the most for it.  The transaction allows the seller to 
receive a price at least equal to, but likely greater than, the seller’s own value of that resource.  
The resource changing hands will empower both parties to create additional wealth, by 
utilizing the resource and by investing or consuming the cash proceeds from the sale.  
Protecting the process of competition contributes to wealth creation by lowering market-wide 
transaction costs ― since competitive markets constitute 
institutionally secured arenas for voluntary cooperation within which individuals 
are free to enter into contracts[] [with others] that they expect to work to their 
benefit[.]  [A]nd it is only because ― or, more precisely, to the extent that ― 
market outcomes are, indeed, the result of voluntary contracting that they can be 
judged ‘efficient’.75 
Efficiency as a competitive process features a different focus than efficiency as a 
particular outcome.  Efficiency as a process protects the liberal value of pursuing interests free 
from the coercion of more powerful actors.  Absent coercion, individuals and businesses have 
a better chance of agreeing to mutually beneficial transactions.  The greater the number of 
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such transactions, the more likely a market will maximize welfare.  The ultimate outcome of 
the market process depends entirely on bargains struck by individual market actors.  Prior to 
the transaction, or the series of transactions, the outcome is indeterminate.  Targeting a 
specific outcome, therefore, makes little sense. 
Because a monopolist will constitute an unavoidable trading partner for many market 
participants, it will have the ability to coerce rivals and consumers to accept terms that they 
would refuse given competitive conditions.  Coercion can manifest in forcing rivals to accept 
an unwanted product, or to accept a less desirable product relative to existing alternatives 
because of discounts off a necessary purchase.  This competitive concern arises in tying and 
bundling law, and both ordoliberalism and NPT provide theoretical support for examining 
such transactions.  By themselves they can lower welfare relative to a “but-for” world76 of 
greater competition.  When tying and bundling additionally weaken existing competition 
further and enable price increases, they harm efficiency however conceived. 
Productive and allocative efficiency represent very specific outcomes
77
 in the 
monopolization context.
78
  NPT values competition as a condition precedent to both 
outcomes.
79
  The NPT view of competition aligns closely to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.  
Regardless of the welfare trade-off between the dominant undertaking and competitors, if the 
exclusionary behavior reduces efficiency while transferring surplus from consumers, it will 
not qualify for Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.  A monopolist will have nothing left over after 
compensating market participants both for the inefficiency generated by, and the surplus 
transferred as a result of, an anticompetitive act. 
With Coasian efficiency, a concentrated market deters welfare-enhancing transactions 
relative to a competitive market, by increasing transaction costs.  Absent pricing power, the 
market would produce greater output.  Both rivals and consumers would enter into a greater 
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number of transactions, increasing their information concerning market conditions.
80
  The 
added information would outweigh the loss of information sustained by the monopolist by 
entering into fewer transactions because the market now produces more information. 
Given the existence of pricing power, net bargaining costs also increase in monopoly.  
While bargaining costs for the dominant undertaking fall, since it can dictate market terms, 
those for rivals and consumers increase at least by an equal measure.  Consumers cannot alter 
the terms of transactions set by the monopolist, as inadequate alternatives exist.  Rivals can 
alter bargaining costs only by innovating or differentiating.  Under competitive conditions, 
lower bargaining costs for rivals and consumers would outweigh the increased bargaining 
costs for the monopolist simply because, again, market production exceeds the level in 
monopoly.  Lower transaction costs improve the likelihood, in a Coasian sense, that assets 
will gravitate to their highest valued uses. 
Ordoliberals favored aggressive monopolization enforcement.  They advocated 
eliminating monopolies wherever possible if more competitive markets would result.  If more 
competitive markets were not possible, then ordoliberals advised imposing on dominant 
undertakings an obligation to act “as if” perfect competition existed.81  Ordoliberals believed 
that such a standard adhered to the rule of law by providing an objective measure and clear 
guidance for dominant undertakings to follow.
82
  Expanding on the “as if” principle, 
ordoliberals argued that classifying particular actions by dominant undertakings as 
impediment competition (rather than performance competition) involved determining whether 
the dominant undertaking could implement such actions without market power.
83
 
This concept could reduce consumer welfare given the actual presence of market power.  
Applied literally, it would prevent the dominant undertaking from engaging in several 
transactions that, while potentially exclusionary, also could improve consumer welfare, such 
as single- and multiple-product rebates.  A dominant undertaking could not lower prices 
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because, if it were operating in a competitive market, any price-cut would fall below cost, 
forcing it to shut-down.
84
 
By targeting a specific outcome, whether efficiency or consumer welfare, neoclassical 
price theorists almost invariably evaluate the effects of a challenged practice more closely 
than would an ordoliberal to determine net efficiency or to identify consumer harm.
85
 
5. Austrian Economics versus Neoclassical Price Theory 
Inspired by Carl Menger, von Bawerk, and von Mises,
86
 Austrian economics has 
influenced the development of monopolization law mostly by emphasizing the welfare-
generating capacity of dynamic efficiency over the static efficiency depicted by Neoclassical 
Price Theory (NPT) models.  Austrian economists do not seek to weaken market power 
outside of the normal interplay of demand and supply.  To the contrary, they discern no 
competitive problem with the existence of market power and high profit margins, because 
profitability regularly fuels technology-enhancing investment.  Such investments further 
stimulate imitation and successive innovations that increase productivity and spur economic 
progress. 
Austrian economists such as von Mises and von Hayek placed more emphasis on the 
element of time, which does not feature prominently in static price theory models.  Austrians 
believe that entrepreneurs represent the key actors in markets, so they closely examine their 
incentives, because only entrepreneurs can establish, coordinate, and consolidate markets.  
The “continual interaction between the entrepreneur and the environment” represents the 
relevant process of competition on which antitrust authorities should focus.
87
  They should not 
strive to impose perfect competition on concentrated markets; the dynamic process of 
competition depends on the quest for market power.
88
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Unlike neoclassical price theorists, Austrians do not believe that markets axiomatically 
tend towards equilibrium.
89
  Instead of adopting a taxonomic method that works deductively 
from internally consistent principles and that results in stable equilibria, Austrians focus 
almost exclusively on competition as a dynamic process that has no predictable equilibrium, 
similar to ordoliberals.  Because individuals and businesses “hold important economic 
information in an extremely non-aggregated way,” judges and competition authorities cannot 
employ competition policy to predict market outcomes and thereby maximize welfare “better 
than the competitive process itself”.90  To attempt to do so, argued von Hayek, exhibits “a 
pretense of knowledge”91 that does not exist, “given the complex interdependencies in socio-
economic systems”92. 
Such systems feature a multitude of relevant influences and the ingenuity of market 
participants, who often can game legal rules to achieve the desirable effect.
93
  Rent-seeking by 
competitors more readily can succeed when governments have the discretion to intervene in 
the internal affairs of successful undertakings to promote competition, rather than intervening 
only when undertakings fail to follow more delineated rules.
94
 
Remedying a specific abuse of dominance generally cannot outweigh the corresponding 
negative influence on the dynamic competitive process and on the competitive incentives of 
entrepreneurs.
95
  The focus on competitive processes and potential or latent competition 
supersedes the presence or absence of actual competition or efficiency.  However, this focus 
does not appear to account for the possibility that, absent monopolization enforcement, 
entrepreneurs will have far less opportunities to innovate and create wealth. 
Although not their objective, the Austrian emphasis on dynamic competition has led 
neoclassical price theorists and antitrust enforcers generally to stress the importance of entry 
barriers when evaluating anticompetitive conduct.  In their absence, nothing prevents dynamic 
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competition from eroding market power.  An acknowledgement of dynamic competition also 
underpins a reluctance to investigate exploitative abuses.
96
 
6. Behavioral Economics97 
Behavioral economics disputes the claim that individuals abide by the rationality tenet of 
Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT).  Behavioral economists assert that individuals do not 
necessarily maximize clearly-defined preferences in most circumstances; they regularly 
display bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest.
98
 
To function effectively in a complex world, boundedly rational individuals must 
rely on cognitive heuristics — simplifying mental shortcuts — that inevitably 
lead people to make some systematic decision errors; as a result, their behavior 
necessarily deviates from that predicted by rational actor models.
99
 
Heuristics such as loss aversion, the endowment effect, the availability heuristic, and 
overconfidence bias
100
 cannot replace the concept of rationality — or always acting to 
maximize utility, satisfaction, or profits.  Rather, heuristics can supplement rationality by 
identifying the circumstances under which individuals will deviate systematically from 
particular market stimuli in a predictable manner. 
For example, individuals care more about losing utility than about subsequently gaining 
the equivalent amount back, even though rationality predicts an equivalent indifference.
101
  
Individuals also ask for a higher price to sell a good that they already own than “they would 
be willing to pay to obtain [the good] in the first place.”102  A rational analysis would reveal 
that the value of the good has not changed from one situation to the next.   
Anecdotal evidence, or whether similar events come readily to mind, carries unjustifiable 
influence over individuals, who overweight such evidence when calculating the probability 
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of an event occurring.  Professor Christine Jolls has discussed how “events that are highly 
available are typically ones that have received a great deal of media attention, and are often 
ones that are intrinsically vivid or memorable, or have a technological nature.”103  Rational 
individuals would not adjust probability calculations based on anecdotal evidence beyond 
their numerical weight within the quantitative data.   
Individuals also exhibit overconfidence when predicting their own future, in that “they 
overestimate their positive traits, abilities, skills, and likelihood of experiencing positive 
events, while they underestimate their vulnerability to certain risks.”104  A rational individual 
would view the future more skeptically, focusing on the quantitative evidence.  
Overconfidence bias “thrives in the business community, including among investors and 
corporate managers.”105 
Bounded willpower means that individuals often disregard their own long-term self-
interests.  Using cocaine despite knowing that it substantially increases the risk of heart 
attacks, strokes, and seizures,
106
 or overeating despite a propensity for heart disease and 
diabetes, represents just two examples.
107
   
Bounded self-interest captures the idea that individuals “may aspire toward benevolence 
in accordance with some religious or social norm of fairness even though such behavior 
deviates from the tenets of wealth maximization.”108  Separating bounded self-interest from 
rationality is no easy task, particularly beyond the short-term, since acting as a decent human 
being can assist in accumulating wealth.  As just one example, undertakings might curtail 
short-term profit maximization to invest in good-will for the sake of higher profits later.
109
 
Critics of using behavioral economics to analyze monopolization claims have argued that 
the theory is indeterminate, not least because it offers no guidelines for assessing the net 
effect of how various heuristics interact both within a dominant firm and between 
competitors.
110
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In each of the subsequent chapters, I will explore whether behavioral economics either 
supplements or contradicts policy prescriptions and legal standards developed by NPT.  If 
appropriate, I also will consider whether the alleged indeterminacy of behavioral economics 
limits its practical use.  Having defined NPT, I now turn to how it has shaped the legal 
concept of abuse of dominance. 
III. The Effect of Neoclassical Price Theory on the Conduct Element of Abuse 
The conceptual framework used to prohibit exclusionary conduct in both the U.S. and EU 
consists of two elements, a structure element and an abuse element.  Both jurisdictions require 
a plaintiff alleging monopolization first to define a market and to establish dominance, or 
market power.  The plaintiff then must demonstrate an abuse that excludes rivals by means 
other than merit competition.  This thesis will focus on the conduct or abuse element because 
of the uncontroversial assertion that Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) has influenced the 
structure element.   
In defining markets, U.S. and EU antitrust agencies examine demand substitution factors, 
or “customers’ ability and willingness to substitute away from one product to another in 
response to a price increase”.111  More specifically, the agencies apply the hypothetical 
monopolist test, which attempts to determine to which products customers would switch, if 
any, in response to a small but significant, non-transitory increase in price (SSNIP), usually 
around 5%.
112
  They thus attempt to trace what happens in a market moving toward 
monopolistic conditions. 
In 2010, Professors Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro proposed an alternative filter to 
defining markets to identify troublesome mergers.
113
  Professors Farrell and Shapiro 
questioned the efficacy of defining markets given a multitude of differentiated products in and 
around them, particularly because categorizing such products regularly involves “artificial 
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line-drawing” that can produce haphazard results.114  Their alternative approach compares 
“the loss of direct competition between the merging parties, which creates upward pricing 
pressure,” to “marginal-cost savings from the merger, which create (offsetting) downward 
pricing pressure”.115  If the interaction between diversion ratios116 — which trace the 
substitution of products after adjustments to price — and marginal cost efficiencies — which 
record the decrease in costs that vary with output because of alterations to labor and capital — 
produces upward pricing pressure, then the competition authority should evaluate the merger 
more closely.
117
  The risk of monopolization has increased.  Both diversion ratios and 
marginal costs are precepts derived by working within NPT models. 
In examining market structure, the EU Commission similarly, though more generally, has 
assessed the competitive constraints imposed by existing and potential competitors, both to 
define the relevant market and to establish dominance.  Dominance means the ability 
“profitably [to] increas[e] prices above the competitive level for a significant period of 
time.”118  This definition precisely matches the one provided by NPT. 
After defining the market, both EU and U.S. competition authorities then turn to market 
share figures as a “useful first indication,”119 or proxy, for market power.  Absent NPT, the 
exercise of determining market power would not focus so predominantly on price
120
 ― 
specifically, on price movements and substitution along a given demand curve, and on the 
ability of the dominant undertaking to maintain prices above costs or the competitive level, 
given its supply curve. 
The conduct inquiry features a more checkered history, in that NPT has exerted less, 
though still prominent, influence over the process of finding an abuse.  In the early stages of 
monopolization enforcement in both the U.S. and EU, conduct considered immoral, 
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insufficiently industrial, and merely exclusionary all counted as an abuse.
121
  NPT originally 
distilled non-collusive anticompetitive acts to dominant firm behavior that lowered either 
productive or allocative efficiency.
122
  A more intricate definition (although not a test for 
liability) would consider anticompetitive those exclusionary practices that materially weaken 
competition or lower efficiency, while ultimately raising prices — so long as enforcement 
does not curtail productive investment.
123
  Weakened competition will affect other parameters 
of consumer welfare such as variety and quality.   
A price objective finds expression in modern EU antitrust enforcement.  The 
anticompetitive foreclosure doctrine exemplifies the importance of this target.  The Guidance 
Paper setting-out the enforcement priorities of the European Commission in abuse of 
dominance cases distinguishes between simple foreclosure, or the elimination of rivals, and 
anticompetitive foreclosure, or the weakening or elimination of existing or potential rivals that 
“adverse[ly] impact[s] on consumer welfare”.124  By “consumer welfare,” the Commission 
mentioned not only “higher price levels,” but also conduct that “limit[s] quality or reduc[es] 
consumer choice.”125  Immediately after expanding the concept of consumer harm, however, 
the Commission defines anticompetitive foreclosure as the exclusion or weakening of rivals 
such that “the dominant undertaking is likely to be in a position to profitably increase prices 
to the detriment of consumers.”126   
While quality and choice, as products of the interaction between demand and supply, also 
represent variables for which NPT accounts, identifying the existence or prospect of higher 
consumer prices as the defining difference between simple foreclosure and anticompetitive 
foreclosure reflects the preeminent value that consumers place on price levels.
127
  After all, 
greater efficiency and lower prices can exclude rivals.  Only when exclusion produces the 
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opposite effect, or perhaps independently weakens the other parameters of welfare, does NPT 
support intervention. 
For price abuses, United States federal courts mostly have demonstrated a willingness to 
find higher prices anticompetitive only if they initially fail a cost test.  A cost test identifies 
abusive conduct as inefficient conduct that likely will produce higher prices.  In the predation 
context, requiring proof of recoupment ensures that lower prices alone do not prompt liability.  
For non-price abuses, federal appellate courts closely have examined whether the challenged 
conduct likely will produce higher prices, as determined by the extent of market power and 
entry barriers.  After concluding that a practice qualifies as unmeritorious competition, this 
inquiry frequently is dispositive. 
Practices that do not appear likely to result in higher prices often will fail the antitrust 
injury requirement.  To collect treble damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act, and thus to 
succeed in establishing a monopolization claim under § 2 of the Sherman Act, all plaintiffs 
must prove antitrust injury.  Antitrust injury is “injury of the type the antitrust laws were 
intended to prevent”.128  In the context of predatory pricing, lower prices above cost “do not 
threaten competition” and “cannot give rise to antitrust injury.”129     
Notwithstanding the influence of NPT, the abuse element in both jurisdictions also 
reflects the impact of other legal principles and other methods of economic analysis, as 
demonstrated by the fact that the “§ 2 monopolizing offense requires something more than the 
existence of monopoly power.”130  Simply by assessing whether the relevant market structure 
more closely resembles perfect competition or monopoly, a policymaker following NPT 
might pursue damage claims against the mere existence of dominance.  Aside from any 
wealth transfer effects caused by monopolization, a competitive market produces greater 
efficiency than a monopolized market.  For this reason, societies generally enjoy greater 
overall welfare with competitive markets.   
The Austrian school of economics has helped persuade competition authorities that, even 
from a purely economic perspective, the “something more” that § 2 and A.102 require, in 
addition to monopoly power, is “an exclusionary practice”.131  Given a dynamic view of 
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competition, monopoly alone does not necessarily produce an overall fall in welfare relative 
to the “but-for” world of increasing existing competition.  In certain instances, the acumen 
applied and the investment incurred to achieve monopoly actually can drive the creation of 
wealth and consumer welfare.
132
 
Having briefly sketched the influence of NPT over defining the economic harm that 
monopolization enforcement targets, and over the factors considered to identify such harm, I 
discuss below how legal principles necessary for effective adjudication also have affected the 
development of NPT. 
IV. Categorical Thinking 
I have focused on predatory pricing in this thesis because if Neoclassical Price Theory 
(NPT) cannot explain and provide practical advice on how to address this abuse, which 
forecloses rivals through lower prices and harms consumers through higher prices,
133
 then it 
likely contributes minimally to a proper understanding of monopolization law.  Other 
anticompetitive practices feature additional means, other than by adjusting prices, to foreclose 
and harm consumers, though such practices often fit within the NPT conceptual framework.   
Bundled discounts damage consumers by lowering, and then raising, prices, similar to 
predation, but mixed bundling also features characteristics of tying practices, by forcing or 
coercing the purchase of an unwanted product.  Particularly since appellate courts have been 
debating whether to treat mixed bundling like predatory pricing or tying, I additionally have 
examined and compared both practices, attempting to explicate further the influence and 
explanatory power of NPT over abuses that ostensibly raise independent theoretical sources of 
anticompetitive harm.   
Given the insular nature of the Ph.D. project, and the significant number of reported U.S. 
appellate cases on each abuse, I had to draw the line somewhere.  A more expansive project 
also might consider loyalty rebates, given that they too coerce and foreclose by lowering 
prices.  Exclusive dealing likewise can resemble loyalty rebates, mixed bundling, and tying in 
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that it can produce the exact same foreclosure effects,
134
 though without employing the price 
mechanism. 
Price squeeze claims and refusals to deal fall into a different category of abuse.  Price 
squeeze claims can look like predation, given that the practice excludes by manipulating 
prices, by charging too low prices in the downstream or retail market, combined with 
charging too high prices in the upstream or wholesale market.  Yet property rights and 
investment incentives in the upstream market also have influenced the development of price 
squeeze law, and rightfully so.  Courts and competition authorities have turned to refusal to 
deal doctrine for partial guidance.
135
  The U.S. Supreme Court has said that if a dominant 
undertaking can refuse to deal with a competitor in the upstream market, then it can charge 
whatever price it wishes to that competitor in the upstream market,
136
 assuming that price 
does not constitute a constructive refusal to deal.  Setting aside the merits of that argument, it 
deserves separate treatment from a thesis focused on NPT.  The property interests inherent to 
a refusal to deal claim also justify weighing competing and independent policy considerations. 
The EU debate about the reform of A.102 has centered on the extent to which courts and 
competition authorities should evaluate exclusionary practices by looking more closely at the 
effects that the challenged conduct has, or will have, on consumers.
137
  The alternative method 
considered often attempts to determine liability primarily based on the form that the 
challenged conduct takes.  The timing and causal relationship between the disputed conduct 
that courts and competition authorities review, and the market effects of such conduct, 
materially influence the substance of this debate.  Courts and competition authorities first 
might ask whether the conduct already has produced competitive effects, characteristic of ex 
post control.  Or courts and competition authorities might have to examine whether the 
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challenged conduct has yet to produce such effects, implicating ex ante control.
138
  Much 
monopolization law involves ex ante review, or examining market conditions and the 
challenged conduct to predict, as accurately as possible, the consequences for consumers over 
the short-, medium-, and long-term.  Only easy cases involve actual competitive effects. 
Judges and competition authorities have relied so heavily on the principle tenets of NPT 
to evaluate potentially anticompetitive conduct because NPT assists in predicting competitive 
effects, or at least helps to identify the likely consequences for certain abuses.  The form 
versus effects debate arguably turns on whether judges or competition authorities should 
assess liability by classifying certain acts as falling within recognized categories of conduct 
that consistently have harmed consumers, or whether they more closely should examine the 
extent to which the challenged conduct actually has, or likely will, harm consumer 
interests.
139
  An effects-based approach closely reviews existing market conditions to reach an 
informed judgment about how the challenged conduct has influenced, or will influence, price, 
quality, and innovation. 
Professor Lianos has argued that effects analysis need not require empirical evidence of 
actual anticompetitive effects: “It may instead take the form of a theory of consumer harm, 
which aims to establish a relationship [] between the specific practice and potential consumer 
detriment.”140  To qualify as effects analysis, the judge or competition authority still needs to 
align the theory and terms of causality with existing economic evidence and conditions in the 
relevant market.
141
 
Legally evaluating exclusionary practices must involve a degree of categorical thinking.  
To identify anticompetitive effects, the judge or competition authority already must have 
formulated a reliable narrative of consumer harm.  NPT has supplied theories, conceptual 
categories of conduct, and examples depicting how an undertaking possessing market power 
can raise prices and harm consumers.  For example, dominant undertakings might engage in 
predatory pricing, mixed bundling, or tying practices.  The existence of such categories 
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permits analytical shortcuts that support a reasoned, logical assessment of the challenged 
practices, while further enabling efficient factual investigations.
142
 
A pure effects-based approach might not bother to classify conduct as falling within a 
pre-existing category that presumably or generally harms consumers.  Instead, an economist 
simply might examine price or output levels and attempt to establish a correlation between the 
challenged conduct and subsequent levels of lower output and higher prices.  Without pre-
existing knowledge of how certain conduct likely harms consumers, the economist seeking to 
maximize welfare would have to isolate the challenged conduct from all the other 
microeconomic and macroeconomic influences on price levels in the relevant market.  The 
economist then would have to ensure that the challenged conduct did not raise efficiency or 
otherwise benefit consumers by an amount that outweighed the price increase.  The 
information costs of gathering that data in individual cases could be prohibitive, or at least 
“set[] limits to the expansion of a full effects-based approach in Article 82.”143 
Ensuring that antitrust jurisprudence abides by the rule of law further curtails the 
application of a pure effects-based approach.  Even dominant undertakings must be able to 
ascertain the governing law before following it.  Fundamental notions of due process that 
have underpinned western judicial systems for millennia would prohibit a competition law 
regime that penalized dominant undertakings for engaging in conduct that harms consumers, 
determined after-the-fact.
144
  Dominant undertakings never would know whether mundane 
business decisions might lead to antitrust liability.   
At a minimum, the rule of law requires that dominant undertakings must be able to 
determine, prior to making decisions, whether an act might violate the antitrust laws.  
Categorical thinking ― or designating certain types of conduct as potentially violating the 
antitrust laws, while applying the same rules to analogous cases ― represents an integral 
requirement not only for the proper administration of the antitrust laws.  Such a requirement 
more basically represents a minimum condition for market economies to function adequately 
at all.
145
  Little investment of time and money would occur if every act of a successful 
business risked antitrust liability.  “The calls for an ‘effects-based’ economic approach do not 
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question the need to classify or create categories of abuses.”146  Judges, enforcement officials, 
practitioners, and academics (not necessarily in that order) may revise those categories 
“according to empirical findings and the evolution of economic theory”.147  Professor Lianos 
has argued that the amendable nature of antitrust categories separates an effects-based 
approach from a form-based alternative.
148
 
Of the existing general standards proposed to evaluate exclusionary conduct, the rule of 
reason most closely resembles an effects-based, or purely economic, approach.
149
  To 
determine liability, the rule of reason balances the anticompetitive harm caused by the 
challenged conduct against any corresponding benefits or efficiencies passed-on to 
consumers.  Implicit to this welfare balancing method, however, the judge or competition 
agency still must classify the challenged conduct to assess the degree of consumer harm.
150
   
A structured rule of reason approach to tying, for example, might consider elements of 
the quasi-per se rule, such as market power, forcing, and the existence of anticompetitive 
foreclosure on the harm-side of the ledger.  To take another example, courts applying the rule 
of reason to exclusive dealing arrangements have asked whether the condition will 
substantially lessen competition in the relevant market.
151
  To know whether the condition 
substantially lessens competition, the judge or competition authority must understand that 
such contract provisions exclude by foreclosing downstream market access to upstream 
competitors, rather than, for example, lowering prices to levels that retail competitors cannot 
match.  Only then can the judge or competition authority assess whether the foreclosure share 
secured by the exclusive dealing arrangement outweighs any actual or likely efficiencies 
produced, thereby causing anticompetitive effects. 
In assessing anticompetitive foreclosure, many of the factors that the Commission 
considers ― such as the strength of the dominant position, the existence of barriers to entry 
and expansion, the position of competitors and customers, the percentage of total sales 
affected, and evidence of actual foreclosure
152
 ― relate to the structure of the market and thus 
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are relevant to all the separate categories of abuse.
153
  But those factors can operate differently 
depending on the abuse under review.  In determining whether a predation scheme 
substantially lessens competition, a judge or competition authority may consider the factors 
listed above as helpful in assessing the likelihood of recoupment.  In a tying or bundling case, 
those factors might help reveal the extent of forcing or coercion present.  Or they might 
indicate the likelihood that the foreclosure of competitors actually harms consumers.  The key 
point is that categorical thinking remains integral to evaluating exclusionary conduct properly 
under any standard, whether a structured rule of reason, substantially lessening competition, 
or anticompetitive foreclosure. 
Judges and competition authorities nevertheless should attempt to devise legal tests that 
treat similar conduct alike, another principle tenet of the rule of law.  If a diversified 
monopolist could achieve anticompetitive foreclosure by either tying or bundling, or by 
loyalty rebates or exclusive dealing, and the monopolist knows that prospective plaintiffs will 
have greater difficulty satisfying the legal standard for mixed bundling relative to tying, and 
for loyalty rebates relative to exclusive dealing, then the monopolist will favor bundling 
practices and loyalty rebates.  That monopolist will escape legal liability more frequently than 
a monopolist in another market that institutes a tying or exclusive dealing arrangement, even 
though both sets of practices harm consumers similarly and achieve the same effect.  Antitrust 
jurisprudence should not permit some monopolists to increase market power relative to others 
predominantly based on the legal tests applied by courts.
154
 
Certain practices may harm consumers more than others, warranting a broader test.  One 
could argue that principle applies to tying relative to mixed bundling because tying involves 
forcing, while mixed bundling employs lower prices to coerce consumers, who always retain 
the option of buying only the linking product.  Some packaged discounts, however, due to 
their extent and to existing market conditions, may exert a level of coercion roughly 
equivalent to forcing.  Under those circumstances, judges and competition authorities should 
not treat mixed bundling more leniently than tying, thereby creating a legal loophole for 
dominant undertakings with skilled counsel to exploit.  Such loopholes harm consumers by 
funneling anticompetitive exclusionary conduct to legally favored practices, thereby 
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increasing the incidence of it.  The consistent application of the antitrust laws will result in 
more competitive markets and lower market-wide prices. 
As the debate over form- versus effects-based approaches to exclusionary practices 
continues to evolve, the contentious issues that likely will arise often will relate to the 
boundaries of, or safe harbors applied to, the different categories of abuse, rather than to the 
wisdom of searching for effects as such. 
V. Outline 
The thesis consists of four substantive chapters, in addition to this Introduction and a 
Conclusion.  The first substantive chapter considers U.S. predatory pricing law.  I find that 
Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) conceptually justifies all the relevant economic factors 
considered in U.S. predation analysis, but it does not explain the fall in plaintiffs’ success rate 
over the last 20 years.   
In the second chapter, I consider EU predation law and find that the same NPT principles 
govern EU predation enforcement, despite a willingness to consider predation claims at prices 
above the average variable costs, but below the average total costs, of the dominant 
undertaking.  Despite the additional liability that this test allows, EU Institutions have decided 
a limited number of predation claims.  This suggests that non-NPT factors have influenced 
enforcement in the EU as well. 
The third chapter examines the evolution of tying doctrine in the EU and US from a 
quasi-per se test to a structured rule of reason, or de facto merger review.  NPT explains the 
relevant legal and economic considerations that have animated tying jurisprudence.  They 
include: (1) market power as a source of coercion, (2) other forms of coercion generated by 
tying products together, (3) the demand and supply considerations that determine whether 
separate products exist, and (4) anticompetitive foreclosure. 
The fourth chapter initially assesses bundling as a type of predation, and then turns to 
analyzing it as a type of tying.  Finding the practice conceptually closer to tying, I recommend 
a legal test based on similar factors.  However, I also suggest implementing market share safe 
harbors that eliminate from consideration discounts that do not risk dominance in the linked 
market.  I further find irreparable fault with the discount attribution standard as the sole test 
for liability under NPT. 
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CHAPTER 2: U.S. PREDATORY PRICING LAW & ECONOMICS 
 
I. Introduction 
This chapter seeks to test the hypothesis that by adopting the basic principles of 
Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) as the predominant analytical framework through which to 
evaluate predatory pricing claims, United States federal appellate judges have lowered the 
probability of plaintiffs winning those claims. 
To recap, NPT posits that suppliers act exclusively to maximize profits, “that demand 
curves slope downward, that an increase in the price of a product will reduce the demand for 
its complement, [and] that resources gravitate to the areas where they will earn the highest 
return”.1  NPT applies the microeconomic models of perfect competition and monopoly to 
analyze monopolistic conduct, while focusing on the various determinants of price.
2
  The 
inefficiency and higher prices created by market power justifies government involvement in 
dominant firm behavior.
3
 
All major schools of antitrust thought have adopted NPT as the relevant theory through 
which to evaluate anticompetitive conduct, to which each adds various assumptions.  In 
response to appellate court decisions that ignored the implications of competitive conditions 
and the absence of market power,
4
 the Chicago School argued that markets tend toward 
                                                 
1
 Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 928 (1979) (then Professor 
Posner did not use the term “Neoclassical Price Theory” (NPT) but rather “price theory”); ROBERT H. BORK, THE 
ANTITRUST PARADOX 90-133 (1978) (cited by Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. 
REV. 213, 215 n.17, 226 (1985), available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1396788 
(Professor Hovenkamp also discusses the “neoclassical market efficiency model,” which “refers to the price theory 
of the Chicago School”)).  To my knowledge, Professor Lianos was the first to discuss “neoclassical price theory”.  
Ioannis Lianos, “Lost in Translation?” Toward a Theory of Economic Transplants, Jean Monnet Working Paper 
08/09 (2009) at 4, 26, 31, 37, 39-40, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1485378; see also Ioannis Lianos & Abel 
Matteus, Antitrust In the New U.S. Administration: A Transatlantic View, Release Two, The GCP Online Magazine 
for Global Competition Policy (January 2009) at 33-34, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1399693.  For a criticism of price theory in the tying context, 
see Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics: Farewell to the Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. PA. 
L.R. 1, passim (1997).  For additional mention of price theory, see Roger Van den Bergh & Peter Camesasca, 
EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW & ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 87-88 (2d ed. 2006); GIORGIO 
MONTI, EU COMPETITION LAW 24, 26, 125, 128 (2007); Nicholas Economides & Ioannis Lianos, The Elusive 
Antitrust Standard on Bundling in Europe and in the United States in the Aftermath of the Microsoft Cases, 76(2) 
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 486, 542 (2009) (also challenging it); LIZA LOVDAHL GORMSEN, A PRINCIPLED 
APPROACH TO ABUSE OF DOMINANCE IN EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW, passim (2010). 
2
 See the discussion under “Price Theory” in the Introduction, supra, pp. 3-7. 
3
 William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The 
Chicago / Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 20 (2007). 
4
 William H. Page, The Chicago School And The Evolution Of Antitrust:  Characterization, Antitrust Injury, And 
Evidential Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1274 (1989). 
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efficiency, that the motive to earn profits supercharges competition,
5
 ensuring the transitory 
nature of market imperfections,
6
 and “that judicial enforcement should proceed cautiously, 
lest it mistakenly proscribe behavior that promotes consumer welfare”.7  Moreover, the 
Chicago School recommended enforcement only when purported exclusionary practices 
reduced productive and allocative efficiency, not when such practices transferred wealth 
from consumers to producers, leaving total wealth unchanged.
8
  Chicago models that draw 
heavily from NPT “have become widely accepted as the conceptual basis for antitrust law,”9 
at least in the United States. 
The Harvard School originally expressed a more skeptical view towards the robustness of 
competition, acknowledging the deleterious competitive effects of product differentiation and 
concentrated market structures.  The absolute number of firms in a market and entry barriers 
matter, as “new entry [does] not [necessarily] discipline anticompetitive practices in 
concentrated markets”.10   
Post-Chicago scholars successfully have employed game theory to challenge the Chicago 
presumption that monopolists have no incentive to engage in anticompetitive practices.
11
  
They similarly have stated that competition does not necessarily prevent or remedy market 
failure, but have gone even further in arguing “that firms can therefore take advantage of 
[market] imperfections, such as information gaps or competitors’ sunk costs, to produce 
inefficient results even in ostensibly competitive markets”.12  The focus under NPT would be 
whether this alleged inefficiency produces higher market-wide prices and lower output, or 
reduces market-wide quality, variety, or innovation when price-effects do not predominate.  
The argument departs furthest from NPT if it dispenses with pricing power as a component 
of monopolization.  In the vast majority of market settings, anticompetitive effects still 
                                                 
5
 Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1701 (1986). 
6
 Page, supra n.4 at 1243. 
7
 Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REV. 219, 222-223 
(1995). 
8
 Page, supra n.4 at 1238. 
9
 Id. at 1307. 
10
 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE 36 (2005). 
11
 Hovenkamp, supra n.1 at 260-274; David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing 
Unilateral Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 73, 74 (2005). 
12
 Jacobs, supra n.7 at 222-23; see Hovenkamp, supra n.1 at 264-274. 
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depend on its existence.  The Post-Chicago School also has expressed more faith in the 
ability of government to identify and remedy anti-competitive practices.
13
 
The prevailing conception is that the application of NPT to monopolization law has 
curtailed enforcement,
14
 credit for which goes to both the Harvard and Chicago Schools.  
While Chicago scholars introduced price theory to monopolization law and popularized it, 
Harvard scholars and judges converted economic arguments into workable legal tests, 
effectively driving those arguments into the Federal Reporter.  They did so by devising the 
tests for both predation
15
 and antitrust injury,
16
 by fully supporting a legal wariness towards 
discouraging price-cutting,
17
 and generally by elevating hurdles to monopolization 
enforcement
18
 because of a shared skepticism toward government involvement in dominant 
firm behavior.
19
  Post-Chicago scholars have attempted to weaken this skepticism somewhat 
but have operated generally within the NPT framework, most persuasively by demonstrating 
how dominant firms can raise rivals’ costs and prices more generally.20  In developing this 
study, therefore, no coherent theoretical alternative to NPT exists in the case law, so 
distinguishing between schools when attempting to test the effect of NPT on plaintiffs’ 
probability of winning predation cases raises methodological challenges. 
After reviewing all reported U.S. Courts of Appeal and U.S. Supreme Court cases 
reaching the merits of predatory pricing since 1950, 62 in total,
21
 I conclude that NPT does 
not necessarily attempt to approximate “effects analysis,” or assessing the legality of 
dominant firm behavior by determining, after the fact, whether it actually produces positive 
or negative competitive effects.  Rather, the tools of NPT predominantly attempt to predict 
                                                 
13
 Jacobs, supra n.7 at 260-61.  For non-price effects to consumer welfare, see Guidance on the Commission’s 
Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant 
Undertakings (2009/C 45/02) at ¶¶ 5, 11, 19. 
14
 See, e.g., Page, supra, n.4 at 1233. 
15
 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Harvard & Chicago Schools & the Dominant Firm, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL 
OVERSHOT THE MARK 109, 110 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008). 
16
 Id. at 112. 
17
 Kovacic, supra n.3 at 21. 
18
 Id. at 15. 
19
 Id. at 80-81. 
20
 Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power 
Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986); Hovenkamp, supra n.10 at 38. 
21
 I included Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simons in the population set because, though a predatory bidding case, the 
Supreme Court viewed the exclusionary claim as close enough to predatory pricing to apply the same legal standard.  
549 U.S. 312, 315, 127 S.Ct. 1069, 1072 (2007) (Thomas, J.).  I express no substantive view on the Court’s 
decision, except to note that its effect will be to narrow predatory bidding claims.  I excluded other cases where the 
Court did not reach the merits of the predation claim. 
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competitive effects.
22
  To prove economic phenomena, economists usually engage in 
quantitative analysis or run regression analyses, selecting a dependent variable, representing 
the proposed effect or outcome of the hypothesis, and independent variables, representing 
proposed causes, or predictors, of the hypothesis.
23
  This chapter seeks to test the hypothesis 
that NPT has lowered the probability of plaintiffs winning predation cases by analyzing 
appellate reasoning and tallying results: by engaging in a qualitative study, which tests 
theories using language, but which also customarily utilizes quantitative methodology.  
Plaintiffs’ rate of success, as measured by whether the court upheld or dismissed the 
predatory pricing claim, constitutes the dependent variable.  The independent variables 
respectively consist of decision-making factors derived from NPT and analysis of the actual 
effects of the predatory pricing scheme.
24
 
NPT constitutes the first independent variable.  Three concepts derived from NPT — 
rationality, competition, and efficiency — conceptually justify the current predation test 
under U.S. antitrust law, which requires plaintiffs to demonstrate below-cost pricing
25
 and a 
dangerous probability of recoupment.  Rationality provides the intellectual support for the 
profit sacrifice test, another legal formulation occasionally used to detect predatory pricing.  
Competition and efficiency justify employing the market power concept to predation claims.  
Judges additionally have considered intent evidence, both objective and subjective, in 
evaluating predatory pricing, and some even have focused on it.  NPT ultimately supplied the 
governing proxy for intent, however: cost tests.   
Crucially, these various mechanisms to detect predation accurately identify 
anticompetitive conduct if — but only if — monopolists behave rationally and maximize 
profits, competition punishes monopolists who fail in this endeavor, and society approves of 
the resource allocation achieved when monopolists price at cost.  But legal tests based on 
costs, profit sacrifice, intent, and market power fail to measure actual anticompetitive effects.  
Instead, they assist judges in predicting whether an initial price-cut will harm consumers.  
Recoupment measures anticompetitive effects, though it involves applying NPT to assess 
                                                 
22
 See generally Page, supra n.4 at 1296. 
23
 For additional detail, see ANDY P. FIELD, DISCOVERING STATISTICS USING SPSS 7, 198 (3d ed. 2009). 
24
 See Appendix for full results. 
25
 Then Professor Frank Easterbrook warned against the perils — for law generally, and for antitrust law specifically 
— of providing insufficient benchmarks for legal standards.  Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. 
L.R. 1, 3 (1984). 
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future market conditions.  I selected these various indicators for likely effects to represent 
NPT in the case law. 
While NPT determines which competitive effects matter when evaluating predation 
claims, effects analysis, the second independent variable, still represents a distinct mode of 
decision-making.  Temporally, it is backward-looking.  Notwithstanding the evolution of 
economic theory and specifically of predatory pricing as a category of abuse, an effects 
analysis examines the actual consequences of the challenged conduct.  It assesses whether 
competitors responded to lower prices by exiting the market, after which the monopolist 
raised prices long enough to recover any losses sustained.  Effects analysis thus requires 
actual proof of — rather than relying on NPT to predict — consumer harm.   
If NPT accurately predicts competitive effects, then the two variables would coalesce, 
raising a multi-collinearity issue, but nevertheless justifying the influence of NPT over 
predatory pricing law.  After rendering judgment, however, courts do not verify the results 
predicted by NPT, which would take time and resources that courts lack, so empirical proof 
validating the accuracy of NPT in predation cases does not exist.
26
  The purpose of the 
second independent variable is not to provide or challenge that missing empirical support but 
to test whether plaintiffs are more likely to win cases in which appellate judges consider 
actual effects. 
To aid in evaluating the evidence, I divide the results temporally to reflect the influence 
of three events critical to the development of U.S. predatory pricing law.  In 1975, Phillip 
Areeda and Donald Turner published an article that established price theory as the conceptual 
foundation to evaluating predation.  They argued that liability should turn on whether the 
monopolist priced below marginal cost, or rather average variable cost because firms have 
great difficulty calculating marginal costs.
27
  Two U.S. Supreme Court judgments reflecting a 
skeptical view of the frequency and viability of predatory pricing — Matsushita28 in 1986 
and Brook Group
29
 in 1993 — mark the other two temporal dividers.   
                                                 
26
 Compare Eleanor M. Fox, The Politics Of Law And Economics In Judicial Decision Making: Antitrust As A 
Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554, 584 (1986), with Page, supra n.4 at 1300. 
27
 Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing And Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975); see also Kovacic, supra n.3 at 6 (discussing the impact of Areeda & Turner’s 
article); Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law & Economics of Predatory Pricing, in ANTITRUST LAW & ECONOMICS 116, 
131 (Keith N. Hylton ed., 2010) (discussing how AVC can fall well below MC at high output levels). 
28
 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (1986) (Powell, J.). 
29
 Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 113 S.Ct. 2578 (1993) (Kennedy, J.). 
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In terms of coding, I labeled the cases as influenced by NPT if the opinion incorporated 
the concept of market power while additionally considering cost evidence, recoupment, profit 
sacrifice, or objective intent.  Only four cases fall outside this category.  The population size, 
at 62 cases, is not large enough to permit a high degree of confidence concerning correlation, 
which usually requires at least 100 data points.  At less than 100 data points, minor 
differences significantly could skew results.  But the cases constitute the population of data 
points, not just a sample, which eliminates sampling error and thus contributes to greater 
accuracy.
30
 
The results demonstrate that plaintiffs’ probability of winning predatory pricing cases has 
fallen over time.  Prior to Areeda & Turner’s article, plaintiffs won 42.9% of predatory 
pricing cases; subsequently, they have won 23.6%.  Plaintiffs’ success rate after Matsushita 
also noticeably narrowed, from 30.3% to 20.7%.  That success rate fell most dramatically 
after Brooke Group — from 31.3% to 7.1%. 
Because appellate judges reasoned from NPT principles when formulating the legal test 
for predation, below-cost pricing and a dangerous probability of recoupment, these results at 
least partially reflect the impact of NPT on predatory pricing law.  The pre-existing legal 
standards applicable to all monopolization and attempted monopolization claims,
31
 
themselves a partial product of NPT, provided the original conceptual framework on which 
NPT has exerted influence. 
I labeled the cases as focused on (1) NPT considerations, (2) Effects, or (3) Intent.  
However, these categories overlap substantially.  Judges have employed NPT and Intent to 
help predict the effects of predatory pricing.  NPT has altered what effects matter, from 
simple exclusion to allocative efficiency and price levels.  To the extent that intent still 
matters, it must assist in proving the harm that NPT has determined predation poses. 
The results of the study do not support the hypothesis that plaintiffs’ probability of 
winning cases improves when judges consider the actual effects of predatory pricing, because 
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 Thanks to Dr. Wagner von Papp for raising the issue of sample size, and to Professor Lianos for mentioning that 
the analysis includes the entire population of data points. 
31
 According to the Tenth Circuit, “The elements of a monopolization case are (1) the possession of monopoly 
power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from 
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”  
Alternatively, “A case of attempted monopolization requires proof that defendant’s conduct was motivated by 
specific intent to monopolize and that a dangerous probability of monopoly existed.”  Pac. Eng’g & Prod. of Nev. v. 
Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 791 (10
th
 Cir. 1977) (Hill, J.) 
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plaintiffs won 20% of such cases compared to an overall success rate of 25.8%, though the 
difference is not overwhelming. 
After attempting this empirical, positive analysis, the last third of the paper constitutes a 
more theoretical inquiry focused on behavioral economics.  To my knowledge, no appellate 
predatory pricing decision explicitly has considered behavioral economic factors.
32
  I argue 
that behavioral economics, principally bounded rationality and bounded self-interest, can 
supplement rationality theory and game theory to enhance the attractiveness of predation 
schemes to dominant firm managers, to whom the rationality principle also applies. 
The chapter proceeds as follows.  Part II briefly sketches the historical development of 
predation law.  Part III sets-out the independent variables.  First, I justify the selection of five 
proxies for NPT: analysis of costs, recoupment, profit sacrifice, objective intent, and market 
power.  I also discuss subjective intent.  I then explain the relevance of the other independent 
variable, effects analysis.  In Part IV, I discuss research results.  I consider the applicability 
of behavioral economics to predation claims in Part V.  And in Part VI, I conclude. 
II. Brief Sketch of U.S. Predation Law Development33 
Modern predatory pricing law arguably developed in response to the Supreme Court’s 
1967 decision in Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co.
34
  The Court considered a 
predatory pricing claim asserted by the most dominant undertaking in the relevant market, 
whose market share, initially at 66.5%, fell to 45.3% by the end of the predation scheme.
35
  
Market power — defined by Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) as the ability to raise and 
maintain prices above the competitive level — either did not exist in the frozen pie market in 
Salt Lake City, or existed only faintly.  The Supreme Court even stated that the relevant 
market was “highly competitive”.36   
In all events, the parties that allegedly engaged in predation did not wield market power: 
their market shares rose only from (1) 16.4% to 29.4%,
37
 (2) 1.8% to 8.3%,
38
 and (3) 10.3% 
                                                 
32 But cf. United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 190 (3d Cir. 2005) (Weis, J.) (the Court determined that 
Dentsply’s pricing practices supported finding market power, particularly evidence that “Dentsply had a reputation 
for aggressive price increases in the market.”). 
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 I added this section based on a suggestion from Professors Jones & Kokkoris. 
34
 386 U.S. 685, 87 S.Ct. 1326 (1967) (White, J.) 
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 Id. at 689, 1329. 
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 Id. at 703, 1336. 
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 Id. at 692, 1330. 
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 Id. 
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to 12.1%.
39
  Such levels currently do not approach dominance anywhere in the world.  
Under existing monopolization law in most U.S. Circuits, these facts would warrant 
dismissal no matter the alleged abuse.  Entities that do not have market power cannot 
unilaterally raise prices, and absent that ability, price-cuts will produce additional consumer 
surplus. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found that all three defendants were pricing either 
below cost or well below cost;
40
 one had incurred “substantial losses,”41 and the other had 
recovered insufficient revenues to pay for long-run costs.
42
  In considering the effect of the 
below-cost pricing on competition in the relevant market, the Court did not discuss 
consumer welfare or the vitality of competition in a market where four undertakings took 
turns lowering prices.  Rather, the Court focused on how the price-cuts affected Utah Pie.  It 
stated that, to remain in business, Utah Pie had to cut prices in response,
43
 that failing to do 
so would have resulted in the loss of important customers,
44
 and that the predation therefore 
cost Utah Pie money, making it “a less effective competitive force”.45  Yet the Court also 
acknowledged that Utah Pie “constantly [was increasing] sales volume and continued to 
make a profit.”46   
The Supreme Court expressed an erroneous view of competition, as measured against the 
NPT concept of perfect competition, in which rivals vie to serve consumer interests at the 
lowest price and cost possible.  Also enigmatic to current monopolization law, the Court 
viewed predation as a type of business tort actionable if the plaintiff could prove the 
challenged price-cut harmed its competitive position.   
Justice Stewart, in dissent, highlighted the economic absurdity of the majority opinion, 
noting that the alleged predation improved competitive conditions,
47
 that liability protected 
“competitors, instead of competition,”48 that “lower prices are the hallmark of intensified 
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 Id. 
40
 Id. at 701, 1335. 
41
 Id. at 697, 1333. 
42
 Id. at 698, 1334. 
43
 Id. at 699, 1334. 
44
 Id. 
45
 Id. at 699-700, 1334. 
46
 Id. at 702, 1335. 
47
 Utah Pie, 386 U.S. at 705, 87 S.Ct. at 1337 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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competition,”49 and that Utah Pie was using the antitrust laws to protect itself “from 
effective price competition”.50  Justice Stewart thus set the stage for the Chicago and 
Harvard Schools to revolutionize antitrust law by more closely aligning its objectives to 
“consumer welfare”. 
Although Utah Pie technically has governed only predation supported by price 
discrimination,
51
 the Supreme Court held in Brooke Group that injury from primary line 
price discrimination “is of the same general character” as predation under Sherman Act § 2.  
The same legal test thus applies to both claims.
52
  U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal long ago 
failed to follow Utah Pie when addressing predation claims under Sherman Act § 2, and 
endorsed the more utilitarian view of competition supplied by NPT.  As another important 
difference, circuit courts demanded market power as a prerequisite to liability.  The courts 
further converged, to differing degrees, on a conception of the practice as profit sacrifice for 
the sake of recoupment. 
The principles and tests supplied by NPT exhibited a distinctive economic coherence 
relative to the holding in Utah Pie, which punished price-cuts that had little chance of 
raising prices.  The perceived objectivity of NPT further allowed judges to select among the 
interests of small and mid-sized companies, large firms, and consumers based on an 
esteemed and well-funded independent body of learning.  NPT assumed the role of legal 
precedent in the antitrust context. 
In considering a predation claim in 1974, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals remarked 
that monopolization requires intent and market power, and that below-cost pricing can 
satisfy the intent element.
53
  In reviewing an attempted monopolization claim involving 
predation in 1976, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals spoke more broadly about the 
elements required to establish predatory pricing, namely profit sacrifice and recoupment.
54
  
It stated that a plaintiff could satisfy both elements by demonstrating that defendant was 
pricing below average variable cost.
55
  Four years later, while not foreclosing alternative 
                                                 
49
 Id. at 706, 1337. 
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 A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1405 (7
th
 Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.). 
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methods of proof, the Ninth Circuit amended this rule by identifying below-cost pricing and 
market power as the requisite elements of predation.
56
  Market power satisfied the dangerous 
probability of success requirement.
57
  The following year, in William Inglis, the Ninth 
Circuit again altered the test, stating that while proof of market power can support a 
dangerous probability of success, the two concepts were not “equivalent”.58  It further held 
that although below-cost pricing strongly supports liability, plaintiffs can establish intent to 
predate by other means.
59
  While below average variable cost (AVC) pricing creates a 
presumption of liability, when the price-cut falls between AVC and average total cost 
(ATC), the plaintiff must demonstrate anticompetitive intent through additional evidence.
60
  
In 1983, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the very same liability test for 
predation,
61
 which also became the governing standard in the European Union.
62
 
Other U.S. Circuit Courts developed variations to the eventual cost and recoupment 
requirements.  As early as 1975, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that actionable 
predation required either (1) pricing below the AVC of the dominant undertaking, or (2) 
profit sacrifice plus the existence of significant entry barriers.
63
  In 1980, the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals, while endorsing marginal or AVC as “an extremely useful factor in 
determining the presence of predatory conduct,” was willing to consider “other factors” as 
well.
64
  In 1983, however, it defined predation as profit sacrifice “for the purpose of driving 
rivals from the market,” allowing the dominant undertaking to charge higher prices and 
recoup any losses sustained.
65
  The Seventh Circuit further limited its holding in Chillicothe 
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by requiring proof of pricing below an appropriate measure of cost as a prerequisite to 
establishing liability.
66
  Subjective intent no longer could substitute for this element.
67
   
The First,
68
 Second,
69
 and Third Circuits
70
 all adopted similar definitions of predation.  
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals was willing to presume the illegality of any price-cut 
below the reasonably anticipated AVC of the dominant undertaking.
71
  The First
72
 and 
Third
73
 Circuits similarly identified the costs of the dominant undertaking as the benchmark 
for analysis but refused to endorse AVC as the only measure of profit sacrifice.
74
  The 
Second Circuit test also called for market conditions that support recoupment in “the not-
too-distant future”.75  The First Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently held that price-cuts 
above ATC could not violate monopolization law.
76
 
Initially in Matsushita in 1986,
77
 and then in Brooke Group in 1993,
78
 the Supreme Court 
determined that the necessary elements to establish predation were pricing below an 
appropriate measure of cost and a dangerous probability of recoupment. 
III. The Independent Variables 
A. Neoclassical Price Theory 
Appellate judges have not mentioned the specific term “Neoclassical Price Theory” 
(NPT) when deciding predatory pricing cases.  To demonstrate the influence of NPT over 
predatory pricing law and to test NPT’s effect on the dependent variable — plaintiffs’ 
probability of winning predatory pricing cases — below I will attempt to establish how 
appellate judges, when considering predation claims, have applied NPT through the 
following five decision-making factors: 
(1) comparing the price level after a reduction to the costs of the monopolist, 
(2) consideration of the monopolist’s probability of recoupment, 
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(3) profit sacrifice by the monopolist, 
(4) examination of the monopolist’s objective intent when lowering prices, 
meaning how the surrounding market circumstances might have influenced a 
decision to cut prices, and 
(5) analysis of the market power wielded by the monopolist. 
1. Costs 
The Supreme Court in Brooke Group stated that every plaintiff “seeking to establish 
competitive injury resulting from a rival’s low prices must prove that the prices complained 
of are below an appropriate measure of [the] rival’s costs.”79  The requirement pre-dates 
Brooke Group, however.  Of sixty-two reported predatory pricing cases at the U.S. federal 
appellate level dating back to 1950, fully sixty-one considered the defendant’s costs relevant 
to determining liability.  Cost analysis embodies two fundamental tenets of Neoclassical 
Price Theory (NPT) — rationality and efficiency.  This section also considers the relevance 
of cost tests given low marginal costs or “free” goods. 
(i) Rationality 
NPT posits that firms operate to maximize profits and that if firms fail to pursue this 
objective, competition will ensure their exit from the market.  Pricing below cost is irrational: 
“A price below average variable cost, and for that matter, a price below average total cost, 
could not possibly be sustained in the long run since, to survive, firms must cover total costs 
in the long run.”80  “At a price less than average variable cost [AVC] the firm is earning no 
return and could incur fewer losses by ceasing operations.”81  A profit-maximizing firm 
voluntarily would sustain losses by pricing below cost only if “the promise of future 
monopoly gains made such a tactic profitable from a long-run perspective.”82  Reformulating 
the principle, the Fifth Circuit has stated that, at a price below AVC, 
[T]he firm is suffering a loss on every unit of output it produces and sells, and 
its behavior is rational only if it hopes by engaging in this conduct to drive its 
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competitors from the market and thereby gain monopoly powers that will 
enable it to charge a monopoly price in the future.
83
 
Conversely, by pricing above AVC, firms act in “an economically rational manner,” 
deriving an “immediate economic benefit from [] sales,” and consequently do not price 
illegally.
84
  Cost tests demonstrate the legal usefulness of examining the economic rationality 
of a dominant undertaking, in that neither competitive firms nor monopolists generally have 
any profit maximizing reason to price below AVC unless engaged in predatory pricing.
85
  A 
rational firm not so engaged would cease operations rather than price below that level.    
Cost tests can indicate the intent of a dominant undertaking.  When maximizing profits by 
pricing above cost, price-cuts closely resemble competition on the merits, though dominant 
undertakings always will want to raise prices after a price-cut.  Acting against self-interest, 
on the other hand, creates an objective concern about the intent of the dominant undertaking.  
Above-cost price-cuts do not suggest an ability or imminent necessity to raise prices again.  
When a dominant undertaking lowers price below cost, it could have earned much higher 
revenues.  The existing market power of the dominant undertaking, coupled with exclusion 
effectuated by below-cost pricing, provides a compelling indication of the future direction of 
prices.  Maintaining prices will result in continued losses and bankruptcy. 
Cost tests embody NPT by integrating the line between economic rationality and legality, 
though on an inverse basis: rational pricing, defined as maximizing profits above cost or at 
least minimizing losses, prevents liability; while irrational pricing below cost elicits a 
recoupment analysis to gauge consumer harm. 
(ii) Efficiency 
Pricing at an appropriate measure of cost achieves the efficiency contemplated by NPT in 
perfect competition.  From a static perspective and in terms of maximizing efficiency, pricing 
at cost constitutes the economic ideal for society, in that society cannot make anyone better 
off without making someone else worse off: 
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[M]arket price reflects what consumers are willing to pay for the last unit of 
output; marginal cost reflects the full current cost of resources needed to 
produce it; a higher price would result in a reduction in output and thus 
deprive some buyers of a commodity for which they were willing to pay the 
cost of production.
86
 
Though willing to consider predatory price-cuts above marginal cost, the Ninth Circuit 
has acknowledged that marginal cost pricing promotes allocative efficiency: “[P]ricing [at 
marginal cost] enables resources to be properly allocated because the price accurately 
‘signals’ to the consumer the [short-term] social cost of the product.”87  Certain U.S. Circuit 
Courts have refused to prohibit prices above the short-term ideal because they have hesitated 
to create inimical incentives, albeit short-term, for monopolists.  Normatively speaking, 
society wants dominant undertakings to price at AVC, so improving short-term efficiency 
should not risk treble damages.  A measure of short-term efficiency under NPT thus creates a 
verifiable benchmark for liability. 
Monopolists, of course, do not operate under the constraints of perfect competition and 
generally price far above marginal cost.
88
  Inelastic demand, product differentiation, and 
entry barriers create market power that permits monopolists to price up-to the market demand 
curve above where marginal revenue equals marginal cost.  The absence of competition that 
supports this price generates inefficiency.  Notwithstanding the existence of market power 
and thus the applicability of the monopoly model,
89
 a marginal cost-based test — which 
because of the difficulty of measuring marginal costs, means an AVC test
90
 — requires rivals 
to operate as if the market were perfectly competitive. 
Competitors that lack attributes that make the monopolist dominant — such as IP rights 
or economies of scale or scope — still must be able to price at a proxy for the perfectly 
competitive price, where even the monopolist incurs losses by not recovering any fixed costs.  
To foster short-term efficiency, therefore, the test requires rivals to compete at a level of 
efficiency that NPT acknowledges rarely, if ever, exists, and at which the dominant 
undertaking otherwise would not operate. 
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The Second Circuit, quoting Areeda & Turner, has declared that monopolists may price 
down to marginal cost because at any price above that level, “only less efficient firms will 
suffer larger losses per unit of output.”91  “Marginal cost pricing,” concluded the Second 
Circuit, “fosters competition on the basis of relative efficiency.”92  The Seventh Circuit has 
declared that “rules requiring price floors higher than short-run marginal cost will tend to 
preserve inefficient rivals or attract inefficient entry.”93  According to this view, excluding 
less efficient competitors by lowering price above marginal cost therefore constitutes merit 
competition. 
Conceptually, such demanding expectations of rivals converts the competitive process in 
monopolized, or nearly monopolized, markets from competition in the market to competition 
for the market, because only another undertaking with the capacity of the monopolist, or 
near-monopolist, would be able to match the dominant undertaking’s competitive 
advantages.  This observation obviously would apply if existing market conditions efficiently 
could accommodate only one undertaking.  Requiring an ability to meet competition at the 
most efficient price raises entry barriers by increasing the financing, scale, and acumen 
necessary to confront a monopolist immediately from the moment of entry.  The rule does 
not permit gradual market success and growth to support a build-up to competition.
94
 
(iii) Low-Marginal Cost or “Free” Goods or Services 
The NPT tenets of rationality and efficiency conceptually support the application of cost 
tests to price-cuts in many industries and markets, though other factors derived from NPT also 
could determine competitive effects.  Where marginal costs approach zero, such as in 
software markets or other markets protected by intellectual property rights, or where the 
dominant undertaking offers a product for free, cost tests customarily applied may reveal less 
information about the intent and efficiency of the dominant undertaking.   
By pricing close to zero, the dominant undertaking will be incurring less short-term 
losses to exclude rivals.  It therefore will be pricing within one NPT conception of rationality.  
Other than signaling a necessity eventually to raise prices to average total cost (ATC) or long-
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run average incremental cost (LRAIC), continuing operations even at a minimal price does 
not cost more than shutting-down.  A court would have difficulty detecting from the 
extremely low price an irrational practice to exclude efficient rivals.  The most efficient price 
possible, or the perfectly competitive price, also more closely approximates zero.  Low 
pricing generates efficiency and bolsters consumer surplus.  It may increase market share, but 
so long as the price remains low, it does not necessarily increase market power. 
Independently, a price close to zero does not prevent as-efficient rivals from competing in 
the short-term.  Intellectual property rights may block them from matching the low costs of 
the dominant undertaking, but that advantage merely relates to the probability of recoupment.  
If a dominant undertaking reduces price below marginal costs in low marginal cost markets, 
then the customary predation test would apply.
95
 
As a rational, profit-maximizing reason for pricing at marginal cost, a dominant 
undertaking may be attempting to maximize the revenues from the alternative side of a two-
sided market.  Network effects, or economies of scale in consumption, typically operate in 
such markets, where distinct sets of consumers purchase separate goods or services on a 
unitary platform.
96
  The elasticity of demand of at least one side of the platform, and possibly 
both, will depend on demand and supply conditions on the other side, specifically the raw 
quantity of members or the intensity of use, which indicates market share.
97
  Such platforms 
set prices based on relative elasticities of demand, and the consumers who value the product 
or service the most often will pay a price that incorporates most of the costs of running and 
supplying both sides of the platform.
98
  Charging women cheaper drinks at bars or lower 
prices to join a dating service may increase, rather than depress, the willingness of men to pay 
higher prices at either establishment, and to buy more drinks at bars.
99
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Given two-sided markets, rational, profit-maximizing pricing might warrant pricing 
below marginal cost to one side of the market.  Two-sided markets provide a clever 
mechanism to price discriminate.  The platform provides a service that a group of consumers 
value at low prices, sometimes even below marginal cost, to maximize distribution.  Selling 
newspapers below the marginal costs of production, to increase circulation, may maximize 
profits because merchants value the increased sales generated through advertising far more 
than production costs, and far more than people value staying informed.
100
   
In the case of search engines and social networks, Google and Facebook provide their 
services for free.  Because such services are interactive, the platforms can collect information 
that consumers have revealed about their interests or identity relevant to their willingness to 
purchase other products or services.
101
  The platform then sells that information to merchants 
in the form of targeted advertisements to consumers based on their revealed preferences,
102
 
which increases the likelihood that the consumer will respond to the advertisement.  
Merchants are willing to pay a premium to advertise to likely customers as determined by 
what they say or write rather than a more random characteristic such as their interest in 
reading about local or world events. 
Not only can pricing below marginal cost to one side of a two-sided market represent 
rational or profit-maximizing pricing, but pricing above marginal cost to that side of the 
market actually may constitute irrational pricing.  This particularly might occur when the 
suppliers initially offered the product for free.  Many consumers would be unwilling to use 
Google or Facebook now if they were charged a membership or usage fee.
103
  The increase in 
revenues generated by charging a smaller pool of users the marginal cost of providing the 
service likely would fall short of the corresponding lower advertising premiums that 
merchants would be willing to pay to reach fewer consumers, who possibly reveal less about 
their individual demand preferences. 
The price below marginal cost to one side of the market does not necessarily represent an 
inefficient price either, since advertisers pay to cover both the variable and fixed costs of 
providing the platform.  The ostensible below-cost price need not sacrifice profits.  It rather 
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increases output and can generate economies of scale on the advertising side of the market.  In 
markets where intellectual property creates the foundation to dominance, such as in the 
internet search market, the marginal cost of expanding supply to consumers, in terms of 
updating the search algorithm, may approach zero.
104
  The short-term efficient price, in other 
words, approximates the alleged predatory price.
105
 
For at least the reasons of failing to indicate non-profit maximizing and inefficient pricing 
in two-sided markets, traditional cost tests inadequately detect predatory pricing.  They also 
do not account for the staggering consumer surplus that two-sided markets produce.  
Hundreds of millions, if not billions, of consumers, pay nothing for services to which most 
attach some value, as measured by their use.  Many merchants also still pay below what they 
would be willing to pay for mass targeted advertising.   
A zero price to consumers further can generate independent economic activity.  The fees 
that many consumers otherwise would have paid to Google or Facebook, they instead can use 
to purchase other products.  Advertising separately spurs additional sales, at least some of 
which never would have occurred.  Enabling economic activity produces jobs, salaries, and 
spending that circulates throughout an economy. 
2. Recoupment 
In addition to establishing pricing below an appropriate measure of cost, to win a 
predatory pricing suit, a plaintiff also must demonstrate a dangerous probability of 
recoupment.  Recoupment means that the monopolist must recover, by supra-competitive 
pricing, the investment in below-cost pricing.  “Recoupment is the ultimate object of an 
unlawful predatory pricing scheme; it is the means by which a predator profits from 
predation.”106  U.S. federal appellate judges regularly, though not comprehensively, have 
discussed recoupment throughout the period since 1950, specifically in forty-three of sixty-
two reported predatory pricing cases.  The doctrine of recoupment derives explanatory power 
from, and indeed exists because of, two principle tenets of Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT): 
competition and rationality. 
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(i) Competition 
Efficiency, one objective of NPT, hinges on the presence of competition.  When prices 
rise above the equilibrium level in perfectly competitive markets, existing rivals will expand 
production or potential rivals will enter those markets and produce the same product at a 
lower price or an innovative alternative that competes with the original — returning market 
prices to equilibrium.  Competition thus will preclude the anticompetitive effects of 
predatory pricing by preventing recoupment: 
Selling below cost [] to drive out a competitor is unprofitable even in the long 
run … The predator loses money during the period of predation and, if he tries 
to recoup it later by raising his price, new entrants will be attracted, the price 
will be bid down to the competitive level, and the attempt at recoupment will 
fail.
107
 
Note again, however, that Judge Posner here describes a competitive dynamic only 
possible absent durable market power and sizeable entry barriers.  Given the existence of 
competitive market conditions, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has agreed that 
recoupment is “uncertain, since supra-competitive prices will attract new entrants (or 
returning competitors).”108  The Second Circuit expressed an even deeper faith in market 
competition when it declared that monopoly “profits, of course, will invite new entry.”109 
In testing for recoupment, judges actually are examining which NPT model applies — 
whether the alleged monopolist operates alongside sufficiently weakened competition that 
rivals cannot expand production, and whether robust entry barriers exist, in which case the 
monopoly model more likely applies and recoupment is likely.  Or whether, because of 
sufficiently robust competition, existing rivals or entrants will boost production in response 
to price increases and thereby prevent recoupment, in which case the market more closely 
resembles perfect competition.
110
  The recoupment inquiry thus examines many of the same 
factors as a market power inquiry.  Recoupment can occur only when the dominant company 
can project market power into the future. 
Because the plaintiff generally already will have demonstrated that the alleged 
monopolist previously had maintained a high market share for several years, recoupment 
analysis often focuses on entry barriers: whether timely and effective entry will negate 
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recoupment.
111
  Unless barriers to entry exist, several circuits have assumed that competition 
will forestall recoupment: 
If it is easy to enter the circular distribution business, PNI’s scheme is doomed 
to failure: any attempt to recoup by charging supra-competitive prices after it 
has gained a monopoly simply will attract new (or old) distributors who will 
undercut PNI and force prices back down to competitive levels.
112
 
The Fifth Circuit has stated that “there must be evidence that the surviving monopolist could 
then raise prices to consumers long enough to recoup his costs without drawing new entrants 
to the market.”113  The Ninth Circuit similarly has dismissed a predatory pricing claim by 
holding that “the ease of entry into [the relevant market] and the number of potential 
participants on every level of it abundantly demonstrates that recoupment of the monopolist 
would never be possible.”114   
Indeed, the absence of entry barriers even pardons below-cost pricing.
115
  At the 
theoretical level, in assessing the likelihood of entry, Professor Monti has asked “whether a 
hypothetical market player would find entry profitable, taking into account the risks and costs 
of entry, the effects of entry on price, and the anticipated response of other firms in the 
market.”116  Competition authorities historically have determined that entry would prove 
“timely” if occurring within two to three years,117 though U.S. antitrust agencies more 
recently have refrained from explicitly selecting a window that qualifies.  Counteracting the 
exercise of market power “requires that the impact of entrants in the relevant market be rapid 
enough that customers are not significantly harmed” by the practice under review.118 
Yet even if entry barriers do not exist over an extended period, by significantly raising 
prices, monopolists need less of a window to recoup.  Entry barriers extend the period over 
which monopolists can recoup, and they thus increase the probability of recoupment 
occurring. 
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This analysis suggests that U.S. federal appellate courts err — even under principles of 
NPT — when focusing only on entry barriers to determine recoupment.  Other relevant 
factors include the extent of the profit sacrifice: the greater the profit sacrifice, the higher 
entry barriers must be to support recoupment.
119
  Recoupment also turns on whether existing 
competitors can expand production fast enough to counteract a monopolist’s attempt to 
increase prices and recoup.
120
  Whether the predation actually excludes competitors also 
matters, since their continued existence in the market might prevent price increases sufficient 
to recover initial price-cuts.  Recoupment further depends on the status of any competitors 
excluded.  If the dominant undertaking’s closest competitors remain in the market, 
recoupment becomes much more difficult.
121
  A preliminary finding of market power 
suggests, though does not establish, that existing competitors might lack the capacity to 
ramp-up production sufficiently to block recoupment. 
In markets characterized by differentiation, judges also need to consider whether rivals 
could reposition closely related products in response to attempted price increases by the 
monopolist.
122
  In clusters of only finely differentiated markets, an alleged monopolist less 
likely can recoup because potential competition more readily would restrain price increases.  
But an alleged monopolist more likely lacks significant market power when operating in only 
finely differentiated markets. 
(ii) Rationality 
Absent entry barriers, and if sufficiently healthy competition otherwise appears likely to 
survive the challenged price-cuts, then recoupment cannot occur.  Predatory pricing 
consequently would appear implausible because no rational, profit-maximizing monopolist 
would incur the losses that predatory pricing entails unless a reasonable probability of 
recoupment existed ex ante.
123
  Absent that “reasonable expectation of recovering, in the 
form of later monopoly profits, more than the losses suffered,” predatory pricing makes no 
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economic sense.
124
  Assuming a price below cost, evidence of recoupment explains the 
irrational — why a monopolist would “forgo profits that free competition would offer [].”125 
Prior to Brooke Group reaching the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit dismissed Brooke 
Group’s predatory pricing claim for failing to proffer “an economically rational basis” for 
recoupment, in that relying on an inherently unstable oligopoly to produce recoupment is 
“economically irrational”.126  Plaintiff argued that to relieve pricing pressure created by 
plaintiff developing generic cigarettes, Brown & Williamson offered consumers its own line 
at prices below average variable costs.  It did so to force plaintiff to increase generic cigarette 
prices and to “introduce oligopoly pricing in the economy segment”.127     
The Supreme Court itself also doubted the likelihood of recoupment, and thus the 
rationality of initially deciding to predate, based on market conditions existing at the time of 
the alleged predation.  Brown & Williamson had just one-ninth of the relevant market: While 
it would incur the profit sacrifice alone, it would recover only 11% of every dollar 
invested.
128
  This suggested that “most of the returns from [] predation would accrue to other 
firms.”129 
However, the Court examined the potential for recoupment only in the generic cigarette 
market, where output increased.
130
  It ignored the potential of earning long-term higher 
profits by altering the market structure and compressing the price difference between generic 
and branded cigarettes.  If the practice proved substantially profitable at the industry level, 
the Court also did not consider the compelling incentive that other oligopoly members 
henceforth would have had to reward Brown & Williamson in other ways to encourage the 
survival and prosperity of the group. 
Supreme Court precedent thus precludes U.S. federal appellate courts from sanctioning 
irrational pricing by a monopolist, at least partially determined by market conditions existing 
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at the time of predation.  To recover under the Sherman Act, the plaintiff must establish that 
the alleged predatory pricing scheme either maximized profits, or appeared likely to do so.  
Otherwise consumers benefit from monopolists pricing irrationally below cost or below a 
profit-maximizing level, without a reasonable prospect for recoupment.  In that sense, 
because of NPT, an irrational pricing scheme constitutes a defense to predatory pricing 
claims.
131
 
(iii) Low-Marginal Cost Products & Standard Setting 
Recoupment analysis involves different considerations when marginal costs are close to 
zero or when, to strengthen network effects in two-sided markets, undertakings provide goods 
or services for free.  Only intentionally pricing below cost or otherwise sacrificing profits 
implicates recoupment.  Losses determine the amount required to satisfy the concept.  In two-
sided markets, pricing below marginal cost on one side simply may redistribute the costs of 
running a platform to the side more willing to pay for the service offered to them.  
Recoupment occurs simultaneously on that side of the market. 
Outside the context of two-sided markets, a price even negligibly below marginal cost or 
average variable cost must increase in the future.  When prices again rise, plaintiffs should 
have an easier time establishing predation if marginal costs or average variable costs trend 
toward zero.  Recoupment would necessitate only a corresponding minimum price increase 
above marginal cost over a similar time period.  While low marginal costs thus can mitigate 
any profit sacrifice incurred, potentially increasing the incidence of predation, they also raise 
the likelihood of a court ultimately finding liability, since recoupment similarly would occur 
even at low prices. 
In non-technology markets, increasing capacity can require significant investment in both 
labor and capital.  Such investments make predation a more expensive and risky exclusionary 
tactic.  This is because, to succeed, recoupment must match losses, which can accumulate 
quickly.  The fact that undertakings can supply goods or services dependent on intellectual 
property at low marginal costs, by streaming software or reproducing it on discs, not only 
makes predating to defend a dominant position more cost-effective.  Low cost predation also 
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enhances the viability of attacking a dominant position,
132
 potentially increasing its 
vulnerability.  Assuming rivals could invent around the underlying intellectual property 
supporting dominance, no trivial task, pricing below marginal cost to supplant the output of a 
dominant undertaking may require little recoupment.
133
  Minimal profit sacrifice makes 
predation more appealing both to rational and boundedly rational managers.  In this context, 
courts would have to decide whether attempted monopolization to replace a monopolist 
benefits or harms consumers. 
Another context common to markets delineated by intellectual property rights where 
predation could prove profitable is the standard setting process.  Winning the support of a 
standard setting organization can guarantee recoupment by protecting monopoly profits for 
many years into the future, until a superior technology appears and earns the support of 
industry participants.  For rational and irrational reasons, any alternative would have to 
overwhelm the existing standard in terms of cost and performance before industry participants 
would consider adopting it.  Inertia stems from sunk costs, or the significant investment that 
industry participants incur to develop “products and technologies that conform to the 
standard”.134  This cost also dulls the incentives of the businesses or individuals most likely to 
have the expertise required to invent a replacement.  
During the period when a standard setting organization considers alternative 
technologies, predating could present a lucrative monopolization strategy.  The price to 
license a technology supporting a standard inevitably will constitute a critical factor on which 
the standard setting organization will focus when selecting among alternatives.
135
  While the 
owners of candidate technologies will have to agree to license their intellectual property on 
fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms,
136
 the standard setting organization 
will not set a range of prices or even determine which FRAND terms ultimately will apply 
during licensing negotiations.  The standard setting organization, representing the interests of 
industry participants, must rely on the good faith representations made by competing 
technology companies concerning their costs and the other market conditions that ultimately 
will determine licensing fees. 
                                                 
132
 Posner, supra n.80 at 255-56. 
133
 See generally id. at 249. 
134
 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 310 (3d Cir. 2007) (Barry, J.). 
135
 Id. at 313. 
136
 See, e.g., id. at 304. 
63 
 
Candidates almost surely will set future licensing terms based on demand conditions and 
the average total costs (ATC) of supplying the relevant technology, since research and 
development, a component of fixed costs, constitute a majority share of the value invested to 
develop a technology.  Allowing the competing technology companies to price below this 
measure during the period when standard setting organizations are considering alternative 
technologies would be equivalent to a misrepresentation concerning the ultimate costs 
associated with licensing fees.  The Third Circuit has found misrepresentations to standard 
setting organizations during this period a form of both monopolization and attempted 
monopolization.
137
   
In this context, pricing below ATC alone can establish predation, since the designation of 
a standard almost surely will guarantee full recoupment of any losses sustained during the 
consideration period.  This example also represents an exception to the NPT requirement that 
monopoly power already must exist for predation to harm consumers.  Standard setting does 
not pose a typical fact pattern because market participants legally collude to raise entry 
barriers to insurmountable levels, ultimately to benefit consumers.  Predation greatly increases 
the risk that the standard setting organization will adopt an inferior technology as determined 
by the relevant tradeoff between price and quality. 
OTHER DECISION-MAKING FACTORS 
If a plaintiff establishes pricing below cost and a dangerous probability of recoupment, 
which predominantly requires market power, other decision-making factors matter not.  
Profit sacrifice above cost and other objective intent factors represent subsidiary 
considerations.  The relationship between market power and recoupment demonstrates 
overlap between decision-making factors, or multicollinearity.
138
  Although multicollinearity 
may reduce the predictive accuracy of individual sub-variables in a model, it does not affect 
the overall predictive accuracy of the sample data, taking the sub-variables together.  
Because I am not interested in how each individual sub-variable representing NPT affected 
plaintiffs’ probability of winning predation claims — but rather how NPT as a predictive tool 
affected that probability — the benefits of the three additional sub-variables far outweigh 
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their costs.  Moreover, all three additional proxies for NPT have appeared both regularly in 
the case law and separately from cost and recoupment analysis. 
3. Profit Sacrifice 
The doctrine of profit sacrifice constitutes another appropriate proxy for Neoclassical 
Price Theory (NPT).  Profit sacrifice occurs when a monopolist deliberately sacrifices 
“present revenues for the purpose of driving [rivals] out of the market,” and then recouping 
the losses through higher profits earned in the absence of competition.
139
  Profit sacrifice has 
no legal significance unless considered jointly with the NPT concept of rationality; indeed, 
profit sacrifice represents the converse of that concept. 
In perfectly competitive markets, suppliers must behave rationally and maximize profits 
or competitors will drive them from the market.
140
  Sacrificing profits suggests intent to 
exclude: no rational supplier would forego present profits unless the pricing scheme creates a 
reasonable prospect for future profits.
141
  Successful firms rarely lower prices benevolently or 
absent compulsion.  Profit sacrifice also reflects existing market power: Without it, the 
sacrifice will result in losses, with the price returning only to the competitive level.  
Depending on the extent of the sacrifice, the willingness of a monopolist to forego profits 
further indicates likely exclusion, regardless of the efficiency of competitors.  Operating 
irrationally, for the benefit of consumers independent of self-interest, justifies a closer 
examination of the challenged practice, specifically how the monopolist intends to recoup.  
U.S. federal appellate courts have conceptualized predatory pricing in terms of detecting 
irrationality and profit sacrifice.  Of sixty-two reported predatory pricing cases since 1950, 
29/64, or almost half, have considered profit sacrifice an important factor.  Following 
Matsushita, which held that a conspiracy to price predatorily made no economic sense,
142
 the 
Fifth Circuit applied the “no economic sense” test — which encompasses a broader category 
of economic activity than profit sacrifice
143
 — to a claim of unilateral predatory pricing.144 
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For some courts, the absence of any profit sacrifice constitutes a defense to predatory 
pricing claims.  The Ninth Circuit has stated that, “Where the opportunity exists to increase 
or protect market share profitably by offering equivalent or superior performance at a lower 
price, even a virtual monopolist may do so.”145  Similarly, in dismissing a predatory pricing 
claim, the Seventh Circuit has said that, by selling above AVC, the defendant acted in “an 
economically rational manner, derived immediate economic benefit from its sales, and did 
not engage in the deliberate sacrifice of present revenues […].”146 
The close relationship between a price-cost comparison and profit sacrifice raises a 
question as to whether the profit sacrifice test is superfluous — whether it simply reflects 
pricing below an appropriate measure of cost — or whether profit sacrifice represents a 
distinct concept.  The answer is: both.  U.S. federal appellate courts have referred to profit 
sacrifice as equivalent to below-cost pricing while also acknowledging that profit sacrifice 
embodies a distinct phenomenon.  The Seventh Circuit,
147
 the Ninth Circuit,
148
 and even the 
Supreme Court
149
 all have spoken of profit sacrifice as defining the offense of predatory 
pricing,
150
 isolating cost as the benchmark by which to measure profit sacrifice.   
Profit sacrifice also can occur well above a firm’s costs.  The Ninth Circuit has 
recognized the potential for one form of profit sacrifice — limit pricing, “in which a 
monopolist sets prices above average total cost [ATC] but below the short-term profit-
maximizing level so as to discourage new entrants and thereby maximize profits over the 
long run.”151  Or a monopolist temporarily can reduce price to a point above ATC but “below 
the profit-maximizing price whenever a new entrant appears ready to enter the market,” to 
intimidate or deter the rival from entering.
152
  The Seventh Circuit sharply has criticized 
condemning this species of profit sacrifice as “rob[bing] consumers of the benefits of [] price 
reductions by dominant firms facing new competition,” and as further “freez[ing] the prices 
of dominant firms at their monopoly levels”.153 
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Aside from the merits of curtailing profit sacrifice above ATC, which the Supreme Court 
has ruled out,
154
 the existence of the debate illustrates how profit sacrifice can constitute a 
concept separate from pricing below cost.  Then-Judge Steven Breyer, writing on behalf of 
the First Circuit, has recognized profit sacrifice as a distinct concept even more difficult to 
measure than pricing below-cost.  Such a determination “hinges not only on cost data, but 
also on elasticity of demand, competitors’ responses to price shifts, and changes in unit costs 
with variations in production volume.
155
  Joint reference to “profit sacrifice” as both below-
cost pricing, one-half of the legal test for predatory pricing, and as failing to maximize 
profits, a separate and more expansive concept, obscures the meaning of the term. 
4. Intent 
In 35/62 reported federal appellate cases, the opinion considered relevant the intent of the 
monopolist when lowering prices below remunerative levels.  Five cases from the 1
st
,
156
 
7
th
,
157
 and 8
th
 
158
 Circuits stated that subjective intent evidence is generally irrelevant to 
determining liability in predatory pricing cases.  The U.S. Supreme Court in Brooke Group, 
however, considered both subjective
159
 and objective intent.
160
  About half of the 35 cases 
that considered intent relevant to liability focused on subjective intent; the other half 
mentioned or implicitly reviewed objective intent.
161
 
Aside from the probative value of intent, the factor keeps resurfacing in the cases because 
intent to monopolize constitutes a requisite element of attempted monopolization claims.
162
  
To the extent that courts have required intent to establish predatory pricing, below-cost 
evidence mostly has satisfied the element.
163
  To demonstrate, the Second Circuit, which 
fully has adopted the Areeda & Turner AVC test, considers intent “crucial” when evaluating 
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predatory pricing claims.
164
  The Sixth Circuit has stated that “motive or intent is the 
distinguishing characteristic of predatory pricing.”165  Reconciling these statements to 
Supreme Court precedent, the Second and Sixth Circuits must be referring to the objective 
intent of the dominant undertaking, as determined by market conditions (including entry 
barriers),
166
 in addition to cost tests.
167
 
In Utah Pie, the Supreme Court briefly discussed subjective intent.  It stated that 
evidence of predatory intent “might bear on the likelihood of injury to competition.”168  
Management at a defendant identified Utah Pie as a “constant check,” or competitive 
restraint, on its pricing and performance.
169
  Without detailing the motivations or objectives 
of the other defendants, the Court noted that “some evidence of predatory intent” existed 
concerning each defendant.
170
   
However, the Court was much more interested in the effect of the challenged pricing on 
its conception of adequate competition,
171
 which it defined in the Salt Lake City market for 
frozen pies as the state of inflated prices existing prior to the challenged price-cuts.  While 
subsequent courts of appeal more closely have measured competition against the perfectly 
competitive and monopolistic models supplied by Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT), and 
have focused more on efficiency considerations when examining predation claims, even Utah 
Pie did not view subjective intent as dispositive or critical to establishing liability. 
Evidence of intent cannot demonstrate actual competitive effects or establish recoupment.  
Rather, intent evidence, similar to the other NPT proxies discussed above, assists judges in 
predicting competitive effects.  The NPT paradigm is profit-maximization, so when firms 
irrationally price below cost, intent evidence can help explain why.  Subjective intent 
evidence consists of documents and correspondence generated by the monopolist explaining 
its state of mind — why the monopolist decided to lower prices.  NPT posits that firms have 
perfect knowledge and choose appropriate means to maximize profits.  If prices fall below 
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cost, firms must have a plan to recoup.  No monopolist accidentally recoups.
172
  In the 
absence of purposeful conduct, whether or not established by documentary evidence, 
recoupment rarely will occur. 
Even aside from the fact that Supreme Court precedent has not emphasized intent when 
evaluating predation claims, subjective intent does not originate in NPT.  Subjective intent 
evidence can be ambivalent, and NPT provides no basis in law or economics to conclude that 
subjective intent, independent of market conditions, will produce anticompetitive effects.  
Many predation cases that discuss subjective intent support a mere desire to exclude rivals, 
which could motivate merit competition.  Very few discuss a plan to recoup, which at least 
more clearly would support an anticompetitive purpose, if not effect.  Because subjective 
intent constitutes an important element to legal claims outside of competition law, and even 
outside of legal topics that focus on business behavior, I do not include subjective intent as a 
relevant NPT factor. 
Objective intent evidence also attempts to explain why the monopolist lowered prices, but 
it consists of surrounding market circumstances and efficiency considerations rather than 
justifications articulated by the monopolist.  Objective intent derives explanatory power 
exclusively from NPT premises, so it constitutes an appropriate proxy for NPT.  In addition 
to below-cost pricing and entry barriers, the following factors also influence objective intent: 
(1) whether market entry or rival expansion immediately precedes the 
monopolist’s decision to lower prices; 
(2) the historical trajectory of prices; and 
(3) the scope of the market targeted: whether the dominant undertaking can limit 
its exposure to losses. 
Market-based evidence concerning objective intent can assist in evaluating the likely 
profitability of a price-cut: whether recoupment follows.  Such evidence can explain 
otherwise ambivalent or irrational pricing decisions. 
5. Market Power 
Market power or monopoly power
173
 refers to the ability of “a single firm or group of 
firms to price profitably above marginal cost”.174  More specifically, a firm or group of firms 
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exercise market power if existing or potential competitors cannot restrain price increases 
above the dominant firm’s marginal cost by expanding within, or entering, the relevant 
market.
175
  Pricing below cost does not require market power, but both reducing prices above 
cost and converting below-cost prices into profits do.   
Dominant firms generally can exercise market power by one of two methods.  Either “the 
firm or group of firms may raise or maintain price above the competitive level directly by 
restraining its own output.”176  Or “the firm or group of firms may raise price above the 
competitive level or prevent it from falling to a lower competitive level by raising its rivals’ 
costs and thereby causing them to restrain their output.”177  For purposes of analyzing 
predatory pricing, the first method of exercising market power more frequently applies, since 
predation initially involves lower output prices rather than higher input prices,
178
 though 
predation can raise rivals’ costs of entering the monopolist’s market.179  Factors relevant to 
determining this classic form of market power
180
 include the market share of the monopolist, 
whether significant entry barriers exist, “the number and size distribution of firms already in 
the market, the stability of market shares over time, and historical evidence on the profits 
earned by the dominant firm.”181   
U.S. federal appellate courts have discussed market power as integral to proving 
predation in forty-eight of the sixty-two reported predatory pricing cases since 1950.
182
  In an 
additional eight cases, the Court considered the likelihood of recoupment.
183
  Market power 
and recoupment did not arise in two other cases only because the Court found that no profit 
sacrifice or below-cost pricing occurred.
184
  In all but four cases, therefore, plaintiff had to 
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establish market power, as defined and determined by NPT, to recover damages for predatory 
pricing.   
The concept of market power follows from the Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) 
principle of competition.  Market power inhibits competition, enables monopoly pricing (or 
pricing above marginal cost), and yields inefficiency.  The existence of market power ensures 
that the model of perfect competition does not apply.  Products are not homogenous but 
differentiated.  Consumers will not readily substitute to other products if the dominant firm 
raises price above marginal cost.  Barriers to entry or expansion exist.  Greater competition 
would force the monopolist to lower price and thus operate at a lower productive cost to 
society.  At that lower cost, additional consumers would be willing to purchase the 
monopolist’s product rather than an inferior substitute.  Market power thus signifies the 
greater applicability of the monopoly paradigm and constitutes a prerequisite to 
recoupment:
185
 the most indicative factor in predicting whether lower prices today 
foreshadow monopoly prices tomorrow.  Without market power, the competitive price will 
prevail, and any attempt to charge supra-competitive prices will induce rivals or entrants to 
expand output, rendering recoupment futile.
186
 
In Atl. Richfield, through which the Supreme Court eventually applied the antitrust injury 
doctrine to monopolization claims,
187
 the Ninth Circuit dismissed a predatory pricing claim 
because, “Although there is a genuine issue regarding market share and entry barriers, there 
appears to be no genuine issue regarding the ability of [defendant’s] existing competitors to 
increase their output.”188  In a relatively recent and important predatory pricing case, the 
Sixth Circuit found that Northwest Airlines “possessed overwhelming market share, and 
[that] barriers to entry were very high.”189  It further held that “Northwest had the requisite 
market power to render its predatory pricing plausible and successful.”190  Examining the 
ability of an undertaking to raise and maintain prices above the perfectly competitive 
paradigm exhibits the influence of NPT over U.S. predatory pricing law. 
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B. Effects 
Analysis of the actual effects of predatory pricing on consumer welfare constitutes the 
second independent variable.  Effects analysis, at least after Utah Pie and beginning with 
circuit decisions in the 1970s,
191
 has progressed along the conceptual boundaries delineated 
by Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT), the first independent variable.  U.S. federal courts have 
applied NPT to market conditions to determine the competitive effects of a price-cut.  The 
intellectual force of NPT compelled the shift in legal concern in all of monopolization law 
from competitors to competition as determined by consumer welfare.
192
  In the context of 
predatory pricing, this generally has meant assessing whether a price-cut ultimately will 
cause consumers to pay higher overall prices: whether the monopolist will recoup.
193
   
Given the substantial overlap between independent variables, multi-collinearity must 
pervade the model.  But it does not reflect perfect multi-collinearity for the following 
reasons.
194
  The sub-variables that together constitute the first independent variable attempt 
to predict competitive effects by examining market characteristics.  By contrast, the second 
independent variable reflects a strictly historical review of market facts, comparing the 
differential between initial price-cuts and subsequent price increases.
195
  The independent 
variables represent different modes of legal analysis that generally occur at distinct junctures 
of a predation scheme.  Each independent variable relies on similar and overlapping, but not 
identical, evidence to establish successful predation.
196
   
1. Stages of Predation 
The predictive capability of NPT, captured by the first independent variable, has proved 
administratively useful to appellate judges because the offense of predatory pricing occurs 
sequentially over time.  The monopolist first lowers price.  Lower prices secondly harm 
competitors.  Then the monopolist thirdly raises prices to supra-competitive levels to recover 
the investment in lower prices and to earn additional profits.  Only at the last step does the 
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monopolist harm consumers.
197
  The timing and stages of predatory pricing separates the 
offense from other exclusionary pricing practices, while raising widespread skepticism that 
any initial investment and short-term consumer benefit actually will convert to recoupment 
and medium-term consumer harm. 
The U.S. Supreme Court once expressed an even more radical view, preferring all short-
term price-cuts even if “the ultimate effect of the cut is to induce or reestablish supra-
competitive pricing.”198  “[D]iscouraging a price cut and forcing firms to maintain supra-
competitive prices,” the Court continued, “depriv[es] consumers of the benefits of lower 
prices in the interim,” and thus “does not constitute sound antitrust policy.”199 
If read literally and independently of the subsequent statement that actual market 
conditions carry greater weight than theory,
200
 such reasoning would eviscerate the claim of 
predation.  And in fact, Brooke Group marked a seismic shift in predation enforcement.  The 
suggestive language employed here — severely discounting any subsequent negative effects 
on consumers and essentially equating predation with price-cuts — reflects an unsparing 
short-term bias in evaluating consumer welfare.   
Dutiful circuit court judges, along with savvy plaintiffs’ counsel, have taken the cue.  
Plaintiffs’ appellate success rate after Brooke Group fell dramatically even as fewer decisions 
reached the appellate courts.
201
 
NPT does not mandate such extreme skepticism towards predatory pricing.  Indeed, by 
empowering courts to predict competitive effects, it actually has enhanced the legal viability 
of predation claims by permitting evaluation prior to the last stage of the offense — prior to 
when consumer harm actually occurs.  Assuming a reasonable degree of accuracy, providing 
judges with the ability to predict competitive effects is a significant attribute of NPT. 
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2. Efficiency 
Analysis of effects, by contrast, entails examining actual efficiency losses or actual harm 
to consumers, in the form of recoupment.  Advocates of NPT might respond that cost tests do 
attempt to measure pricing efficiency rather than attempting to predict it.  And indeed, cost 
tests measure static efficiency at a particular point in time, which might prove dispositive if 
the offense of predatory pricing did not occur sequentially over time.  The risk to consumer 
welfare from predation is not the current price that cost tests measure, but a subsequent, 
higher price.  That higher price involves wealth transfer effects and inefficiency that could 
outweigh any short-term consumer gain.  In that sense, cost tests account for one relevant 
data point along a dynamic line of data points.   
In markets characterized by significant innovation, cost tests anchored at AVC do not 
even measure the most relevant competitive effects of predatory pricing.  Prices below ATC 
create inefficiency and anticompetitive effects as well.  To finance research and development 
that raises productivity and that brings welfare-enhancing products to market, dominant 
undertakings must cover their total costs of production.  An AVC benchmark in such markets 
over-subsidizes innovation and wastes resources, producing allocative inefficiency.  It allows 
dominant firms to exclude rivals with prices that do not account for the investment required 
to produce the product.  Dominant undertakings normally earn market returns on that 
investment based on the barriers to entry it creates and based on consumer demand for the 
product.  An AVC benchmark further redirects competition and investment to other markets 
potentially in less need of it.  While investment incentives loom large, therefore, in other 
areas of monopolization law, promoting efficiency and lower prices — beyond the 
immediate term — constitute more important objectives for predatory pricing law. 
Cost tests also attempt to predict competitive effects by providing a benchmark below 
which the risk of predatory pricing significantly increases.  Once breached, judges then 
consider objective intent, market power, and the probability of recoupment.  The purpose of 
the second independent variable is to determine which factors courts more closely examine 
when deciding predatory pricing cases: factors derived from NPT that attempt to predict 
effects, or the actual competitive effects of the challenged practice.  Another purpose of the 
second independent variable is to determine how plaintiffs fare when courts focus on effects 
to resolve predatory pricing claims rather than predictive decision-making factors derived 
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from NPT.  I hypothesize that plaintiffs’ rate of success in predatory pricing cases increases 
when courts examine — rather than exclusively employ NPT to predict — actual effects. 
Consequences matter.  Scholars
202
 have debated exactly what antitrust law should aim to 
pursue, from allocative efficiency to minimizing wealth transfers from producers to 
consumers.
203
  But even Chicago School scholars, the most ardent advocates of applying 
NPT to competition law rules,
204
 have argued that liability should turn on the effects of 
challenged practices.  Judge Posner has recommended evaluating competition by its 
consequences — specifically, “whether the restriction caused the firm’s output to rise or 
fall.”205  The neo-Chicago approach “accepts the Chicago tenet that legal rules can and 
should be assessed on their consequences in terms of efficiency.”206  Harvard School scholars 
similarly have crafted legal rules focused on evaluating exclusionary effect in terms of 
efficiency.
207
 
3. Actual Anticompetitive Effects 
In the predatory pricing context, an effects-based approach would consider: 
 whether the purportedly anticompetitive prices terminally weakened or drove 
rivals from the market, 
 whether weakened or excluded rivals restrained the dominant undertaking from 
raising prices and to what extent,
208
 
 how efficiently rivals actually operate, and whether they could match the 
efficiency of the dominant undertaking, 
 whether other competitors restrain the dominant undertaking from raising prices 
post-predation,
209
 and  
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 whether recoupment actually occurs — whether the dominant undertaking was 
able to raise prices high enough and long enough after weakening or eliminating 
rivals to recover the initial investment in below-cost pricing. 
An effects-based approach therefore focuses on present market conditions and how they 
explain recoupment.  If full recoupment has not occurred, then market conditions will 
determine whether it is close.  The Supreme Court, at least, always has found such evidence 
compelling in predatory pricing cases, even in cases that feature legal reasoning and 
presumptions derived from NPT.
210
 
Consider Matsushita.  Plaintiffs Zenith Radio Corporation and National Union Electric 
Corporation claimed that defendants, twenty-one corporations that manufacture or sell 
television sets, conspired to exclude plaintiffs from the U.S. television market.  The pricing 
scheme involved setting “artificially high prices for television[s] sold [] in Japan,” while 
simultaneously fixing prices below costs “for television[s] exported to and sold in the United 
States”.211  Despite an opinion that discussed profit sacrifice and the “no economic sense” 
test, the Court’s holding turned on the fact that, despite a predatory pricing scheme that 
already had lasted twenty years, plaintiffs could not establish anticompetitive effects or 
recoupment.
212
  “Two decades after their conspiracy is alleged to have commenced, 
[defendants] appear to be far from achieving [recoupment]: the two largest shares of the retail 
market in television sets are held by RCA and respondent Zenith, not by any of 
petitioners.”213   
Moreover, a dispute over the effects of predation, whether recoupment actually occurred, 
arguably drove the holding in Brooke Group as well.  Plaintiffs asserted that the predatory 
pricing scheme succeeded by narrowing the price gap between higher-priced branded 
cigarettes and lower-priced generic cigarettes, “from approximately 38% at the time Brown 
& Williamson entered the segment to approximately 27% at the time of trial.”214 
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Yet the Court calculated that the increasing market share of generic cigarettes ensured 
that sufficient competition existed, precluding recoupment.
215
  “Following Brown & 
Williamson’s entry, the rate at which generic cigarettes were capturing market share did not 
slow; indeed, the average rate of growth doubled.”216  Five years after the alleged predation 
commenced, “the generic segment expanded from 4% to more than 15% of the domestic 
cigarette market, or greater than 2% per year.”217 
This approach represented an effects analysis because the Court sided with the view that 
more consumers purchasing generic cigarettes produced lower overall prices relative to the 
“but-for” world of no price-cuts below cost.  The Court ignored the possibility that the price 
of generics would rise steadily to a level that more closely approximated the original price of 
branded cigarettes. 
4. Efficiency As Effects 
Cases also exist, however, where a NPT variable — the relationship between prices and 
costs — designed to facilitate predicting competitive effects, actually outweighed evidence of 
consumer harm.  In U.S. v. AMR Corp., for instance, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
dismissed a predatory pricing claim because the Justice Department failed to establish that 
American Airlines priced below an “appropriate” measure of cost.218  The Justice 
Department proffered evidence that American was pricing below four measures of cost, two 
measures based on average total cost (ATC), and two representative of profit sacrifice.   
The Court initially stated that “[d]espite a great deal of debate on the subject, no 
consensus has emerged as to what the most appropriate measure of cost is in predatory 
pricing cases.”219  “In this circuit,” the Court continued, “we have spoken of both average 
variable cost and other marginal cost measures as relevant”220 — a selection well within the 
Tenth Circuit’s discretion given Supreme Court precedent.221  As to why it accepts various 
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measures of marginal cost, the Tenth Circuit stated that “[s]ole reliance on AVC as the 
appropriate measure of cost may obscure the nature of a particular predatory scheme”.222   
Of the four cost measures proffered by the Department of Justice, the Tenth Circuit 
rejected two as too closely resembling profit sacrifice tests, which, according to the Tenth 
Circuit, “involve a great deal of speculation and often result in injury to the consumer and a 
chilling of competition.”223  In rejecting profit sacrifice measures above cost, the Tenth 
Circuit followed the Supreme Court’s holding in Brooke Group that demanded pricing 
below-cost even if profit sacrifice otherwise occurred. 
The Tenth Circuit appeared to have designated average avoidable cost as the appropriate 
cost benchmark in AMR Corp.
224
  Because American arbitrarily had allocated certain 
common or fixed costs associated with running its business, costs that did “not vary 
proportionately with the level of flight activity,”225 to the other measures considered by the 
Tenth Circuit, it held them “invalid as a matter of law”.226 
While Tenth Circuit precedent can support that conclusion, Supreme Court precedent 
certainly did not compel it, as the Tenth Circuit repeatedly claimed.  Brooke Group never 
stated that, to establish predation, plaintiffs must prove prices below only variable cost, or 
even incremental costs.  Consequently, the Tenth Circuit could not accurately state that 
“utilizing the[] cost measures [in Tests Two and Three] would be [] equivalent [to] applying 
an average total cost test, implicitly ruled out by Brooke Group’s mention of incremental 
costs only.”227  While Brooke Group mentioned “incremental costs,” it did so only to 
reiterate the open question whether predation could occur above that level,
228
 ruling out only 
prices above cost.
229
  The Tenth Circuit might have been coaxing the Department of Justice 
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to appeal, and the Supreme Court to provide needed guidance on what factors to consider 
when selecting the appropriate cost measure.  The DOJ did not appeal. 
Cost considerations negated the necessity of evaluating the medium-term effect of the 
challenged price-cuts on customers of American Airlines.  The Court recited as a fact that 
American willingly had sacrificed profits by combining lower prices with greater capacity: 
“By increasing capacity, American overrode its own internal capacity-planning models for 
each route, which had previously indicated that such increases would be unprofitable.”230  In 
addition to matching competitors’ lower prices, American “increased the number of planes 
and seats available” only on routes served by competitors.231  The Court also acknowledged 
persuasive evidence of either actual or likely recoupment: “Once the [lower-cost 
competition] ceased or moved its operations, American generally resumed its prior marketing 
strategy, reducing flights and raising prices to levels roughly comparable to those prior to the 
period of low-fare competition.”232 
The Tenth Circuit, of course, could not ignore cost evidence.
233
  Doing so would have 
violated the rule of law.  The rule of law demands, before attaching liability, a reasonably 
clear and accessible body of legal rules and standards from which parties can identify their 
legal obligations.
234
  The rule essentially requires that the law apply to everyone, and it 
benefits individuals and corporations alike.  Uncertainty generated by arbitrary and 
potentially confiscatory legal rules would suppress trade and investment.
235
 
Yet the established existence of anticompetitive effects might have exerted greater 
influence on which cost measure to accept.  Similar to the prevailing view now and then, the 
Tenth Circuit favored short-term over medium-term efficiency considerations and price 
levels.  Regardless of the actual justification, the rule of law did not require the Tenth Circuit 
to reject all four cost measures.  Disregarding anticompetitive effects and ruling on the basis 
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of a decision-making factor constructed to predict anticompetitive effects constitutes 
deontological
236
 reasoning that unduly risks inaccurate results.
237
 
IV. Results 
A. Overall Results 
I chose Professors Areeda and Turner’s article as a temporal divider because of a 
suspicion, confirmed by the case law, that it made Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) 
accessible to the judiciary, and thereby greatly expanded its influence.  I chose Matsushita 
and Brooke Group because they represent the only predation decisions decided by the 
Supreme Court after NPT gained prominence in legal and academic circles.  The decisions 
also illustrate the control that the Supreme Court has over the boundaries of monopolization 
claims.
238
 
Initially, from 1950 to 1975, prior to Professors Areeda & Turner’s article, federal 
appellate courts issued only 7 reported predatory pricing decisions; fifty-five such decisions, 
from 1975 until the present,
239
 followed that article.  Professors Areeda & Turner’s article 
thus marked the emergence of NPT and revived a dormant legal claim, even if it did not 
make the claim easier to establish.  Pre-Areeda & Turner’s article, plaintiffs won 3 cases and 
lost 4: a success rate of 42.9%.  Post-Areeda & Turner’s article, plaintiffs have won 13 cases, 
losing 42, for a success rate of roughly 23.6%, almost 20 percentage points lower.   
The Supreme Court decided Matsushita in 1986.  Prior to Matsushita, plaintiffs won 10 
predatory pricing cases at the federal appellate level and lost 23, a success rate of 30.3%.  
Post-Matsushita, plaintiffs have won 6 predatory pricing cases and lost 23, for a 20.7% 
success rate — representing a fall in that rate of almost a third.  I cannot conclude from this 
evidence that Matsushita caused plaintiffs’ success rate to fall, but a discernible relationship 
between the Matsushita judgment and a subsequently lower success rate appears to exist, 
strengthened by the fact that the cases analyzed here constitute the entire population of data 
points available, eliminating the risk of sampling error. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court decided Brooke Group in 1993, twenty-two years ago, but 18 
years after Professors Areeda & Turner’s article.  Prior to Brooke Group, plaintiffs won 15 
predatory pricing cases at the federal appellate level and lost 33, resulting in a 31.3% success 
rate.  Post-Brooke Group (including Brooke Group) , plaintiffs have won one case at the 
federal appellate level, while losing 13 — a success rate of 7.1%, well below the overall 
success rate of 25.8%. 
Not only has plaintiffs’ success rate noticeably fallen since Brooke Group — from 31.3% 
to 7.1%, by over three-fourths — but the number of reported opinions by appellate courts 
have fallen as well.  From Professors Areeda & Turner’s article in 1975 until the 1993 
judgment in Brooke Group, U.S. federal appellate courts published 42 predatory pricing 
decisions.  After Brooke Group, from 1993 until 2014, federal appellate courts have issued 
just 13 opinions on the merits of predation.  Thus, from 1975 until 1993, a period of 18 years, 
U.S. appellate courts filed over 3 times more predatory pricing decisions than from 1993 
until 2014, a period of 22 years.  While this fact simply may indicate a settled body of law,
240
 
reducing the need for appellate courts to issue opinions, it also supports the claim that Brooke 
Group lowered the probability of plaintiffs winning predatory pricing cases. 
B. Effects Determined by Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) 
U.S. federal appellate courts at least partially relied on decision-making factors derived 
from NPT to decide liability in 58 of 62 reported predatory pricing cases.  This fact should 
not surprise, since the legal test for predatory pricing — evidence of below-cost pricing and a 
dangerous probability of recoupment — essentially adopts 3 of the 5 NPT factors that 
attempt to predict the competitive effects of predation.  Three of the four other decisions 
considered cost evidence, but they did so without incorporating the concept of market 
power.
241
  The results when appellate courts applied NPT to assess effects essentially mirror 
the overall results because appellate courts considered only effects, or only effects and intent, 
in just four reported cases, all between 1950 and 1967.
242
 
C. Effects Absent Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) 
In two early predation cases, the courts determined liability based on the effects of the 
challenged price-cut, in terms inconsistent with Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT).  In Gen. 
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Gas Corp. v. Nat’l Utilities of Gainesville, Inc., the Fifth Circuit at first appeared to apply 
NPT by intimating that the price at issue did not fall below the costs of the defendant; that 
price-cuts generally harm the public only when they again rise; and that the defendant held 
25% of the relevant market.
243
  The Court examined whether the challenged cuts would 
eliminate plaintiff and other competitors, but ultimately ordered an amendment to the 
injunction limiting price-cuts based on that factor.   
Similarly, while the Supreme Court in Utah Pie considered whether the defendants priced 
below their costs of production, a NPT inquiry, the Court ignored the potential for 
recoupment, since at the end of the predation, the defendants had market shares of 8.8%, 
8.3%, and 29.4%, while the plaintiff held a 45.3% market share.
244
  The Court also found the 
reduced profitability of the plaintiff relevant to liability,
245
 even while its net worth more than 
doubled during the predatory period.
246
 
Effects potentially could encompass many legal and economic variables.  NPT has 
narrowed the relevant effects in predation cases to actual or potential recoupment. 
D. Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) & Intent Predicting Effects 
This category initially sets-out the results when courts only applied predictive factors 
derived from NPT — to the exclusion of effects, but not intent.  I include intent in this 
category because after Professors Areeda & Turner’s article, when courts discussed intent as 
a controlling factor, they usually referred to NPT factors — particularly whether price fell 
below cost — to discern the intent of the dominant undertaking.  Thirty-three such cases 
exist.
247
 
Prior to the publication of Professors Areeda & Turner’s article, plaintiffs won 1 of 2 
cases, or 50%.  Post-Areeda & Turner, plaintiffs won 9 of 31 cases, or 29%.  Prior to the 
Supreme Court’s judgment in Matsushita, plaintiffs won 7 of 21 cases, or 33%; post-
Matsushita, plaintiffs won 3 of 12 cases, or 25%.  Prior to the Supreme Court deciding 
Brooke Group, plaintiffs won 10 of 29 cases in which the appellate court attempted to predict 
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competitive effects by applying NPT, or 34.5%.  After Brooke Group, plaintiffs have lost all 
4 cases, or won 0%. 
This evidence supports several points.  As an initial matter, using NPT to predict effects 
exploded after the publication of Professors Areeda & Turner’s article, from 2 cases to 31.  
The evidence also appears to establish that circuit courts relied less exclusively on NPT and 
intent to decide predation cases after both Matsushita and Brooke Group relative to before 
those cases.  While the absolute number of cases also fell, the number of instances where 
courts considered effects steadily increased until, after Brooke Group, they considered effects 
in 10 of 14 predatory pricing cases. 
Plaintiffs’ success rate in establishing predation progressively fell after each evidentiary 
marker.  Pre- and post- both Areeda & Turner’s article and Brooke Group, plaintiffs’ success 
rate when the court applied NPT to predict effects fell dramatically.  Pre- and post-
Matsushita, that success rate fell as well, though plaintiffs still won 1 of 4 cases afterwards 
rather than 1 of 3. 
The evidence further demonstrates that plaintiffs’ success rate actually improved when 
appellate courts attempted to predict effects by using NPT rather than tallying results.  In 
other words, the evidence does not support the hypothesis that utilizing NPT to predict 
effects lowers plaintiffs’ chances of winning predation cases relative to considering actual 
effects.  In all but one category of cases, plaintiffs more likely lost when the appellate court 
examined effects, whether or not NPT applied.   
Pre-Areeda & Turner’s article, plaintiffs won 2 of 5 effects cases, or 40%; afterwards, 
they won 4 of 24 cases, or 16.7%.  Pre-Matsushita, plaintiffs won 3 of 12 effects cases, or 
25%; post-Matsushita, plaintiffs won 3 of 17 such cases, or 17.6%.  Pre-Brooke Group, 
plaintiffs won 5 of 19 effects cases, or 26.3%; they won 1 of 10 subsequently, or 10%.  
Plaintiffs’ success rate therefore declined in all categories of effects cases, by over 23%, 7%, 
and 16%, respectively. 
By comparing the success rates in NPT cases against effects cases, I found additional 
evidence for the proposition that predicting effects does not bias plaintiffs’ case.  Plaintiffs 
won 50% of NPT cases before Professors Areeda & Turner’s article against 40% of effects 
cases; they won 29% of NPT cases afterwards relative to 16.7% of effects cases.  Pre-
Matsushita, plaintiffs won 33% of NPT cases against 25% of effects cases; those percentages 
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fell to 25% and 17.6%, respectively, after Matsushita.  Prior to Brooke Group, plaintiffs won 
34.5% of NPT cases and 26.3% of effects cases; they won 0% of NPT cases and 10% of 
effects cases post-Brooke Group. 
Plaintiffs always stood a better chance of winning predation cases if the Court predicted 
effects using NPT rather than determining actual effects, except after Brooke Group.  And 
one case, Spirit Airlines, explains the difference in that category.  Plaintiffs’ overall success 
rate when the Court employed NPT and intent to predict effects is 30.3% (10/33 cases); they 
won 20.7% (6/29) of cases involving actual effects. 
V. Behavioral Economics 
The fact that plaintiffs have won one reported predatory pricing case at the U.S. federal 
appellate level since Brooke Group may outrage or comfort depending on one’s ideological 
commitments.  Either way, the application of Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) to predatory 
pricing claims, not necessarily the theory itself, appears to have lowered plaintiffs’ 
probability of winning predation cases drastically at least since 1993.  Predatory pricing law, 
and the tenets of NPT upon which it rests, have not changed significantly since Areeda & 
Turner’s landmark article in 1975, 40 years ago.  Meanwhile, the field of behavioral 
economics, a marriage between psychology and economics, has produced evidence 
weakening the NPT claim that maximizing utility and profits motivate all market activity.  
Since the 40
th
 anniversary of Areeda & Turner’s article has arrived, and since the 20th 
anniversary of Brooke Group recently passed, perhaps now is an appropriate time to evaluate 
whether behavioral economics can add insights and predictive accuracy to the unrivalled 
contributions of NPT, and to evaluate whether any adjustments to current predation law 
might abate the rout of plaintiffs since Brooke Group. 
Behavioral economics could influence predation law in various ways, both inside and 
outside the framework of NPT.
248
  U.S. federal appellate judges could decide to abandon the 
cost and recoupment concepts that have guided analysis of predation claims at least since the 
mid-1970s and instead apply a distinct test.  Appellate judges also could consider the 
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applicability of the availability heuristic when evaluating the likelihood of recoupment.
249
  
This heuristic particularly applies to the probability of subsequent entry or re-entry.  
Behavioral economic scholarship further might convince appellate judges to adjust the 
current error-cost calculus to account for the possibility that the endowment effect and loss 
aversion might influence dominant company managers to predate more frequently.  Evidence 
that behavioral economics might increase the frequency or viability of predatory pricing 
further might prompt judges to shift the evidentiary burden in individual cases.  The 
following paragraphs explore the extent to which behavioral economics can explain 
predation consistent with the basic tenets of NPT. 
A. Purpose of Behavioral Economics in Predatory Pricing Law 
If behavioral economics is to enhance the predictive accuracy of NPT as applied to 
predation law by limiting false-negative errors,
250
 it cannot merely identify irrational or 
boundedly rational behavior by a monopolist, explaining why a monopolist might predate.  
This is because non-profit maximizing price-cuts increase consumer welfare.  Consumers 
benefit from lower prices that eventually do not rise to supra-competitive levels, or that the 
monopolist does not recoup in some other fashion. 
Rather, to expand the variety of predatory schemes that the Sherman Act forbids, 
behavioral economics still must explain how seemingly irrational, or boundedly rational, 
behavior confers profits on the dominant firm.  In other words, behavioral economists must 
explain how boundedly rational behavior actually constitutes rational behavior.  While 
behavioral economics might expand the legally-recognized motivations for predating, it 
complements or further explicates rationality and recoupment by helping to identify profit-
maximizing price-cuts. 
To discern the contours of rational and boundedly rational behavior in the predation 
context, below I set-out the objectives of a monopolist and its rivals when predation occurs, 
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and further evaluate how behavioral economics can assist in explaining those objectives and 
the corresponding actions of competitors in concentrated markets. 
1. Monopolist 
The two most important decisions that a monopolist takes concerning predation are, 
initially, to cut prices drastically to a level below some measure of cost, and subsequently, to 
raise prices again to supra-competitive levels.  In considering each decision, Neoclassical 
Price Theory (NPT) posits that the monopolist will aim only at maximizing profits, the 
overarching objective, but subsidiary objectives also may exist.  A monopolist may predate 
to expel a competitor from the market, to deter a rival from entering the market, or to 
discipline a competitor that competes too fiercely. 
Monopolistic entities decide on pricing only through managers, individuals to whom the 
rationality principle should apply.  Corporate governance law long ago recognized that self-
interested managers who formulate and execute policy may pursue objectives other than 
long-run profit maximization.  Such alternatives include short-term profit-maximization, 
meeting growth targets, or revenue maximization — all to earn promotions or boost 
bonuses.
251
 
Neoclassical economists and price theorists generally have responded that the threat of 
hostile takeovers, the possibility of shareholders or boards of directors replacing managers, 
and the existence of profit maximizing competitors limit such freedom.
252
  The ideas here 
are, first, that corporate raiders can earn huge sums identifying and replacing 
underperforming managers, so competition in the market for corporate governance should 
prevent self-interested managerial behavior.  Second, corporate governance law entrusts 
directors to monitor managers and to ensure that they maximize shareholder value.  Third, 
shareholders have the self-help remedy of replacing directors who inadequately monitor 
underperforming managers.  And fourth, competition in the relevant product market will 
check managers who fail to maximize profits by punishing their firms and promoting rivals 
run by profit-maximizing managers. 
But the existence of market power or dominance in the product market changes the 
calculus, weakening the effectiveness of these processes in holding managers accountable.  
                                                 
251
 ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 282 (8
th
 ed. 2012). 
252
 Id. 
86 
 
Dominant firms (operating outside of niche markets)
253
 may constitute less appealing 
takeover targets given that market power already has inflated the firm’s share price, and has 
allowed the stock-piling of financial reserves conducive to blocking, and thus deterring, 
hostile bids.  While market power in various markets may not wholly obstruct or deter a 
determined, deep-pocketed suitor such as Google or Apple, market power at least would slow 
the pace of takeovers, permitting dominant firm managers to pursue objectives other than 
profit-maximization. 
Market power equates with weakened competition, the ability of the dominant firm to 
influence the market price, and thus the ability to act independently of competitors.  So by 
definition, rivalry already fails adequately to restrain the dominant firm, creating scope for 
influences other than competing on the merits, such as behavioral economics, to operate at 
least over the medium term. 
While a dominant firm’s share price might fall due to unprofitable predation, thereby 
attracting suitors or indirectly strengthening actual or potential competitors, the fact of 
dominance hinders even this result by eliminating the premise.  Dominance significantly 
raises the probability that predation — even if originally motivated by bounded rationality — 
actually will succeed.  Market power means that the dominant firm, after cutting prices, 
subsequently can raise price without many consumers switching to other suppliers,
254
 and 
without rivals entering the market to supply a similar product at a lower price.
255
  Thus 
market power can convert otherwise irrational pricing into a rational, profit-maximizing 
scheme by enabling recoupment. 
Given the absence of competition in the relevant product market and in the market for 
hostile takeovers, moreover, even the most diligent directors or shareholders may be unable 
to identify and replace underperforming, boundedly rational managers.  This is because 
market power prevents competitors from capitalizing on and punishing boundedly rational 
acts, as would occur in a perfectly competitive market.  The lack of competitive restraint 
creates an artificial price floor under the share price.  Directors and shareholders in any event 
may have no incentive to discipline or replace managers who initiate predatory pricing for 
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boundedly rational reasons, particularly if the predation proves successful because of market 
power.  In such cases, predation constitutes a profit-maximizing strategy, for which directors 
and shareholders even might reward managers if the scheme, though illegal, goes 
undetected.
256
 
All this might prompt the observant skeptic to respond that behavioral economics need 
not alter the existing predatory pricing test inspired by NPT, in that the relevant focus 
remains on recoupment.  Regardless of whether rational or boundedly rational reasons 
motivated dominant firm managers, what ultimately matters is whether the predation proves 
profitable, whether recoupment occurs. 
Evidence derived from behavioral economics still might demonstrate an increased 
likelihood that recoupment will occur.  For example, because of the availability heuristic, a 
history of below-cost pricing in response to attempted entry could establish the requisite 
likelihood of recoupment when supported by evidence of high profit margins and entry 
barriers.   
Similarly, just as cost tests help to identify potentially anticompetitive prices unrelated to 
merit competition, applying bounded rationality to the motivations of dominant firm 
managers could supplement this inquiry.  The existence of behavioral motivations to pricing 
decisions might affect the cost benchmark used to measure predation, thereby lowering the 
threshold for liability. 
2. Rivals 
The two decisions by rivals most likely to incite predatory pricing include entering a 
market or significantly expanding output and lowering price.  Like dominant firms, rivals too 
seek: 
(1) to maximize profits, 
(2) to raise entry barriers and differentiate their products so as to lower the 
elasticity of demand and to maximize the difference between price and the 
output level where marginal revenue equals marginal cost, 
(3) to increase market share, and even 
(4) to drive the incumbent from the market. 
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In evaluating an entrant’s objectives, one cannot assume that an entrant is either small or 
large, since dominant firms in adjacent markets might consider investing the resources 
necessary to enter the monopolized market, notwithstanding significant entry barriers.  
Unlike the monopolist, however, rivals and their managers probably cannot afford to indulge 
in boundedly rational, or irrational, foibles — at least when such foibles prompt entry or 
expansion.  They must maximize profits because they either currently face, or will face, 
fierce competition from the monopolist, assuming collusion does not follow predation. 
Firms dominant in other markets, though perhaps possessing significant financial 
resources, generally will focus on maximizing profits when considering whether to enter 
because of entry barriers and the financial sums at stake.  On the other hand, because of 
significant uncertainty concerning (1) market conditions, (2) the capacity of the monopolist, 
and (3) the monopolist’s reaction to entry,257 potential entrants still might depart from purely 
rational decision-making and indulge in boundedly rational reasoning.   
The competitive effects of bounded rationality when exercised by rivals can go in either 
direction.  If rivals engage in boundedly rational expansion or entry, that decision likely will 
enhance consumer welfare by strengthening competition, spurring innovation, and lowering 
prices.
258
  But if bounded rationality prevents competitors from entering into, or expanding 
within, a dominant market, or leads to collusive pricing after entry, then failing to identify the 
deterrent effect that bounded rationality exerts on entry reduces consumer welfare by 
improving the effectiveness of predation. 
B. Application 
1. Loss Aversion, Endowment Effect & Bounded Self-Interest 
Loss aversion occurs when individuals care much more about losses than about 
equivalent gains; the endowment effect reinforces that conclusion by demonstrating that 
individuals demand higher payment to sell an object already part of their endowment than to 
purchase the equivalent object having never owned it.
259
 
Monopoly profits, the aspiration of all businesses, can reach considerable levels.  Even if 
modest, the endowment effect and loss aversion must attach equally to monopoly profits as 
to coffee mugs and other more mundane widgets, as rent-seeking behavior by monopolists, 
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such as government lobbying,
260
 demonstrates.  Having obtained the objective of their 
pursuits — the pinnacle in business achievement — managers at dominant firms are unlikely 
to stand-down when a competitor  threatens entry into its market — threatens forcefully to 
take that endowment by outperforming dominant firm managers, by beating them.  Indeed, 
loss aversion and the endowment effect must apply with considerable strength to monopoly 
profits, given that, in the original experiments, the subjects at least received remuneration for 
selling the object.  By contrast, competition from entry often represents a zero-sum struggle 
for profits with no corresponding benefit. 
Bounded self-interest may compound the urge to defeat entry by all means available to 
dominant firm managers.  U.S. society effectively has institutionalized the will to compete 
and the desire to win: Americans love winners.  Proof for this assertion lies in the wild 
popularity of, and money sloshing around in, professional sports,
261
 in steady or increasing 
application rates to elite universities despite the costs of attendance spiraling upwards, and in 
the very form of government operating in the U.S., as democracy requires politicians to 
defeat another candidate merely to remain employed. 
To reach a level of pricing oversight at a dominant firm, a manager generally must have 
competed effectively, even fiercely, surpassing rivals from the ground floor upwards through 
the ranks of the dominant firm.  Confronted with entry, a challenge to their superiority, to 
their ability to send their children to those elite universities, and to their very professional 
existence, dominant firm managers might price below-cost to defeat entry even if they do not 
anticipate fully recouping the investment in below-cost pricing.  Dominant firm managers 
actually may act irrationally or against self-interest according to NPT.
262
 
Antitrust law measures recoupment at the firm level but when evaluating the probability 
of predation occurring, it also could consider recoupment at the individual manager level.  If 
entry or expanded production threatened to displace the dominant company, either 
eliminating it from the market or substantially curtailing its profitability, the management 
team confronting the entry or expanded production would not survive the market 
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displacement.  Directors and shareholders would clamor for replacements, and the original 
management team would have difficulty securing equally desirable positions if they oversaw 
the displacement.  Viewed from that perspective, the management team might count the 
elimination or deterrence of entry or expanded production as adequate recoupment even if 
the dominant company cannot immediately raise prices above pre-predation or “but-for” 
levels.
263
  Retaining their positions and reputations, in addition to the possibility of later 
raising prices and recouping at the firm level, would more than compensate the management 
team for short-term lower prices and decreased shareholder value. 
Given the previous lack of competitive pressure and the resulting profits that characterize 
monopoly, managers at dominant firms not only have the incentive to protect monopoly 
profits, they also have the market freedom and the financial ability to guard their endowment.  
The tested response to loss aversion and the endowment effect suggests that dominant firm 
managers would pay more to avoid the loss, to keep the endowment, than the actual value of 
that endowment.  Dominant firm managers might well be willing to incur a loss to avoid the 
complete loss of monopoly profits — might well be willing to price below cost even if full 
recoupment never occurs. 
A countervailing effect might restrain predatory pricing.  Loss aversion and the 
endowment effect might apply to the predation stage, during which the dominant undertaking 
incurs losses.  Managers operating in the best interests of a corporation might view the losses 
from below-cost pricing as the relevant endowment.  In such instances, bounded rationality 
could deter or prevent the initial loss necessary to initiate a successful predatory pricing 
scheme. 
However, such considerations suggest that dominant undertakings will not turn to 
predatory pricing as a first defense against competition.  Yet if potential or existing rivals 
pose an existential threat to the dominant undertaking or its managers, loss aversion and the 
endowment effect more likely will apply to the sum of future profits threatened over the 
short-term losses required to initiate predation.  Entry might pose the complete loss of 
monopoly profits, or the personal loss of a job.  Significant existing market power that 
increases the probability of recoupment lowers the balance of risks in favor of predation.  It 
also compounds the attachment to maintaining monopoly profits over avoiding short-term 
                                                 
263
 Strader, supra n.119 at 219-221. 
91 
 
losses.  Given the potential interaction of heuristics in this context, dominant undertakings 
likely will attempt to narrow the scope of the practice by directing predation only at limited 
markets where their closest, or potentially closest, competitors operate. 
Antitrust law cares little about monopoly losses unless those losses cause consumer harm, 
which in the case of predatory pricing means subsequently higher prices from deterring entry 
or competition.  The question of consumer harm turns on the market power existing after the 
price-cut, and the time frame over which to evaluate higher prices.  If considerable market 
power exists, then recoupment should occur expeditiously, even if dominant firm managers 
did not initiate the predation to maximize profits. 
2. Availability Heuristic & Overconfidence Bias 
The availability heuristic states that individuals allow anecdotal evidence, such as 
whether a similar event comes readily to mind, to influence probability calculations.
264
  
Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) has modeled entry in game theoretic terms, which not only 
assumes that incumbents and entrants individually act rationally, but further assumes that, in 
deciding whether to enter or how to respond to entry, each party accounts for the rationality 
of the other party, essentially by asking: “If I believe that my competitors are rational and act 
to maximize their own payoffs, how should I take their behavior into account when making 
my decisions?”265  Players prefer “dominant strategies,” which maximize welfare no matter 
what the other player does.  But they often settle for a “Nash Equilibrium,” which maximizes 
welfare given what the other player does.
266
 
In the game of entry, incumbents and entrants both might exhibit bounded rationality and 
further plan for the other party exhibiting bounded rationality.  The possibility of incumbents 
and entrants maximizing welfare subject to heuristics adds additional uncertainty to the entry 
game, since each participant must determine, prior to acting, whether the other party will 
respond rationally or boundedly rationally.  The availability heuristic fosters no such 
uncertainty, however, because it reinforces the attractiveness of predation assuming entry 
constitutes a repeated game. 
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In the standard NPT model of rational entry, the entrant may or may not view the entry 
game as recurring, but for the monopolist, combating entry will constitute a repeated game, 
in which reputation matters.
267
  Monopolist managers know that future entrants will study 
how the monopolist responded to entry when calculating their strategies.
268
  Facially 
irrational actions, such as pricing below cost, actually may prove rational and maximize 
profits over the long-term by deterring entry.
269
 
Given all the information available, for example, a rival may determine that entry would 
yield profits because a rational, profit-maximizing monopolist would refrain from predating 
post-entry.  But if, in fact, the monopolist had predated after each prior entry attempt, the 
rival cannot plan for the monopolist pricing rationally post-entry.  Both the increased 
uncertainty conjured by previous instances of predation and the actual threat of losses could 
deter profit-maximizing entry.  Ostensibly irrational predatory pricing constitutes a long-term 
profit-maximizing strategy,
270
 a behavioral entry barrier that exists because the entrant cannot 
rely on the incumbent maximizing short-term profits post-entry.
271
 
The availability heuristic reinforces the attractiveness of predation if entry constitutes a 
repeated game.  In deciding whether to enter, a rival likely will overemphasize the prospect 
of predation if the monopolist previously has predated, particularly if the monopolist 
predated recently, because of the availability heuristic.  In calculating the probability of 
predation assuming imperfect information, which almost always exists, prior similar 
instances of predation will distort the entrant’s assessment of whether the monopolist will 
predate again post-entry. 
An entrant subject to the availability heuristic is more likely to forego profitable entry, 
raising the profitability and probability of predation occurring even if the incumbent cannot 
recover the full investment in below-cost pricing until the game repeats, perhaps in the 
distant future.  In this instance, similar to limit pricing, predation could prolong a lower level 
of monopoly profits yet still maximize profits over the long-term.  In deciding whether to 
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predate, the monopolist might account for the uncertainty generated and the intimidating 
effect on future entrants captured by the availability heuristic. 
Quantifying reputation effects in the context of examining rationality or the availability 
heuristic will prove difficult and could amount to testimony by rival managers who presently 
could gain from weakening the monopolist’s position by claiming deterrence.  Quantification 
difficulties, however, do not negate the existence of the phenomenon.  Objective evidence 
that illuminates the motivations for, and potential consequences following, significant price-
cuts in monopolized markets is relevant to whether predation exists.
272
  Quantification 
difficulties might affect the weight attached to such evidence. 
Overconfidence bias also might afflict current and future entrants, counteracting the 
effect of the availability heuristic by causing entrants to discount the risk of both predation 
and failure post-entry, and to view the probability of successful entry more highly than 
rationality dictates.  Professor Tor has documented how rivals, when contemplating entry, 
often exhibit “insensitivity to the expected intensity of competition in high-profit industries” 
post-entry, while also ignoring entry barriers.
273
 
Professor Leslie, by contrast, has described how overconfidence bias also might afflict 
the monopolist in that “the more that a firm values an outcome — [] monopoly power — the 
more likely it is that overconfidence will bias the decision-making process.”274  While 
proving overconfidence bias in court would appear nonsensical, its operation on the 
dominant undertaking again might alter the error-cost analysis applied to predation.  
Knowing that the overconfidence of rivals might prompt entry notwithstanding the existence 
of structural entry barriers could encourage the dominant company to consider other means 
to thwart rivals and to raise behavioral entry barriers, such as predation. 
Although behavioral economics offers no theoretical means to determine which heuristic 
ultimately might cause or prevent predation, the issue simply might depend on the evidence 
proffered.  Such evidence certainly appears relevant to explaining the potential competitive 
consequences of predatory pricing.  At a theoretical level, a pragmatic analysis highlights the 
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profit-maximizing potential of predation,
275
 or alternatively, refutes the claim that predation 
rarely ever occurs.  Most relevant behavioral considerations illustrate this:
276
 
(1) the availability heuristic operating on the potential entrant, 
(2) the overconfidence of the monopolist, 
(3) bounded self-interest operating on the monopolist,277 and 
(4) loss aversion and the endowment effect influencing both the entrant and 
monopolist.
278
 
So does the rational NPT view that entry constitutes a repeated game in which a reputation 
for predation can deter entry. 
Such theoretical profitability, however, does not mean that predation will occur 
frequently.  But it will occur if market power exists.  The current error-cost framework 
applied to predation, which focuses on the self-defeating aspects of the practice,
279
 assumes 
surrounding competitive market conditions, not the reality of insufficient competition that 
monopoly poses. 
VI. Conclusion 
I can discern no imminent end to the reign of NPT over U.S. predatory pricing law.  
Simply by examining the number of plaintiff wins in U.S. federal appellate courts since 
Brooke Group, a casual observer could conclude that U.S. federal appellate judges have 
found scant evidence of market power in predating companies over the last 22 years.  Or 
perhaps a misperception pervades the current application of predation law, in which judges 
assume that competition operates equivalently both in perfectly competitive and monopolistic 
markets.  Judges assume that all firms, despite the existence of market power, are capable, at 
all times, of pricing, or entering and pricing, at the monopolist’s AVC, a price at which the 
monopolist does not even cover its current operating costs, and at which the monopolist does 
not otherwise price.  Perhaps legal realism has influenced enforcement: Predatory pricing 
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litigation can last for years and costs a great deal for everyone involved; judges like clearing 
their dockets; and cost tests provide a convenient filter to dismiss predation cases.
280
  
Whatever the actual answer, the application of NPT to predation law need not operate as an 
insurmountable barrier to enforcement.  U.S. judges must acknowledge that market power or 
dominance can exist in the U.S. economy, and appreciate the potential anticompetitive 
effects that follow from that finding, in predation law and monopolization law generally.
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CHAPTER 3: EU PREDATORY PRICING LAW & ECONOMICS 
I. Introduction1 
Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) is not just an American mode of analysis.  EU 
Institutions have crafted a predatory pricing doctrine based on the very same tenets of NPT 
— rationality, competition, and efficiency — that shaped U.S. predation doctrine.  The legal 
tests differ, however.  EU Institutions have demanded proof of dominance, below-cost 
pricing, and, until recently, proof of an intention to exclude for prices between AVC and 
average total cost (ATC),
2
 though no longer.
3
 
The EU considers pricing below-AVC irrational as well, to which it attaches a 
presumption of illegality.  But the EU further considers pricing below-ATC but above-AVC 
irrational,
4
 since over the medium-to-long-term, an undertaking must cover total costs to 
remain in business.  Potential rivals also focus on the ATC of the dominant undertaking when 
deciding whether to enter a market, since that cost represents the minimum price that rivals 
must match to remain viable beyond the short-term.  More generally, the equilibrium market 
price, or the medium- to long-term price on which supply and demand forces rest, will equal 
the long-run marginal costs of production.
5
  An undertaking pricing below ATC or long-run 
average incremental cost (LRAIC) incurs a loss with each sale — namely, the failure to cover 
a relative apportionment of fixed or long-run incremental costs, respectively. 
By contemplating liability for prices between AVC and ATC, the EU has promoted a 
view of efficient pricing beyond the short-term.  As-efficient competitors generally need to 
match price-cuts down to ATC or LRAIC, a standard that obviously promotes greater 
competition as such, since it permits a greater number of rivals to compete, whether or not 
overall lower prices result.  Absent super-dominance, price-cuts above ATC are legal, which 
strengthens pricing freedom. 
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Even longer-term cost tests promote only static efficiency and ignore the existing 
competitive structure.  The as-efficient competitor test permits dominant undertakings to 
price more efficiently when attempting to exclude rivals.  Yet successful predation lowers 
market-wide efficiency, which judges and competition authorities can determine only by 
examining market conditions and the health of competition after the challenged price-cut 
takes effect.  Cost tests substitute the hypothetical efficiency of competitors for consumer 
welfare,
6
 when the existence of either equally efficient or less efficient competitors could 
prevent recoupment after the lower price phase.  Post Danmark recently demanded 
anticompetitive effects for prices between incremental costs and ATC, a nod to this analysis. 
In the right factual setting, EU predation law could veer away from price as the 
centerpiece of analysis.  The Commission Guidance on enforcing A.102 mentions 
undistorted competition only in the first paragraph,
7
 but as a treaty obligation, it can bind EU 
courts when applicable.  While vague, the concept likely incorporates more than just price 
effects.  The Commission has discussed the importance of quality, variety, and innovation to 
the competitive process, while emphasizing price.
8
  Because price levels remain the focus of 
the predation claim, however, even in an unusual factual setting, NPT will remain relevant to 
the analysis. 
As another theoretical point to consider, EU Institutions implicitly have accounted for the 
psychology of predation and the exclusionary potential of the availability heuristic as far 
back as AKZO.  The Commission stated that the combination of AKZO’s market power and 
its repeated instances of price-cuts in response to attempted entry intimidated and deterred 
subsequent entry attempts by projecting a determination to block entry.
9
  On appeal, the 
Court of Justice nevertheless required proof of below-cost pricing.
10
 
The chapter proceeds by examining, in Part II, the influence of the NPT concepts of 
rationality, competition, and efficiency over EU predation law.  The rationality subsection 
focuses on the ATC benchmark, maximizing profits, and predating rationally.  The 
subsection on competition closely considers perfect competition, “normal” competition, 
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market structure — and its relation to anticompetitive foreclosure — and promoting pricing 
restraints on the dominant undertaking.  In the efficiency subsection, I assess the as-efficient 
competitor test, examine potential cost measures, consider the legal effect of Post Danmark 
on prices between the AVC and ATC of the dominant undertaking, review above-cost 
predation, evaluate the distinction between price restraints and non-price restraints, and 
investigate non-cost measures of efficiency.  After identifying a source of behavioral 
economics in EU predation law in Part III, I conclude in Part IV. 
II. Influence of Neoclassical Price Theory On EU Predation Law 
In addition to requiring the existence of dominance, or substantial market power, the 
predation test employed by EU courts and regulators also incorporates the major tenets of 
Neoclassical Price Theory (“NPT”) — rationality, competition, and efficiency.  Adopting a 
cost test to evaluate predation claims demonstrates a firm belief that the principles of NPT 
maximize welfare when applied to the predation context, even if focusing on other NPT 
concepts might result in a more expansive inquiry and greater levels of welfare. 
A. Rationality 
1. Cost Tests & Maximizing Profits 
At a price below average variable cost (AVC), a monopolist maximizes profits by ceasing 
production; continued production constitutes irrational pricing.
11
  Identifying instances in 
which dominant undertakings price “irrationally” warrants closer examination because 
market survival depends on rational pricing.  Another profit-maximizing motivation must 
exist prompting a dominant firm to forgo short-term revenue.  After determining that Tetra 
Pak priced below AVC (and average total cost), for instance, the EU Commission stated: 
“This [pricing below cost] again confirms that Tetra Pak’s conduct was opposed to any 
economic rationality other than as part of an eviction strategy.”12 
The Commission also found the possibility of irrational pricing below ATC (and AVC) in 
Wanadoo, holding that by failing to recover accounting costs, which include an economic 
rate of return, defendant Wanadoo “was hovering close to, but always slightly on the wrong 
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side of, the borders of economic rationality.”13  Wanadoo operated at a loss for two years 
while failing to generate surplus profits on other product lines.
14
  To strengthen a finding of 
unmeritorious competition, the Commission decided that “[a]n analysis of full costs is 
necessary in [] light of [] Community case-law [].”15  Defendant “was aware of the dangers 
associated with its pricing of ADSL services from a very early stage,” yet nevertheless 
“knowingly weighed a short-term profitability objective against an objective of vigorous 
penetration of the market, and [] it deliberately sacrificed the first [short-term profitability] to 
the second [widespread market penetration]”.16   
The irrational below-cost pricing harmed consumers only if the overall scheme proved 
rational by ultimately “lead[ing] to [the] maximization of profits through [] exclusionary or 
other anticompetitive effects”.17  The total cost standard reflected an alternative notion of 
rationality and suggested that while cost measures attempt to set a floor for rational pricing, 
various cost measures exist.  NPT does not dictate precisely which measure to apply,
18
 
though it does support inquiring into recoupment. 
NPT itself likewise does not necessarily define rational pricing by whether an 
undertaking prices above an appropriate cost measure.  When attempting to identify profit 
maximizing price-cuts, both the time-frame over which, and the juncture at which, to 
evaluate the decision matters.  As to the time-frame, no undertaking possesses 
comprehensive market knowledge.  Each undertaking requires a margin of discretion when 
setting prices within which to test competing hypotheses concerning how best to meet 
consumer preferences while maximizing profits.
19
 
Ex ante, undertakings cannot know for sure whether pricing decisions will prove 
profitable.  By constantly testing demand conditions, an undertaking can build up 
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institutional knowledge that allows it to adjust more responsively and profitably to market 
conditions going forward.  A pricing decision may produce losses over the short-term but 
generate profits over the medium- to long-term.  For instance, in response to fickle short-term 
consumer preferences, cutting prices below a particular cost measure could minimize losses 
rather than shutting-down.  Rational pricing also could include raising prices when enough 
consumers fail to switch to substitute products. 
Conversely, an undertaking may believe that a pricing decision will maximize profits, 
and that decision in fact may maximize profits in the short-term.  Observed over a longer 
period, however, it may prove irrational.  A price-cut may fail to stimulate demand, or a 
price-increase may drive customers to rivals or attract entrants into the market. Or lower 
pricing could result in inadequate revenues to differentiate sufficiently to meet evolving 
consumer preferences.  Innovation, involving pricing decisions or otherwise, cannot occur 
without a margin of discretion to experiment. 
The law does not burden dominant undertakings with a legal test that turns on the 
rationality of pricing as determined by a legal expert.  It rather targets exclusionary pricing 
that temporarily sacrifices profits below a threshold that reveals a plan to exclude and earn 
profits by unmeritorious competition.  As the designated threshold, cost tests also supply 
undertakings with a safe harbor above which they can avoid legal liability when 
experimenting with pricing. 
2. ATC More Relevant to Rival 
By charging a price that does not include a proportionate fraction of fixed costs per unit 
of output, the dominant undertaking fails to cover overhead expenses.  A profit-maximizing 
undertaking cannot remain in business beyond the short-term unless the market price reaches 
average total cost (ATC), avoidable costs, or long run average incremental cost (LRAIC). 
The average variable cost (AVC) measure seeks to identify predatory pricing by 
delineating the line between rational and irrational pricing from the perspective of the alleged 
dominant undertaking.  From the perspective of the targeted undertaking or a potential 
entrant, the ATC of the dominant undertaking represents the more relevant benchmark.  A 
competitor is more interested in the minimum price that the dominant undertaking must 
charge to remain in business beyond the short-term.  The ATC or LRAIC of the dominant 
undertaking represents the efficient price that the rival must achieve to compete effectively 
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against the dominant undertaking absent predation.  Any price below that measure could 
deter as-efficient competition, since rivals will enter a market only when the anticipated 
equilibrium price exceeds their own projected ATC.
20
  
A price below the dominant undertaking’s ATC, avoidable costs, or LRAIC also could 
bankrupt an existing rival that lacks the profit base, product diversification, or financing 
necessary to supplement a price that yields an operating loss on each unit of output.  In the 
least competitive industries, or those featuring substantial fixed or sunk costs, this dynamic 
will prove most acute, permitting dominant undertakings to deter or eliminate rivals merely 
by pricing below ATC, avoidable costs, or LRAIC.
21
 
3. Rationally Predating 
Rationality also encompasses predating at the lowest cost possible to a dominant firm.
22
  
AKZO engaged in low-cost predation in the sense of “concentrat[ing] its price cuts on the 
flour additives market,” a market “extremely important to [its rival] ECS but of relatively 
minor significance to AKZO in the context of its overall organic peroxides business”.23  
Avoiding the significant losses that would follow predating in a multiplicity of markets, 
AKZO adopted the strategy of “achieving its aim at the lowest cost to itself”24 — a rational 
pursuit in accord with NPT. 
The EU Commission has closely examined predation strategies that leverage dominance 
across markets, termed “cross-subsidization”.  For example, Tetra Pak operated in four 
adjacent markets — aseptic machines and cartons and non-aseptic machines and cartons, 
maintaining dominance to varying degrees in the machine and aseptic markets — but faced 
competition from upstarts in the cartons and non-aseptic markets.  According to the 
Commission, Tetra Pak pursued the exclusionary strategy of contractually requiring 
purchasers of machines, who also purchased cartons, to purchase cartons exclusively from 
Tetra Pak for the life of the machine.  Tetra Pak then sold cartons below both AVC and ATC, 
a rational strategy because: 
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Tetra Pak thereby limits competition to the area which is most favorable to it, 
i.e. that of machines, where the technological entry barriers are very high, 
especially on the aseptic market, where it enjoys a virtual monopoly.  [T]hese 
same contractual clauses prevent the emergence of any competition in the 
cartons sector, where the technological barriers are much lower.
25
 
Conjoining tying and below-cost pricing, but only to certain markets, enabled Tetra Pak to 
maximize the chance of earning profits while predating by minimizing losses. 
B. Competition 
1. Model of Perfect Competition 
Now consider the extent to which EU predation law has incorporated the Neoclassical 
Price Theory (NPT) concept of competition.  NPT generally conceives of competition as that 
state of economic affairs existing in perfect competition, where many suppliers produce a 
homogenous, undifferentiated product, and no supplier has significant control over price.  A 
perfectly competitive market does not feature entry barriers, meaning that no firm can earn 
more than economic profits because supra-competitive profits would attract expanded 
production or entry.  EU monopolization law generally attempts to promote this NPT 
paradigm.
26
   
The model of perfect competition applies with particular relevance to predation claims 
because the victim of predation alleges anticompetitive exclusion from low prices.  And 
perfect competition depicts the lowest price that an undertaking may charge in the short-run 
while still competing on the merits.  In a peculiar twist, the short-term competitive paradigm, 
pricing at marginal cost, also constitutes the lower limit to competitive pricing.  A predation 
test anchored at marginal cost therefore allows the greatest and most exclusionary price-cut 
consistent with continued operations; any deeper price-cut would warrant shutting-down.  
Consumers have access to short-term lower prices of the highest magnitude, yet a marginal 
cost standard, or AVC proxy, further maximizes the likelihood that price-cuts around this 
threshold will exclude competitors and ultimately cause higher prices.  
When evaluating predation claims, EU Institutions have examined how closely the 
relevant market conditions resemble either perfect competition or monopoly to predict 
whether the alleged dominant undertaking later could profit from currently low prices by 
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subsequently raising prices without prompting expanded production or entry.  While a 
monopolist and an undertaking operating in a competitive market could lower price below 
cost, only the monopolist later could earn supra-competitive profits after excluding 
competitors.  Because the relevant market structure separates the two scenarios, EU 
Institutions also have defined competition by reference to market structure.   
Before further discussing that concept, I consider how “normal competition” relates to 
the NPT view of competition. 
2. Normal Competition 
Normal competition equates with competition on the merits, or competition based on 
“performance”.27  Normal competition thus embodies the competition envisioned by 
Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) that drives both imperfectly competitive and monopolized 
markets towards the efficiency-maximizing model of perfect competition.  Predatory pricing 
can distort the proper functioning of the price mechanism.  The dominant undertaking 
inefficiently over-produces the relevant product, sending the inaccurate signal that costs of 
production are lower than reality.  The over-production permits consumers who are not even 
willing to pay for production costs to purchase the product.  The dominant undertaking could 
forgo this societal loss by producing products for which consumers are willing to pay the 
production costs.  Additionally, efficient rivals also reading the inaccurate price signals, who 
could have produced the product at cost, now must reinvest resources into producing other 
products or services that consumers may not value as highly.  Predation thus misrepresents 
market signals and corrupts the price mechanism, leading to weakened competition and 
inefficiency. 
This outcome followed in Tetra Pak, facilitated by patents and technological barriers 
protecting both the carton and machine markets.
28
  The Commission remarked that “[i]t is 
barely conceivable that undertakings whose conduct is dictated by the laws of the market 
would be able to impose contractual clauses on their clients as restrictive as [those imposed 
by Tetra Pak].”29  Tetra Pak priced non-aseptic cartons individually at un-remunerative levels 
to exclude rivals, at least partially enabled by its dominant position in the aseptic markets.  
The exclusionary scheme “allow[ed] a trading policy to be pursued which no longer 
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respect[ed] the economic reality of prices.”30  The Commission intervened to promote price 
competition such that supply and demand in the non-aseptic carton market again could 
produce efficient prices.  NPT favors restoring to markets the accurate transmission of 
information and signals encapsulated by the price mechanism.   
Deutsche Post employed a related strategy, using profits earned in the government-
sanctioned monopolized market for standardized mail to fund below-cost pricing in the mail-
order parcel services market.
31
  The Commission again assessed liability because of the 
inefficiency generated by predation. 
3. Structure 
Predation claims cannot proceed unless the Commission initially finds dominance.  
Dominance means that the Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) model of monopoly applies to 
the relevant market.  Entry barriers exist, the defendant produces a sizable portion of market 
output, and it can control price levels.  Dominance at least conceptually supports a 
presumption that predation could prove rational and profitable; recoupment is possible.   
At times, EU Institutions have attempted to promote more legal notions of competition 
when deciding abuse of dominance cases.  A primary reason is treaty obligation.  Former 
Article 3(1)(g) EC, now Protocol No. 27 of the Treaty of Lisbon, requires that EU 
Institutions establish a system of undistorted competition.
32
  No similar provision has 
required Community Institutions to maximize efficiency or total welfare,
33
 though Treaty 
drafters and signatories must have presumed that a market structure that promoted 
undistorted competition generally would maximize welfare.
34
 
The concept raises the question of what is the baseline or benchmark for competition, the 
counterfactual that would exist absent distortion.  From what does the challenged conduct 
distort competition?
35
  The treaties do not address the question of what qualifies as 
undistorted competition, or how to achieve an undistorted structure of competition.  Mooted 
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answers by EU Institutions have included “individual freedom of action, the protection of 
market operators against the exercise of economic power by others, the consumer interest in 
the guarantee of a cheap [and desirable] supply of [] goods[,] and a collective interest in 
promoting technical innovation”.36   
Unfortunately, however, this non-inclusive list does not translate into principles useful in 
determining, for instance, when a low price qualifies as predation.  Existing law, in any 
event, does not require that the Commission demonstrate insufficient freedom of action, 
inadequate supply as indicated by exploitative prices, or insufficient technical innovation, 
when establishing an abuse of dominance.
37
  The unconfined boundaries of concepts such as 
economic freedom could facilitate unprincipled and overly aggressive, and thus welfare-
detracting, enforcement levels.
38
  The freedom to compete, for instance, does not distinguish 
between efficient and inefficient, or close and distant, competitors.
39
  Should governments 
subsidize companies that allow more efficient undertakings to charge higher prices?  Should 
it finance wasteful research that has little chance of improving welfare or appealing to 
consumer preferences? 
Market structures that promote undistorted competition likely represent markets that 
approach the perfectly competitive paradigm.  That benchmark appears as viable as any, 
though perfectly competitive markets rarely exist.  Nor would society want all markets, at all 
times, to approach perfect competition.  EU policy-makers may have envisioned another 
concept of competition such as “workable” competition,40 which supports the quest for 
market power that drives innovation.  Or they simply may have meant market conditions that 
foster rivalry or facilitate price and quality competition and innovation.   
The Commission Guidance Paper on Enforcement Priorities in Applying A.102 TFEU — 
which, unlike treaty obligations, does not legally compel anything — states that rivalry 
drives innovation.  Without the immediate threat of losing market share to potential or 
existing competitors, undertakings have little incentive to innovate, operate efficiently, or 
pass on efficiency gains to consumers.  That position, of course, directly opposes the 
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Austrian stance that the pursuit of market power and monopoly profits drive innovation.
41
  
Particularly given faint competition, the Guidance Paper continued, promoting rivalry 
outweighs all other considerations.
42
  Rivalry reaches its peak in perfect competition.  And 
monopoly maximizes the profits that make investment attractive.  Regardless of the precise 
analogy, EU law could benefit from the conceptual framework provided by NPT, in terms of 
tracking and nudging the evolution of markets between the perfectly competitive and 
monopolistic paradigms. 
i. Entry Barriers 
Promoting competition to ensure an effective market structure alternatively could mean, 
when examining whether an anticompetitive abuse has occurred, focusing on the strength of 
entry barriers.  As applied to predation analysis, EU Institutions have sought to examine 
whether predation significantly weakens the existing structure of competition, a result more 
likely if entry barriers exist.  The degree of dominance greatly influences the likelihood of 
predation succeeding, and the strength of entry barriers is a leading indicator of dominance.   
Before examining costs in Compagnie Maritime Belge, for example, the Court of Justice 
noted that the liner conference “has a very large market share and has held it for some time,” 
demonstrating “a position of strength”43 and formidable entry barriers.  Having determined 
that weakened competition existed, and that entry barriers prevented any process of 
competitive regeneration, the Court of Justice stated that Compagnie Maritime Belge had a 
special responsibility not to impair further the existing structure of competition.
44
  The more 
dominant an undertaking, the more restrictively that special responsibility applies.  At its 
apogee, the special responsibility prevented Compagnie Maritime Belge from offering above-
cost discounts to its only competitor’s customers.45 
The existence and operation of entry barriers have represented primary factors for 
analysis in EU predation cases.  The Commission in AKZO, for example, determined that 
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entry barriers, including start-up costs, had weakened competition sufficiently to render 
predation an effective strategy: 
Apart from ECS there appear to have been no recent entrants to the organic 
peroxides market.  Having regard to the high start-up costs, and the market 
structure, it is most unlikely that new producers, knowing the likely reaction 
of AKZO, will be ready to enter the market.
46
 
The Commission here refers to two separate categories of entry barriers.  High start-up costs, 
a structural feature of the market, prevented competitors from entering or re-entering the 
market after AKZO raised prices.  The act of repeatedly predating in response to competitive 
entry or expansion deterred its recurrence; it thus constituted the other category of entry 
barrier.
47
  The interaction between structural and behavioral entry barriers raised the 
probability of recoupment and further demonstrated that predation can alter the existing 
structure of a market, protecting or enhancing the monopoly power of a dominant 
undertaking.
48
 
The institutional relationship forged between France Telecom and Wanadoo provides an 
additional example of entry barriers that financially made predation an operable strategy.
49
  
France Telecom granted preferential treatment to Wanadoo, in the form of exclusive access 
to “commercial and technical deployment facilities and potential financial support”.50  
Competition as conceived by the Commission and the General Court did not proceed on the 
relative merits of plaintiff’s and Wanadoo’s ability to provide desirable products or services 
at low-cost.  Only Wanadoo could use France Telecom’s distribution network, which 
involved a maze of exclusive commercial relationships.  The advantages of that network 
would have required a fortune in time and money to replicate.
51
  The Commission and 
General Court found that the structure of the market, coupled with below-cost pricing, 
prevented competition on the merits.
52
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ii. Foreclosure versus Anticompetitive Foreclosure 
The concept of foreclosure concerns preventing rivals from accessing or continuing to 
operate on a relevant market.  Foreclosure can occur for competitive or anticompetitive 
reasons, for example following a price-cut.  Promoting rivalry and undistorted competition 
by preventing foreclosure, without further inquiring into the likely effect on consumers, has 
motivated Commission enforcement actions at times.  A potential explanation, previously 
recognized by Community Institutions, is to ensure equality of opportunity for “all direct or 
indirect users of [] products, wholesalers and retailers”.53  The purpose of EC competition 
law, according to this formulation, is to preserve the “freedom to compete at any level in the 
chain of distribution”.54  By holding that the Commission need not demonstrate that conduct 
challenged under A.102 “had any actual or direct effect on consumers,”55 the General Court 
in British Airways implicitly supported the freedom to compete paradigm.  It also reinforced 
previous findings by EU Courts that when dominant undertakings offer loyalty rebates, they 
generally harm consumers, enough to avoid further inquiry. 
A policy of preventing foreclosure and protecting the freedom to compete — when 
insufficiently supported by actual or likely consumer harm — could sustain high prices.  It 
would do so by prohibiting price-cuts from supra-competitive levels or by undertakings 
operating more efficiently.  The competitive structure propagated here not only could raise 
prices in the relevant market, by sustaining uncompetitive companies, it also could preclude 
the more efficient and cost-effective production of goods and services in other markets, 
where those companies might compete more effectively. 
In recent guidelines concerning enforcing Article 102, which again do not carry legal 
force, the Commission distinguished between foreclosure, or excluding competitors, and 
anticompetitive foreclosure, “that is exclusion of competitors that leads to consumer harm.”56  
A competition authority or judge aiming to prevent foreclosure or to promote rivalry will 
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focus on the welfare of competitors when examining exclusionary conduct.
57
  A competition 
authority or judge targeting anticompetitive foreclosure also might attempt to prevent 
foreclosure or promote rivalry and thereby protect competitors, but only particular 
competitors that advance consumer welfare.  Such competitors restrain the dominant 
undertaking from raising price or curbing quality or innovation.
58
   
A foreclosure analysis simply asks whether the challenged conduct has or will eliminate a 
rival.  An anticompetitive foreclosure analysis goes further, examining how the elimination 
of rivals will affect market conditions and ultimately consumers.  A shift in analytical focus 
towards consumer welfare underlines the importance of Neoclassical Price Theory in 
assessing the competitive effects of foreclosure.
59
  NPT enables prognostication and testing a 
counterfactual hypothesis, such as comparing consumer welfare after the alleged 
exclusionary conduct significantly weakened or eliminated rivals (the existing or soon-to-
exist scenario), to consumer welfare if that conduct had not occurred (the hypothetical 
scenario).
60
  Exclusion that raises prices or lowers efficiency converts foreclosure into 
anticompetitive foreclosure. 
While consistent with a structural analysis in that the competition authority or judge must 
examine 
 entry barriers, 
 the extent of product differentiation, 
 the present and potential scale of the monopolist and rivals, and 
 the evolution of the market, 
consumer welfare guides which competing market structure to prefer.  Price levels represent 
the foremost metric of consumer welfare, but the relationship between price and the costs of 
the dominant undertaking, quality, variety, and innovation also matter. 
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4. Promoting Restraint 
The EU understanding of competition historically has emphasized the restraint that 
particular rivals exert on each other.  For example, in AKZO, the Commission stated that 
maintaining competition may require protecting a smaller or inefficient rival, if its behavior 
disproportionately restrains the monopolist.  The idea is that “[t]he importance of a particular 
firm to the maintenance of competition does not depend so much upon its size as upon the 
impetus and direction of the competition which it provides to the larger established 
producers.”61  This doctrine promotes a more focused view of the competitive pairings or 
spheres of competition that actually enhance consumer welfare.   
Targeting efficiency might permit a dominant undertaking to eliminate smaller or less 
efficient rivals.  Competitive constraints analysis entails a more circumspect inquiry into 
competition, focused on whether a particular competitor, however efficient, constrains the 
dominant undertaking from pricing higher, providing worse service, or innovating less.
62
  If a 
particular rival does prevent such competitive ills, competition and consumers benefit from 
its existence in the market, and Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) could support antitrust 
enforcement to ensure its survival.  NPT aims to promote not only the efficiency achieved in 
perfect competition, but equally important, the vigorous price and quality competition 
depicted in that model.  Economists and policy-makers generally look to perfect competition 
as a paradigm because, in many if not most market settings, consumers would fare best given 
its existence.  Promoting incentives to invest and innovate can constitute countervailing 
concerns. 
C. Efficiency63 
When markets operate efficiently, consumer preferences exert the greatest influence on 
what suppliers produce.  Suppliers provide such goods and services at the cheapest price 
possible.  The model of perfect competition depicts this peak of consumer satisfaction.  
Suppliers earn only an economic rate of return under such conditions, so they do everything 
they can, sometimes legal, sometimes illegal, to avoid perfect competition.  Suppliers prefer 
monopoly.  When no rivals exist or could appear in response to price increases, then 
suppliers produce an amount that drives the biggest wedge between cost and price, thereby 
                                                 
61
 ECS/AKZO [1985] OJ L374/1, at ¶ 86. 
62
 Evans, supra n.58 at 53, 60. 
63
 On the essentials of efficiency under NPT, see Strader, supra n.18 at 209-212 (& sources cited therein). 
111 
 
maximizing profits and the transfer in surplus from consumers to producers.  Suppliers 
become rich.  Only relatively more wealthy consumers or particularly avid fans of the 
product can afford to purchase it.  Everyone else spends their money on less desirable 
products.  The interaction between the monopolist and consumers determines market-wide 
conditions.
64
 
1. As-Efficient Competitor Test 
To identify price-cuts that do not qualify as merit competition, judges and competition 
authorities conduct an as-efficient competitor test, which compares the production costs of 
the dominant undertaking to the price level existing after a challenged price-cut.  If the price 
falls below average variable cost — if the undertaking prices beneath a proxy for the most 
efficient price that would have maximized consumer welfare in perfect competition — then 
not even an efficient rival could have matched the price-cut.  Other cost measures gauge 
efficiency beyond the short-term.  Unmeritorious competition justifies liability.    
Applying the as-efficient competitor test as the sole measure of predation indicates a 
predominant interest in preserving static efficiency.
65
  The relevant question turns on whether 
the dominant undertaking has priced below an appropriate measure of cost, not on the 
competitive effects of the price-cut.  Such effects include whether the exclusion of particular 
competitors eventually will lead to higher prices or reduced quality and innovation, or 
whether the excluded competitors reasonably could have achieved the efficiency of the 
dominant undertaking in the near future.  The as-efficient competitor test exclusively targets 
efficiency in a relative sense.  Recoupment attempts to assess the market-wide efficiency, or 
net effect, of predation.
66
 
“A true as efficient competitor test” would involve a more detailed analysis of market 
conditions, “necessitat[ing] an evaluation and comparison of the cost structures of the 
targeted rivals and of the dominant undertaking.”67  In setting a legal standard that complies 
with the rule of law, and thus in ensuring that dominant undertakings can evaluate the 
legality of their pricing practices, EU courts have refrained from asking dominant 
undertakings to temper price-cuts based on a direct comparison of costs.  Such information 
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may not be publicly available,
68
 and promoting the exchange of such information could 
encourage collusion.  By eliminating the need to evaluate the costs of competitors and the 
consequences of actual exclusion, the as-efficient competitor test saves the dominant 
undertaking legal costs and the judicial system administrative expenses. 
2. Better Efficiency Measure: AVC, AAC, ATC, LRAIC? 
As a matter of Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT), the duration over which to evaluate 
efficiency, or merit-based pricing, separates the competing cost-measures, average variable 
cost (AVC) and average total cost (ATC), discussed by the Court of Justice in AKZO.
69
  A 
monopolist will price at a proxy for the most competitive price, absent short-term 
considerations, only when dominance no longer exists.  It normally will shut-down rather 
than price below AVC.  A monopolist will keep prices around an efficiency measure that 
includes both variable and fixed costs when competitive restraints approach the competitive 
paradigm.  It will price below ATC or long-run average incremental cost (LRAIC) to exclude 
as well, since it would incur a loss on each sale.  Sustained pricing below these measures also 
would prompt the monopolist to shut-down.
70
  Over the long-term, prices will settle around 
the long-term marginal costs of the monopolist. 
The Commission has recognized the importance of operating profitably even in the short-
term because of the resulting competitive effects.  It stated that “even if the underlying policy 
considerations of Articles [101] and [102] were limited [] to the achievement of short-term 
efficiency,” the ATC test still more accurately assesses relative efficiency: 
[I]t is not only the ‘less efficient’ firms which will be harmed if a dominant 
firm sells below its total cost but above variable cost.  If prices are taken to a 
level where a business does not cover its total costs, smaller but possibly more 
efficient firms will eventually be eliminated and the larger firm with the 
greater economic resources [] will survive.
71
 
By arguing that a price between AVC and ATC “eventually” could exclude an as-efficient 
competitor, the Commission designated the medium-to-long term as the more relevant period 
over which to examine exclusionary pricing.  During that period, ATC more accurately 
measures the efficiency of market-wide pricing.   
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The Commission also may have been expressing the insight that dominant firms and 
competitors alike rarely select price and output levels, or decide whether to enter or depart a 
market, by exclusively examining short-term considerations.  A dominant undertaking will 
not lower price below-cost without considering whether and when it can raise the price again.  
Likewise, a potential or existing rival will not enter or cease production without analyzing its 
prospects over the medium-term. 
The Commission in AKZO expressed a willingness to assess liability to pricing below 
ATC and above AVC if accompanied by evidence that the dominant undertaking intended to 
predate.  The Court of Justice in Post Danmark recently determined that the illegality of 
prices below ATC did not turn on intent evidence.
72
  Post Danmark involved competition 
between two companies that delivered unaddressed mail: “brochures, telephone directories, 
guides,” and newspapers.73  Because defendant Post Danmark had a government-sponsored 
monopoly “in the delivery of addressed letters and parcels not exceeding a certain weight,”74 
it could utilize common resources in both markets.  Forbruger-Kontakt alleged that Post 
Danmark won contracts from existing customers to deliver unaddressed mail by pricing 
below average total costs (ATC) while above incremental costs.
75
 
Similar to its holding in AKZO, the Court of Justice determined that inefficient 
production for purposes of identifying predatory pricing could occur above AVC as well: 
[T]o the extent that a dominant undertaking sets its prices at a level covering 
the great bulk of the costs attributable to the supply of the goods or services in 
question, it will [] be possible for a competitor as efficient as that undertaking 
to compete with those prices without suffering losses that are unsustainable in 
the long term.
76
 
“[T]he great bulk” of a dominant undertaking’s costs will include some fixed costs.  In the 
market for delivering unaddressed mail, the Court of Justice looked beyond the short-term to 
designate the relevant benchmark by which to measure efficient production, “as-efficient” 
competition, or merit competition.  Such competition would transpire around the average 
avoidable costs (AAC) or LRAIC of the dominant undertaking. 
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The Commission Guidelines on Article 82 recommend AAC as the lower threshold for 
liability, which includes all costs, whether variable or fixed, that the dominant undertaking 
could avoid by shutting down.
77
  AAC does not include fixed costs common to the 
production of multiple products.
78
  Without explicitly mentioning AAC, the Court of Justice 
appears to have approved of this cost measure as well.  Because prices were above AVC, 
however, and because the Court did not explicitly state a willingness to presume the illegality 
of price-cuts below AAC, it did not supplant the holding of AKZO on this point.   
The Court discussed the relevant cost benchmarks in terms of incremental costs and 
ATC.  ATC does not represent a political conception of efficiency, but one long-term 
measure of efficiency under NPT.
79
  The Article 102 Guidelines selected LRAIC, or the 
long-run costs to produce an additional increment of output, as the outer benchmark against 
which to measure the efficiency of competitors.
80
  NPT does not dictate which measure more 
accurately identifies efficiency.  The time-frame over which to measure efficient pricing, as 
determined by the selection of a cost benchmark, is a critical policy choice for predation 
enforcement.  It raises the normative question of whether society should encourage dominant 
undertakings to price at an efficient level exclusively over the short-term, or also over the 
long-term.  The answer materially will affect the difficulty of establishing liability. 
Aside from NPT considerations that focus on the dominant undertaking, the choice of a 
cost benchmark raises subtle macroeconomic considerations as well.  Relative to AVC, the 
other cost measures avoid favoring particular industries.  Dominant firms operating in 
capital-intensive industries such as the technology sector require large initial investments and 
have lower variable costs than dominant firms operating in labor-intensive industries, 
including service sectors such as healthcare and hospitality.  Assuming at-will labor 
contracts, salaries usually qualify as variable costs.  Dominant technology companies more 
easily can exclude competitors with price-cuts down to AVC compared to dominant 
healthcare companies.  This advantage allows dominant technology companies to achieve a 
relatively higher market capitalization.  If labor accounts for a majority of operating costs, 
then the chief method for lowering costs, raising profits, and competing when demand 
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softens will be to fire workers.  The existence of higher fixed costs provides an alternative 
source from which to cut costs.  While disfavoring dominant firms that hire relatively more 
workers, an AVC test further disfavors entrants precisely in those industries where predation 
is most likely and effective: capital-intensive industries.  Significant entry barriers 
characterize such industries, where prices below ATC or LRAIC most risk bankrupting 
entrants burdened with high start-up costs. 
On the other hand, an ATC or LRAIC benchmark could dampen investment incentives in 
capital-intensive industries if investors there currently count investment returns to include the 
ability to drive competitors from the market with AVC pricing.  Resetting the predation 
threshold to AAC would weaken the ability of dominant firms to eliminate competitors, and 
thus should lower their share prices.  Increased competition could cause the dominant firm to 
discover the next technological breakthrough, however.  Or an ATC or LRAIC threshold 
could enable the dominant firm to enter and compete more effectively in adjacent markets.  
NPT provides no theoretical basis to weigh short-term efficiency against competing 
economic concerns. 
As a matter of liability, an AVC threshold will deter many more predatory pricing suits 
than an AAC, LRAIC, or ATC benchmark, a policy consideration that undoubtedly favors 
the AVC benchmark if predatory pricing is rare and ineffective.  If, however, predatory 
pricing is more prevalent and effective, then a singular AVC threshold likely under-deters 
unmeritorious price-cuts.  Questions of deterrence also raise challenging measurement issues 
that remain largely unanswered during formal predation investigations because of the 
inherently predictive nature of the inquiry.  The fundamental question is empirical and 
evolutionary: Given the existence of significant market power, do price-cuts by a company 
responding to entry or expanded production result in lower or higher prices over time?  
Because a cost measure that incorporates at least a portion of fixed costs better accounts for 
the incentives of competitors and the sustainability of prices beyond the immediate term, it 
more accurately answers the question that predation poses. 
3. Post Danmark & Effects 
A seismic policy shift occurred in 2012 when the EU Court of Justice raised the issue of 
anticompetitive effects in predatory pricing cases.  No longer willing to assess effects based 
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on the intent
81
 of a dominant undertaking when it lowers prices below ATC but above 
average variable cost (AVC), the Court stated that henceforth it would inquire into whether, 
“without objective justification,” the price-cut “produces an actual or likely exclusionary 
effect, to the detriment of competition and, thereby, of consumers’ interests.”82 
A predation doctrine that determines liability based exclusively on whether a monopolist 
lowers price below an appropriate measure of cost equates efficiency to competitive effects.  
From an evidentiary perspective, it assumes adverse market effects based on the inability to 
match price-cuts below the most efficient price of the dominant undertaking.  EU predation 
doctrine historically has ignored other relevant market considerations that could have 
indicated where prices might have settled after an initial price-cut.   
Ultimate price levels determine the net effect of predation on consumers and the medium- 
to long-term efficiency of the practice.  Regardless of the relationship between the challenged 
price and the costs of the dominant undertaking, consumers benefit from price-cuts that 
subsequently do not increase enough to produce higher overall prices, increased market 
power, and recoupment.  Lower prices and less market power do not harm competition.
83
 
4. Above-Cost Predatory Pricing 
Cost tests condemn price-cuts below the shut-down price of the dominant firm not only 
because such prices represent inefficient pricing, which they do.  After all, cost tests permit 
inefficient pricing above cost.  Pricing below AVC demonstrates an exclusionary animus.  
Short- and long-term cost tests literally promote as-efficient competition by not expecting 
competitors to operate at a level of efficiency where even the dominant undertaking would 
incur losses.  Conversely, when a competitor cannot match price-cuts above an appropriate 
measure of cost, the market potentially could operate more efficiently in the competitor’s 
absence.  Cost tests prevent high cost undertakings from continuing to serve consumers when 
a more-efficient firm, whether the monopolist or a rival, could produce that same good at 
lower cost, or utilize the less-efficient firm’s resources to produce another good in another 
market more-efficiently.  In accord with standard precepts of Neoclassical Price Theory 
(NPT), AKZO held that price-cuts above average total cost (ATC) were presumptively legal. 
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Yet NPT could support liability for price-cuts above ATC as well.  In Compagnie 
Maritime Belge, the Court of Justice enjoined price-cuts above ATC (1) because the liner 
conference wielded “super-dominance,” or market power approaching monopoly, (2) 
because it cut prices only on routes where the rival was competing, and (3) because 
eliminating the rival would eradicate all remaining competition in the relevant market.
84
  
Super-dominance meant years of pricing well above cost, formidable and sustained entry 
barriers, and the near absence of functioning competition.  In one sense, the above-cost price-
cuts were efficient because they moved market prices toward the perfectly competitive 
paradigm.  In another sense, the Court recognized that the existence of competition, however 
feeble, constrained the dominant undertaking from inefficiently raising prices even further 
above preexisting levels.   
AG Fennelly argued that “the mere fact that [] prices are not pitched at a level that is 
actually [] below total average (or long-run marginal) costs does not [] render legitimate the 
application of such a pricing policy.”85  In following that argument, the Court signaled that 
efficiency cannot outweigh competition when competition otherwise would not exist.  In 
other words, the Court will not permit near-monopolies, no matter how potentially efficient, 
to eliminate all competition.  More generally, efficiency is one policy consideration that must 
compete with others, perhaps preeminent of which is ensuring the existence of competition. 
Compagnie Martime Belge raises important policy issues.  Because price-cuts represent 
the simplest and most common method of competing, both EU and U.S. Institutions only 
cautiously have sought to prohibit them.  Cost-tests provide a theoretical framework by 
which to cabin the search for anticompetitive price-cuts.  Although rigid and potentially 
inconclusive, cost-tests contribute a degree of determinacy to an otherwise ad hoc and open-
ended market inquiry.  Absent cost tests, competition authorities would have to conduct a 
fact-intensive, merger-like review of all price-cuts initiated by dominant undertakings, aimed 
at predicting how competition would develop in the absence of the targeted competitor.  Such 
an inquiry would entail substantial administrative costs.  Promoting competition in markets 
particularly enfeebled by monopoly power might justify the administrative costs involved.  
That justification loses force, however, in the majority of other markets where price-cuts 
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above cost can represent competition on the merits.  In those many markets, competition 
authorities or judges might have difficulty determining precisely at what level price-cuts 
sufficiently eliminate competitive restraints to permit market-wide higher prices.  
Indeterminacy in assessing an equilibrium price level after prices initially fall could render 
the adjudicative process arbitrary and indeterminate. 
In addition to that concern, preventing exclusion above cost might involve short-
circuiting the primary mechanism by which markets achieve efficiency and maximize 
societal welfare.  By deterring dominant undertakings from cutting prices, a disregard for 
cost tests could place the onus on rivals to lower prices.  On the other hand, cost tests 
represent the belief that allowing dominant undertakings maximum leeway to compete will 
promote consumer interests relative to the absolute existence and process of competition.  
Cost tests theoretically align the interests of consumers and dominant undertakings despite 
the fact that all businesses have a strong incentive to maximize price, along with profits. 
More recently, the Court of Justice rescinded any willingness to condemn price-cuts 
above ATC.  In Post Danmark, the Court held that such cuts were incapable of having “anti-
competitive effects”.86  Economically speaking, that assessment is inaccurate, since short-
term price-cuts above-cost that eliminate or intimidate competitors in a market characterized 
by dominance could lead to recoupment through yet higher-prices.  The result of higher 
prices would depend on the market structure, particularly the strength of entry-barriers. 
Reconciling Compagnie Maritime Belge and Post Danmark, the Court must be saying 
that unless a dominant undertaking holds super-dominance, the consumer benefits of price-
cuts above-cost even in markets characterized by dominance outweigh the material 
administrative costs of conducting a merger-like review to identify anti-competitive price-
cuts.  Without a cost benchmark or the resources to initiate a merger review of the many 
competitive price-cuts above cost, the risk of condemning and deterring competitive price-
cuts outweighs the too indefinite anticompetitive harm inflicted by lower prices above-cost.  
Maintaining competition, therefore, normally requires allowing anti-competitive price-cuts 
above cost in all but exceptional circumstances. 
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5. Price Restraints versus Non-Price Restraints 
The Commission Guidance on applying Article 102 TFEU reflects the extensive 
influence of Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) over EU monopolization law generally, but 
specifically over pricing abuses.  The Guidance Paper carries significant persuasive 
authority, since it applies much of the accumulated learning of NPT.
87
  In evaluating 
exclusionary practices, the Commission targets anticompetitive foreclosure, or foreclosure of 
competitors that ultimately harms consumer welfare.
88
  The Commission then sets-out 
conditions that generally permit anticompetitive foreclosure, including 
1. the existence of significant market power, which typically accompanies high entry 
barriers, economies of scale and scope, or network effects; 
2. the foreclosure of particularly robust competitors that, prior to the exclusionary 
conduct, restrained the dominant undertaking’s pricing; 
3. the expanse of the exclusionary practice, meaning the percentage of total sales 
affected; and 
4. direct evidence of an exclusionary strategy, which could assist in evaluating the 
likely effect of the exclusionary conduct.
89
 
All the factors considered relevant, except for exclusionary intent, derive from NPT. 
As to the second variable above, Professor Evans has stated that “[a] competitive 
constraint is any factor that tends to reduce the expected profit that a firm can earn from 
taking some action that would harm consumers.”90  To identify such restraints, a competition 
authority might examine the extent to which existing competitors constrain each other from 
raising prices prior to the challenged practice, what competitive constraints survive the 
practice and whether rivals retain capacity to expand production, and whether potential 
constraints, such as entrants, might exert sufficient pressure on the dominant undertaking to 
prevent subsequent increases in price.
91
 
In discussing the four factors above, the Commission states that, while it also applies to 
price-based exclusionary practices, because price competition generally benefits consumers, 
the Commission will intervene only to prohibit price-cuts that exclude as-efficient 
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competitors.  This cost test essentially represents a safe harbor in that anticompetitive 
foreclosure generally will not exist when the dominant undertaking excludes inefficient 
competitors.
92
  But anticompetitive foreclosure still may exist even if the competitor cannot 
match such price-cuts.
93
  Importantly, the efficiency of the competitor influences the inquiry 
into anticompetitive foreclosure only when exclusionary practices involve price, but not 
otherwise.
94
 
The standards are inconsistent, but they also present other theoretical difficulties.  As an 
initial matter, such a distinction creates an incentive, when attempting to exclude 
competitors, to use price-based methods.  The Commission will analyze non-price based 
exclusionary conduct by whether it harms consumers, regardless of the targeted competitor’s 
efficiency.  But the Commission generally will permit the dominant undertaking to employ 
pricing practices to exclude less efficient competitors even if the foreclosure harms 
consumers.  The Commission essentially substitutes the efficiency of the competitor, or 
whether it has achieved the efficiency of the dominant undertaking, for consumer harm in 
price abuse cases.  Yet consumer welfare constitutes a broader concept for non-price abuses. 
A cost test enforces the principle that, because a less efficient competitor cannot match 
the lowest price that a dominant undertaking rationally could charge, consumers do not 
benefit from the competition that it does add to an already uncompetitive market.  Yet if the 
dominant undertaking chooses to exclude the less efficient competitor by a method other than 
lowering price, the competitive value of the rival will depend on whether its continued 
existence in the market contributes to consumer welfare.  The means by which the dominant 
undertaking excludes influences the value that the targeted rival contributes to the 
competitive process.  Surely that value exists independently of the competitive tactics chosen 
by a dominant undertaking.   
As Chief Justice Roberts intimated in Linkline,
95
 either the efficiency of competitors 
constitutes a relevant factor when determining harm to consumer welfare caused by 
eliminating competitors, or it does not.  Whether the dominant undertaking excludes by 
price-based or by non-price-based methods should not alter the calculus.  “What counts is the 
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effect of the specific conduct on consumers, not the price or non-price label attached to it 
[].”96  Of course, expanding cost tests to non-price abuses likely would curtail enforcement. 
The Commission justifies the different treatment of the two practices by arguing that 
price competition generally benefits consumers.
97
  And it does.  From an error-cost 
perspective, moreover, the risk of striking down a benign competitive practice (false positive) 
undoubtedly increases when that practice immediately benefits consumers.
98
  The task of 
examining market conditions to determine whether prices subsequently will increase enough 
to outweigh an initial consumer gain may pose greater difficulty than evaluating how a 
practice that immediately harms, or has no effect on, consumers subsequently will influence 
them.  Yet many exclusionary practices, including non-price practices such as tying, confer 
initial benefits on at least some consumers, such as providing an innovative new product or 
lower prices for two products.   
Discerning the ultimate welfare effects of price and non-price practices alike often will 
require market analysis and informed prediction.  Precisely because pricing practices 
generally benefit consumers immediately, however, judges and competition authorities also 
face a heightened risk of not condemning harmful price-cuts (false negative).  Set to one side 
the administrative costs and deterrent effect of aggressively pursuing pricing practices.  
Purely on grounds of NPT, adequately assessing the net impact of price-cuts may require a 
closer examination, because pricing practices more acutely raise the risk of both false 
positives and false negatives.  Their ultimate competitive effects are simply more difficult to 
work-out.   
Under NPT, lower prices, an alternative allocation of resources that yields lower prices or 
greater output, or increased innovation all can raise efficiency.  The relevant efficiency 
inquiry focuses on whether the presence of a particular competitor lowers market-wide 
prices, causes the dominant undertaking and other competitors to allocate resources more 
efficiently, or raises productivity by enhancing the incentives to innovate.  The Commission 
also considers improved product quality and additional consumer choice as relevant 
objectives aside from efficiency.  Whether the target of exclusionary practices, price-related 
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or not, can avoid shutting-down while pricing at the dominant undertaking’s costs does not 
necessarily gauge the competitive consequences of the practice.   
The challenged practice might increase output and lower prices, or it might coerce 
additional purchases over the short-term, only because the practice excludes and enables 
lower output and higher prices over a disproportionately longer duration.  Competitors’ 
productive efficiency relative to the dominant undertaking also says nothing about the effect 
of the challenged act on innovation, quality, or consumer choice. 
Measurement difficulties partially explain why competition authorities and courts have 
relied on cost tests to identify anticompetitive pricing conduct rather than precisely assessing 
any direct effect on efficiency.  But measurement difficulties cannot justify a dominance 
regime that, on the one hand, converts a second-order question, or indirect method, for 
determining anticompetitive exclusionary conduct into the primary means of establishing a 
pricing abuse.  On the other hand, the regime completely ignores the efficiency of the 
targeted competitor when evaluating non-price related abuses.  Cost tests serve several 
legitimate legal and economic purposes, but exclusive reliance on cost tests to identify 
anticompetitive pricing abuses unduly raises the risk of inaccurate results. 
6. Efficiency Defined by Other Measures 
Perfectly competitive markets rarely, if ever, exist.  Professor Evans has argued that 
companies generally avoid competing vigorously with each other.  They instead expend 
significant resources designing methods to differentiate their products “through physical 
differentiation, service, quality, advertising, branding, location, and many other factors”.99  
The widespread prevalence of differentiation significantly raises the difficulty of “drawing 
hard market boundaries,”100 which does not mean entry barriers do not exist.  Indeed, the 
resources expended to differentiate products can operate as robust entry barriers.  The 
prevalence of differentiation rather means that instead of a finite number of products 
competing in a bounded market, many products “usually substitute along a continuum.”101  
That is, most markets do not qualify as perfectly competitive or monopolistic, but rather 
more closely resemble monopolistic competition, or graduated competition between 
differentiated products.  In such markets, each competitor wields a degree of market power, 
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“but not to the extent” of a monopolist.102  To compete successfully in markets characterized 
by monopolistic competition, which predominate in both the EU and U.S., companies may 
have to combine low prices, a sparkling brand image, and high quality.
103
 
Perhaps in recognition of the widespread prevalence of monopolistic competition and of 
the fragmented markets upon which such competition regularly occurs, the Court of Justice 
recently expanded the concept of efficiency beyond productive and allocative measures — 
and beyond price-based measures: 
Competition on the merits may, by definition, lead to the departure from the 
market or the marginalization of competitors that are less efficient and so less 
attractive to consumers from the point of view of, among other things, price, 
choice, quality or innovation.
104
 
If companies competed only on price, then productive efficiencies, or producing goods 
more cheaply, and allocative efficiencies, or employing a mix of resources market-wide that 
provided consumers with the goods desired at the lowest cost, accurately would measure both 
consumer and societal welfare.  But if competition rather transpires along various categories, 
from quality to service features to popularity, as well as price, then consumer welfare (a 
substantial component of societal welfare) includes concepts beyond productive and 
allocative efficiency. 
Expanding the metric of consumer welfare beyond price perhaps raises insurmountable 
administrative difficulty, however.
105
  Judges and competition authorities generally lack the 
ability to replicate the potentially infinitesimal demand and supply data points that 
individuals and businesses in the market produce and respond to.  The market then 
simultaneously processes such data points to generate existing and emerging prices, variety, 
quality, and innovation. 
Production costs, as a proxy for perfect competition, provide the relevant counterfactual 
for price levels.  So long as competition remains healthy, rivals will reduce prices toward that 
welfare-maximizing benchmark.  No similarly tangible counterfactual for variety, quality, or 
innovation exists but the imagination of plaintiffs’ counsel and judges.  Businesses generally 
have greater expertise identifying and producing the combination of product characteristics 
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that maximizes welfare.  The reasons why include (1) because businesses have more and 
better information concerning costs and consumer preferences, and (2) because the market 
rewards those businesses most attuned to calibrating consumer wants and producer capability 
— with profits, comfort, status, independence, and happiness. 
Measurement difficulty equally arises when gauging innovation.  Consumers may not 
want the same good or service produced more cheaply, but might prefer a more expensive 
product that combines functionalities, such as telephone and computer services, particularly 
if friends are buying it.  Once a company manufactured a new product, then one could speak 
of efficient production, but productive or allocative efficiency does not necessarily generate 
differentiation or innovation.  The term “dynamic efficiency” purports to capture innovation, 
but price viewed as a measure of the willingness of consumers to pay does not fully 
internalize the innovation process.  Both lower and higher prices could spur innovation.
106
   
Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) more generally fails to depict innovation and 
differentiation as a distinct or freestanding efficiency.  Productive efficiency represents a 
singular snapshot of a company’s cost level, or of the relationship between costs and prices at 
a company or in a particular market.  Economists use the term dynamic efficiencies to 
illustrate forces, such as innovation, that generate efficiencies over time.  Under standard 
models of NPT, innovation often causes a supply-side shock that raises productivity levels or 
lowers costs, thus generating productive and allocative efficiencies.  Innovation also could 
shift the market demand curve outward, but it may have no effect at all.  The importance of 
innovation for producing wealth and welfare, however, has prompted economists and 
competition authorities to analyze the variable separately.  Indeed, the Commission has 
justified protecting the process of competition and rivalry as an essential engine of 
innovation and thus as an essential cause of “dynamic efficiencies”.107  Incentives to innovate 
and differentiate thus ultimately produce productive and allocative efficiencies, but the 
phenomenon does not represent a separate category of efficiency. 
Measurement difficulty even complicates targeting allocative efficiency.  While judges 
and competition authorities can observe and analyze price levels, and compare prices to the 
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costs of the dominant undertaking, they cannot practically measure allocative efficiency.  It, 
too, represents a nebulous concept, because allocative efficiency essentially is a 
macroeconomic concept.  Instead of the insular, microeconomic focus of productive 
efficiency, allocative efficiency depends on a cascade of hypothetical, but-for opportunity 
costs that no judge or competition authority could map with any degree of confidence.  Its 
contours and value would depend on the reaction of both consumers and producers acting 
rationally, boundedly rationally, and irrationally to presently non-existent market conditions.  
To improve allocative efficiency in concentrated markets outside of natural monopoly 
situations, lawyers and economists generally recommend greater output and more intense 
competition, which would restrain pricing.
108
 
The reader should not interpret the above discussion highlighting the importance of price 
levels to identifying consumer welfare, alternatively in terms of producing consumer surplus 
and encouraging innovation, as a prescription for ignoring productive efficiency.  The 
Commission in Wanadoo appeared to separate the efficiency of a practice from whether it 
raises competitive concern: 
[W]hile the search for scale economies and learning effects may be included 
among the rational justifications for predatory behavior, it may not serve to 
legitimize that practice from the point of view of competition law since it has 
the effect of conferring a more favorable cost structure on the dominant 
undertaking to the detriment of its competitors.
109
 
The Commission would forbid a dominant undertaking from lowering prices in certain 
instances even when justified by the pursuit of scale economies and learning effects — by the 
pursuit of efficiency, if such efficiency confers a competitive advantage on the dominant 
undertaking.  Attaining such advantages, of course, constitutes the objective of all 
competitive action.  Consumers gain from lower prices when undertakings operate in a 
productively and allocatively efficient manner, even if they eliminate competitors.  When 
dominant firms lower prices not as a ploy for subsequently higher prices but to exclude 
competitors by producing more cheaply, society unequivocally should encourage that pursuit.  
Discouraging it will weaken competition, cause higher prices, and harm consumers.  
Removing the pursuit of efficiency from the competitive process literally turns competition 
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on its head, rendering the concept meaningless or detrimental as a principle to guide antitrust 
policy, and as a benchmark to monitor markets. 
III. Existing Influence of Behavioral Economics on EU Predation Law 
This section endeavors to describe the implicit influence of psychology, or Neoclassical 
Price Theory (NPT) and psychology, on existing EU predatory pricing law.  Though not 
mentioning the term, the EU Commission anticipated the contribution of the availability 
heuristic to the value of predating as far back as AKZO, by noting that consistently pricing 
below cost in response to attempted entry likely would deter future entry attempts, thereby 
enhancing the anticompetitive effect of predation.  The availability heuristic is a concept 
originating in behavioral economics that states that when calculating the probability of an 
event occurring, individuals overweight anecdotal evidence, particularly vivid or memorable 
events receiving widespread media attention.
110
  They thus perceive a higher probability of 
an event occurring than what actually exists. 
EU Institutions described the psychology of predation when first evaluating the practice, 
specifically how previous instances of pricing below-cost can intimidate and deter rivals 
contemplating entry.  This effect greatly enhances its profitability: 
The annual reports of AKZO [] indicate that smaller firms which have 
attempted to expand their market share or penetrate new markets have almost 
invariably been unsuccessful in the face of AKZO’s response … Apart from 
ECS there appear to have been no recent entrants to the organic peroxides 
market.
111
 
In each prior instance of attempted entry or expansion, AKZO responded by pricing below-
cost, which so thoroughly thwarted rival entry that apart from the then-current target, ECS, 
no rivals had attempted recent entry into the relevant market.  Such facts amount to a 
textbook example of how the availability heuristic can deter market entry in response to 
predation.   
The Commission already had established AKZO’s dominance, so rivals knew of AKZO’s 
superior market position, in terms of entry barriers and product differentiation.  These facts 
alone would have deterred a fair measure of entry or expansion.  Having additionally 
observed the low prices that repeatedly blocked previous entry attempts, managers at 
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potential entrants very likely responded by overestimating the probability of an identical 
outcome recurring, that is failed entry, and thus pursued other market opportunities.
112
 
AKZO, the dominant undertaking, having deterred potential entrants by demonstrating a 
willingness to incur losses, reaped bountiful returns.  AKZO undoubtedly earned enough to 
recoup the original investment in below-cost pricing because, after all, AKZO continued the 
practice for many years during which its profit margins never fell, and during which it never 
lost market share to competitors.  All of which demonstrates the profitability, and thus the 
rationality, of the practice under NPT.  To break the cycle of deterrence, to prevent AKZO 
from continuing to deploy predatory pricing as an entry barrier, and to improve market 
conditions for competition, the Commission found that the pricing practice violated A.102.  It 
commented that “the elimination of ECS would have a dissuasive effect upon any other small 
producer which might be minded to attack AKZO’s established market position.”113   
Yet the Commission did not consider the psychology or deterrent effect of predation in 
isolation.  “Having regard to the high start-up costs, and the market structure, it is most 
unlikely that new producers, knowing the likely reaction of AKZO, will be ready to enter the 
market.”114  Without dominance, including high structural entry-barriers, employing 
predation as a behavioral entry barrier loses exclusionary potency.  Stated differently, 
AKZO’s success at eliminating and deterring potential entrants hinged not only on the 
exclusionary and intimidating effect of below-cost pricing, but at least equally on AKZO’s 
ability to control prices and to exercise market power, protected by structural entry barriers.   
Given the difficulty of, and discretion involved in, accurately defining markets, evidence 
of previous instances of predation could prove telling, particularly in markets subject to 
tipping.  Where competition authorities are attempting to establish dominance or considering 
whether to examine more closely certain pricing practices, identifying previous instances of 
substantial price-cuts in response to entry or rival expansion could help demonstrate market 
power.  Or it at least could alert competition authorities to the potential for dominance, 
prompting a closer review of market conditions and the probability of recoupment.  The 
absence of previous instances of predation, of course, does not absolve a current attempt.  A 
                                                 
112
 But see Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, And Legal Policy, 101 
MICH. L. REV. 482, 504-531 (2002) (discussing the strength of overconfidence bias in the context of entry). 
113
 ECS/AKZO [1985] OJ L374/1, at ¶ 86. 
114
 Id. at ¶ 70. 
128 
 
dominant undertaking may be investing in the deterrent effect.  But a sequence of substantial 
price-cuts in response to entry or expansion raises the issues of dominance and deterrence, 
and further enhances the probability of recoupment.  
This analysis, focused on contextual market conditions, can occur mostly outside the 
framework of comparing prices to costs.  The A.102 Guidance on Enforcement Priorities 
highlight how behavioral considerations alone, specifically an intention “to influence the 
expectations of potential entrants and thereby deter entry,” can alert the Commission to the 
possibility of predatory pricing, if the resulting reputation risks anticompetitive 
foreclosure.
115
  The Commission must proffer:   
(1) evidence concerning multiple markets and periods;  
(2) evidence that the dominant undertaking actively seeks to deter entry; and 
(3) evidence that potential competitors can observe or otherwise identify the 
predatory behavior that excludes or weakens a current rival.
116
 
The Commission in AKZO found the psychology of predation even more compelling than 
cost-analysis, though admittedly in a case involving below-AVC pricing. 
The important element is the rival’s assessment of the aggressor’s 
determination to frustrate its expectations, for example as to [the] rate of 
growth or attainable profit margins, rather than whether or not the dominant 
firm covers its own costs.
117
 
The Commission was willing to assess liability at least partially based on AKZO’s 
determination to prevent entry, without any additional proof of pricing below cost.   
The Court of Justice in AKZO, however, overruled the Commission’s decision on this 
point when it set-out the cost framework that until Post Danmark solely governed predation 
liability.
118
  While demonstrating that pricing below cost still constitutes a prerequisite to 
proving predation, behavioral considerations, particularly the availability heuristic, remain 
relevant to establishing anticompetitive effects and recoupment.
119
 
  
                                                 
115
 Guidance (2009/C 45/02) at ¶ 68. 
116
 Discussion Paper (Dec. 2005) at ¶ 119. 
117
 ECS/AKZO [1985] OJ L374/1, at ¶ 79. 
118
 Case C-62/86 AKZO, 1991 ECR I-03359.  
119
 The year that it decided AKZO, the Commission implicitly echoed the importance of behavioral considerations in 
Hilti, acknowledging the disciplinary and anticompetitive potential of selective price-cuts by a dominant 
undertaking.  See IV/30.787 & 31.488 – Eurofix-Bauco v. Hilti (88/138/EEC) (No. L 65/19) Commission Decision 
of 22 Dec. 1987 at ¶ 81 (listed in Lianos, supra n.2 at 187-202). 
129 
 
IV. Conclusion 
The claim of predatory pricing would not exist absent the widespread acceptance, in legal 
and economic circles, of Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT).  All existing liability tests for 
predatory pricing, and the vast majority of conceivable alternatives, derive from its tenets.  
The structure of the EU test conceptually permits greater liability relative to the prevailing 
test in the U.S.  In Post Danmark, however, the Court ordered proof of anticompetitive 
effects for prices between average total cost and average avoidable cost.  Prior to that 
holding, the Commission did not need to establish the recoupment of losses initially 
sustained, nor did it have to examine competitive restraints after the predation phase.   
Requiring plaintiffs to satisfy additional elements to a legal test raises the difficulty of 
proving liability.  Yet the Commission brought scarce few predatory pricing claims after 
AKZO,
120
 which meant that enforcement levels in the EU, notwithstanding claims brought by 
National Competition Authorities, arguably did not even match U.S. levels, at least prior to 
Brooke Group in 1993.   
Other legal considerations have dampened enforcement levels as well.  The perceived 
administrative costs of properly assessing anticompetitive effects, the rule of law attributes of 
a cost test, and the legal intuition that an imprecise liability rule might deter price-cuts — all 
have outweighed the theoretical shortcomings and inaccuracy of cost tests.  Add to these 
legal factors the suspicion popularized by the Chicago School that predatory pricing is 
“rarely tried, and even more rarely successful,”121 and enforcement levels on both sides of the 
Atlantic have proved minimal at best. 
For those skeptical of monopolization enforcement generally, the claim of predatory 
pricing has provided a model of how to curtail enforcement.  Cost tests represent the 
lifeblood of that model, so skeptics have attempted to apply that test wherever possible to 
other monopolization claims, most commonly to pricing abuses.  Because the legal factors 
discussed above that have proved so effective at dampening predation enforcement do not 
necessarily apply with equal vigor to other monopolization claims, even to other pricing 
abuses, and because cost tests derive from NPT, NPT itself likely can supply the most robust 
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conceptual opposition to the advancement of cost tests into areas of monopolization law 
where other NPT considerations more aptly would determine welfare.
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CHAPTER 4: TYING LAW & ECONOMICS 
I. Introduction 
Tying and bundling harm consumers by foreclosing competitors, curtailing choice, and 
raising prices.  The European General Court has indicated that it will apply the same analysis 
to evaluate both practices.
1
  Tying relies on market power in one product to force sales of 
another product, thereby excluding rivals in a tied market that cannot compete effectively 
with the tied package.  For the practice to raise antitrust concern, the exclusion or weakening 
of rivals additionally “must harm the competitive process and thereby harm consumers,”2 
which predominantly means that the practice must increase prices in the tied or the package 
market.  In the United States, to avoid the label of “monopoly leveraging,” which generally 
will preclude liability, the practice further must protect, create, or pose a dangerous risk of 
creating market power: the ability to price above cost.
3
   
This narrative of consumer harm, both the origin of coercive potential and the 
anticompetitive ends achieved by the practice, derive from Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT).  
Unless an undertaking has pricing power in a tying market, it cannot force consumers to 
purchase unwanted products.  In competitive markets, an attempt to tie an unwanted product 
will fail because consumers simply will switch to alternative suppliers offering the tying 
product individually.
4
  If consumers do buy the package in competitive markets, they must 
prefer the combination to individual consumption.  Market power directly influences the 
level of forcing that a dominant undertaking can apply, and thus the means by which the 
practice harms consumers.  Significant market power in the tying product increases the 
likelihood that consumers will forego purchases of preferred tied alternatives.   
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Critical to the claim as well, of all consumers buying the tied product, the percentage 
independently also buying the tying product, or who would buy that product if the price were 
lower, greatly influences the ability to exclude.
5
 
Exclusion in any market, standing alone, does not harm consumers and should not 
warrant antitrust liability.  Even unmeritorious competition that does not reduce efficiency or 
transfer consumer surplus to the dominant undertaking does not harm consumer welfare.  
Nevertheless, tying jurisprudence in both the U.S. and EU has sought to promote merit 
competition between tied goods.
6
  For antitrust injury to exist, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has stated that the exclusion must alter competitive conditions in the relevant 
markets such that the dominant undertaking can raise prices without prompting enough 
customers to switch to alternative suppliers to render the price-hike unprofitable.
7
  The 
independent requirement of the quasi-per se rule that the tying arrangement affect a 
substantial amount of commerce in the tied market relates directly to price levels.  If the 
arrangement does not foreclose above that threshold, it will not affect competition, consumer 
choice, and price levels enough to justify enforcement.  The tying arrangement must confer 
pricing power on the dominant undertaking, or move market conditions in the tied or package 
market closer to the monopoly model. 
Taken together, the arrangement must substantially lessen competition or significantly 
impede effective competition, in particular by strengthening dominance.  That will occur 
only if the tie-in excluded competitors that restrained the dominant undertaking from raising 
prices, and remaining or potential rivals cannot expand or enter the tied or package market in 
time to prevent sustained price increases.  Similar to predatory pricing, therefore, rationality, 
competition, and efficiency supply the conceptual framework that best explains modern tying 
jurisprudence. 
Tying law implemented NPT at the outset through the quasi-per se test, conceived by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Jefferson Parish.  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Microsoft 
more recently endorsed the rule of reason, in effect a substantially lessening of competition 
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approach, to evaluate technological tying.
8
  The elements to the quasi-per se test remain the 
guideposts to this more flexible inquiry, however.   
The EU Commission and General Court in Microsoft I concurred by administering a 
structured rule of reason, which entailed methodically applying the elements to the quasi-per 
se approach previously used to evaluate contractual tying.  Because technological tying more 
likely produces efficiencies and innovation, the EU Institutions refused to presume 
foreclosure, instead assuming the burden to establish “real foreclosure effect[s]”.9  In 
addition, they gave Microsoft an opportunity to prove an objective justification, or net 
efficiencies, that might have outweighed any demonstrated foreclosure effects, though 
Microsoft failed in this endeavor.
10
  The final step to this analysis involved assessing 
Microsoft’s tying practice holistically.  The General Court concluded that “there was a 
reasonable likelihood that tying Windows and Windows Media Player would lead to a 
lessening of competition so that the maintenance of an effective competition structure would 
not be ensured in the foreseeable future.”11 
The quasi-per se test first determines the existence and extent of market power in the 
tying product.  Absent pricing power, though not necessarily monopoly power, the inquiry 
ends.  The dominant undertaking must tie together separate products, otherwise competition 
law would punish companies for manufacturing a product, adding extra features, or otherwise 
improving the product.  The NPT concept of consumer demand, or whether consumers 
exhibit sufficient willingness to pay for separate products, governs the separate product 
inquiry.  Yet the United States Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit further have found that 
supply conditions ― specifically, the extent to which efficiencies permit discounts on a tying 
package ― endogenously influence demand conditions.12   
A focus of the abuse, the tying arrangement must force the purchase of an unwanted 
product.  Oligopoly market structures in and around the tied product market can muddy the 
determination whether the tie-in links an unwanted product, since competitors capable of 
testing the desirability of the tied product or package by differentiating around it may refrain 
from doing so to deter incursion into markets where they hold pricing power.  Judges and 
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competition authorities thus often focus on the extent of market power or anticompetitive 
foreclosure to gauge coercive potential. 
Finally, a quasi-per se tying claim must establish the foreclosure share; de minimus 
foreclosure unlikely will harm competition by raising prices.  Because U.S. antitrust 
plaintiffs anyway must establish antitrust injury or consumer harm in all monopolization 
cases, U.S. judges and competition authorities essentially could combine the separate 
inquiries here, as the EU Courts have done, and search for anticompetitive foreclosure, or 
foreclosure that ultimately harms consumers by raising prices or curtailing quality or choice.  
Tying jurisprudence under either the Jefferson Parish or the respective EU and U.S. 
Microsoft approaches focus on the relevant NPT factors that determine the exclusionary and 
anticompetitive potential of tying arrangements. 
In addition to this Introduction, the chapter contains one substantive section and a 
Conclusion.  Section II discusses the NPT Foundations to Tying.  In Subsection A, I set-out 
how NPT explains the general consumer harm and benefits associated with tying.  Subsection 
B turns to the relevance, under NPT, of market power in the tying product.  Subsection C 
argues that coercion cannot exist absent market power.  Subsection D discusses the 
importance of requiring separate products under NPT, while Subsection E considers 
Anticompetitive Foreclosure in the tying context, as conceived by NPT. 
II. Neoclassical Price Theory Foundations to Tying 
A. Consumer Harm & Benefit 
Unlike predatory pricing, which purports to damage consumers exclusively through the 
price mechanism, because the initial effect of tying is to coerce consumer choice, the claim 
raises the possibility that monopolization law might focus on an aspect of consumer welfare 
other than price or efficiency levels.  Yet most of the various theories expounding on the pro- 
and anticompetitive effects of tying ― from damage to the tied market to the tying market to 
the net effect on both markets ― generally measure consumer harm by the resulting effect on 
prices.  Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT), by setting-out how exclusionary practices 
influence prices, and how prices in turn influence levels of product variety and innovation, 
has supplied the theoretical tools by which judges and competition authorities have evaluated 
tying arrangements. 
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In measuring anticompetitive effects, NPT recommends first determining whether supply 
and demand conditions resemble competitive or monopolized markets, and second looking to 
whether the tying arrangement alters market conditions towards the monopoly paradigm.  
Even efficiency concerns matter to consumers only to the extent that they cause prices to fall 
or improve quality and variety. 
United States federal courts generally have implemented an overarching concern for price 
levels through the antitrust injury doctrine, which requires a plaintiff to demonstrate, as a 
condition precedent to establishing liability, that the challenged conduct harmed consumers.  
U.S. federal judges have utilized the doctrine to dismiss monopolization claims where the 
plaintiff could not demonstrate a viable theory of consumer harm.  Harm to individual 
competitors, including lower profitability or even exclusion, do not necessarily count as 
antitrust injury.  While alternative measures to consumer welfare exist, such as greater 
product variety, quality, or innovation, price represents the most tangible and important 
measure.  Consumers care about variety, quality, and innovation.  Assuming a properly 
defined market, however, the majority of consumers in that market care most about price 
levels.  Consumers otherwise register their preferences for product characteristics in their 
willingness to pay for them.   
Judges and economists (unlike consumers), in any event, have difficulty determining 
whether the higher prices that generally accompany greater quality, on balance, contribute to 
consumer welfare.  Quantifying variety, quality, and innovation in the aggregate poses 
extraordinary measurement difficulties, not least because judges and even economists do not 
have the tools to make interpersonal utility calculations.
13
  Price performs this function, in the 
interplay of supply and demand in the relevant market.  Market intervention that attempted to 
promote aspects of consumer welfare other than price, if price otherwise functions properly, 
could resemble regulation, which only severe market failure can justify.  It often would 
require ad hoc, subjective judgments.   
In the U.S. and EU Microsoft cases, which receive central treatment in this chapter, the 
price of the tied good was not a relevant factor, since consumers ostensibly received web 
portals and media players for free.  However, these freebies existed only because they 
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protected pricing power in the operating system market.  This dynamic enabled the presiding 
judges and enforcement officials to highlight how the tying arrangement harmed other 
aspects of consumer welfare and the competitive process, such as product quality and 
innovation.
14
  Where prices exist, prohibiting exclusionary practices that raise prices enable 
judges and competition authorities to promote consumer welfare by an objective measure. 
As an example of the centrality of price-effects even in tying jurisprudence, the Fifth 
Circuit encountered a vertical tying arrangement between hamburger patty machines and 
patty paper in Hollymatic.
15
  While not outwardly discussing the antitrust injury doctrine, the 
Court did not examine the four elements of the quasi-per se tying rule because, even 
assuming a tie-in existed, the forced purchase did “not purport to affect prices charged for … 
goods.”16  Conditions in the patty paper market suggested that, although the particular 
plaintiff dealer could not sell other brands of paper, fierce competition and the absence of 
entry barriers there ensured that the tying arrangement did not raise prices to paper 
purchasers.
17
  Implicitly, the Court also must have found that Hollymatic lacked significant 
market power in patty machines; otherwise the tying arrangement might have foreclosed 
enough paper sales to raise prices.  Or perhaps alternative uses of paper overwhelmed the 
amount used in machines such that even full foreclosure of paper competitors active in 
supplying machines would not raise the price of paper.  Either way, the price of paper 
constituted the fulcrum of the analysis.  Because consumers responded to the higher price 
dictated by the tying arrangement simply by purchasing machines or paper elsewhere, the tie-
in could not have harmed them.  “Now this may have cost [plaintiff] money ― injured it ― 
but it belies its claim of injury to competition.”18 
1. NPT Explains How Tying Benefits Consumers 
NPT has supplied the narrative concerning how tying can benefit consumers.  The 
ubiquity of tying, in both competitive and concentrated markets, suggests that the practice 
can serve consumer interests.  The tying of lectures to the pursuit of university degrees, 
keyboards to the purchase of computers, and baggage transport to the purchase of airline 
tickets, all can benefit consumers.  Generally, providing choice may cost more than limiting 
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purchasing options, which can simplify production and lower prices.  “Limiting 
combinations of options can save fixed costs associated with a full range of product offerings 
and can foster product-specific cost reductions”19 that lower marginal cost, as when greater 
scale allows an undertaking to move further down its average cost function.  Tie-ins further 
can enhance productive and transactional efficiency not only by lowering costs, but also by 
improving product quality and facilitating distribution.
20
  Higher product quality from the 
forced purchase of appropriate and well-functioning input products and spare parts can save 
consumers on repair costs and can help the tying undertaking build a reputation for reliability 
that can lower advertising costs and thus prices.  Justice Scalia also has spoken of the 
potential that tying “may, through the resultant manufacturer control of aftermarket activity, 
yield valuable information about component or design weaknesses that will materially 
contribute to product improvement.”21 
Tying additionally can benefit consumers by eliminating double marginalization.  If prior 
to the tying arrangement, two separate entities charge monopoly prices in the tying and tied 
markets, then two sets of monopoly mark-ups, or two sets of deadweight losses, exist.  Those 
losses represent, according to NPT, the allocative and productive inefficiencies caused by 
lowering output, raising cost, and pricing some consumers out of the market.
22
  But if the 
tying undertaking vertically integrates, offers both products as a package, and replaces the 
second monopolist, then it can charge one monopoly mark-up that reduces the previously 
applicable deadweight losses from two to one.
23
   
Of course, when consumers purchase the tying and tied products in variable proportions, 
the tying undertaking generally will not replace a pre-existing monopolist in the tied market, 
but rather will weaken or eliminate a number of oligopolists.  The additional weakening of 
competition in the tied market may allow prices there to rise above pre-entry or pre-tying 
levels, so the double marginalization theory requires careful analysis. 
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2. NPT Explains How Tying Harms Consumers in Tied Market 
NPT further has explained how tying arrangements can harm consumers.  Consider first 
the tied market.  By forcing consumers of the tying product to buy the tied product as well, 
an undertaking with market power in the tying product can reduce demand for competing tied 
products by foreclosing pre-existing sources of sales.
24
  Conversely, the dominant 
undertaking, through compulsion, enhances demand for its own tied product.
25
  The potential 
for monopolization of the tied good arises because of foreclosure.  If joint consumption of the 
tied and tying products accounts for a high enough percentage of tied market sales, then the 
tying arrangement could reduce competitors’ profits “below the level that would justify 
continued operation”.26  This result is particularly likely either when high fixed costs 
characterize the tied product market, since a rival reduced to a small market share then will 
have higher unit costs.
27
  Or when the tied product market exhibits scale economies such that 
the foreclosure prevents competitors from attaining the sales necessary to match the 
dominant undertaking’s costs and prices.28  In both cases, the tied product market resembles 
oligopoly, not perfect competition.  Consumer harm customarily follows the exit of tied 
market rivals, which allow the dominant undertaking to raise prices.
29
 
Notice how, given the presence of scale economies, the tie-in can eliminate equally 
efficient competitors.  Tied product rivals could have the exact same average cost function 
(average cost as a function of quantity) as the dominant undertaking yet still lack the ability 
to price competitively because the tie-in has moved the rival up that average cost function.
30
  
A tying arrangement need not even force rivals to exit the market to harm consumers.  In 
addition to inhibiting the realization of scale economies, the abuse can deprive rivals of the 
“network effects or economies of [] scope, distribution, supply, research, or learning” 
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required to compete effectively with the dominant undertaking in the tied product market.
31
  
If the tying arrangement impedes rivals’ ability to restrain price increases in the tied product 
market in any such ways, it will have harmed consumers even if rivals continue to compete at 
a weakened capacity.
32
 
The analysis under NPT need go no further, but a tie-in followed by rival exit also 
reduces product variety,
33
 a component of consumer welfare.  Accounting for price and non-
price features, a tying arrangement can eliminate even more efficient rivals that can produce 
a higher quality or otherwise more desirable tied product at the same cost.
34
  By employing 
market power to “impair competition on the merits in another market,” a tying arrangement 
can insulate “a potentially inferior product [] from competitive pressures,”35 the absence of 
which ensures lower product quality and variety and higher prices. 
If the objective of the tying arrangement is to enhance market power in the tied product 
market, to assess the likelihood of that objective, and thus to assess the likelihood of 
consumer harm, NPT requires examining market conditions there.  Assuming that consumers 
purchase the tying and tied products in variable proportions and that the undertaking has 
market power in the tying product, Justice O’Connor has argued that acquiring pricing power 
in the tied product market as well turns on whether a number of stable sellers already occupy 
that market, and on the pre-existing strength of tied market entry barriers.
36
   
Oligopolistic conditions in the tied market further might prompt a dominant undertaking 
to employ a tying arrangement strategically to exclude rivals, such as when a competitor 
there is experiencing operational or financial difficulty, or cannot extend or secure a credit 
line.  Introducing a tie in such circumstances can force a vulnerable competitor to exit the 
tied market, even when the tying arrangement does not maximize the dominant undertaking’s 
profits in a static sense.
37
  Yet because tying often constitutes a low-cost form of exclusion, 
particularly if the dominant undertaking already operates in the tied market, tying can bolster 
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profits even if the arrangement does not foreclose extensively.
38
  If the tie-in costs the 
dominant undertaking little, and thus requires minimum or no profit sacrifice, even 
marginally weakening competitors justifies the arrangement if it curtails their ability to 
innovate or lower prices.
39
 
Tying arrangements also can misallocate resources, lower productive efficiency, and 
transfer wealth away from consumers.
40
  When tied consumers switch to inferior or less 
desirable products because of the tie-in, tying contributes to allocative inefficiency and 
deadweight loss, and more likely lessens total welfare.  At least a partial misallocation of 
resources is inherent to any tie-in.  The coercion or forcing of consumers to buy one product 
along with another redirects resources away from tied products that some consumers 
otherwise would have purchased.  The size of the foreclosure share ― particularly that subset 
of consumers who would have bought competitors’ tied products but-for inelastic demand in 
the tying market ― represents the extra resources misallocated to the dominant undertaking.  
If the forced foreclosure share is substantial, and competitors exit the tied market, then the 
markets into which they subsequently enter, or the idled use of their resources, also represent 
a misallocation of resources. 
Tying further can lower productive efficiencies by raising the costs of both the dominant 
undertaking and rivals.  Particularly with technological tying, a dominant undertaking could 
increase both fixed and marginal costs by integrating two separate products.  If insufficient 
consumer demand exists for the combined product, then the tie-in will have depressed 
purchases of both the tying and tied products, and will have prevented the dominant 
undertaking from achieving the scale economies anticipated in the tied market.  Rivals in the 
tied market that experienced foreclosed sales also could experience higher marginal costs.  In 
all events, market-wide costs can rise if the dominant undertaking, fueled by forced sales, 
replaces rivals in the tied market that previously produced more cheaply on an individual 
basis, or maintained a lower average cost function. 
Aside from promoting inefficiencies, if the dominant undertaking succeeds in transferring 
pricing power from the tying to the tied market, then it also would have succeeded in 
transferring surplus from consumers to itself.  The tying arrangement not only could force 
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tied product consumers to pay more for the tied product than they otherwise would have 
absent the arrangement, but such consumers very likely will value the tied product less than 
an alternative that they would have chosen.  Tying thus can compress consumer surplus from 
both ends — from the perspective of price and willingness to pay.  Given the consumer 
welfare standard that applies in both the EU and U.S., this wealth transfer as defined by NPT 
counts as an anticompetitive effect. 
3. The Single Monopoly Profit Theorem 
The above analysis of harm to the tied product market assumes that consumers use the 
tying and tied products in variable proportions, meaning that consumers also purchase the 
tied product for individual consumption or as a complement to products in other markets.  
But if consumers purchase the tying and tied products strictly in fixed proportions, meaning 
that they only consume the tied product when consuming the tying product, then the Single 
Monopoly Profit Theorem applies, and tying arrangements predominantly will promote 
competition.  Monopolists then have few profit-maximizing incentives to exclude tied 
product competitors, since increased demand for the tied product means proportionally 
increased demand for the tying product as well.
41
  Conversely, raising prices in the tied 
market reduces sales in the tying market, where the monopolist earns supra-competitive 
profits.  A monopolist can decide to shift that profit between the two markets, but cannot 
grow the pie: only one monopoly profit exists.
42
  Under such conditions, the monopolist has a 
strong incentive to promote differentiation and to expand demand of the tied product.
43
 
Professors Aaron Director and Edward Levi, the conceptual founders of the Chicago 
School of antitrust law and economics, doubted the prevalence of undesirable tying, even if 
the undertaking had market power in the tying product.
44
  Such doubt may have arisen 
because, prior to the tie, the undertaking already was maximizing profits by pricing where 
marginal revenue equaled marginal cost.  From a static perspective and assuming the tie does 
not increase demand for the tying product, incurring the extra cost of producing the tied 
product would add to profits only if the following conditions applied.  Enough consumers 
continued to purchase the package at the higher price, enough to outweigh the greater sales 
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previously secured by offering only the tying product at a lower price.
45
  That calculus 
further depends on the following factors: 
(1) the efficiency with which the undertaking can produce the tied product;  
(2) the extent to which consumers continue to want the tying product at the higher 
price ― which depends on their sensitivity to price increases or their elasticity 
of demand; and  
(3) independent consumer demand for purchasing the two products together. 
Generally, tying an undesirable tied product will raise costs and lower sales as marginal 
consumers respond to the higher price and switch to other products, thus lowering profits.  
With undesirable tying, the undertaking would earn greater profits either by not tying, or by 
not tying and lowering the price of the tying product, which at least would increase sales.
46
  
A rational undertaking simply would choose not to tie. 
The conditions of the single monopoly profit theorem do not encompass all, or even 
most, tying arrangements, however.  The theorem assumes that, when most markets trend 
toward oligopoly, perfect competition characterizes the tied product market, not only prior to 
the tie but also subsequently.
47
  It therefore assumes that the tying arrangement does not alter 
the market structure of the tied market towards oligopoly or monopoly ― that the 
exclusionary nature of any tying arrangement fails to secure any additional profit.
 48
  This 
line of reasoning leads proponents of the theory to conclude that rational monopolists choose 
to tie strictly because of the enhanced profits procured from greater efficiencies. 
Yet because many tied products have uses outside the tie-in, the dominant undertaking 
can earn additional profits on sales of the tied product used separately from the tying product.  
This occurs when the dominant undertaking can weaken competitors in the tied market 
through foreclosure, raising costs, or raising entry barriers ― allowing it to increase the price 
of the tied product, even if it must lower price of the tying product.
49
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4. NPT Explains How Tying Harms Consumers in Tying Market 
In addition to providing the theoretical support for how tying can raise prices and thus 
harm consumers in the tied market, Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) also supplies the 
intellectual foundation for how tying can raise prices and harm consumers in the tying 
market.  Tying can raise entry barriers to both the tying and tied markets and so function as 
an entry deterrent device.
50
  The tying undertaking already holds pricing power in the tying 
market, so competitors restrain its pricing there only to a limited extent.  If rivals wish to 
expand within or enter the tying market, the tie forces them to incur the additional cost and 
financial risk of conjointly producing the tied product.  That additional burden on 
competition should weaken even further their ability to restrain the tying undertaking’s 
pricing. 
This analysis also hinges on the contours of consumer demand, since when consumers 
actually prefer purchasing the tying and tied products separately, and their willingness to pay 
can support continued separate production, demand conditions create an opening for rivals to 
enter either market.  When demand operates the other way, however, and consumers grow to 
expect the products offered as a package, the tying undertaking would have succeeded in 
raising entry barriers to both markets.  Moreover, pre-existing entry barriers to the tying 
market ensure a period of practical monopoly in selling the package, which bestows on the 
dominant undertaking a material head-start in winning or maintaining brand loyalty. 
Consumer demand may not support a tying arrangement that conjoins two substitute 
products unless they are also complements because each substitute satisfies the same 
consumer need.  From the perspective of suppliers, however, tying possible substitutes can 
operate as a particularly effective exclusionary tool.
51
  A potential rival to the tying 
undertaking may choose to enter the tied market first so as to avoid having to overcome, all 
at once, the established customer loyalty and corresponding inertia associated with a 
dominant product.
52
  Competing in the tied market may allow the entrant to overcome this 
inertia gradually by offering “a sub-product, a bargain brand, or the next generation in 
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product development”.53  Initially producing the tied product also may lower entry costs and 
limit sunk costs, by relegating competition to a smaller portion of a potentially larger 
market.
54
  Limiting competition allows the rival to gain experience in product technology, 
consumer tastes, and product life cycles in a related market before challenging the dominant 
undertaking head-on in the tying market.
55
  Finally, competing successfully in the tied market 
may enable the rival to build a reputation for producing quality goods and services 
efficiently, which would help secure the financing necessary to enter the larger and more 
insulated tying market.
56
 
By tying the two products together, the dominant undertaking can maintain tying pricing 
power “for longer or at a higher degree”:  
1. by deterring entry into the tied product market, thus eliminating a potential 
source of competition; 
2. by weakening rivals in the tied product market, thus either delaying or 
preventing entry altogether into the tying market; or perhaps 
3. by forcing premature entry, which reduces the likelihood of success.57   
The tying practice denies the actual and/or potential rival enough sales to support gradual 
entry into the tying market.
58
  It also raises the production costs of a substitute that otherwise 
more effectively might constrain the dominant undertaking’s pricing power in the tying 
market.
59
 
B. Market Power in Tying Product 
Undesirable or unwanted tying that harms consumers cannot occur in the perfectly 
competitive markets envisioned by Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) because competition 
negates the potential for coercion.  Competitors in both the tying and tied markets price the 
relevant goods or services at marginal cost, ensuring that consumers will view the forced 
purchase of an additional, unwanted product as a price-hike.  Either because many 
competitors exist or many competitors could exist in the tying market in response to 
attempted price increases, consumers readily will switch to alternative tying products 
                                                 
53
 Id. 
54
 Id. at 2088. 
55
 Id. at 2092. 
56
 Id. at 2091-92. 
57
 Abbott & Wright, supra n.19 at 188, Elhauge, supra n.31 at 417. 
58
 Id. at 188. 
59
 Elhauge, supra n.31 at 417, 418. 
145 
 
unburdened by the tie, and the tie will unravel.  Such an undesirable tie, equivalent to a price 
increase, can persist only if the seller has market power.
60
   
Market power ― embodied in the unwillingness or inability of consumers to switch to 
alternative products in response to price increases, and thus representing the power to control 
prices and to exclude competition
61
 ― allows sellers to force purchasers “to do something 
[they] would not do in a competitive market”.62  Market power cannot exist absent entry 
barriers that prevent competition.  Entry barriers must inhibit rivals either from offering a 
roughly equivalent tying product at a competitive price, or from “design[ing] and offer[ing] a 
similar package for a similar cost”.63  If a tie survives despite competitive conditions in the 
tying market, then consumers must prefer purchasing the two products together as 
demonstrated by their willingness to pay the higher joint price that finances producing the 
two products together.
64
 
Because undesirable tying cannot harm consumers in competitive markets, both United 
States federal courts and European courts require plaintiffs to demonstrate, as a condition 
precedent to liability, that the defendant has market power in the tying product.
65
  For the 
distinctive purpose of establishing market power ― rather than as a method of proving 
anticompetitive effect ― judges and competition authorities have conducted the hypothetical 
analysis recommended by Judge Easterbrook that focuses on whether the price of the tied 
package exceeds the price of the two components offered in competitive markets.
66
  This 
exercise involves parsing the package price to determine whether it equals the sum of the 
marginal costs of producing the two products separately.
67
  Alternatively, the plaintiff could 
show that distinct rivals sell identical tying and tied products separately at combined prices 
below the joint package price.  More frequently, however, plaintiffs attempt to demonstrate 
tying market power indirectly by proving that, first, barriers to entry exist, second, that the 
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defendant previously had, or currently has, a high tying market share, and third, that 
insufficient competitive restraints exist to prevent price increases in the tying market. 
While undertakings generally cannot coerce without market power in the tying product,
68
 
the mere presence of market power does not prove coercion.  Consumers may prefer that the 
undertaking sell the two products together for any number of potentially competitive reasons.  
Such reasons include:  
 the distinct complementarity of the two products;  
 lower transaction costs from purchasing the two products together; and  
 lower prices stemming from the production efficiencies generated by the supplier 
producing and selling the two products together.   
For such reasons, Professor Hovenkamp has noted that both monopolists and their customers 
can profit from package sales.
69
 
Even an efficient tie can eliminate any possibility of purchasing the two products 
separately, however, harming welfare by curtailing choice.  If market power in the tying 
product exists and supports the construction of market power in the tied market, rivals or 
potential rivals will have difficulty re-introducing choice in the tied market on comparable 
terms if consumer preferences shift.  Bundling the two products coerces less and thus lowers 
the risk of anticompetitive effects. 
Whether or not possible, tracing consumer preferences in existing markets to what they 
would have been in competitive markets may require a great deal of judgment.  In 
competitive markets, consumer preferences are more visible because no barriers to entry or 
expansion inhibit rivals from constantly testing such preferences by offering alternative 
products or services either to win-over existing consumer demand, or to create new demand.  
Under competitive conditions, rivals in and around the relevant market will exploit any and 
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all profit opportunities presented by unstable demand and supply conditions, including the 
shifting desires of consumers.
70
 
By contrast, market power creates continuity in demand and supply, while masking and 
dictating consumer preferences.  Entry barriers prevent rivals from testing and modifying 
existing consumer wants, so the market will not reflect potential consumer demand under 
competitive conditions.
71
  Absent a healthy process of competition, enforcement authorities 
would have to rely on economists to construct a market that does not exist in reality, to 
identify products that might have appeared on the market, and to determine whether such 
products would have appealed to consumer preferences.  Economists can disagree, of 
course.
72
 
Dominant undertakings rarely will act as catalysts for disruptive technologies and 
products.  They have no incentive to aggressively alter consumer demand and risk 
cannibalizing existing profits unless new products appear likely to generate independent 
revenue streams.  The inertia and profitability of dominance represents a material constraint 
on monopolist-led innovation that usually results in conservative investments to slightly 
improve products rather than in market altering, creative new products.
73
  Supply conditions 
shape demand conditions when market power exists. 
U.S. precedents have stated that the market power necessary for unlawful tying need not 
reach the minimum level that would support a monopolization claim under § 2 of the 
Sherman Act.
74
  The economic power required in the tying market may “exist[] only with 
respect to some of the buyers in the market.”75  A less demanding market power inquiry 
could mean that the law requires pricing power only in a sub-market.  Questions of markets 
and sub-markets often reduce to a market definition inquiry, precisely how the court or 
regulator defines the relevant market.  NPT provides analytical tools to examine market 
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definition and market power, such as whether particular products restrain the undertaking 
from raising prices in the tying market.  A lower threshold for liability likely responds to the 
high market share traditionally required for dominance under Sherman Act § 2.
76
 
Although subsequently retaining the general principle that tying market power need not 
rise to the level of monopoly, the U.S. Supreme Court consistently has required plaintiffs to 
demonstrate pricing power.  The question is “whether the seller has the power, within the 
market for the tying product, to raise prices or to require purchasers to accept burdensome 
terms that could not be exacted in a completely competitive market.”77 
The source of that pricing power may vary.  Indeed, the Court has implemented a 
seemingly boundless standard for identifying pricing power.  The seller must exhibit only 
“some advantage not shared by [] competitors in the market for the tying product,”78 which 
more precisely means some demand or supply advantage.
79
  The problem with this test is that 
such advantages almost always exist in differentiated markets, which characterize the vast 
majority of real-world markets.  If applied literally, then, the standard collapses, since most 
differentiated producers would meet it. 
In an outlier of tying precedent, the European Court of Justice in Tetra Pak II made the 
following determination.  Because (1) the four markets at issue were closely related ― two in 
aseptic machines and cartons, and another two in non-aseptic machines and cartons, and (2) 
Tetra Pak held a near monopoly in the aseptic markets and a leading position in the non-
aseptic markets, the Commission did not have to prove that Tetra Pak held a dominant 
position in the non-aseptic markets.  The close associative links between the four markets 
ensured that Tetra Pak’s dominance extended to the non-aseptic markets, even though 
dominance as such did not exist there.
80
   
The following facts helped establish the conceptual links that justified (from the 
Commission’s and Court’s perspective) the transfer of dominance.  The cartons were nearly 
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identical on the aseptic and non-aseptic markets.  The cartons packaged nearly identical 
products on both markets.  And most customers of non-aseptic products also bought Tetra 
Pak’s aseptic products81 ― making Tetra Pak the inevitable supplier of machines and cartons 
for most users. 
Critical to this analysis, the alleged tying occurred exclusively on the non-aseptic 
markets, where Tetra Pak tied cartons and services to machine sales.
82
  The case thus appears 
at least a partial exception to the market power requirement underpinning tying doctrine, 
since Tetra Pak did not hold sufficient market power in the non-aseptic machine market to 
support a finding of dominance.   
Given the standard for demonstrating market power applied by U.S. courts, on the other 
hand, perhaps the case does not represent such an outlier.  The Commission described the 
non-aseptic markets as oligopolistic: Tetra Pak held a market share of roughly 50% to 55%, 
almost twice that of its nearest rival.
83
  The Commission also found that while the 
technological barriers to entering the aseptic machine market were considerable, such 
technological barriers did not significantly obstruct entry into the non-aseptic machine 
market.
84
   
According to NPT, market power cannot exist, no matter how high an undertaking’s 
market share, unless entry barriers prevent potential rivals from responding to attempted 
price increases by flooding the market with alternatives, thereby depressing prices back down 
to the competitive level.  Absent entry barriers, therefore, the Commission could not even 
establish the lower U.S. threshold of pricing power in the tying product that need not rise to 
the level of dominance. 
To account for this theoretical deficiency, the Court of Justice chose to view the two sets 
of markets as a unitary system.
85
  This determination allowed the Court to hold that the 
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technological barriers in the aseptic machine market prevented competitors from entering the 
non-aseptic machine market and lowering price down to marginal cost.   
The concept of associative links has no basis in NPT.  Either the relevant market included 
both aseptic and non-aseptic machines and cartons, and Tetra Pak wielded market power in 
the machine market; or separate markets existed and Tetra Pak lacked market power in the 
non-aseptic machine market.  By maintaining both that four separate markets existed and 
that, despite the absence of entry barriers, Tetra Pak exercised pricing power over the non-
aseptic machine market, the Commission and the Court of Justice, in finding tying liability, 
departed from fundamental precepts of NPT. 
C. Coercion Cannot Exist Absent Market Power 
EU and U.S. courts uniformly have required evidence of coercion before finding tying 
liability.  However, the EU Commission, in its 2009 enforcement priorities in applying A.102 
TFEU, omitted coercion as a requisite element to the claim.
86
  Perhaps the Commission 
views coercion as a natural consequence of market power and anticompetitive foreclosure, 
and thus a redundant element to any tying claim. 
A dominant undertaking can offer desirable tied packages, however, which might raise 
prices in both the tying and tied markets.  Unless the package forces consumers to buy an 
unwanted product, it increases consumer welfare and therefore should not trigger liability.  
Anticompetitive tying cannot occur without coercion.   
Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) nevertheless explains how coercion produces 
anticompetitive effects, by accounting both for the origin of coercion ― meaning pricing 
power in the tying market, and for the harm that coercion causes consumers — measured in 
terms of anticompetitive foreclosure.  Anticompetitive foreclosure occurs when a tying 
arrangement protects pricing power in, or transfers pricing power from, the tying market.  It 
also occurs when the tie-in prevents merit competition from functioning in at least the tied 
market, thereby moving that market closer to the monopoly paradigm. 
Coercion historically has occurred at a level of forcing beyond persuasion such that a 
seller requires a buyer to purchase a second product as a condition precedent to obtaining the 
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first product.
87
  The coercion realistically must foreclose the option of purchasing the tying 
product separately from the undertaking with pricing power in the tying market.
88
  The tying 
practice further must compel, directly or indirectly, the purchase of a product either 
unwanted or preferred separately, whether or not offered by a competing supplier.
89
  A 
vertical tying arrangement between a manufacturer and a dealer that does not foreclose a 
sufficient portion of the retail market, such that consumers nevertheless have adequate access 
to competing products, does not limit consumer choice enough to prompt liability.
90
 
Under NPT, the ability to curtail consumer choice proportionately increases with market 
power.  A company can force consumers to forego a preferred mix of products only if it 
wields pricing power in the tying market,
91
 or the ability to decrease output without losing 
enough consumers to render the decision unprofitable.  If perfect competition characterizes 
the tying and tied markets ― meaning that to cover costs, suppliers must satisfy consumer 
preferences or consumers will switch to rivals who will ― and if consumers prefer 
purchasing the tying and tied products separately, then the tying undertaking will have no 
means or ability to force consumers to purchase the package.  “[A] perfect competitor could 
not coerce any buyer into taking anything.”92 
Judge Easterbrook, a persuasive advocate of NPT, has discussed the non-price 
consequences of condemning tying arrangements without a showing of market power.  
Essentially, of deleting a desirable combination of products, an alternative market option, and 
thus “reducing rather than enhancing the vigor of competition and the welfare of 
consumers”.93  If consumers dislike a package yet continue to buy it, however, then the seller 
must have a dominant share of a tying market protected by entry barriers, and thus have the 
ability to restrain choice by exercising market power.  “Only if buyers are forced to purchase 
the tied services as a result of the seller’s market power would the arrangement have 
anticompetitive consequences.”94  The U.S. Supreme Court has grafted such NPT tenets into 
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tying jurisprudence, evidenced by the fact that it has not found coercion or compulsion to 
purchase another product without first determining that market power existed in the tying 
market.
95
 
1. Determining Coercion by Testing Consumer Demand 
Institutional economics supports the proposition that dominant undertakings have wide 
scope to influence consumer preferences, and thus have wide scope to affect the legal 
parameters of coercion.  Absent market power, competitors will engage in an unceasing 
testing process, constantly altering price and quality combinations to probe consumer 
preferences and win market share.
96
  The act of tying two separate products by a dominant 
undertaking artificially disrupts that selection process because market power prevents rivals 
both from offering a substitute to the package, and from improving upon that substitute to 
serve consumer needs better.
97
  What the market produces in such a situation may not benefit 
consumers relative to how the tied market would have developed absent the tie-in. 
A dominant undertaking might anticipate the evolution of both a tying and tied market 
and employ a tying arrangement to alter fundamentally the parameters of that evolution to 
favor its own products, for either defensive or offensive reasons.
98
  The profit maximizing 
package ordained by a dominant undertaking unlikely will track what consumers otherwise 
would have preferred in both the tying and tied markets after having the opportunity to select 
among various options.
99
  The tying arrangement would have allowed the dominant 
undertaking to “shape endogenously consumer preferences by establishing an artificial 
selection process.”100 
The following paragraphs attempt to demonstrate that market power not only enables 
coercion, it also makes coercion more difficult to prove, at least in the technology markets 
that have attracted the most recent scrutiny from competition officials.  Market power can 
deter vigorous competition between potential oligopolists, and the corresponding testing of 
consumer demand that follows, which establishes a basis to evaluate coercion.  Tying in 
differentiated markets raises the prospect that rivals may not be willing to test consumer 
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demand, leaving the preferences of many consumers inscrutable.  That unwillingness both 
might render any search for coercion indeterminate.  It also might channel the analysis to 
whether the undertaking has market power in the tying product.   
If oligopolists compete in several overlapping markets, in each of which a distinct 
oligopolist holds a leading position, then the rivals capable of producing a differentiated tied 
product that consumers might prefer over the actual tied product may refrain from producing 
it, so as not to prompt fiercer competition in the market where the oligopolist holds a leading 
position.  A reluctance to compete affects the accuracy of tying jurisprudence because the 
appearance of an alternative to the tied product would provide an opportunity for consumers 
to prefer another product, which would establish the coercive potential of the tying 
arrangement. 
Consider the actual and potential competition between the technology giants Apple, 
Microsoft, and Google.  Apple, the most profitable and largest company by market 
capitalization in the world,
101
 makes electronic devices, such as phones, computers, TV’s, 
and MP3 players, many of which Apple ties together.  Apple developed a mobile operating 
system called iOS that runs on these devices (except Mac computers), but which Apple does 
not license for outside use.
102
  Both Microsoft and Google have created alternative mobile 
operating systems, Windows Phone and Android, respectively, that they do license for use on 
competing electronic devices.
103
   
Microsoft and Apple compete in the development of operating systems for computers, 
with Microsoft’s Windows historically and presently dominant.  Apple’s OS X represents a 
niche operating system at least partly because, once again, Apple does not license OS X for 
use outside Mac computers.
104
  Google also has launched a limited foray into the operating 
system market through the open source, Linux-based Google Chrome OS, which it designed 
to interface primarily with web applications.
105
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Finally, Google and Microsoft’s Bing ― which joined forces with Yahoo in 2010106 and 
together currently account for a 30% market share
107
 ― compete in the search engine market, 
where Google holds a dominant position. 
The differentiation between the technology giants has limited, though not precluded, 
head-on competition, generally relegating it to discreet market segments that either 
strategically protect other dominant positions or signal the likelihood of retaliation if full-
blown competition ensues.  This evolution of the various distinct, but related, markets likely 
would hinder the willingness of all three dominant undertakings to test consumer demand in 
the tied markets of rivals.  Generally in technology markets, which require prodigious sums 
merely to challenge an entrenched incumbent, only the other technology giants have the 
relevant expertise
108
 and the financial wherewithal or balance sheets to incur the potentially 
massive fixed costs, whether in IP, branding, or network effects, necessary to compete. 
Take Apple’s decision in the 1980s and 1990s not to license the predecessors to OS X for 
use on Dell, HP, and IBM computers, among others, thereby avoiding direct confrontation 
with Microsoft and maintaining its unique product offering and brand image.  Microsoft 
reciprocated by not integrating into the device market and by not attempting to drive Apple 
out of the computer business altogether by drastically cutting the price of Windows toward 
cost.  Apple continued to develop its reputation for elegant user interface, on which it relied 
to launch wildly popular, and often tied, products that pioneered new markets, such as the I-
Phone and IPAD. 
Both Microsoft and Google have responded to Apple’s profitability by entering upstream 
markets that compete with Apple on the supply or input level, as Android and Windows 
Phone, among other mobile operating systems,
109
 run non-Apple smart phones and tablet 
computers.  Google’s development of Android simply might represent an attempt to find new 
revenue streams, but Android also might serve to warn Apple about entering into the search 
business.   
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Microsoft’s recent purchase of Nokia crosses the vertical threshold into full head-on 
competition in the mobile handset market.  Yet even here, Microsoft likely is targeting the 
more elastic portion of demand for smart phones, consisting of value consumers who cannot 
afford Apple’s I-Phone.110  Whether Microsoft can move its smart phone offering upmarket 
to rival the I-Phone directly ― a feat that Microsoft’s X-Box accomplished in the gaming 
console market,
111
 to the chagrin of Nintendo and Sony ― might depend on Apple’s 
willingness to license OS X to competing computer hardware manufacturers. 
Microsoft also has initiated direct competition with Google.  In 2009, Microsoft launched 
Bing as an alternative search engine.
112
  In 2010 Microsoft signed a joint venture with Yahoo 
to take over the functional operation of Yahoo’s search engine, which included selling 
advertising.
113
  In 2011, Google ― surely in response to Microsoft’s incursion into its core 
market ― launched Chrome OS, which, because it offers only a browser, media player, and 
file manager, only faintly competes with Windows.  Yet Microsoft surely understood the 
implication of the three applications featured by Chrome OS ― two of which, browsers and 
media players, were the subject of historic antitrust investigations by the European 
Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice.  Both investigations highlighted the threat 
that browsers and media players potentially posed to Microsoft’s monopoly in the operating 
system market, and thus the anticompetitive objective of both tying arrangements.  Microsoft 
sought to stamp-out nascent competition in presently complementary, yet potentially 
substitutable, markets.  Again, the extent to which Google develops, invests in, and markets 
Chrome OS might depend proportionally on the ferocity with which Microsoft competes in 
the search engine market. 
Of course, all three giants simply may be preparing for a future in which Apple, 
Microsoft, and Google “clouds,” the ultimate tied service, compete to meet both work and 
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entertainment consumer electronic needs.
114
  In such a market, individuals might use 
software available in rival clouds online at both work and home to draft memoranda, to 
develop architectural blue prints, to search for information online, to download music, to talk 
on the phone, and even to access movies and television shows.  The hardware of the various 
giants might contribute extra features to its corresponding cloud.   
But that hypothetical world seems improbable according to the rationality tenet of NPT, 
if only because holding monopolies in the various market segments above more likely would 
generate greater profits for the technology behemoths over time than dividing the spoils three 
or more ways in one market.  Given the likely price-tag initially to purchase connectivity, 
only a minor segment of consumers could afford access to such clouds, though as the market 
matured, competition likely would lower both prices and profits while increasing 
accessibility.  The technology companies then might offer access to segments of the market 
at higher prices to increase revenue. 
A more direct answer to the question whether sufficient market incentives exist in the 
facts above to prompt potential rivals to test consumer demand — on which an accurate 
reading of coercion depends — might go as follows.  So long as any tying arrangement did 
not directly encroach on a market in which another technology giant was earning sizable 
profits, the remaining giants might prove reluctant to fully develop competing tied products 
so as to test the extent of coercion generated by the tying arrangements of rivals.  That 
reluctance may persist even if the remaining giants have a strategic interest in the tied 
market, and even if the giants represent one of only a few companies capable of testing 
demand in the tied market or competing directly with the package.  A similar consideration 
likely would deter aggressive competition in many oligopolistic, differentiated markets.  The 
reluctance nevertheless originates in market power somewhere. 
Absent market power in the NPT sense, the tying undertaking cannot prevent or 
intimidate rivals from offering additional choice in either market at comparable prices.  
Welfare suffers because consumers may not know that they do not want the tied product 
unless attractive substitutes exist.  Competition authorities and judges would be able to detect 
coercion more easily if market power did not deter competition.  The presence of robust 
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market power in the tying product, therefore, significantly enhances the ability to coerce 
while simultaneously inhibiting the capability of the legal system to detect coercion. 
Small wonder that U.S. and EU courts and competition agencies have relied so heavily on 
market power in the tying product to predict the likelihood of, rather than actually to prove, 
coercion.  The reluctance to offer substitutes in related oligopolistic markets both could bias 
tying inquiries against finding coercion, if the absence of alternatives persuades consumers to 
prefer the dominant company’s offerings.  Inadequate incentives to compete also could bias 
investigations toward finding coercion, if judges and competition authorities respond by 
presuming its existence based on market power.  Either way, inadequate competition, which 
yields inadequate information, weakens the enforcement process. 
2. Manipulating Consumer Demand with Market Power, Behavioral Economics & 
Eliminating the Pricing Mechanism 
Market power in a tying product creates advantages in winning over consumer demand 
that tied rivals cannot match.  Coercion will not exist if consumers prefer the tied package.  
Consider how a dominant undertaking might attempt to manipulate consumer preferences to 
favor a package.  The psychology of purchasing a joint product over two separate products 
likely will favor the tying undertaking.  Aside from saving on transaction and production 
costs, many consumers might prefer a package simply because the tied product seemingly 
adds functionality or performance to a pre-existing product at a hidden price.  Tying removes 
the pricing function as a mechanism to calibrate consumer wants and producer capability.  It 
thereby could eliminate head-to-head competition between the dominant undertaking and 
certain rivals based on price and quality.   
Narrowing the purchasing decision from two separate products to one instead focuses the 
consumer’s attention on the tying product where the dominant undertaking enjoys unique 
advantages that confer pricing power.  If many purchasers of the tied product also buy the 
tying product, and those purchasers have a favorable impression of the tying product, then 
they are likely to transfer that favorable impression to the tied product as well.
115
  Consumers 
will do so even if they otherwise might view that product as inferior to alternatives.  The 
superior branding of the tying product can eliminate the coercion (as forcing) inherent in any 
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tying arrangement, by allowing robust demand for the tying product to obscure the higher 
priced or lower quality tied product. 
Tying doctrine aims to preserve merit competition in the tied market,
116
 defined as the 
competition that exists in the perfectly competitive models of Neoclassical Price Theory 
(NPT).  Either the tied rival cannot enter the tying market and produce a similar package as 
the dominant undertaking, or the tied rival cannot match the price subsidies or economies of 
scope flowing from the tying to the tied market.  Tying arrangements thus corrupt the pricing 
mechanism as a primary means to exhibit efficiency and win-over tied customers.  By 
altering the purchasing process, the dominant undertaking can force a tied rival to exit the 
market based on factors unrelated to merit competition. 
Once consumers have bought a tied package, rival tied competitors might have to 
overcome loss aversion and the endowment effect to win back custom.  Loss aversion states 
that individuals value existing utility much greater than gaining an equivalent amount 
elsewhere.
117
  The endowment effect states that individuals require a higher price to sell a 
good already owned than they would be willing to pay for that same good initially.
118
  For the 
coercion generated by behavioral economics, if any, to produce anticompetitive foreclosure, 
it will have to interact with market power in the tying product.   
Market power, price-cuts permitted by market power, or consumer demand more likely 
will prompt customers to purchase the package initially rather than bounded rationality.  For 
instance, dominant undertakings will have greater scope to offer discounts that tied product 
rivals cannot match.  Once customers buy the package, loss aversion makes them less likely 
to switch back to purchasing only the tied product even if the tying undertaking subsequently 
rescinds any discount and raises prices to previous levels.  Consumers place extra value on 
maintaining existing levels of utility and are willing to pay for it.  This dynamic further can 
affect the difficulty with which plaintiffs can establish coercion, since consumers eventually 
might prefer a tying arrangement even if prices subsequently increase. 
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The endowment effect applies similarly.  Once consumers have purchased and grown 
accustomed to a tying package, they might consider the extra utility added from the tied 
product as part of their endowment or, combined with the tying product, a baseline of 
satisfaction against which any tied alternative must exceed to alter purchasing decisions.  For 
repeat customers and both durable and non-durable goods and services, therefore, these 
heuristics might require tied rivals to produce a far superior alternative in terms of price or 
quality to overcome the heightened demand for the package exacerbated by behavioral 
economics. 
Bounded self-interest might pull some consumers in the opposite direction when 
purchasing the package or tied product.  This heuristic posits that individuals can aspire to 
benevolence and individual notions of fairness even if such behavior costs them money.
119
  
Consumers of rival tied products might ignore the initial package discounts or tied product 
discounts and continue purchasing from the tied rival out of loyalty or possibly self-interest, 
if it is a sophisticated buyer and can anticipate foreclosure.
120
   
In assessing this heuristic and its strength, bounded self-interest likely applies only faintly 
unless the tied good is durable and expensive, or implicates health and safety concerns.  In 
that case, consumers might prefer a rival product for rational reasons such as to reduce risk.  
Lower prices, particularly if offered by a dominant, and thus trusted, undertaking, are likely 
to outweigh altruistic and schematic purchasing motivations in all but exceptional 
circumstances.  Self-interest, in one guise or another, generally motivates market 
transactions, or at least motivates those who enter into the most transactions.   
The net effect of heuristics in the tying context thus favors the tying undertaking.  The 
coercion identified by both NPT and behavioral economics will work in tandem to produce 
anticompetitive effects in the tying context, assuming sufficient market power and 
overlapping demand between tied products exist. 
D. Separate Products 
1. Demand Conditions 
All tying requires separate products; otherwise antitrust law would penalize undertakings 
for assembling components to a single product, or for choosing how to manufacture a 
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product.  Of the potentially myriad methods of identifying separate products, including by 
comparing product characteristics or by exercising subjective intuition, both United States 
and European Union courts have relied on a principal pillar of Neoclassical Price Theory 
(NPT), the concept of demand, to address the question.  The law of demand essentially posits 
that as the price of a good falls, all else equal, consumers will demand more of that good.  
And as the price of a good rises, all else equal, consumers will demand less of it.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court in Jefferson Parish stated that deciphering the existence of independent 
products “turns not on the functional relation between them, but rather on the character of the 
demand for the two items.”121   
This point of law has evolved since Jefferson Parish in accord with fundamental tenets of 
NPT, at least in the context of technological tying.  In the U.S. Microsoft III case, the D.C. 
Circuit addressed the tying of Internet Explorer to the Windows operating system.  It 
criticized the consumer demand test if used as the exclusive method for identifying separate 
products.  Specifically, the Court worried that such a test might “chill innovation” by 
deterring companies from integrating new functionality into their products, if that 
functionality previously existed independently on the market.
122
  The separate consumer 
demand that automatically would precede integration in such instances, along with the 
associated threat of treble damages if liability ensues, could prevent product innovation that 
might benefit consumers substantially.  The Court further stated that the other elements of the 
quasi-per se rule articulated by the Jefferson Parish Court do not adequately counterbalance 
the potential tax on innovation that the separate products test might levy if focused 
exclusively on consumer demand.
123
 
In applying the separate products test, EU Institutions have not expressed the same 
concerns over innovation as the D.C. Circuit did.  The Commission in Microsoft I endorsed a 
“but-for” version of that test, inquiring into whether, absent the tying, “a substantial number 
of customers would purchase or would have purchased the tying product without also buying 
the tied product from the same supplier.”124  On appeal, the General Court affirmed that the 
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separate product prong of any tying analysis depends on customer demand.
125
  If independent 
demand for the tied product does not exist, “there can be no question of separate products 
and no abusive tying.”126  The General Court found that separate products existed because, 
although consumers may have preferred media players integrated into operating systems, 
they did not necessarily prefer Windows Media Player over alternatives.
127
  The fact that, 
notwithstanding the tying arrangement, a material number of consumers continued to acquire 
media players manufactured by rivals supported this claim.
128
 
2. Supply Conditions 
Despite ostensibly isolating the demand side in defining product markets, courts and 
regulators have not ignored, in testing for separate products, the supply-side influences that 
both shape and reflect demand, particularly the drive to produce efficiently.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court, for instance, has stated that for two separate products to exist, sufficient 
consumer demand must enable the efficient production of goods or services independently.
129
  
Stated differently, consumers must be willing to pay a high enough price for both the tying 
and tied products such that sellers immediately can recover their marginal or avoidable costs 
of producing the two products separately. 
One easily can imagine a factual scenario where this condition does not hold.  Consider 
the separate provision of pathological services, a laboratory-based specialty, from general 
hospital services.  Patients and hospitals proved unwilling to pay a price high enough above 
pathologists’ marginal costs to permit them to set-up shop separately from hospitals.  This 
fact prompted the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to dismiss a tying claim because the 
pathologists failed to establish that two separate products or services existed.
130
  
The D.C. Circuit has drawn an explicit relationship, though “inversely proportional,” 
between perceptible separate demand and net efficiencies, a supply consideration:
131
 the 
greater the joint efficiencies from producing two products together, the less that consumers 
will demand them separately.  This is so because of the steep premium consumers would 
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have to pay to finance independent production.  Conversely, if a seller can extract minimum 
efficiencies from jointly producing two goods or services, then consumers should exhibit 
stronger demand for purchasing the two items separately.  The small price differential 
between the jointly and separately produced goods unlikely will outweigh the inability to 
choose.  In the extreme opposite case, if joint production allows the manufacturer to offer the 
tied product for free compared to the “but for” or non-tied alternative, few consumers likely 
would demand independent production.
132
  The rule depends on supply considerations and 
price movements to reveal demand. 
The U.S. consumer demand test does not just balance demand and supply considerations.  
Rather, it ultimately balances consumer preferences (demand) and cost savings and 
efficiencies (supply) against the reduction of consumer choice that tying inherently 
effectuates.
133
  While NPT incorporates the existence of consumer choice as a beneficial by-
product of competitive markets, or as a justification for both higher and lower prices, it 
generally does not balance such a factor against price considerations.  Consumer choice helps 
determine price levels.  The facts of the U.S. Microsoft III case did not present the 
opportunity to weigh price against choice, since consumers ostensibly acquired web portals 
for free. 
The consumer demand test articulated by the D.C. Circuit ultimately would attempt to 
measure whether the tie-in, “on balance,” enhances consumer welfare.134  A welfare inquiry 
as a component to the quasi-per se test would absorb all other considerations.  Perhaps that 
was the point, because the Court proceeded to recommend a rule of reason as the appropriate 
test to evaluate technological tying.
135
 
While applying a far-narrower separate products test, the EU General Court in Microsoft 
also considered that supply factors informed consumer demand.  For instance, relevant 
supply factors encompassed technical features of the tying and tied products including the 
history of their development, as well as the commercial practice of both Microsoft and rivals 
leading up to the integration of the two products.
136
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The Commission and General Court did not need to consider the potential efficiencies 
generated by the tying arrangement under the separate products prong of the liability test 
because a distinct prong of that test, focused exclusively on objective justifications, 
independently accounted for efficiencies.  Under that heading, the Court held that the 
curtailment of consumer choice and innovation brought about by the tying arrangement far 
outweighed any accompanying efficiency gains in terms of eliminating the consumer 
transaction costs of integrating media players, or of enhancing the technical performance of 
the Windows operating system.
137
  In any event, the tie-in was not indispensable to achieve 
the pro-competitive effects sought.
138
 
3. Behavioral Economic Considerations to the Separate Products Inquiry 
In the context of tying doctrine and establishing separate products, once customers begin 
to purchase the tied package, behavioral economics, and particularly loss aversion, can 
integrate in the minds of consumers what they previously considered separate products.
139
  
This affects demand considerations.  Switching back to purchasing only the tied product 
represents a loss valued greater than the package or either product offered separately, even 
products otherwise valued equivalently.  With market power, an undertaking can build 
momentum towards a tied package by offering discounts or compelling a sample purchase of 
the tied product, providing an opportunity for behavioral economics to operate. 
The overconfidence bias of the tying undertaking also will tend to integrate markets.  
Overconfidence bias holds that, when predicting the future, individuals, including managers 
at companies, overestimate positive outcomes while underestimating the risk of failure.
140
  
For both rational and boundedly rational reasons, dominant undertakings will tend to add 
features to a product to increase and protect market power.
141
  Yet dominant undertakings 
will tie more than rationality predicts because their managers generally will overestimate the 
receptivity of consumers to additional product features. 
Depending on the existing contours of consumer demand and the degree and breadth of 
market power in the tying product, these heuristics could produce either competitive or anti-
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competitive effects.  Competitive effects will follow if the tying undertaking succeeds in 
improving the tying product, or if its many tying attempts either weaken its own market 
power in the tying product, or weaken the market power of dominant undertakings operating 
in the various tied markets targeted.  The tie-in will produce anticompetitive effects if the 
market power of the tying undertaking allows it to monopolize various other markets by 
offering products that do not improve consumer welfare, but that consumers purchase 
anyway because of the desirability of the tying product.  Anticompetitive effects also will 
arise if the various tie-ins protect the tying market from competition. 
The net effect of these two heuristics in the separate products context again favors the 
tying undertaking, since they will support the defense that a single product exists.  The 
strength of market power in the tying product still constitutes a condition precedent for loss 
aversion and overconfidence bias to harm consumers by facilitating the integration of 
markets against their interests. 
E. Anticompetitive Foreclosure 
Before determining that a tying arrangement is illegal, the U.S. Supreme Court and the 
EU Courts have required plaintiffs to demonstrate the fact that, or the likelihood that, the 
tying arrangement has foreclosed, or will foreclose, a substantial volume of commerce in the 
tied market.
142
  From the U.S. perspective, this element most directly tests for 
anticompetitive effects, in the sense that unless the tying arrangement forecloses a material 
percentage of competitors in the tied good market, it unlikely will raise prices in either 
market or reduce consumer choice substantially. 
The EU even more explicitly has linked foreclosure to anticompetitive effects as defined 
by Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT).  To incur liability, the tying arrangement must produce 
“anticompetitive foreclosure,” or foreclosure that harms consumers generally in terms of 
higher prices, but potentially in terms of reduced quality, choice, and innovation, if price 
effects do not predominate.   
From a broader NPT perspective, tying raises competitive concerns, or moves markets 
further away from the competitive paradigm, because it might allow monopolists to exclude 
actual or potential competitors in the tied or tying markets which otherwise would have 
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restrained price increases above the competitive level.
143
  The quasi-per se rule that provides 
the framework for liability in both jurisdictions essentially sets-up the inquiry into 
foreclosure or anticompetitive foreclosure. 
1. Price Effects, Overlapping Demand, and Coercion Under NPT 
Tying arrangements that either exclude or raise rivals’ costs (RRC) can generate 
anticompetitive foreclosure within the terms of Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT).  The RRC 
conceptual framework examines whether exclusionary practices “place rival competitors at a 
cost disadvantage” in procuring inputs or producing outputs sufficient to permit price 
increases in output markets.
144
  By foreclosing a certain percentage of potential business in 
the tied good market, a monopolist can prevent tied good competitors from attaining the 
economies or other advantages necessary to compete effectively against the monopolist in 
either the tied or tying markets.  Insufficient competition allows the monopolist to raise 
prices. 
If the foreclosure in the tied good market does not reach a certain threshold, determined 
theoretically and practically by NPT, tied good suppliers will have ample opportunity to 
lower costs and prices.  Conversely, the greater the share of supply foreclosed, the greater the 
potential cost and price increases that will follow.
145
 
Even if tying excludes or raises rivals’ costs, however, a host of conditions still might 
prevent the monopolist from increasing prices.  To address the issue of price effects, the 
examiner further must analyze competitive restraints in the tying and tied good markets to 
ascertain the ability of excluded rivals, existing rivals, and potential entrants to obstruct price 
increases by expanding output.
146
  An anticompetitive foreclosure analysis further may 
involve a discretionary prognostication based on the relationship between the tying 
arrangement and the evolution of demand and supply conditions going forward.  In the 
majority of contractual and technological tying cases where market prices remain a relevant 
variable, anticompetitive foreclosure will exist if the tying arrangement, because of consumer 
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responses, excludes or materially weakens rivals that most restrain the dominant undertaking 
from raising prices, generally in the tied market.
147
  Foreclosure often will precede any price 
effects caused by tying.  It also represents a rough proxy for the amount of consumer choice 
curtailed, though remaining tied competitors may produce more highly differentiated 
products than those excluded. 
Overlapping demand between tying and tied products can greatly influence whether the 
tie-in produces anticompetitive foreclosure.
148
  According to NPT, overlapping demand 
means that, absent the tying arrangement, consumers of the tying product regularly buy the 
tied product.  If significant overlapping demand exists, then the tying arrangement likely will 
exclude a material portion of tied competitors, since it will force consumers who otherwise 
bought their products to buy only the package.  The tying arrangement takes existing 
customers from tied rivals.  If only an insignificant amount of demand overlaps, meaning that 
tying product consumers generally do not buy the tied product independently, then the tying 
arrangement will not take customers from tied rivals, at least initially.  Retaining their 
customers will allow tied rivals to stay in the market.   
Yet if the tying market is much larger than the tied market prior to the tie-in, then it will 
substantially reduce the market share of tied rivals.  Lower market share eventually could 
exclude them when the tying arrangement confers on the dominant undertaking economies of 
scale or scope or other advantages inherent to market power. 
The extent of anticompetitive foreclosure in the tied market also depends on the extent to 
which the tying arrangement affects the contestable part of demand for the tied product.  That 
issue also implicates coercion and resembles the foreclosure inquiry raised by loyalty rebates.  
If the tying undertaking already operates in the tied market prior to the tying arrangement, 
then presumably a proportion of purchasers of the tied product already buy the tying product.  
As the percentage of consumers who otherwise would buy, absent the tie-in, both the tying 
and tied products from the dominant undertaking grows, the tying arrangement coerces less, 
even if it forecloses potential competition.  The greater the contestable portion of demand, 
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meaning the higher the percentage of consumers who substitute, or would substitute, between 
tied products, the greater the potential anticompetitive effect of the tying arrangement. 
An undertaking usually will account for a competitive portion of tied purchases prior to 
the tying arrangement, but after instituting the tie-in, that portion will increase substantially.  
That extra portion of consumer demand that previously went to tied products sold by rivals, 
but now goes to the package, represents the contestable portion of demand foreclosed to 
competitors, and a measure of coercion or forced purchases.
149
   
Tied rivals may retain at least a portion of contestable demand.  Subsequent foreclosure 
could exclude as-efficient and more efficient rivals by reducing their scale of operations.  
The tying arrangement thus could exclude lower priced alternatives that cannot compete with 
the dominant undertaking in the tying market.
150
 
The package further enables pricing freedom that tied rivals lack.  The tying undertaking 
could win tied product sales despite raising the price of the tied product within the package, 
because it can lower the price of the tying product.
151
  Alternatively, the tying arrangement 
may allow the dominant undertaking to win individual product sales in the tied market by 
lowering the individual price of the tied product while raising the price of the package. 
Aside from efficiency considerations, when demand under competitive conditions would 
have supported more variety or greater quality in the tied market, a tying arrangement can 
reduce consumer surplus by reducing the contestable share available to competitors.  It does 
so even if only inefficient rivals would have met that demand.
152
 
NPT has identified the coercion that produces anticompetitive foreclosure.  A tying 
arrangement coerces regardless of the percentage of overlapping demand, and even if that 
percentage does not foreclose enough of the tied market to make continued or new operation 
there unprofitable.  The tying arrangement still coerces those tying product customers who 
would have preferred to purchase an alternative tied product even if they represent, say, only 
one-fifth of consumers affected by the tie-in.  Forcing these consumers to purchase an 
unwanted product does not produce anticompetitive foreclosure.  It may produce 
                                                 
149
 Cf. Economides, supra n.27 at 138. 
150
 Cf. Intel, Comp/37.990, Commission Decision of 13 May 2009, at ¶ 1612.  
151
 Nalebuff, supra n.46 at 7-10, 14-18. 
152
 Cf. Economides, supra n.27 at 124. 
168 
 
anticompetitive effects only if the judge or competition authority measures consumer welfare 
by the elimination of choice. 
Competition law alternatively may not deem coercion anticompetitive unless the tying 
arrangement forecloses a high enough percentage of tied rivals that, to a designated degree, 
price goes up or quality goes down.  For that to happen, overlapping demand generally must 
exist.  The dominant undertaking’s tied product must account for a large portion of 
consumption in the tied market.  While coercion is inherent to any tying arrangement, 
therefore, it raises competitive concern when it causes foreclosure beyond the competitive 
threshold.  Only then will the tie-in materially affect price levels and consumer choice. 
Anticompetitive effects measured in terms of anticompetitive foreclosure influences 
competition.  Absent an anticompetitive tying arrangement as defined by NPT, competition 
in the tied market would have more closely resembled the competitive paradigm where rivals 
compete by adjusting price and quality to provide continually better products.  An 
undertaking with pricing power in the tying market can short-circuit that process and win 
market share in the tied market solely because of an ability to satisfy consumer wants in an 
entirely separate market. 
Anticompetitive foreclosure can proceed along two parallel tracks.  A tying arrangement 
can force unwanted purchases of a second product, and it can manipulate consumer 
preferences away from competing tied products.  Even if tying undertakings gain from the 
brute force method of forcing additional sales, the indirect route adds a multiplier effect 
because it influences consumer preferences and demand conditions.  If the tie ultimately 
convinces consumers to prefer the package, then they will be less likely to substitute away 
into viable or even more attractive alternatives, or to stop purchasing the products altogether.  
Consumers also will want to purchase the tying package more frequently and will be willing 
to spend more on it.  The multiplier effect thus may sustain higher prices far longer than 
would have occurred otherwise. 
The indirect method also may better protect the positive brand image of the dominant 
undertaking and may avoid further encouraging rivals to offer a competing package.  
Achieving foreclosure by manipulation therefore might motivate tying arrangements even 
more than the direct exclusionary method. 
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Yet U.S. tying doctrine appears to recognize only coercion that directly forces unwanted 
purchases, and the EU Commission does not even designate coercion as an independent 
element to a tying claim,
153
 though the General Court and Court of Justice still require 
evidence of coercion before imposing tying liability.  The U.S. Supreme Court in Jefferson 
Parish declared that the illegality of a tying arrangement depends on forcing a buyer to 
purchase a “tied product that the buyer either did not want at all, or might have preferred to 
purchase elsewhere on different terms”.154  This focuses the question of consumer harm at 
least initially on eliminating choice for the tying purchaser rather than how the tie-in 
influences consumer preferences because of weakened competition in the tied market. 
Following this precedent, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that plaintiffs can 
satisfy this element by showing that buyers of a tying product or service accepted an 
additional product or service that they considered burdensome or disfavored.
155
  Or plaintiffs 
can demonstrate coercion by proving that a customer, because of a tying arrangement, bought 
a tied product at an inflated price when an equally desirable alternative in terms of quality, 
branding, and variety existed at a lower price.
156
 
While the quasi-per se test pins liability on the coercion of consumers and the foreclosure 
of competitors, foreclosure minus coercion will not harm consumers in a legal sense, 
regardless of whether it alters demand conditions over time to favor the dominant 
undertaking.  The absence of coercion suggests (1) that consumers prefer, and freely choose 
to buy, the package over purchasing the products separately, (2) that they are indifferent to 
foreclosure, and (3) that their revealed preferences favor the package.  The foreclosure of 
competitors then reflects market forces, or the interplay between supply and demand; 
antitrust law seeks to promote this result.  In those circumstances, higher prices do not raise 
anticompetitive concern, because they reflect strong consumer demand.  Higher prices even 
may go hand-and-hand with greater consumer surplus, if consumers’ reservation price for the 
package now cumulatively exceeds their reservation price for the tying and tied products sold 
individually.  Even if coercion were not a separate element to a tying claim, therefore, it still 
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represents a prerequisite to anticompetitive foreclosure, or foreclosure that harms consumers, 
in the tying context. 
Competition law guided by NPT does not aim to protect competitors, or ensure “fair-
play” in all markets.  The importance of coercion to tying doctrine demonstrates this norm.  
If enough consumers in both the tying and tied markets prefer the package because it 
generates efficiencies and thereby permits lower packaged prices, or if the package enhances 
functionality, then even if the tying arrangement excludes more efficient tied competitors, the 
package still enhances consumer welfare. 
The existence of coercion alone, on the other hand, does not establish anticompetitive 
foreclosure.  A tying arrangement may coerce consumers relative to the options available in a 
“but-for” world of perfect competition in the tying and tied markets, yet still enhance both 
consumer and total welfare.  The tying arrangement may finance research and development 
that leads to innovation and product improvements.  While the consumer may pay more 
given the tying arrangement, the package produces greater consumer surplus than 
competitors offering the products separately.  In these circumstances, coercion initially may 
exist and then dissipate after the dominant undertaking produces a better version of each 
product or a better combined product. 
The tying undertaking manipulates consumer preferences under these circumstances as 
well, but for the betterment of consumers.  The fact that tying can manipulate preferences to 
the betterment or detriment of consumers further demonstrates the sagacity of selecting 
consumer welfare as the lodestar for all of competition law. 
Establishing that coercion produces anticompetitive foreclosure often will prove 
challenging.  It may require constructing a “but-for” world of perfect competition in the tying 
product.  Under competitive conditions depicted by NPT, consumer preferences very likely 
would differ from existing preferences.  If strong demand characterizes the tying product, 
consumers may buy the package for that reason alone.  Or if demand also supports the tied 
product, they may purchase the package purely because of the discount on offer, even if 
consumers disfavor the dominant undertaking’s tied product.  Given competitive conditions, 
consumers would not choose to purchase a package when the discount off the tying product 
or package does not exceed the lower price of, or greater desirability of, a competitor’s tied 
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product, or when the package itself does not add functionality.  Consumers simply would 
purchase both the lower priced tying and tied products separately.   
Comparing existing market conditions to a “but-for” world requires an intensive market 
analysis and a degree of forecasting.  The case for such a detailed analysis might be strongest 
with tying, however, because it can merge two markets. 
By conditioning the opportunity to purchase a necessary or popular product on the 
simultaneous purchase of a separate product, the tying undertaking suspends the exercise of 
independent judgment as to the merits of the tied product.
157
  And by grafting the necessary 
or popular product’s appeal onto the competitive product, a tying arrangement insulates the 
tied product “from the competitive stresses of the open market”.158  If two separate products 
exist, then competition previously proceeded along delineated, non-overlapping lines (though 
the two products could have represented partial substitutes).  This means that distinct sets of 
products generally would have constrained attempts to increase the prices of each individual 
product.  Assuming market power exists in the tying product, the substitutes available to 
restrain price increases in that market will not operate as effectively as the competitive 
restraints at work in the tied market, where market power is weaker.  The tying arrangement 
allows an undertaking, essentially, to more closely approximate competitive conditions 
between the two markets, thereby transferring at least a portion of pricing power from the 
packaged to the tied market. 
Under NPT, to determine the extent to which a tying undertaking successfully transfers 
its market power to the tied market and achieves enough foreclosure there to mirror 
conditions after a merger, a judge or competition authority closely must examine demand and 
supply conditions in both the packaged and tied markets subsequent to the tie.  The 
fundamental questions focus on the reaction of consumers to a forced purchase, including 
whether they will turn to rivals capable of differentiating.
159
  When a sufficient percentage of 
consumers continue to demand the tied product separately, the competitive issue depends on 
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whether the tying arrangement confers on the tying undertaking a unique production 
advantage in the tied market unrelated to merit competition.  When insufficient demand for 
separate products persists, the supply-side question turns to whether tied rivals or other 
potential competitors can enter the package market and compete with the tying undertaking 
there.  Market power in the tying product regularly will allow an undertaking to block such 
competition. 
As another relevant consideration under NPT, the foreclosure rate in the tied market may 
underestimate the extent of consumer harm when a tying arrangement forecloses particularly 
distinct substitutes.  Foreclosure may harm consumers more acutely if the excluded products 
were “manifestly different from the consumer’s perspective” from the remaining products in 
the tied market.
160
  Consumers prefer choice over coercion, particularly when the options 
available are stark.  Greater differentiation in non-luxury markets, in markets that do not 
substantially affect health and safety, and in markets that do not raise significant 
externalities, allows consumers to consider what product characteristics maximize their 
welfare, and to test preliminary hypotheses concerning what they like. 
Given clearly delineated variety in such markets, consumers are more likely to find a 
product that they value far above the asking price, which thereby maximizes consumer 
surplus.  A more drastic curtailment of differentiation among tied products therefore may 
aggravate the consumer harm caused by a tying arrangement.  Ultimate success in creating a 
merged market against consumers’ wishes marks a measure of anticompetitive foreclosure in 
the tying context. 
2. EU Microsoft I Case 
While perhaps the chief concern, tying jurisprudence does not just aim to prevent higher 
consumer prices and inefficiency, the leading indicators of anticompetitive effects under 
Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT).  It also attempts to guard against tying arrangements that 
stifle merit competition.  In the U.S. Microsoft III case, the D.C. Circuit stated that, under 
competitive conditions, goods appeal “directly” to consumer choice on the merits.161  Market 
power does not inhibit buyers from exercising their own judgment concerning the price and 
                                                 
160
 Cf. Intel, Comp/37.990, at ¶ 1605 (discussing loyalty rebates, but the foreclosure and coercion issues resemble 
those presented by tying arrangements (listed in Lianos, supra n.1 at 187-202)). 
161
 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 87. 
173 
 
quality mix in the goods that they prefer.
162
  The Court determined that the tying 
arrangement, combined with indirect network effects, allowed Microsoft to “stave off” any 
meaningful competition in the tying or tied markets, regardless of the perceived quality of 
alternatives.
163
  In the web portal market, providing higher quality represented the primary 
method of competition, since Microsoft ostensibly made Internet Explorer available free of 
charge.
164
 
Microsoft employed a similar practice in the EU Microsoft I case, tying media players to 
its dominant operating system.  Again Microsoft eliminated price as a potential means to 
compete by offering Windows Media Player (WMP) for free to consumers of its operating 
system.  Without the ability to lower price, rivals could compete only by offering higher 
quality or more innovative media players.  The General Court stated that Microsoft’s market 
power in the operating system market, combined with the tie-in, secured “a competitive 
advantage unrelated to the merits” of WMP.165  The tying arrangement permitted Microsoft 
“automatically” to transfer its market power on the operating system market to the media 
player market, “without having to compete on the merits”.166   
Under conditions of perfect competition, Microsoft would have had to build a vastly 
superior media player, in terms of quality and innovation, to achieve the same market share 
that it did simply by tying WMP to its operating system.  The tying arrangement enabled 
Microsoft to “evade[] competition and the significant additional costs which it entails.”167  
Consumers would have had greater influence over the product characteristics that ultimately 
prevailed in the media player market.  The tie-in thus produced allocative inefficiency.  Even 
though it did not raise media player prices, NPT accurately predicted the anticompetitive 
effects of the practice. 
(i) Anticompetitive Foreclosure Measured by Coercion 
The tying at issue in the EU Microsoft I case presents a milder form of coercion 
compared to that depicted in paradigmatic tying arrangements, in the sense that Microsoft did 
not explicitly prohibit, or financially discourage, consumers from using rival tied products.  
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Various media players were available to download at no-charge from the Internet,
168
 and 
Microsoft did not technically inhibit either the download or the selection of rival media 
players alongside the Windows offering.
169
  However, Windows Media Player (WMP) came 
pre-installed on Microsoft’s dominant operating system, and users could not remove it even 
if they preferred alternative media players. 
The EU General Court held that coercion existed because Microsoft deprived customers 
“of the realistic choice of buying the tying product without the tied product”.170  Because 
customers only could add a second media player, rather than initially selecting a preferred 
offering, or replacing WMP with another product,
171
 the tying arrangement conferred on 
Microsoft a singular advantage in media player competition: 80% of all operating systems 
shipped worldwide featured just one media player, which the tying arrangement guaranteed 
was WMP.  Moreover, Microsoft also ensured that WMP automatically appeared on 95% of 
operating systems, and thus computers, shipped worldwide.
172
   
Due to the additional transaction costs and expense required to install a second media 
player, computer manufacturers predominantly included only one.  This selection narrowed 
the contestable portion of the relevant market.  As the General Court stated, “developers of 
third-party media players compete with each other in order to have their products pre-
installed” in 20% of the available market.  Microsoft was able to evade all competition in the 
uncontested portion of the relevant market ― which reached 80% ― “and the significant 
additional costs which [competition there would have] entail[ed].”173 
The prohibited coercion amounted to systemically altering the market structure for media 
players and the incentives of content providers, software developers, and computer 
manufacturers in a manner unrelated to merit competition under Neoclassical Price Theory 
(NPT).  The manipulation of market structure and incentives significantly enhanced the 
desirability of WMP without lowering its price or improving its quality.  The tying 
arrangement favored Microsoft in two respects.   
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First, it ensured that consumers tested Microsoft’s media player first, and because the 
vast majority of media player consumers neither were aficionados of, nor did they have to 
pay explicitly for, media players, such consumers were likely to assume that WMP worked 
best with Windows.  And having become part of the Windows endowment, unless WMP 
proved grossly dysfunctional or inadequate, most consumers would switch to a second 
product only if it offered compellingly better functionality.  Under the rationality tenet of 
NPT, such a discrepancy in functionality unlikely would occur given both the vast financial 
resources available to Microsoft to ensure rough parity, and the deterrent effect of the tie-in 
itself.  The tie-in made achieving a market share conducive to recovering the investment 
necessary to develop a significantly better media player exceedingly difficult. 
As a second and more daunting consequence of the coercion at work in the EU Microsoft 
I case, the tying arrangement took advantage of indirect network effects that conjoined the 
purchasing incentives of operating system consumers and the financial incentives of content 
providers and software developers to write content and applications compatible with 
WMP.
174
  Consumers prefer media players for which content providers and software 
developers have written the most content and applications, and content providers and 
software developers prefer writing content and applications for the most popular media 
players.  They have this preference because maximizing distribution ultimately maximizes 
revenue, and because writing content and applications for other media players require 
additional outlays of limited resources.   
Microsoft’s near monopoly in the operating system market meant that by writing content 
and applications for WMP, content providers and software developers could reach virtually 
all potential users of media players at the lowest cost.
175
  Computer manufacturers also saved 
money by including only one media player.
176
  The tying arrangement thus manipulated 
competitive conditions to favor Microsoft simply by ensuring the ubiquity of WMP.
177
  The 
enhanced features and additional content written to WMP in turn made the product more 
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desirable to consumers.
178
  Even the low substitution costs of downloading free alternatives 
could not overcome such advantages.
179
 
Despite stark differences between computer software and nails,
180
 the coercion at issue in 
Microsoft and Hilti could operate in a similar manner.  Hilti nail gun consumers had to 
purchase Hilti nails, so they additionally could not buy the nails offered by competitors.  
Purchasing Windows operating system ensured that consumers had the option of using 
WMP, while nothing prevented them from using another product.  However, the tying 
arrangement materially raised the entry barriers and switching costs to achieving the market 
penetration required to attract the content and applications that would have allowed rival 
media players to match the functionality of Microsoft’s product.  The EU General Court held 
that the tie-in raised such barriers high enough that no rival media player could have 
overcome them.
181
  If correct, this finding meant that the net effect of the coercion applied by 
Microsoft actually converged towards the Hilti example.  A tying arrangement that ― 
exclusively because of pricing power in the tying product ― fixes competitive conditions so 
that consumers inevitably will prefer the dominant undertaking’s tied product achieves the 
same degree of anticompetitive foreclosure as directly forcing the same result. 
As evidence of this proposition, the EU General Court highlighted that “in three months 
Windows Media Player 6 obtained almost the same distribution by being bundled with the 
Windows operating system as it achieved in a year by downloading.”182  NPT greatly 
influenced and expanded the EU Microsoft I Court’s view of coercion, as not necessarily the 
act of forcing, but the consequence of manipulating market conditions to block competition 
based on “the intrinsic merits of [] two products”.183  If such exclusionary acts further harmed 
consumers — and the Court ruled that it did by reducing variety and precluding more 
extensive product improvements
184
 — then the tying arrangement produced anticompetitive 
foreclosure. 
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(ii) Weakening Competition as Anticompetitive Foreclosure 
Because of indirect network effects and the tying arrangement employed by Microsoft, 
Windows Media Player (WMP) achieved nearly full market coverage.  To achieve the same 
coverage, rival media players would have had to expend practically infinitesimal resources in 
advertising and distribution that Microsoft saved merely by tying the two products together.  
No matter the efficiency or creativity of a rival media player, consumers were likely to 
choose WMP because of its seemingly cost-free and actual transaction-free ubiquity.  Of 
course, Apple partially surmounted these entry barriers and higher costs by introducing a 
distinct and disruptive technology popular among consumers, namely the Apple IPOD, itself 
tied to Quicktime Media Player.
185
  But that development did not prevent years of Microsoft 
dominating the media player market because of a tying arrangement that conferred an 
unparalleled competitive advantage on WMP unrelated to the product’s intrinsic qualities,186 
or to consumer demand.  Absent the tie-in, concluded the General Court, different demand 
considerations more focused on product desirability would have determined the prevalence 
and general popularity of media players.
187
  The tie precluded merit competition and 
replicated monopoly conditions in the media player market. 
Although the tying decision in the EU Microsoft I case did not turn on higher media 
player prices, if consumers hypothetically had paid a price for media players, Microsoft’s 
tying arrangement likely would have raised it.  The dominance of the Windows operating 
system insulated Microsoft from any hypothetical pricing restraints that competing media 
players could have exerted, since Microsoft included WMP at no price within the operating 
system package.  The tying arrangement further significantly raised the cost structure of 
rivals by forcing them to engage in expensive distribution methods such as mail order 
advertising, or less costly methods such as downloading the media player from the internet.  
Both distribution methods, nevertheless, were of limited effectiveness because, to work, each 
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required consumers to incur the extra transaction costs of installing or downloading a product 
similar to one that already came pre-installed on their operating system.
188
 
In fact, the tie-in completely removed the price mechanism as a lever of competition, so 
rivals could not attempt to win market share by lowering costs and prices.  Instead, to rival 
Microsoft’s market share, rival media players would have had to produce a far superior 
product, and then would have had to expend significant resources advertising the product to 
consumers.  If an explicit price existed, rival media players would have had to charge a steep 
premium above Microsoft’s offering to cover at least their inflated distribution and 
advertising costs.  Knowing the extra cost that competitors producing rival media players had 
to incur, Microsoft could have raised the hypothetical price of WMP while still retaining a 
dominant market share.  All because of pricing power in a separate product. 
The General Court noted that Microsoft must have incorporated at least a portion of the 
cost of developing WMP in the price of its operating system.
189
  The lack of remuneration in 
the media player market suggested that Microsoft actually aimed to maintain or increase the 
price of its operating system either (1) by adding features that enhanced functionality at a 
hidden price, or (2) by weakening competition in a market that eventually could replace 
operating systems.  Eliminating the explicit relationships between price and cost and price 
and quality in the media player market constituted a substantial anticompetitive effect of the 
tying arrangement. 
Examining foreclosure from the perspective of behavioral economics, rather than 
rationality and profit maximization, once consumers paid for WMP by purchasing Microsoft 
Windows, both products became part of their endowment.  The tie-in therefore increased the 
intrinsic value of WMP in the minds of consumers compared to the “but-for” world of 
formulating value absent the tie.  In that “but-for” world, consumers would have determined 
desirability based solely on the merits of the competing products. 
The absence of the price mechanism did not prevent the General Court from affirming a 
merger review approach to evaluate the tying arrangement.  The Court ultimately concluded 
that a reasonable likelihood existed that the tying arrangement materially foreclosed 
                                                 
188
 For a discussion of the welfare effects of free goods, see Michal S. Gal & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Hidden Costs 
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competitors in the tied good market.
190
  This approach did not involve adopting an 
independent test for tying arrangements or raising rivals’ costs, since the General Court, for 
the purpose of identifying exclusionary conduct, meticulously reviewed the basic elements of 
an illegal tying claim ― market power, separate products, coercion, and anticompetitive 
foreclosure, while permitting inquiry into whether efficiencies outweighed anticompetitive 
effects.  Rather, the merger review approach looked beyond a singular focus on requiring 
convincing historical proof of each tying element to a more holistic, forward-looking market 
inquiry.  This inquiry examined whether the challenged conduct, here tying, also had stifled, 
or likely would stifle, “effective competition from vendors of potentially more efficient 
media players who could [have] challenge[d] [Microsoft’s] position”.191 
By upholding a market intervention that attempted to counteract an undertaking with 
significant market power in one market that had monopolized a second market, the General 
Court sought to protect competition as conceived by NPT.  The monopolization proceeded 
not by providing a higher quality, more desirable, or more efficiently produced product, but 
by manipulating consumer preferences through a recognized method of exclusion only 
available to dominant undertakings — tying. 
III. Conclusion 
Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) mostly explains the relevant legal and economic 
considerations that have driven the development of tying doctrine in both the EU and U.S.  
Pricing power in a large tying market frequently will represent the most critical determinant 
to tying success, along with the extent of overlapping demand between the tying and tied 
products.  Courts and competition authorities evaluate the existence of separate products by 
applying basic concepts of demand and supply.  Accurately determining whether the legal 
elements of coercion and foreclosure harm consumers requires the close examination of such 
NPT concepts as elasticity, the contours of demand and supply, the strength of entry barriers, 
and the robustness of competitive restraints in the tying, tied, and packaged markets, before 
and after the tying arrangement takes effect. 
Even the evolution of tying doctrine towards an abbreviated merger analysis or structured 
rule of reason test, led by both the D.C. Circuit and the EU General Court, merely highlights 
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the overwhelming influence that NPT has exerted, and continues to exert, on tying law.  
While non-NPT considerations such as behavioral economics could influence tying law at the 
margins, it still generally requires the presence of market power to produce anticompetitive 
effects.  Tying can impede rivals from winning market share by producing a higher quality, 
more innovative, or cheaper product, thereby obstructing merit competition.  It thus can 
lower consumer welfare and effectuate monopolization according to standard NPT models.
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CHAPTER 5: BUNDLING ECONOMICS & LAW 
I. Introduction 
To varying degrees, bundling resembles both tying and predatory pricing.  Some U.S. 
Courts of Appeal, and the EU Commission to an extent, view bundling as a form of predation 
and thus have attempted to evaluate the conduct by applying the discount attribution standard 
or another cost-based test.  Multiple product discounts differ from single product discounts in 
material respects, however.  Predation excludes entirely by foregoing profits otherwise 
available.  A bundled discount need not entail any profit sacrifice.  Dominant undertakings 
can manipulate prices within a bundle to eliminate the need to forgo profits, particularly 
since many purchasers of the linking product exhibit inelastic demand when confronted with 
price changes.  The independent popularity of the linking and linked products, the 
complementarity of the bundled products, and the pre-existing overlapping demand for the 
bundled products ― all will affect the exclusionary potential of the discount.   
Unlike in the predation context, the discount attribution standard does not attempt to 
determine the efficiency of individual price-cuts.  Rather, the standard tests whether a 
hypothetically equally efficient competitor could match all the various price-cuts if 
aggregated and applied to the competitive product, without pricing below the average 
variable cost (AVC) of the dominant undertaking.
1
  With predation, AVC represents the 
lower limit of any discount, the short-term efficient price, and the shut-down price of the 
dominant undertaking, since it will earn an immediate loss on any discount below that 
measure.  By contrast, package purchasers potentially could gain substantially more 
consumer surplus from a bundled discount because of the possibility of multiple price-cuts.  
The profit margin on the competitive product limits the potential benefit to package 
purchasers under the discount attribution standard, which therefore does not account for the 
greater utility that bundled discounts can provide to at least some consumers. 
The incongruence between single and multiple product discounts raises the question 
whether bundling resembles tying more closely.  While forcing consumers to purchase two 
products harms more than offering price-cuts to coerce a second purchase, since consumers 
                                                 
1
 The Commission test asks whether the incremental price that consumers pay for each product in the bundle falls 
below the long run average incremental cost of the dominant undertaking to add that product to the bundle.  
Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive 
Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings (2009/C 45/02) at ¶ 60 [“Guidance”]. 
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at least retain the option to buy the products individually, when price-cuts reach substantial 
proportions, the difference dissipates.  Examining market power in the linking product ― 
and thus a significant portion of the potential to coerce prices in the linked or packaged 
markets ― would provide relevant evidence of the exclusionary and anticompetitive 
potential of any discount.  The relationship between the dominant undertaking’s costs and the 
extent of the discount also affects coercive potential, but the discount attribution standard 
tests for nothing else.   
Independent of cost evidence, both the extent and the timing of discounts influence their 
anticompetitive effect, as well as the magnitude of any countervailing consumer benefit.  The 
discount attribution standard does not attempt to work-out whether the benefit to package 
purchasers outweighs the loss to single product buyers, who ultimately may face higher 
prices in the linked market.  The test further ignores the fundamental inquiry underlying all 
exclusionary practices, that is, whether the discount forecloses enough competitors, or 
particularly important competitors, such that the dominant undertaking gains pricing power 
in the relevant market. 
The frailties of the discount attribution standard would lessen if it were folded within an 
approach that resembled the quasi-per se test utilized in tying law.  The discount attribution 
standard could help establish market power, coercion, and potential anticompetitive effects, 
but it singularly establishes each element insufficiently.  A quasi-per se tying test applied 
holistically to determine whether the discount ultimately produces anticompetitive 
foreclosure more accurately would measure the harmful effects that bundling poses.  Any test 
focused on consumer welfare further would need to balance the lower prices that bundling 
usually confers on package purchasers against competitive effects in the linked market.  A 
quasi-per se test would retain flexibility both:  
(1) to ignore price-cuts that simply induce marginal purchases, that fall below 
cost but are unlikely to result in higher prices, or that otherwise confer 
substantial benefits on consumers (over-inclusive); and  
(2) to identify price-cuts that weaken competitive conditions in the linked market 
but that do not violate the discount attribution standard (under-inclusive).   
It also would enhance allocative efficiency by not channeling exclusionary conduct to pricing 
practices. 
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To comply with the rule of law, I additionally recommend two safe harbors for dominant 
undertakings producing separate products that are considering whether to offer a bundled 
discount.  To the extent that the market share of the dominant undertaking in the linked 
product does not exceed 45%-50%, the discount is per se legal.  Alternatively, if the 
dominant undertaking can establish that less than 60% of linked product purchasers also buy 
the linking product, then the discount is legal.  When dominant undertakings do not qualify 
for either safe harbor, they must defend against proof of anticompetitive foreclosure.  
Dominant undertakings reasonably might assume the risk of accurately defining the relevant 
markets ex ante as a burden of dominance, and of profitably utilizing non-replicable 
advantages in a separate market to extend pricing power. 
To take a couple concise examples of the inadequacy of the discount attribution standard, 
when a linked product competes in a competitive market, the profit margin on the dominant 
undertaking’s linked product is minimal.  If a dominant undertaking offers a bundled 
discount to consumers buying its leading linking product as well, then the discount very 
likely would violate the discount attribution standard.  Yet if demand conditions would 
continue to support several linked competitors, and material foreclosure does not ensue, then 
the test would have precluded a practice that generated significant additional consumer 
surplus.  Conversely, when the linked product competes in an oligopolistic or monopolistic 
market, significant discounts that exclude competitors that restrained price increases would 
harm consumer welfare, assuming price increases follow price-cuts.  Yet the bundled 
discount might not violate the discount attribution standard because of the tremendous 
profitability of the linked product. 
The discount attribution standard does not necessarily seek to prevent higher prices or to 
promote lower prices.  It rather aims to prohibit the exclusion of rivals because of pricing 
power and discounts in separate markets.  This focus on as-efficient competitors or merit 
competition reflects a greater concern for the process of competition over price levels.  The 
test seeks to promote the model of perfect competition between products within the same 
market, but inadequately measures the anticompetitive effects of bundled discounts in the 
linked market.  It further ignores overlapping demand and the prospect for recoupment. 
Because monopolization law applies to dominant undertakings, an anticompetitive 
foreclosure analysis would affect their pricing incentives only in linked and packaged 
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markets.  Dominant undertakings would retain the freedom to dictate competitive conditions 
in linking markets.  The administrative burden of such an approach, as the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals demonstrated in LePage, need not unduly surpass that of singularly 
applying the discount attribution standard.  Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) does not fully 
support either approach because each only partially complies with its principal tenets.
2
 
This chapter features two substantive sections that together attempt to demonstrate the 
overwhelming influence of NPT over bundling law in the EU and U.S.  Section II examines 
the NPT Foundations to Bundling.  Section III offers recommendations to amend existing 
bundling doctrine in certain regions of the United States and in Europe.  Section II(A) asks 
whether Bundling Resembles Predation.  The first subsection (i) employs NPT to examine 
the General Proximity of Single & Multiple Product Discounts, while the second part (ii) 
critically assesses the Discount Attribution Standard under NPT.  Section II(B) alternatively 
asks whether Bundling Resembles Tying.  Concluding that it does, the section argues that 
detecting anticompetitive bundling requires evidence of: (i) Market Power, (ii) Coercion, and 
(iii) Anticompetitive Foreclosure, as defined by NPT.  Finally, Section II(C) contrasts the 
opposing approaches to bundling under NPT adopted by, respectively, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in PeaceHealth — which exclusively applied the discount attribution 
standard, and the Third Circuit in LePage — which arguably applied the elements to a quasi-
per se tying test as subparts to a structured rule of reason. 
II. Neoclassical Price Theory Foundations to Bundling 
If Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) greatly has influenced the development of tying law, 
then it likely would have exerted even more influence over bundling jurisprudence, which 
addresses discounts offered when purchasing two or more products together.  If tying coerces 
through contractually or technically forcing the purchase of a second product, then bundling 
coerces through price-cuts.  Price-cuts generally reduce profitability at least initially, or the 
spread between prices and costs, and thereby increase efficiency.  At first glance, NPT might 
support a permissive approach to bundling, perhaps viewing the practice as conceptually 
similar to predatory pricing.  And indeed, some Circuit Courts of Appeal, led by the Eighth 
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 Thanks to Professors Jones & Kokkoris for requesting clarification on the relation between NPT and the two 
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and Ninth Circuits, exclusively examine the relationship between costs and price to evaluate 
bundling. 
In addition simply to acknowledging that prices fall after a price-cut, however, NPT also 
attempts to promote competition and efficiency over time, and specifically, the competitive 
conditions depicted in the model of perfect competition.  Under such conditions, the market 
will produce the levels of price, variety, and quality that consumers prefer, as determined by 
their willingness to pay. 
After identifying profit sacrifice, the U.S. and EU predatory pricing tests also attempt to 
measure how the price-cut ultimately will affect market conditions and price levels, at least 
for price-cuts within a certain range.
3
  The discount attribution test incorporates no similar 
analysis of actual competitive effects.  Regardless of the conclusion reached after applying 
the discount attribution standard, NPT would not support a discount that altered competitive 
conditions toward monopoly, as measured by a material reduction in competitive restraints 
on the dominant undertaking.
4
   
Alternatively, because NPT has incorporated the Kaldor-Hicks measure of efficiency, it 
would allow all price-cuts that benefited more consumers than it harmed.  For bundled 
discounts, this reasoning suggests that price-cuts should not incur liability if they benefit 
packaged consumers more than they harm linked product consumers.  In considering all 
monopolization conduct, NPT attempts to promote consumer welfare across all markets, as 
demonstrated by its focus on allocative efficiency and price levels over time.  The Third 
Circuit has adopted this second, more holistic approach to bundling claims.  This section 
attempts to trace the influence of NPT over the competing approaches. 
Perhaps no other action that a company can take more closely embodies competition on 
the merits and more effectively benefits consumers than a price-cut.
5
  Lower prices 
contribute directly to consumer surplus, or the difference between what consumers actually 
pay for a product and what they are willing to pay.  And lower prices further deepen a market 
by permitting additional consumers to purchase the product.  Understandably, U.S. federal 
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 Jay Matthew Strader, Post Danmark’s Recoupment Element, 10(2) COMPETITION LAW REVIEW 205, 234-38 (Dec. 
2014). 
4
 On competitive restraints, see David S. Evans, Lightening Up On Market Definition, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAW 60 (Einer Elhauge ed., 2012). 
5
 Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1062 (8
th
 Cir. 2000) (Murphy, J.) (“Cutting prices is the 
very essence of competition.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
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courts have taken great care not to punish economic behavior that benefits consumers, and a 
bundled discount, if not a disguised penalty, “is a price discount on a collection of goods”6 
that allows consumers “to get more for less”.7  In that sense, lower prices immediately 
benefit consumers
8
 regardless of the purpose motivating them, and ultimately benefit 
consumers if the price-cuts do not subsequently cause higher prices ― which they must to 
justify their implementation.
9
  Increased efficiency can explain bundled discounts above cost, 
as an undertaking can reduce costs by simultaneously selling multiple products to one 
consumer rather than several products individually.
10
 
While bundling can exclude rivals that cannot match discounts offered on multiple 
products, sometimes leading to higher prices in the linked market, it also can produce 
ambivalent welfare effects.  For example, bundling can encourage consumers to make 
incremental purchases that they otherwise would not have made, resulting in greater overall 
revenue for the dominant undertaking and potentially greater consumer satisfaction.  Absent 
bundling, assume that a material portion of consumers, call them marginal consumers, might 
purchase only the dominant product and forgo purchases of the bundled product or 
substitutes because they value such products a little less than the asking price.  The 
monopolist sells at least the linking product well above cost, creating great scope to offer a 
package that lowers the price of the linked product to marginal consumers.  A form of price 
discrimination, the bundled discount in this instance might help the dominant undertaking 
achieve greater scale in the linked market, thus lowering costs.  Or the package otherwise 
may boost profitability, as the lower price on the linking or linked products boost sales of 
both products, each of which the dominant undertaking sells above cost and thus earns a 
profit.
11
 
Consumers who previously bought both products unequivocally gain consumer surplus 
from the discount.  Marginal consumers may or may not gain from purchasing the bundle, 
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 Cascade Health Solutions v. Peacehealth, 515 F.3d 883, 902-3 (9th Cir. 2008) (Gould, J.). 
7
 Id. at 895. 
8
 Nicholas Economides & Ioannis Lianos, The Elusive Antitrust Standard on Bundling in Europe and in the United 
States in the Aftermath of the Microsoft Cases, 76(2) ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 486, 489-90 (2009). 
9
 Cascade Health Solutions, 515 F.3d at 901 (quoting Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 
U.S. 209, 223, 113 S.Ct. 2578, 2588 (1993) (Kennedy, J)). 
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 Id. at 895. 
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 Cf. Barry Nalebuff, Bundling as a Way to Leverage Monopoly, Yale School of Management Working Paper #36, 
7-10, 14-18 (2004) (discussing the profitability of manipulating the prices of bundled products), available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=586648.  
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particularly if the monopolist discounts the linking product minimally or not at all.  They 
would gain the value of the linked product but very little consumer surplus from it.  And the 
discount may have caused marginal consumers to forgo purchases of products valued less 
highly on which they nevertheless would have secured greater consumer surplus.  The 
welfare effects on consumers who exclusively continue to buy the linked product depend on 
whether the bundled discount confers pricing power on the dominant undertaking.  Judges 
and competition authorities have not attempted to calculate the net welfare effects of bundled 
discounts on consumers, perhaps because of measurement difficulties.  Instead, they have 
turned to other concepts derived from NPT for guidance. 
Because multiple product discounts at least ostensibly resemble single product discounts, 
identical arguments in the predation context have arisen in the bundling context.  The Ninth 
Circuit, for instance, has quoted Supreme Court jurisprudence on predatory pricing to support 
the applicability of cost tests to bundling claims, stating that price-cuts above-cost that 
competitors cannot match exclude on the basis of efficiency or a lower cost structure, and so 
represent competition on the merits.
12
  Pioneering this line of argument, the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals has stressed the importance of pricing incentives for dominant 
undertakings,
13
 which generally price well above marginal costs and, by definition, “lack 
market discipline on their prices.”14  Monopolization law generally should not discourage 
such companies from lowering prices, since the primary and simplest means to compete 
consists of cutting prices to increase sales.  Indeed, monopolization law principally exists to 
promote market conditions that facilitate lower prices.  Attaching treble damages to price-
cuts already deters, to an extent, the very action that competition seeks to promote.
15
 
Treble damages do not exist in Europe, however.  The deterrent effect of finding price-
cuts implemented by dominant undertakings illegal correspondingly will not reach the same 
level as in the United States.  Less punitive remedies in Europe have not precluded at least 
the EU Commission from viewing multi-product rebates as a form of predation, warranting 
the application of a cost test.  Yet the EU cost test critically differs from the discount 
attribution standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit.  The test does not aggregate all the 
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discounts on the competitive product.  Because it evaluates the legality of bundled discounts 
on a product-by-product basis — specifically, whether the packaged price covers the LRAIC 
of adding a product to the bundle — the Commission test retains absolute efficiency in 
production as a relevant benchmark for analysis.
16
  In that sense, it continues to advance 
efficiency as a primary objective of NPT by creating a legal safe harbor for dominant 
undertakings that do not price any individual product within a bundle inefficiently low.   
The discount attribution standard, by contrast, examines only the relative efficiency of the 
competitive product in the bundle after artificially calculating its price.  The dominant 
undertaking could fail the discount attribution test while still producing the competitive 
product efficiently. 
The Commission test also permits package consumers to benefit to a greater extent from 
the various discounts that a dominant undertaking can offer in a bundle.  Concomitantly, the 
Commission test permits dominant undertakings to exploit their diversification more fully.  
In the history of EU enforcement, the Commission has not chosen to pursue any multiple 
product discount claims outside of merger analysis, so the General Court and the Court of 
Justice have not had an opportunity to develop this area of monopolization law. 
In attempting to sort-out the merits of an under-developed legal claim, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court has not reviewed a bundling claim either, the temptation to classify the 
practice as analogous to an existing abuse will prove irresistible when similarities facially 
exist.
17
  The judiciary nevertheless should exercise care that similarities between conduct do 
not obfuscate differences in the method and consequences of exclusion.  The risk of 
analytical error increases when the benchmark for one analog historically has curtailed 
enforcement, as cost tests have done with predation.  The more closely a judge or 
competition authority conceptualizes bundled discounts to predatory pricing, the more 
closely that judge or competition authority will view the practice as price competition, 
subject to cost tests that, at least in the predation context, strictly assess liability based on a 
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relational formula.  If a judge or competition authority conceptualizes bundled discounts as 
an alternative form of tying or exclusive dealing, then a potentially more lenient standard that 
focuses on anticompetitive foreclosure could apply.
18
  Even within the NPT framework, 
therefore, a crucial conceptual question governing what legal standard to use when assessing 
bundling is whether the practice more closely resembles predatory pricing, tying, both, or 
neither.   
To answer that question legally and economically, an examiner must inquire into both 
how, exactly, bundling produces anticompetitive effects, and into how closely those effects 
approach the competitive concern raised by predation or tying.  In the section below, I 
examine the analogy to predatory pricing. 
A. Bundling as Predation 
1. General Similarity Between Single- & Multiple-Product Discounts 
A defining characteristic of predation ― and one that principally explains the law’s deep-
seated reluctance to condemn the practice, thus justifying the applicability of cost tests ― is 
the inherent profit sacrifice required.
19
  By lowering prices, a dominant undertaking bestows 
on consumers additional consumer surplus and gratuitously forfeits producer surplus ― or 
the difference between the lowest price at which a manufacturer would sell a product, around 
cost, and the price of the actual sale.  Because the practice looks identical to merit 
competition, which benefits consumers and market-wide efficiency, and because 
Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) assumes that all undertakings operate to maximize profits, 
price-cuts violate competition law only if lower prices today appear likely to produce higher 
prices later, enough to convert any sacrifice into a profit.  Outside of examining market 
conditions, a judge or regulator might attempt to discern the anticompetitive potential of 
lower prices by determining whether a dominant undertaking purposefully forgoes profits or 
additional revenues by pricing below cost.  The below-cost pricing does not harm consumers, 
however.  Only recoupment through subsequent price increases does. 
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Bundling provincially can resemble predatory pricing if the effective price of a product in 
the package falls below cost.
20
  This can occur, for instance, when the dominant undertaking 
maintains the price of the tying equivalent but adds a product or service “at no additional 
charge or at some price less than cost”.21  In such instances, consumers initially gain from the 
attractively priced package but lose if the exclusion or weakening of competitors permits the 
dominant undertaking subsequently to raise prices to monopoly levels and to recoup the 
original investment in lower prices.
22
 
(i) Bundling Does Not Require Profit Sacrifice 
Not all bundling requires an initial profit sacrifice or subsequent recoupment.  Because 
multiple products exist in a bundle, according to Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT), the need 
for sacrifice and recoupment may depend on the elasticity of demand of the individual 
products in the package.  A higher price on an inelastic product may prompt some customers 
to buy alternatives, but a discount on the elastic product may attract many more customers to 
the dominant undertaking.  Its market power suggests that it will have great scope to adjust 
prices to minimize customers switching away from its products.  Bundling allows dominant 
undertakings to arbitrage varying degrees of elasticity of demand for linking and linked 
products.   
The net effect of such discounts can generate revenues for a dominant undertaking, while 
further enhancing medium-term profitability by excluding rivals that restrain price increases 
in the linked market.  If demand for one or both packaged products is inelastic for a 
substantial portion of output, meaning the uncontested portion of demand for one or both 
products is sizable, then by manipulating prices within the package, the dominant 
undertaking still can exclude while avoiding any profit sacrifice.
23
 
For instance, if a dominant undertaking has cornered 80% of the market for product A 
and 40% of the market for product B, and if 65% of consumers who buy product A also buy 
product B, then the dominant undertaking can lower the price of product B and collect 
additional sales there at a greater rate than the loss of sales caused by higher prices in the 
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mostly uncontested A market.  The package earns immediate profits and thus requires neither 
a net sacrifice of revenues nor recoupment.  Yet if the discount reduces competition in the B 
market, then the dominant undertaking subsequently might be able to raise B prices.
24
 
The plaintiffs in the U.S. British Airways case did not assert a bundling claim but rather 
challenged single product discounts on plane tickets.  Nevertheless, the example 
demonstrates how multiple product discounts could operate without profit sacrifice and the 
corresponding need for recoupment, if British Airways were to have conditioned the 
discounts on purchasing multiple tickets.   
In the actual case, plaintiffs argued that British Airways lowered ticket prices below costs 
to “marginal” passengers, or those who would not otherwise have flown, on contested routes 
from London to the United States, while simultaneously raising prices on uncontested routes 
out of Heathrow.
25
  British Airways held a material portion of uncontested routes out of 
Heathrow because of a significant advantage in landing spots that Virgin Atlantic could not 
replicate.  The spots originated in a government monopoly and were perpetuated as a 
property interest, which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered a “legitimate” 
competitive advantage.
26
 
The Court applied the predatory pricing rubric and dismissed the claim essentially 
because of insufficient evidence.  It found that because marginal passengers accounted for 
only between three and 14 percent of passengers to the United States, and because the 
number of passengers to the United States increased substantially in the decade prior to the 
case, plaintiffs failed to establish that the additional flights that allegedly lowered prices 
below costs “were entirely attributable to the use of incentive agreements.”27  If British 
Airways added those flights because of increased demand for transatlantic air travel, then 
selling a small portion of tickets on such flights below cost did not render the entire flight 
unprofitable.   
Even if Virgin Atlantic were able to establish below-cost pricing, continued the Second 
Circuit, it failed to show recoupment.  Virgin Atlantic proffered evidence only that British 
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Airways raised prices by 14 percent on “five challenged routes prior to Virgin’s entry and 
expansion,” not that those additional revenues “balance[d] out the losses on below-cost 
tickets.”28  Absent proof that British Airways recouped or likely would have recouped the 
below-cost discounts, Virgin Atlantic could not establish consumer harm. 
To alter the facts slightly to fit the bundling context, assume that British Airways sold 
bundled flights to travel agents, who sell a substantial percentage of airline tickets in the 
United Kingdom.  For example, British Airways offered discounts for economy class tickets 
on flights between London and New York, which reflect elastic demand.  However, it 
increased prices for business travelers on that route.  Because of perks derived from loyalty 
schemes such as upgrades and free tickets, and because employers usually pay their fare, 
business travelers exhibit inelastic demand for flight tickets and thus have a greater tolerance 
for fare increases.  To complete the bundle, British Airways raises prices, to varying degrees, 
for both economy and business travelers on flights between London and Hong Kong, which 
has a minimal effect on capacity.  Most customers on this route are business travelers, 
whether in economy or business class.
29
 
Further assume that British Airways designed the scheme to weaken Norwegian Airways, 
a hybrid low-cost and flag carrier that recently entered the London to New York market.  
Consumers are willing to fly Norwegian — which, to offer lower prices, has unbundled 
passenger amenities such as baggage handling and cabin service — only on flights less than 
eight hours.
30
  This demand constraint means that Norwegian profitably could not enter the 
London and Hong Kong route.  Norwegian does not offer business or first-class seats, so it 
has much less scope to engage in price discrimination. 
Finally, assume that an oligopoly characterizes competition on routes between London 
and New York, but that a duopoly characterizes competition on flights between London and 
Hong Kong, with British Airways enjoying a dominant position while competing only 
against Virgin Airlines.  Landing spots in London and Hong Kong constitute formidable 
entry barriers on that route.  Virgin also operates flights between London and New York.   
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Travel agents are willing to purchase the bundle because, although they can charge 
smaller mark-ups on the London to Hong Kong route, they earn much greater profits on the 
London to New York route because of both higher mark-ups and greater sales.  They thus 
absorb a portion of the price increase on flights to Hong Kong, and a portion of the price 
decrease on flights to New York, but not enough to obstruct demand forces: more consumers 
choose British Airways when flying to New York.   
Virgin Atlantic benefits from the bundle offered by British Airways even though it loses 
sales on the London to New York route because the discount simultaneously weakens 
competition on that route by eliminating Norwegian Airlines.  Its exit enables higher prices 
for transatlantic flights.  Because Virgin also gains sales and additional profits on the London 
to Hong Kong route, it does not lower prices on those flights.  Sizable price-cuts would 
render the bundled discount unprofitable to British Airways.  In fact, Virgin raises prices on 
the Hong Kong route to right below the British Airways rate.  Virgin understands the 
objective of the discount, and anyway does not wish to antagonize its larger rival on the 
Hong Kong route. 
While British Airways previously was selling in the elastic portion of demand on all 
flights, such that increases and decreases in capacity, respectively, if taken in isolation, 
would lower profits,
31
 several factors mitigate any potential profit sacrifice: (1) the response 
of travel agents, which introduce another layer of pricing on top of those set by British 
Airways; (2) rewards schemes, which make demand less responsive to price fluctuations; and 
(3) the collusion of Virgin Airlines, which increases profits on the London and Hong Kong 
route. 
The discount would sacrifice even less profits, if any, assuming that other airlines on the 
London to New York route also institute the same type of bundle, raising prices on routes 
where they hold a duopoly-like position.  Under such circumstances, the bundling does not 
represent a form of price discrimination.
32
  Rather, its design and effect is to exclude 
Norwegian without engaging in head-to-head competition on the merits, and to restore 
previous profit margins on the London and New York route relative to the “but-for” level 
that would have existed had Norwegian continued to service that route.  New York and 
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London customers initially gain short-term lower fares but eventually pay higher prices 
because of the discount.  The success of the bundling scheme is by no means guaranteed, 
however, and it depends on a number of factors: 
 the cooperation of other competitors on the New York and London route, and the 
cooperation of Virgin Airlines on the London and Hong Kong route;   
 the duration of the discount required to exclude Norwegian and thus the tolerance 
of even loyal consumers who eventually might switch to other carriers, 
particularly for business travelers on the London and New York route,  
 the willingness of the British and Hong Kong governments to expand airport 
capacity, 
 the then-existing strength of the British brand, which sustains both leisure and 
business travel to the United Kingdom, and 
 the then-existing price of fuel, among other factors. 
As the hypothetical example shows, regardless of whether the discount actually lowers 
prices below cost, bundled discounts can exclude “less diversified but [potentially] more 
efficient producers”.33  Norwegian Airlines could not compete on the London and New York 
route not because consumer demand would not support its low-cost model of service.  If 
given a chance to compete, perhaps that model could have overcome brand loyalty, 
transformed consumer tastes for mid-haul travel, and reduced costs and prices further by 
gaining scale.  Rather, Norwegian could not compete on the London and New York route 
because of consumer demand in entirely separate markets and collusion.
34
   
Conceptually integrating bundling and predatory pricing can sanction, in certain 
instances, the foreclosure of an efficient, undiversified competitor providing a product 
desired by consumers merely because, according to the discount attribution test, all the 
relevant discounts do not fall below the incremental cost of the competitive product.  In the 
example above, the dominant undertaking actually increased prices on the other segment of 
the bundle, which protected against liability under the discount attribution standard.  Such a 
test takes no account of such relevant factors under NPT as the purpose, determined from 
market conditions, motivating the dominant undertaking to price at cost, below total cost, 
avoidable cost, long-run average incremental cost, or slightly above AVC.  Rather, “[t]he 
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Supreme Court has forcefully suggested that we should not condemn prices that are above 
some measure of incremental cost.”35 
Identifying the likely effects of bundling requires a closer analysis.
36
  A cost test for 
bundling considers many contextual factors that distinguish bundling from predation as either 
irrelevant or exculpatory, since “unless the discounts resemble the behavior that the Supreme 
Court in Brooke Group identified as predatory,”37 no liability exists.  Yet bundling never will 
resemble predation fully, since multiple products are involved. 
2. Discount Attribution Standard 
The discount attribution standard attempts to approximate the cost-based test applied to 
predation.  According to the Ninth Circuit, equally efficient competitors can match all 
discounts, once aggregated, at or above the dominant undertaking’s average variable cost to 
produce the competitive product.
38
  The theoretical soundness of the test under Neoclassical 
Price Theory (NPT) hinges on the practical validity of the claim that only discounts that 
exclude a hypothetical equally efficient competitor can cause consumer harm.
39
  A higher 
level theoretical explanation for the equally efficient competitor test relates to the sanctity of 
price-cuts.  Discounts offered by non-dominant undertakings predominantly advance 
consumer interests.  Competition law seeks to encourage price-cuts unless blatantly 
anticompetitive.  A more nuanced or contextual rule, by creating legal uncertainty, could 
deter dominant undertakings from offering price-cuts or bundled discounts.
40
  Consider 
closely each of the arguments above.
41
 
(i) Discount Attribution Standard Both Under- and Over-Deters 
From the perspective of Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT), the discount attribution 
standard both under-deters and over-deters bundled discounts.  As discussed above, the test 
does not account sufficiently for the inelastic demand that characterizes a substantial portion 
of production for at least one product in the bundle.  The ability to price profitably while 
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excluding even equally efficient suppliers by manipulating prices within a bundle could 
reduce the need for either single or aggregated prices below cost.  The discount attribution 
standard under-deters price-cuts in at least the following three examples. 
In a traditional market context, a dominant undertaking, D1, bundles two products, A and 
B.  Inelastic demand characterizes most of the production of good A, so D1 normally prices 
A at $100 despite a marginal cost of $50.  More elastic demand characterizes product B, 
which D1 has marketed (using revenues from its hefty advertising budget for A) as an up-
market, differentiated version of alternatives.  So D1 prices it at $50 notwithstanding a 
marginal cost of $40.  A competitor, C1, normally prices its non-advertised version of 
product B at $45, and produces it at a marginal cost of $40. 
Assuming that A and B are complementary products and that the potential for significant 
overlapping demand exists,
42
 then D1 can offer a package in which it keeps the bundled price 
of A at $100 and lowers both the bundled and standalone price of B to marginal cost, or $40, 
but raises the standalone price of A to $102.  The bundled price is now $140, a $10 discount 
off normal prices. 
D1 loses some revenue but threatens the existence of C1, an equally efficient competitor, 
without ever having to lower the price of product A or the price of product B below marginal 
cost.  The lower package price, moreover, causes additional consumers to buy both A and B 
from D1, so D1 earns incremental profits on the increased sales of A.
43
  Even if C1 lowers 
the price of B to marginal cost, or $40, C1 still cannot compete with the package ― since the 
price of C1’s B and D1’s A together, at $142, still exceeds D1’s package price of $140.  
Neither can C1 compete on a standalone basis, given that many consumers, because of D1’s 
strong brand, prefer B individually from D1 rather than C1. 
C1, in any event, cannot operate indefinitely without covering a portion of fixed costs.  
Moreover, the bundle gives D1 a massive advantage in developing a better B product, as it 
can invest a portion of the $50+ in profits earned on product A toward research and 
development in product B.  Once C1 exits the market, D1 can return the price of B to $50 or 
higher.  The discount attribution standard would not assess liability because the packaged 
discount, subtracted from, and allocated exclusively to, B, never falls below marginal cost. 
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Another example where the discount attribution standard under-deters anticompetitive 
price-cuts mirrors the very same weakness of cost tests in the predation context, that is when 
a competitor operates less efficiently, yet its presence in the market still lowers prices.
44
  If 
C1 instead produces B at a marginal cost of $45 but prices the product at $47, the product, 
though inefficiently produced, still might restrain D1 from raising prices on B much above 
$50.  D1 can offer a bundled discount in which it lowers the packaged price of either A or B 
by $6, so the discount remains well above the marginal cost of B.  Even if C1 lowered the 
price of B to marginal cost, therefore, consumers would prefer D1’s package over 
individually buying A from D1 and B from C1.   
Assuming sufficient overlapping demand between A and B existed, the discount itself 
could exclude C1.  If D1 also lowered the standalone price of B by $5 or $6, a tactic that 
would negate the need to bundle, then C1 either eventually or immediately would have to 
exit the market.  D1 similarly would have eliminated a restraint on raising the price of B 
above $50.  Both methods of excluding C1 and raising prices in the B market occur without 
violating the discount attribution standard. 
Notwithstanding the fact that bundling can promote lower prices and efficiency, consider 
the third example of how the discount attribution standard can under-deter anticompetitive 
price-cuts, this time in new economy markets.  In traditional markets, the bundle might allow 
the dominant undertaking to lower costs by achieving greater economies of scale or scope.  
In new technology markets where marginal costs can approach zero and where additional 
users can make a platform more desirable to advertisers, adding to profitability, a bundle may 
create demand and thereby contribute substantial revenues above cost.  Google can earn 
additional advertising revenues when Android customers use its search engine over Bing.  
Aside from earning limited advertising revenues, Microsoft has monetized free 
teleconferencing by charging a fee to Skype members who call and text mobile phones and 
landlines.
45
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Notwithstanding potential efficiencies and the welfare generating capacity of bundling, 
applying the discount attribution standard to such hypothetical bundles provides great scope 
for evading liability.  If no price exists, as in the example of the implicit Google bundle, then 
no discount exists.  The test does not even apply.  Alternatively, assuming dominance existed 
in the Skype example, when an undertaking offers one product for free but offers a discount 
off list prices for the linked product to encourage more people to become members, the 
discount attribution standard collapses into a single product cost test.  The undertaking might 
offer the discount to boost advertising revenues on the platform.  The discount attribution 
standard allows the undertaking to avoid establishing recoupment on a single product 
discount.  By approximating a simple cost test, the discount attribution standard in this 
instance also fails to account for the potential exclusionary objective of the bundle: linking 
the demand features of two separate products.  Receiving two products for the price of one, 
itself offered at a discount, greatly enhances the effectiveness of a bundle. 
The following example conversely demonstrates how the discount attribution standard 
can over-deter bundled price-cuts when undertakings operate rationally under NPT.  It does 
so by not properly weighting the benefits that discounts provide to packaged consumers, and 
by not considering other relevant factors that determine the exclusionary potential of 
discounts.  Assume again that both D1 and C1 manufacture product B at a marginal cost of 
$40.  C1 prices B at $45.  Now assume that D1 offers a bundled discount in which it lowers 
the price of A from $100 to $92, and the price of B from $50 to $47, meaning that the 
aggregated discount on the bundle of $11, if applied only to product B, would lower its price 
below D1’s marginal cost, thereby violating the test.46 
The lower prices on both A and B substantially benefit consumers who otherwise would 
have bought both products, along with consumers who were enticed to buy both products 
because of the discount.  Because D1 kept the individual prices of products A and B at $100 
and $50, respectively, the bundled discount would exclude C1 only if consumer demand 
shifted toward the package.  Foreclosure depends on the market power of D1 in A, a measure 
of coercive potential, but also on the strength of overlapping demand to consume products A 
and B concurrently.
47
  When weak, the amount of the combined price-cut — on which the 
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discount attribution standard exclusively focuses — need not exclude C1.  The extent of a 
bundled discount can affect that willingness, but it still must exist independent of the 
discount.  Perhaps because of the supra-competitive price of A or of the package, enough 
consumers would continue to purchase only product B to support continued production by 
C1. 
Moreover, the extent of a discount, while partially reflecting exclusionary potential, also 
represents the potential to benefit consumers.  After all, the greater the discount, the greater 
the contribution to consumer surplus, and under NPT, consumer surplus embodies a 
significant component of consumer welfare.
48
  Because consumers gained $11 on each 
purchase of the package, even if the discount excluded C1, it still would have benefitted 
package consumers materially, unless they ultimately pay higher prices for the linked product 
or package.  The discount still would have represented a net benefit to consumers, 
notwithstanding the exclusion of C1, if subsequent higher prices in the packaged and linked 
markets do not exceed $11 in additional consumer surplus per packaged sale during the 
discount period.  And that would depend on D1’s market power in A, the popularity of the 
package, and on competitive conditions in market B after the discount. 
(ii) Discount Attribution Standard Nevertheless Complies with Rule of Law 
Now consider the legal rejoinder that any restraint on price-cuts, including a more 
nuanced or contextual pricing standard, might deter monopolists from cutting prices by 
creating legal uncertainty.  Advocates of cost tests argue that such tests can promote 
competition by creating safe harbors for dominant undertakings to lower prices.   
The first response stresses context, in that only few companies actually achieve 
dominance.  Even fewer have dominance that fuels exclusionary bundled discounts: the 
monopolist must operate in several markets where consumer demand would support 
bundling.  Eliminating a strict cost test in bundling cases, or deemphasizing its importance, 
will not discourage price-cuts by the vast majority of market participants, who operate in 
imperfectly competitive markets, or at least in individual markets. 
Secondly, if a company achieves dominance, then as the Neoclassical Price Theory 
(NPT) model of monopoly has shown, competition already operates in that market 
deficiently.  Entry barriers exist.  A price-cut will harm consumers when prices subsequently 
                                                 
48
 Consumers also benefit from the elimination of deadweight loss. 
200 
 
rise, which they will when the price-cut weakens competitive restraints.
49
  Monopolization 
law wants to deter price-cuts by dominant undertakings that lower prices only over the short-
term and that ultimately produce higher market-wide prices.  Dominant undertakings will 
work hard to ensure that price-cuts achieve that objective.
50
  While efficiency matters, even 
short-term efficiency, so too does maintaining competition.
51
  Consumer welfare in 
monopolized markets usually depends on an adequate balance between these two basic tenets 
of NPT.
52
 
However, dominant undertakings must be able to assess the legality of bundled discounts 
prior to implementing them.  Safe harbors provide legal certainty that promotes economic 
activity.  In the absence of cost tests, another legal or economic mechanism must replace 
such attributes. 
(iii) The Discount Attribution Standard Does Not Measure Efficiency 
In the predatory pricing context, cost tests attempt to promote efficiency by protecting 
price-cuts by dominant undertakings that do not fall below the most efficient level.  
Conversely, cost tests do not nurture competition by sheltering competitors from price-cuts 
above cost.  Cost tests thus force competitors to achieve equal potential efficiency as the 
dominant undertaking or risk exclusion from the market.
53
  The Neoclassical Price Theory 
(NPT) concern is that striking down price-cuts above cost could propagate inefficiency by 
legally protecting smaller, higher cost rivals that have not achieved the scale necessary to 
compete effectively, thus weakening the competitive process, all while denying customers 
the benefits of lower prices.
54
 
Two related but distinct issues under NPT determine the ultimate merits of this analysis.  
The first is whether excluding competitors with price-cuts that lower the price to the 
dominant undertaking’s AVC actually promotes efficiency and competition.  Consumer 
demand may support only one undertaking operating at minimum efficient scale.  Meaning 
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that, to compete, rivals would have to differentiate sufficiently to alter consumer preferences 
before operating efficiently in a relative sense.  Yet success in differentiation may eliminate 
the applicability of cost tests, if the two undertakings compared have different costs because 
they essentially produce different products.  When a market can support only one 
undertaking operating at minimum efficient scale, protecting competitors from price-cuts 
above the AVC of the dominant undertaking both might foster inefficiency and dull the 
differentiation process. 
To the extent possible in many monopolization contexts, judges and competition 
authorities attempt to weigh the allocative and productive efficiencies produced by a 
challenged practice against the lower prices that competition might offer.  The objective 
remains to maximize medium- to long-term consumer welfare in the immediate market and 
in markets where the monopolist operates.  Investment concerns always influence such 
inquiries whether in the context of natural monopolies or otherwise.  The potential 
indeterminacy of such an inquiry underlines the centrality of lower prices to consumer 
welfare, so long as adequate incentives to produce necessary and desirable goods and 
services persist. 
From a legal perspective, demonstrating allocative inefficiency, rather than predicting it, 
could prove beyond the capability of the judicial system.  Pricing power can exist only within 
a properly defined market.  A dominant undertaking has the ability to raise price above the 
competitive level only to those consumers who buy its goods or services, not to consumers 
generally.  In the context of bundling, the dominant undertaking has market power in the 
linking product, and the legal question is whether the bundled discount allows it to strengthen 
or extend that market power to the linked market.  Higher prices constitute the primary 
societal harm that justifies legal action. 
As discussed previously, allocative efficiency essentially is a macroeconomic concept, as 
it refers to the ability of an economy to allocate capital and labor to those many markets 
where consumers are willing to pay production costs.  When allocative inefficiency exists, 
either too few or too many resources are flowing to markets under- or overvalued by 
consumers.  Because of the ability to raise price and under-produce the relevant good or 
service, a dominant undertaking generates allocative inefficiency. 
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Courts would have great difficulty deciding bundling disputes based on evidence 
attempting to demonstrate the actual magnitude of allocative inefficiency.  The plaintiff 
would have to identify consumers and producers who are currently buying and 
manufacturing other products, but who would buy or manufacture the linking or linked 
products if the dominant undertaking did not bundle, or adjusted the price of the bundled 
products.  Existing and excluded competitors provide a benchmark, as do consumers and 
producers in related markets, and the distribution of consumers before and after the bundle.  
Needless to say, this process would involve sifting through large amounts of economic data.   
NPT allows judges and competition authorities to examine the difference between price 
and cost as a means to deduce the extent of allocative inefficiency.  Comparing price levels, 
which can demonstrate absolute harm to consumers, and examining price-cost margins, 
which indicate the opportunity cost to consumers of monopolization, provide a far more 
tangible, and thus legally cognizable, basis to measure anticompetitive conduct.    
Determining consumer welfare by weighing efficiency against lower prices might 
incorporate other market characteristics, including the potential efficiency of rivals, which 
cost tests ignore.  A competitor may be capable of producing as efficiently or even more 
efficiently as the dominant undertaking but lack the scale to match current price-cuts down to 
AVC.
55
  Given additional time to compete, such a competitor might equal or even surpass 
price-cuts offered by the dominant undertaking.  Those price-cuts in turn would have created 
incentives for the dominant undertaking to operate more efficiently or to differentiate.
56
 
Preventing the dominant undertaking from slashing single product prices down to AVC 
need not always impair the process of competition, nor promote inefficiency, because 
nothing prevents existing or potential rivals from continually reducing prices to the dominant 
undertaking’s AVC or lower.  Under a long-run cost measure that incorporates recoverable 
fixed costs, only the dominant undertaking in the first instance cannot cut prices down to 
AVC to exclude competition.
57
 
Advocates of the AVC rule might respond that competitors will have less incentive to 
lower prices continually if monopolization law prevents dominant undertakings from 
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competing by cutting prices to AVC.  Preventing a dominant undertaking from cutting prices 
reduces the urgency of rivals to cut prices as well.  This concern carries less weight at the 
AVC benchmark because the dominant undertaking cannot sustain operations at AVC, and 
neither could an equally efficient competitor.  Competitors still must contend with the 
dominant undertaking’s ability to lower prices down to the minimum sustainable level, where 
competition over the medium- to long-term would settle in an efficient market.  Pricing 
around that level because of competition provides added incentive to lower costs as a method 
to increase profits.  As a snapshot of market conditions, long-run incremental cost represents 
the best available proxy for the equilibrium price under NPT.
58
 
The second issue that informs the merits of efficiency-targeting when evaluating price-
cuts is the likely consequences of additional competition.  If it will produce lower prices and 
better quality goods and services while not deterring existing productive investments or 
similar future investments, then the additional competition will contribute to consumer 
welfare.  The judge or competition authority should know that, absent competition, market 
prices likely will return to levels far above any cost measure. 
Promoting efficiency by allowing price-cuts down to AVC could mean preventing 
undertakings other than the monopolist from investing resources in the monopolized market.  
The AVC benchmark increases returns on investment, both economy-wide and in the market 
under consideration.  All else equal, this will enhance investment incentives.  Promoting 
competition by adopting a longer-term cost measure, on the other hand, ultimately could 
provide greater incentives to lower costs and prices.  The welfare maximizing potential of 
cost tests may require a judgment concerning the relative weight to attach to efficiency, 
competition, and investment incentives given the particular characteristics of the relevant 
market. 
Cost tests nevertheless exhibit weaknesses.  They ignore historic price levels and, unless 
the price falls below cost, the likely direction of prices after a price-cut excludes or 
disciplines a target.  Cost tests reward the potential efficiency of dominant undertakings even 
if used exclusively as a tool to raise prices.  Cost tests fail to account for the possibility that a 
dominant undertaking more likely will price towards efficient levels going forward if 
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competition, even relatively inefficient competition, remained in the market.  Cost tests 
therefore only questionably promote efficient pricing in the single product context. 
Applied to multiple products, the discount attribution standard does not even promote 
absolute efficiency, let alone lower prices, or does so more tenuously.  At least in the 
predation context, cost tests attempt to determine the efficiency of a price after a discount.  
By contrast, a price-cut to the competitive product in a bundle may qualify as efficient yet 
still violate the discount attribution standard if the price-cuts of other products in the bundle, 
however efficient, when added to the competitive product, lower the price below cost.  By 
aggregating discounts, the discount attribution standard eliminates the relationship between 
single-product efficiency and liability.  Efficiency in an absolute sense no longer provides a 
safe harbor. 
(iv) Peculiar Consequences of the Discount Attribution Standard for Competition 
As a consequence of the theoretical ease of establishing liability under the discount 
attribution standard relative to a predation test,
59
 the discount attribution standard may 
encourage dominant undertakings to cut prices exclusively on the competitive product to win 
market share.  That result does not necessarily count as welfare maximizing, however.  The 
test could discourage a dominant undertaking from utilizing competitive advantages to offer 
discounts that move pricing and efficiency in several markets closer to the competitive ideal 
under Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT).  This is so at least for purchasers of the package, and 
possibly for purchasers of the competitive product as well. 
Bundling doctrine should focus on the welfare tradeoffs between purchasers of the 
package who potentially gain considerable amounts of consumer surplus, and single product 
purchasers who, because of the discount, ultimately might pay more for the linked product.  
Balancing tradeoffs does not inherently benefit either set of consumers at the expense of the 
other.  Instead, the approach adopts a Kaldor-Hicks, or utilitarian, view of welfare, assessing 
liability only when higher prices in the linked market outweigh lower prices in the packaged 
market.   
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Judges and competition authorities more easily can identify the benefits secured by 
package purchasers, which amount to the aggregated discounts.  The loss to consumers of the 
linked product depends on whether the discount excludes rivals operating in the linked 
market, and on competitive conditions there after exclusion — whether prices are likely to 
rise.  They will when the market more closely features characteristics of monopoly.  The 
absolute number of package consumers relative to linked product consumers also would 
affect the analysis.   
Instead of tallying gains against prospective losses, the discount attribution standard 
attempts to protect competition in the linked market by capping the level of discounts that a 
dominant undertaking can offer in a bundle.  The existing profitability of the linked product 
oddly determines that limit.  The test therefore favors the interests of linked product 
consumers over package consumers, and it protects consumers of competitive linked 
products more vigorously than consumers of monopolistic linked products.  Tying and 
bundling will prove most effective as an exclusionary device in linked markets where 
competitive conditions are weakest.  The single monopoly profit theorem more likely applies 
when the linked market is competitive.  The discount attribution standard thus favors liability 
when the discount unlikely produces anticompetitive effects, while it becomes most difficult 
to satisfy when bundling poses the greatest risk of anticompetitive effects. 
The test further finds liability even if the dominant undertaking, while producing the 
competitive product less efficiently than rivals, lowers the price of that product above the 
rival’s price, if the other discounts in the bundle, once aggregated, reduce the effective price 
of the competitive product below the cost of the dominant undertaking.  In other words, the 
test assesses liability on price-cuts that leave the standalone price of the linked product above 
that of competitive alternatives. 
The discount attribution test offers theoretical clarity as a counterweight.  It attempts to 
address the unfairness of losing customers because of an inability to compete in separate 
markets.  When single-product competitors survive bundled discounts, the dominant 
undertaking will have difficulty subsequently raising prices in the linked market and 
recouping the investment in lower prices without losing market share.  If prices remain low, 
the discount will have produced more efficient pricing in the linked market.   
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The concern for merit competition in the linked market serves to promote the process of 
competition, and precisely matches the original concern of tying law.  Unlike tying 
jurisprudence, however, the discount attributions standard ignores critical information 
relevant to identifying anticompetitive effects. 
(v) Discount Attribution Standard Ignores the Effects of Differentiation 
Product differentiation further inhibits the ability of the discount attribution standard to 
assess accurately the welfare effects of bundling under NPT.  Product differentiation means 
that rivals do not offer the same products as the dominant undertaking.  They instead sell up-
market or down-market versions of the relevant product, or an alternative that provides 
similar or partial functionality.
60
  Using a dominant undertaking’s costs to determine the 
competitive survival of a product tailored to comparable, but distinguished, consumer 
interests raises the potential of incongruent comparisons, of likening different products, and 
thus potentially of depriving a subset of consumers of desirable combinations at lower 
prices.
61
 
Take the example of laptop computers and Apple’s IPad.  The IPad caters to consumers 
more interested in recreation, but it still siphons revenues from laptop computers because of 
comparable functionality, including browsing the Internet, checking email, connecting with 
friends and family via Facebook and Twitter, watching movies, listening to music, and 
reading books.
62
   
Price-cuts in one market likely affect demand in the other, but the products are not 
identical, not least given the lack of a keyboard and other word processing features on the 
IPad, so the costs of each product will differ markedly.  Apple has invested significant 
resources in display, visual effects, and sound quality,
63
 as one would expect of a 
manufacturer marketing a device for entertainment, while such features have limited utility 
when drafting documents or filling-out spreadsheets.  The premium that IPads command, 
however, probably relates more to the faddish popularity of all Apple products, which 
combine novel, elegant, and user-friendly packaging of predominantly pre-existing 
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functionality.
64
  IPads and laptop computers likely operate in separate but highly correlated 
markets.   
To limit the ability of Apple to cut prices on IPads based on discounts applied to Apple’s 
laptop computers makes little sense, as the exercise compares divergent supply-side 
structures.  Such an analytical framework eviscerates any ability to evaluate properly the 
relative efficiency of each respective production process.  A judge or competition authority 
cannot determine whether Apple produces an efficient computer screen when IPad screens 
and laptop screens decidedly differ.  On the demand side, supply-side considerations such as 
different cost structures risk helping one set of consumers at the expense of another: here, 
protecting consumers who use laptop computers predominantly for work, while harming 
recreational users of laptop computers. 
To flush-out the example more fully, if Apple were to bundle the IPad and Mac 
computer, and Acer were to bring a monopolization claim, focusing on the cost of the Mac 
computer as the benchmark to assess the anticompetitive potential of discounts on both Mac 
computers and IPads appears, at best, odd, and at worse, misleading.  Assume that Apple has 
a dominant position in the tablet computer market and that it offers a significant discount on 
both IPad and Mac computers if bought simultaneously, which materially raises the market 
share of Mac computers relative to Acer.  Apple already took great pains to differentiate the 
Mac from alternative computers, in much the same way that it attempted to differentiate 
IPads from laptops, by designing and marketing Macs more for entertainment and artistic 
purposes, though they retain work functionality such as word processing.  Assume that the 
cost of Mac computers exceeds that of most Acer models, but that the cost of most Acer 
computers exceeds the cost of most IPads.
65
  Further assume that profit margins on IPads 
dwarf that of computers, whether Mac or Acer, though the margins on Mac computers 
exceed that of Acer computers. 
In this instance, Apple’s ability to exclude Acer would stem from:  
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a. the tremendous room that Apple has to lower prices because of high profit 
margins on both products, particularly the IPad;  
b. the popularity of the IPad and thus from the willingness of many computer 
consumers to try a Mac, and thus to invest simultaneously in both products 
in exchange for lower prices, rather than purchasing only a computer or 
both products separately from different manufacturers; and 
c. the socioeconomic background of both computer and package purchasers, 
whether they can afford to buy both devices, even given substantial 
discounts. 
The cost of the Mac computer informs the exclusionary potential of the discounts only 
partially and only in conjunction with other market information, including the follow factors: 
 the cost of producing Acer computers ― which helps indicate the level of 
differentiation between the products; 
 consumers’ preferences for desktop computers over laptops — which might 
influence their willingness to buy IPads; 
 consumer preferences for IPads over gaming consoles — which constitute a 
substitute for entertainment; 
 the percentage of computer purchasers that are businesses, and the extent to which 
businesses purchase computers for employee use rather than providing a fixed-
sum for purchase — since businesses generally will not purchase IPads for their 
employees, but employees might buy an IPad if the employer pays for the Mac; 
and 
 entry barriers to Acer, in terms of expense and time, to develop and market a 
viable rival to the IPad — because low entry barriers likely would prevent the 
bundle from excluding Acer from the computer market. 
If a cost comparison between Mac and Acer computers reveals significant differentiation 
between the products, and if the profit margin on Mac computers is modest relative to IPads, 
then the discount attribution standard produces questionable results.  It would protect the 
lower cost Acer model and consumers who use computers primarily for work purposes at the 
potentially significant expense of consumers who use computers for both work and 
entertainment purposes as well as IPads for entertainment.  The bundled discount could 
increase efficiency in both the personal computer and tablet computer markets by a 
tremendous amount.
66
  Measured against consumer welfare, product differentiation 
exacerbates the divisions between consumers created by bundling, for which the discount 
attribution standard cannot account. 
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3. Anticompetitive Potential of Bundling 
The previous discussion on the weaknesses of the discount attribution standard and the 
potential consumer benefits of bundling cannot erase the potential harm that bundling poses 
to consumer welfare.  A diversified dominant undertaking can use a bundled discount to 
exclude an equally or more efficient competitor that produces only a single product.  That 
equally or more efficient single product competitor may not be able to operate above cost 
after matching the steep discounts only possible because of the bundle.
67
   
To continue with the IPad example, if Apple determined that the most profitable course 
for the company involved expanding Mac sales, it could offer the bundle discussed above, 
and the discount could reach prodigious proportions.  The discount further might remain 
above Apple’s long-run average incremental costs to produce each product, and the AVC of 
the Mac computer after having aggregated the discounts.  Buyers of the package would 
receive an immense boost to consumer surplus, and the package could help Apple secure a 
dominant share of the personal computer (PC) market if consumers began to prefer, and were 
willing to pay for, the extra features included in Mac computers.   
Consumers who prefer cheaper, more basic computers designed only for work functions 
would lose if computer manufacturers such as Acer exited the PC market because the bundle 
permitted Apple to siphon off its most profitable customers, leaving insufficient profitability 
at the lower-end of the market.  Such consumers also would lose if the likes of Acer instead 
redesigned their computers to compete directly with Mac computers, thus forcing value 
consumers either to forgo the purchase altogether or to buy a product with expensive, 
undesirable extra features. 
A bundled discount may harm consumers in another fashion.  It may not provide any 
discount at all, but merely disguise a price hike.  This can occur, for instance, if the dominant 
undertaking raises the standalone price on the product in which it holds market power, while 
keeping the bundled price at the level existing prior to the discount.  Consumers of the 
bundle receive no discount at all relative to pre-existing price levels, but they secure a 
discount off the standalone price of the linking product.  Only an undertaking with significant 
market power in the linking product profitably could enact such a discount.
68
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Bundling allows dominant undertakings to manipulate prices on multiple products, a 
luxury that predatory pricing does not permit.  The coercion created by simultaneously 
fiddling with several linked prices fundamentally distinguishes bundling from predatory 
pricing, and further weakens the propriety of evaluating its potential anticompetitive effect 
exclusively with a cost test. 
4. Lessons from Predation to Apply to Bundling 
In the bundling context, assuming prices actually fall, the price-cut achieves the objective 
of competition.  Even if the price-cut excluded a competitor that restrained price increases in 
the linked market, the alleged anticompetitive act actually lowered prices, at least initially.  
Absent the motivation to exclude such competitors, the dominant undertaking may have 
refrained from cutting prices.  A monopolization test designed to maintain competitive 
restraints may sacrifice price-cuts to protect a competitor whose ability to restrain price 
increases justified its competitive existence.  Sustained lower prices negate the justification 
for the continued existence of the competitor.  Only if the dominant undertaking 
subsequently increases prices and recovers the investment in discounts would exclusion of a 
competitor raise antitrust concern. 
The prospect of recoupment, therefore, should accompany anticompetitive bundling.
69
  
Examining the extent of dominance in the linking product is indispensable to identifying 
anticompetitive effects because market power will facilitate subsequent price increases that 
harm consumers.  The greater the dominance that the discounts achieve in the linked market 
in terms of weakening the countervailing effectiveness of competitive restraints, the more 
likely prices will rise.  While recoupment particularly applies to the predation context 
because the profit sacrifice itself excludes, and while recoupment can occur simultaneous to 
the packaged discount or exclusion, recoupment from some source, either now or later, also 
must occur in the bundling context.  Otherwise the price-cut generates losses that benefit 
consumers, eliminating any need to punish the conduct.
70
   
Similar to predation, subsequent recoupment will depend on various market conditions, 
including the extent and duration of any profit sacrifice, the extent of foreclosure in the 
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linked market, the extent of entry barriers protecting both markets,
71
 in addition to the 
tenacity of competitive restraints remaining in the linking and linked markets.
72
  In the 
context of bundling, requiring recoupment is just another way of requiring anticompetitive 
foreclosure, since recoupment unlikely will occur absent foreclosure, and since foreclosure 
that does not contribute to recoupment will not harm consumers.  The Commission’s 
recommended test for bundling could support a showing of recoupment.
73
 
To satisfy the rule of law, a challenged act must violate a norm or rule that warrants 
further scrutiny by enforcement authorities.
74
  Monopolization law does not condemn 
successful companies that achieve high market shares by operating efficiently or by adeptly 
serving consumer interests.  A dominant undertaking must engage in some practice that 
weakens the competitive process.  In the predation context, the exclusionary act consists of 
pricing below cost; with tying, it involves forcing the purchase of separate products together.  
Only a voluntary, designated act should lead to monetary damages or injunctive relief.  
Similar to predation, a bundle excludes competitors by lowering prices, which at least 
initially enhances consumer welfare.  Something else about the bundle and the surrounding 
market conditions must justify legal inquiry. 
Attempting to limit, as the discount attribution standard does, the amount of consumer 
surplus and the extent of lower prices that packaged discounts bestow on consumers itself 
harms consumer welfare.  Dominant undertakings should have the freedom to improve 
market conditions without risking either single or treble damages.  Bundling poses less risk 
of exclusion to linked competitors than tying does to tied competitors because consumers of 
the linking product always retain the option to buy the linked product from competitors.  
Even those consumers inclined to buy both the linking and linked products still can purchase 
the linked product from rivals.  Unless demand conditions support the bundle, meaning they 
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allow the dominant undertaking to limit the contested share of demand in the linked market,
75
 
rivals generally will have ample opportunity to compete and to avoid exclusion.
76
 
As long as the dominant undertaking can earn incremental revenue that matches the 
LRAIC cost of supplying the linked product, the EU Commission test will not find liability.
77
  
It complies with the rule of law, while promoting efficiency and the interests of packaged 
consumers.  Because the Commission test does not account for the coercive effect of linking 
discounts, it more readily would permit exclusion in the linked market, even of more efficient 
rivals.  It thus does not target merit competition.  In terms of strengths and weaknesses, the 
Commission test essentially mirrors the discount attribution standard. 
Another potential approach might focus on curtailing only those bundled discounts that 
pose the highest risk of foreclosure.  Monopolization law might allow dominant undertakings 
to set prices freely within a bundle, to prevent linked product consumers from blocking the 
lower prices, greater efficiency, and greater consumer surplus generated by bundled 
discounts.  When dominant undertakings couple bundled discounts with individual lower 
prices in the linked market, or individual higher prices in the linking market, however, the 
practices together enhance the coercive and exclusionary effect of the bundle by framing it 
with discounts on the individual products.  The combination of discounts reaches all 
consumers of the linked product. 
If the dominant undertaking wishes to win over linked product consumers, it should do so 
by lowering prices in the linked market, or by offering a bundled discount, but it should not 
be able to conjoin both practices.  The manipulation of prices outside the bundle could 
represent the abuse that justifies an expanded inquiry into anticompetitive foreclosure or 
recoupment.
78
  This test also would abide by the rule of law. 
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B. Bundling as Tying 
Bundling resembles tying in many facets.  A dominant undertaking sells two or more 
separate products together to raise profits either by altering consumer demand or increasing 
efficiency, or by excluding rivals from a linked market, which weakens pricing restraint in 
that market or potential pricing restraint in the linking market.  But the practices nevertheless 
differ in a material respect: Tying actually forces consumers to buy two separate products 
from the dominant undertaking, while bundling provides financial incentives, in the form of 
lower prices, to comply with the linking condition. 
In the sections that follow, the chapter considers the relevance of applying certain 
elements of the tying test under the quasi-per se rubric ― specifically market power, 
coercion, and anticompetitive foreclosure ― to bundling practices.79  The purposes are, first, 
to continue to delineate the influence of Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) over bundling law, 
whether viewed as a form of predatory pricing or tying, and second, to continue to evaluate 
the EU Commission test and the discount attribution standard as methods to assess 
anticompetitive bundling claims, particularly if viewed as another form of tying. 
1. Market Power 
For tying or bundling to cause anticompetitive foreclosure, the undertaking must have 
dominance in the linking product.  In the tying context, market power must be capable of 
forcing the purchase of an unwanted product.
80
  Healthy competition in the tying market 
would preclude coercion. 
The coercion employed by bundling derives at least partially from lower prices.  Under 
Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT), to lower prices while avoiding a profit sacrifice, an 
undertaking must have been pricing above cost in either the linking or the linked market.  
This fact suggests that, the greater the market power that a bundling undertaking holds, the 
greater it will be able to lower prices and coerce consumers.  In that sense, a market power 
inquiry in both the tying and bundling contexts achieves a similar objective: to gauge the 
extent to which an undertaking can coerce or force purchases of another product. 
Profit margins alone do not prove market power.  Both oligopolistic markets and 
differentiated markets feature prices above cost, and dominant undertakings can bundle many 
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differentiated products.  Market power further hinges on the extent of existing and potential 
competitive restraints.
81
  Entry barriers must exist.  While an integral element, therefore, the 
extent of a discount does not fully indicate the degree of market power that a linking 
undertaking wields. 
If an undertaking bundles two competitive products, it will have no scope to reduce 
prices on the package unless the bundle itself enhances productive efficiency, or to raise 
prices on the individual products to make the bundle more attractive.  In fact, competitive 
markets in both products leave little scope to recoup or to raise prices if the bundle excluded 
rivals, unless potential competitors cannot match the undertaking’s efficiency.  Such bundles 
thus generally benefit consumers, otherwise they simply would buy the products separately, 
and therefore raise little competitive concern. 
The market power necessary to produce anticompetitive foreclosure in the bundling 
context likely exceeds the market power required to produce the same effect in the 
technological tying context, though not necessarily in the contractual tying context.
82
  The 
reason is that technological tying fully integrates two products.  The undertaking that 
technologically ties must invest initially to manufacture a unique product, but neither the 
contractual nor the technological tying undertaking needs to expend any additional resources 
above production costs to perpetuate the tie-in.   
By contrast, when producing a variety of products, a bundling undertaking does not need 
to incur up-front costs to link them.  Yet it must offer the discounts during the entire course 
of the bundle to produce and maintain the same coercive effect, whether competitive or 
anticompetitive.  Factors derived from behavioral economics could lessen the extent of the 
requisite discount, but many customers still will require a financial incentive to continue 
purchasing both products together.  Depending on the duration of the discounts offered and 
the market power of linked product competitors, to achieve anticompetitive foreclosure, 
bundling could prove far more expensive than tying, requiring greater profit sacrifice and a 
larger financial war chest to exclude and recoup.  The investment could demand a higher 
degree of market power than tying. 
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Applying the concepts of rationality, competition, and efficiency, for bundling to produce 
ongoing anticompetitive effects, market power ultimately must exist in the linked product as 
well.  More specifically, entry barriers must prevent re-entry after the dominant undertaking 
excludes linked rivals.  The bundling itself may allow the dominant undertaking to transfer 
entry barriers from the linking market to the linked market.  Absent entry barriers in some 
form, if the dominant undertaking attempts to raise prices in the linked market, excluded 
rivals or others will enter that market and thwart any attempt at higher profits or recoupment.  
The dominant undertaking often will need to raise prices in the linked market to recover at 
least a portion of any investment in discounts, unless it boasts nearly perfect inelastic demand 
in the linking or packaged markets, an unlikely prospect.  A bundling scheme that does not 
increase linking market power or that does not create entry barriers in the linked market will 
generate losses or be revenue-neutral for the dominant undertaking.  It further will benefit all 
consumers, both linking and linked, even if it excludes linked competitors. 
The discount attribution standard only indirectly incorporates the market power variable 
in the sense that dominant undertakings have greater scope to lower individual product prices 
and to violate the rule relative to competitive undertakings.  The Commission test accounts 
for market power only in a limiting sense, by preventing the dominant undertaking from 
lowering the incremental price of an additional product within a bundle beneath the long-run 
incremental costs of producing the product.  Both tests thus ignore other indicators of market 
power that may enable the discount to produce anticompetitive effects. 
The costs of an undertaking have no necessary relationship to its market power.  The 
marginal or variable costs of a dominant undertaking likely will be lower than that of most 
rivals, however, because of the economies or other benefits that dominance brings.  When 
economies of scope allow the dominant undertaking to lower the costs of producing the 
linked product, plaintiffs will have greater difficulty establishing liability under either test.  
But lower costs translate into lower prices only if competitive restraints remain in the 
relevant market.  The bundle may improve efficiency while supporting higher prices that 
harm consumers. 
As intimated above, the objective of the dominant undertaking may not be to weaken 
linked rivals, but to eliminate remaining competitors in the linking market.  A more accurate 
inquiry than either the cost test advocated by the Commission or the discount attribution 
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standard systematically would measure market power in both the linking and linked products 
in relation to the discounts offered.  Combined with demand conditions in the linking and 
linked markets, these factors determine the accuracy of predicting the anticompetitive 
potential of discounts under NPT. 
2. Coercion 
Both lawyers and economists might expect competition law to treat forcing more severely 
than coercing, and so tying more strictly than bundling.  The reality depends on the legal test 
applied.  A structured rule of reason test in the bundling context could resemble a 
technological tying inquiry.  It is difficult to say practically how stringent the cost test 
discussed by the Commission would operate in practice, since no examples of its application 
exist.  Because it isolates prices and costs on each bundled product, or at least on adding each 
product to the bundle, the test permits great scope for coercive discounts.  The discount 
attribution standard ― because it allocates all discounts to the competitive product ― 
theoretically will find liability more frequently than either a structured rule of reason or the 
Commission’s cost test, though any cost test poses practical and evidentiary difficulties to 
apply.
83
 
At some juncture, the difference between coercion and forcing dissipates.  Also given the 
significant ability that dominant undertakings have to manipulate both the standalone and 
bundled prices of multiple products, a packaged discount could present consumers of the 
linking product with no practical or viable alternative but to purchase the linked product as 
well from the dominant undertaking.  In such circumstances, employing separate tests to 
evaluate two practices that achieve identical results simply creates an artificial incentive to 
design the exclusionary practice to fit the more lenient standard.   
On the other hand, because coercing rather than forcing generally does not impair 
consumer choice as extensively, competition law actually may want to channel vertical 
linking practices towards discounts and away from technological or contractual tying, where 
consumers have no option to purchase the tying product alone.  Tying jurisprudence, 
particularly the test applied to technological tying, because it more closely examines the 
potential and actual effects of the exclusionary act, may encourage precisely the opposite 
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result by implementing both a more accurate and a conceptually more difficult test to satisfy 
than the discount attribution standard.
84
 
Because consumers generally pay a higher price for the bundle relative to purchasing the 
linking product alone, when consumers buy the bundle, they must want both products.  The 
mechanism of coercion and exclusion in the bundling context is price.  A price-cut at least 
initially offers packaged buyers additional consumer surplus.   
Even if tying jurisprudence aimed to prohibit forcing, bundling jurisprudence cannot 
endeavor exclusively to prohibit coercion, since coercion initially manifests in lower prices 
for some consumers.  The pricing mechanism constitutes a market-based device that 
inherently coerces, to both pro- and anticompetitive effect.  While potentially pro-
competitive, dominant undertakings do not offer discounts to keep prices low.  The question 
is not simply whether the discount coerces because it surely does.  The more relevant 
accompanying question under NPT is whether the discount excludes or disciplines rivals 
whose market presence otherwise prevents price increases or promotes merit competition.
85
 
When a dominant undertaking offers discounts to encourage customers to purchase two 
products together, the discount will affect five possible sets of customers.  The customers 
who already buy the dominant undertaking’s linking product may decide, because of the 
discount, to buy the linked product as well from the dominant undertaking.  Coercion there 
does not harm competitors and unlikely will cause anticompetitive effects, because in this 
instance the dominant undertaking merely grows the linked market: It does not take 
customers away from linked competitors.  If the dominant undertaking subsequently attempts 
to raise prices, consumers at least can switch their purchases of linked products to 
competitors.  The same antitrust consequences follow both for consumers originally 
purchasing only the dominant undertaking’s linked product and for consumers previously 
purchasing neither product.   
Alternatively, the bundled discount may prompt the customers of linked competitors to 
try the dominant undertaking’s linking product and purchase the bundle.  Or it may persuade 
consumers buying the dominant undertaking’s linking product and competitors’ linked 
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product to switch and now buy the linked product from the dominant undertaking.  While the 
dominant undertaking surely would welcome customers who bought only the linked product 
from competitors, and while such bundling could harm linked rivals, multiple product 
discounts likely target the last group, those originally buying the linking product from the 
dominant undertaking and the linked product from competitors.  If enough such customers 
switch to the bundle, then the dominant undertaking will have weakened competitive 
restraints by driving linked competitors from the market.  Once excluded, if entry barriers 
exist, the dominant undertaking has greater leeway to increase prices in the packaged or 
linked markets because of weakened competition.  Coercion in that instance causes 
anticompetitive foreclosure. 
A more fundamental question is whether coercion exists at all in the bundling context.  
The answer depends on the definition used.  While dominant undertakings can manipulate 
prices so that rational consumers inclined to buy the linking product from the dominant 
undertaking also buy the linked product from it, a bundle never eliminates the option of 
buying the linked product from competitors unless exclusion occurs, unlike tying.  If 
coercion means the absence of choice, then bundling does not coerce.  However, if coercion 
means altering market conditions so that a particular segment of consumers will act 
irrationally by purchasing the linked product from competitors, then bundling can coerce.  
Coercion would appear strongest when consumers focus primarily on price. 
The degree of price-cuts and their distribution, accounting for the baseline from which 
prices fall, certainly influences the existence and extent of coercion, as does the duration of 
the price-cuts.  Drastic price-cuts exclude acutely, particularly if the dominant undertaking 
can cut prices on several products in a bundle.  The longer the price-cuts last, the more 
coercive they become.   
Yet severe price-cuts over extended periods also contribute most to the consumer surplus 
of package purchasers, so a tension or direct proportional relationship generally exists 
between the coercive potential of discounts and their ability to increase consumer surplus.  
Significant price-cuts still raise the issue of motivation: They may require longer periods of 
recoupment, which in turn necessitate higher levels of market power. 
Product quality and the efficiency with which dominant undertakings and linked 
competitors produce the linked product also may affect coercive potential.  Greater efficiency 
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allows greater price-cuts, which coerce more.  On the other hand, even significant price-cuts 
on a package may not influence customers to switch to the dominant undertaking’s linked 
product if that product offers inferior quality. 
Like in the tying context, therefore, demand conditions also influence the potential extent 
of coercion in the bundling context.  Consumers may not wish to purchase a second or third 
product with the primary product, no matter how steep the discount.  The degree of 
complementarity or overlapping demand between the products,
86
 or the extent to which 
consumers want to consume the relevant products together, also will indicate the 
exclusionary potential of a bundled discount. 
Because consumers generally operate to maximize utility given budget restraints (and 
access to credit), the individual strength of demand for the products bundled separately 
influences coercive and exclusionary potential under NPT.  Two popular bundled products 
more likely will exclude rivals relative to a popular and unpopular product, even if 
complementary.  If consumers otherwise would purchase two products, then they would be 
more eager to buy them together at a discount than acquiring a linked product that they 
customarily do not purchase, even at a more significant discount.  An example might consist 
of a discount off a popular brand of laundry detergent and a popular brand of paper towels, 
compared to a popular brand of tennis shoes and rock-climbing spikes.  Even if the relative 
discount off the athletic apparel were steeper, the discount off the detergent and paper towels 
might exclude competitors more effectively. 
The individual prices of the goods bundled, aside from their profitability, also influences 
coercive and exclusionary potential.  Consumers are more likely to purchase two separate 
toys together rather than two separate cars, because of budget constraints.  Bundled discounts 
are less likely to exclude producers of expensive products. 
Another supply concept derived from NPT that can affect the extent of coercion is the 
potential for differentiation around the linked market.
87
  A successful, profit-generating 
bundling scheme will attract competition, most likely at the weakest point of market entry.  
New rivals will initiate competition by attempting to differentiate around the linked market.  
Depending on the strength of entry barriers, differentiation may permit rivals to chip away at 
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profitability without having to compete directly against the linking product or the bundle.  
Entry barriers also will influence the time frame over which differentiation can restrain the 
pricing power of the dominant undertaking.
88
   
Whether differentiation around the linked market already exists or ultimately mushrooms, 
it will reduce the coercive impact of the bundling scheme by providing opportunities to 
switch back to alternative linked products.  Differentiation can increase the willingness of 
consumers to forgo the discount or to pay higher prices to enjoy distinctive product features.  
Successful differentiation further creates pricing power, permitting rivals to cut prices as 
another method to lure customers.  Extensive differentiation around the linked market 
therefore will raise the cost of sustaining a coercive discount. 
On the other hand, after attaining a dominant position in the linked market, consumer 
inertia, perpetuated by switching costs and brand loyalty, will inhibit differentiated 
competition.  Because of the corresponding potential for greater profitability in differentiated 
markets, bundling to acquire dominance in such markets still might constitute an attractive 
exclusionary strategy.
89
  Consumer preferences interacting with supply conditions, two 
building blocks of NPT, matter at least as much to coercion as price and the extent of 
discounts.
90
 
3. Anticompetitive Foreclosure 
The EU Commission formulated the concept of anticompetitive foreclosure to refer to 
foreclosure that harms consumers.  The discussion of bundling in the Article 82 Guidance 
Paper is sufficiently ambiguous to support requiring anticompetitive foreclosure as an 
element of the abuse.  The Commission addresses tying and bundling under the same heading 
and specifically discusses anticompetitive foreclosure in the context of bundling.
91
 
However, the Guidance Paper also supports a presumption of anticompetitive foreclosure 
if the discount fails a basic cost test targeted at LRAIC.  The Commission discusses the as-
efficient competitor test as applied to bundling under a sub-section entitled “Multi-product 
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rebates”.  A separate “Efficiencies” sub-section follows, but the test articulated intrinsically 
incorporates the potential efficiencies of producing several products at once.  This reading of 
the Guidance Paper just about equates bundling to predation, effectively eliminating the 
claim as an independent abuse under A.102 TFEU.  The Commission takes-up the topic of 
“Predation” after “Tying and bundling”.  Such a reading certainly could signal a continued 
unwillingness to devote enforcement resources to pursuing anticompetitive bundling 
practices. 
(i) Foreclosure Effects of Bundling 
While a dominant undertaking may bundle in response to consumer demand ― to win 
market share or to exploit greater efficiencies ― Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) also 
supports other objectives to bundling, such as excluding rivals and thereby relieving pricing 
pressure.  Bundling can foreclose a substantial share of the linked market and raise rivals’ 
costs, particularly when fixed costs are high, since reducing the market share of rivals will 
increase their unit costs, which could marginalize or force them to exit the market.
92
 
Anticompetitive effects occur when, to secure discounts off a necessary purchase, 
consumers buy the bundle even if they prefer the price and quality mix of competitors’ linked 
products.
93
  Demand then may not be capable of supporting the continued efficient operation 
of rivals in the linked market.  A bundle could eliminate competitors who can produce more 
desirable linked products relative to the dominant undertaking but who cannot compete in the 
linking market.
94
 
As a subtle alternative method to foreclose, if consumers initially have relatively little 
preference between the price and quality mix of competing linked products, and thus if 
relatively competitive conditions characterize the linked market, a bundle might coerce by 
providing an inexpensive opportunity to advertise.  Because consumers must buy product A 
from the dominant undertaking, by providing a minimum discount on a product from which 
it already earns a high profit margin, the dominant undertaking can direct consumers’ 
attention to another product, B.  The bundle thus provides a competitive advantage in 
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capturing demand for product B unrelated to merit competition.
95
  In a perfectly competitive 
market, rivals could not utilize existing profit margins or advertising budgets in one market 
to lower prices in another market.  Unable to bundle because of market power in A, rivals in 
the B market that already operate near cost would have to raise prices to unsustainable levels 
to achieve the same degree of advertising and growth prospects. 
Multiple product price-cuts further may create market power and foreclose rivals because 
the discount allows consumers to experience the additional utility of purchasing two products 
rather than one.  It allows consumers to purchase an individual product that they previously 
valued a little less than the asking price.  The added value of this product may prompt 
consumers to spend more money.  Afterwards, consumers may have less money, but higher 
utility.  In other words, a discount on one product increases consumer surplus on that 
product, but a discount on two products, while perhaps increasing combined consumer 
surplus by an equivalent amount, also allows some consumers to purchase a product 
previously unaffordable.  The discount empowers dominant undertakings to win sales by 
transferring producer surplus earned in another market, which weakens the ability of rivals to 
compete in the linked market.
96
 
Bundling additionally capitalizes on deviations from NPT, particularly the short-term 
rationality of consumers, which can contribute to foreclosure in the linked market.  If 
exclusion occurs, then many consumers will have taken the short-term savings on several 
desirable products rather than strategically supporting medium-term lower prices in the 
linked market by not buying the bundle.
97
  Competition law cannot expect most or even 
many consumers to work-out the cumulative competitive consequences of their purchases.  
Consumers irrationally may forsake products that they prefer, leading to their exclusion from 
the market, in exchange for short-term discounts.   
Unlike the consumers depicted in NPT models, many consumers do not have the ability 
or information necessary to determine whether the immediate individual benefit of lower 
prices on several products ultimately outweighs higher overall prices.  A collective action 
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problem adversely might influence their judgment, justifying intervention by competition 
authorities.  Anticompetitive effects in such scenarios follow from market failure, or the 
cumulative irrationality of consumers. 
Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) explains a great deal about bundling, including:  
1. the primary source of anticompetitive concern, market power;  
2. the means by which a dominant undertaking achieves anticompetitive effect, 
through lower prices, manipulating demand and supply conditions, or 
compulsion derived from market power, all of which can foreclose 
competitors, affecting elasticity and initially shifting the supply curve 
outwards; and  
3. the harm to consumer welfare that foreclosure can enact, namely the higher 
prices, lower efficiency, and reduced variety and quality characteristic of 
monopolization, of ultimately shifting the supply curve inwards. 
Yet also because of NPT, the mere act of foreclosure does not raise anticompetitive concern 
unless it also produces anticompetitive effect. 
Determining the anticompetitive effects of bundling requires balancing lower prices to 
package purchases against medium- to long-term price effects in the linked market if the 
discount forecloses rivals.  The objective justification prong of the technological tying test 
applied to Microsoft by the EU General Court conceptually could support this inquiry.
98
  In 
the context of bundling, however, it would need to occur earlier to determine whether the 
bundle produced anticompetitive foreclosure.  Such a test would need to balance tangible, 
short-term discounts against the direction of competition in the linked market: whether the 
discount yields recoupment or otherwise generates additional profits from exclusion.  A 
bundled discount that created significant additional consumer surplus for packaged 
consumers, but that decimated competition in a linked market of material size, unlikely 
would avoid liability. 
(ii) Exclusionary Limits to Bundling Relative to Tying 
The rationality tenet of NPT demonstrates a few inherent limitations to bundling.  Most 
bundles will include the linking product and either a complement or an unrelated product, 
                                                 
98
 Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Grand Chamber), ¶¶ 
1091-1150 (17 Sept. 2007). 
224 
 
since consumers generally will not pay twice for similar functionality.
99
  Like tying, bundling 
can produce genuine productive efficiencies by, for example, reducing double 
marginalization.
100
  While bundling could enhance market power in the linking product, 
when it prompts consumers of linking rivals to switch producers or otherwise raises barriers 
to entering the linking market, the linked product unlikely will enhance functionality enough 
to warrant a massive increase in demand for the linking product.  A bundle will not, for 
instance, create a new product by technological integration. 
Rather, dominant undertakings more likely target the linked market intending to create a 
new source of revenue and profits.  To succeed, dominant undertakings must raise price and 
thereby extract profits from the linked market.  Dominant undertakings will finance price-
cuts from existing or future profits.  The more popular the linking product is, the lower the 
quantity of discounts that they will have to offer to capture linked market share.  
Notwithstanding the cost to dominant undertakings, by implementing a bundled discount, 
they must have reason to believe that it ultimately will succeed in raising prices.  Because 
dominant undertakings participate in the market far more than other entities, they will have 
far more information about demand conditions than either rivals or enforcement authorities. 
Aside from the provincial observation that tying coerces to a greater degree than 
bundling, foreclosure depends on joint-product customers diminishing the contested portion 
of demand in the tied or linked markets by purchasing the tying or bundled package.  
Competition depends on a sufficient percentage of the tied or linked market remaining open 
or contested after accounting for package purchases.  To the extent that package purchasers 
make-up most of the tied or linked market, leaving single-product suppliers too few 
consumers to sustain operations, the package almost surely will foreclose competitors. 
Forcing is a much cheaper method than offering discounts to limit the contested portion 
of demand in a linked market.  Some tied customers will not have wanted to pay for the 
dominant undertaking’s tied product, so a percentage of tied customers will be unattainable 
to a dominant undertaking that bundles.  Because elasticity of demand varies among 
customers, the bundling undertaking would have to provide a range of discounts, both high 
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and low, to accomplish the same degree of foreclosure as a tying undertaking does by 
contract or product design.  Consequently, all else equal, the uncontested portion of demand 
in a tied market likely will exceed, sometimes by a significant degree, the uncontested 
portion of demand in a corresponding linked market.
101
 
As a knock-on effect, a tying undertaking should have greater revenue left over, from not 
having to offer discounts, to lower prices or improve features in the individual market for the 
tied product, where demand is contested.  Relative to bundling undertakings, tying 
undertakings not only can improve the tying product through a technological tie-in, but they 
also have greater scope to improve the tied product.  Such advantages may improve 
consumer welfare, but only after accounting for weaker competition in the tied market.  
Absent the tie-in, the dominant undertaking would not be able to exploit advantages that 
rivals cannot replicate, no matter how efficient they are.      
Certain forms of tying also raise higher entry barriers than bundling: Technological tying 
can merge two markets, completely eliminating the opportunity to compete in the tied 
market.  After uncontested demand reaches a certain threshold, competitors have to enter the 
integrated product market to compete at all.  With bundling, no matter how high the 
percentage of uncontested demand, excluded and potential competitors still can improve, or 
differentiate around, the linked product alone.  Competitors generally will need less ingenuity 
and financial capability to compete in the linked market relative to the tied market. 
Bundling thus presents less risk of sustained foreclosure: Plaintiffs should have more 
difficulty satisfying the applicable legal test for bundling relative to tying, since bundling 
monopolizes less effectively than tying. 
(iii) Most Relevant Indicators of Anticompetitive Foreclosure 
Cost tests ignore the actual effects of discounts on price levels.  In addition to the 
relationship between the extent of the discounts once aggregated, and the costs of the 
dominant undertaking to produce the competitive product, other conditions of demand and 
supply, derived from Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT), also determine the exclusionary 
potential of bundled discounts.  The following list, which mostly summarizes the discussion 
so far, includes: 
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 the extent of market power in the linking product; 
 the extent of market power in the linked product; 
 the extent of differentiation in the linked market;102 
 the strength of complementarity between bundled products; 
 the extent of overlapping demand between bundled products; 
 the extent of the discount regardless of its relation to cost; and 
 the individual strength of demand or popularity for each bundled product, which 
gauges the exclusionary potential of the discount by examining whether 
consumers are likely to purchase the bundled products anyway. 
In addition to the above factors, which indicate the exclusionary potential of the bundled 
discount, the following factors, many of which both U.S. and EU antitrust agencies consider 
during merger review, indicate whether the exclusion further will produce anticompetitive 
effects, specifically by raising prices, generally in the linked market.  The importance of these 
additional factors signifies that exclusion itself represents an integral part of the competitive 
process.  Other market conditions must interact with exclusion to produce anticompetitive 
effects.  They include: 
(1) the extent to which the price-cuts excluded competition, which relates to 
diversion ratios caused by the packaged discount, or the proportion of 
sales gained at the expense of various substitutes because of the 
discount;
103
 
(2) whether remaining rivals produce close substitutes to the linked product104 
and further retain the ability to restrain the pricing of the dominant 
undertaking by, for example, profitably expanding output,
105
 further 
differentiating, or otherwise neutralizing the advantages secured by the 
discount;
106
 
(3) whether, for example, the bundle weakened or excluded the dominant 
undertaking’s closest competitor in the linked market, or the competitor to 
which many consumers would turn if the dominant undertaking 
subsequently were to increase prices;
107
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(4) whether the bundle weakened or excluded a maverick in the linked 
market, or an undertaking that historically had assumed a particularly 
disruptive role in lowering prices;
108
 
(5) whether potential or excluded rivals later could respond to higher prices 
by entering the linked market; 
(6) whether the dominant undertaking devised the bundled discounts 
specifically to exclude particular competitors because of recent entry, or 
because the target had begun to exert tangible restraint on the dominant 
undertaking’s pricing; and generally 
(7) whether prices likely will rise. 
4. The Rule of Law 
A different version of the technological tying test applied in the Microsoft case, altered to 
fit the bundling context, more accurately would identify anticompetitive bundling than either 
the discount attribution standard or the cost test advanced by the EU Commission.  However, 
any such test that failed to incorporate a cost test or a similar benchmark for liability would 
violate the rule of law when applied to bundling.  Bundling does not merge two markets.  
Unlike tying where the tie itself constitutes the abuse, where the dominant undertaking does 
not stumble into tying unaware, and where the test partly determines whether a tie exists, 
bundling as a practice cannot constitute an abuse because it generally lowers prices in the 
first instance.  Lowering prices, as a category of conduct, represents a fundamental method to 
compete on the merits. 
From the perspective of the judiciary, something else about the bundling must indicate an 
abuse and prompt a more searching inquiry into anticompetitive effects.
109
  From the 
perspective of dominant undertakings, a particular aspect of a bundling practice or particular 
characteristics of the surrounding market must give them notice that they risk liability.  
Concerning pricing practices, perhaps the greatest conceptual attribute to cost tests is that 
they separate-out conduct that might lead to liability, namely pricing below some measure of 
cost. 
Simple foreclosure does not provide a workable alternative in the bundling context 
because pro-competitive price-cuts also exclude.  The act that raises the prospect of abuse 
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ideally must capture conduct the majority of which produces anticompetitive effects.  Or 
certain clearly identifiable market characteristics must give the dominant undertaking prior 
warning that short-term pro-competitive behavior likely will yield medium-term 
anticompetitive effects, prompting liability.  Pricing below cost in the predation context 
might satisfy the first condition, but as I have argued throughout this chapter, it fails in the 
bundling context. 
C. Comparing The Bundling As Predation Approach (PeaceHealth) To The 
Bundling As Tying Approach (LePage) In Practice 
The discount attribution standard appeals most to those courts that view bundling as a 
form of predation.  Because Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT) has defined efficiency 
generally and the proxy used for market-wide efficiency — namely the difference between 
the costs of a dominant undertaking and its prices — by adopting the discount attribution 
standard, the Ninth Circuit relied on NPT to decide PeaceHealth.  While the discount 
attribution standard theoretically could support liability in a variety of instances, in practice, 
it will assess liability rarely when the dominant undertaking earns high profit margins in the 
linked market. 
An approach that does not turn exclusively on the relationship between prices and costs, 
but rather more closely examines the competitive effects of a bundled discount, reflects a 
view of the practice as closer to tying.  The Third Circuit in LePage adopted just such an 
approach, termed anticompetitive foreclosure by Professors Economides and Lianos.
110
  This 
mode of analysis also derives exclusively from NPT principles, since it focuses on 
competitive restraints and the likely direction of prices after exclusion. 
At the conceptual level, the Ninth Circuit views multiple product discounts 
fundamentally as price discounts on a collection of goods.
111
  This starting point impels the 
Court down a path that leads to a benign and deferential view of price-cuts.  Seeking to attach 
liability to the chief lever of competition, plaintiffs must establish that the discount lowers 
prices below the dominant undertaking’s incremental costs.112  Any other standard provides 
insufficient guidance to dominant undertakings considering discounts,
113
 potentially “denies 
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customers the benefits of the defendant’s lower costs,”114 and overly protects higher cost and 
smaller rivals.  The plaintiff in PeaceHealth could not establish that the various discounts, 
once aggregated, lowered the price of the competitive product below the dominant 
undertaking’s average variable cost (AVC), so the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the 
bundling claim. 
Interestingly, however, the Ninth Circuit failed to dismiss the accompanying tying claim, 
reasoning that the plaintiff hospital provided enough evidence (to avoid dismissal) that the 
prices of defendant’s tied services were higher than plaintiff’s rival services.  Plaintiff 
therefore could ask a jury whether sufficient coercion existed such that “a rational customer 
would not [have] purchase[d] [defendant’s] allegedly overpriced product in the absence of a 
tie.”  Enough evidence existed such that a jury could determine whether, through the exercise 
of market power, defendant forced consumers “to do something that [they] would not do in a 
competitive market”.115  Defendant, owning three hospitals,116 surely exercised monopoly 
power in the tying product, as no other hospital in the relevant market provided tertiary 
medical services,
117
 or complex medical services like invasive cardiovascular surgery.
118
  Yet 
plaintiff competed with the defendant in the provision of primary and secondary medical 
services, or more typical medical services like MRI scans.
119
 
The Ninth Circuit undoubtedly understood the irony of the accompanying holdings.  On 
the one hand, dismissing a bundling claim in which monopoly power in tertiary medical 
services financed discounts of 30% to 40% in primary and secondary medical services,
120
 
simply because the discounts, once aggregated, did not fall below the AVC of providing 
primary and secondary medical services.  That peculiarity indicates the extent of the 
dominant undertaking’s pricing power in tertiary medical services, and existing profit-levels 
in primary and secondary medical services.  On the other hand, the Court upheld a tying 
claim that utilized that very same market power in tertiary medical services to force 
insurance companies to buy tertiary, primary, and secondary medical services from the 
defendant. 
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In each case, the need of some patients to use tertiary medical services constituted the 
most decisive factor for insurance companies deciding whether to accept the tying or 
bundling conditions.  While insurance companies with patients using tertiary medical 
services had no choice but to accept the tying arrangement, the bundled discount arguably 
coerced to an equal measure.  After all, the bundling arrangement bestowed on insurance 
companies discounts upwards of 30% to 40% of the cost of primary and secondary medical 
services as well. 
In both cases, the arrangements excluded not because the plaintiff hospital operated 
inefficiently by providing lower quality or more expensive primary or secondary medical 
services.  Indeed, it provided cheaper such services.
121
  Rather, the arrangements excluded 
because the plaintiff hospital did not, and possibly could not, compete in an entirely separate 
market, that for tertiary medical services. 
The Ninth Circuit partially based the separate legal treatment on the fact that insurance 
companies and their patients secured an immediate tangible benefit in the form of discounts 
of 30% to 40% off all medical services.
122
  Of course, a bundling standard consistent with 
NPT must account for the appreciable immediate benefit that lower prices provide to 
packaged consumers, in the form of additional consumer surplus.  And a 30% to 40% 
discount constitutes a tremendous savings. 
But the discount attribution standard does not consider what happens to the prices of 
primary, secondary, and tertiary medical services once the bundling arrangement disappears, 
after having disciplined or excluded plaintiff from the market.  If the defendant were unlikely 
to recoup the discounts, perhaps because entry barriers to opening a fully integrated hospital 
were low, then the price-cuts unambiguously would have benefitted consumers.  Entry 
barriers likely were high, however, since neither the plaintiff hospital nor anyone else in the 
relevant market had attempted to provide tertiary medical services. 
Given the incongruity of allowing one exclusionary scheme that accomplishes the precise 
objective as a prohibited alternative, perhaps the Ninth Circuit implicitly was inviting the 
plaintiff to seek further review so that the Supreme Court better could rationalize the legal 
principles governing both the freestanding legal claim of bundling, and the interaction 
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between bundling and tying claims.  The Supreme Court almost surely is interested in 
whether competition law channels similar conduct into one or the other practice solely 
because of the differing stringency of the applicable legal tests.  Yet the plaintiff did not 
appeal the Ninth Circuit’s decision. 
Prior to PeaceHealth, the Third Circuit in LePage took a more skeptical view of bundling 
practices.  Instead of focusing exclusively on the relationship between the dominant 
undertaking’s costs of producing the competitive product and the aggregated discounts, the 
Third Circuit looked to various factors that contributed to the exclusionary potential of the 
discount, such as: 
 “the increase in the defendant’s market share, 
 the effects of foreclosure on the market, 
 benefits to customers and the defendant, and 
 the extent to which customers felt they were precluded from dealing with other 
manufacturers.”123 
Such factors closely track the elements to a structured rule of reason in the technological 
tying context: market power, coercion, and anticompetitive foreclosure, while also counting 
potential efficiencies.  Note that this more expansive market-focused inquiry need not 
exclude the obvious relevance of cost evidence.  The Third Circuit considered both (1) the 
level of the hypothetical discount that LePage would have had to offer on the competitive 
product to match all of 3M’s bundled discounts, and (2) the effect of having to offer those 
discounts on LePage’s ability to compete — as the most critical factors in the bundling 
analysis.
124
  The importance of the relationship between prices and costs mattered because it 
attempted to quantify the exclusionary and coercive potential of the bundled discount.  The 
discount attribution standard thus assisted the Court in determining whether LePage could 
have remained viable in the linked market after matching the discounts of the dominant 
undertaking.  The paramount question remained, however, whether the discount likely would 
have caused anticompetitive foreclosure, or whether it would have excluded a competitor that 
historically had restrained, and likely would have continued to restrain, the dominant 
undertaking from raising prices.
125
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The difference in focus between the analytical approaches of the Ninth and Third Circuits 
is material.  Instead of examining evidence relating only to the dominant undertaking, the 
Court also scrutinized the competitive position of the plaintiff and other rivals or potential 
rivals in the relevant market.  The purpose of examining the competitive position of rivals 
was not to protect their profit margins.  Thus evidence that LePage earned margins over 30% 
in the private label tape market prior to 3M instituting the bundled discount did not support a 
finding of liability.
126
  But the fact that LePage’s profit margins not only declined, but 
actually fell to negative 10% because the bundling arrangement lowered the efficiency of its 
manufacturing process, at least delineated the exclusionary potential of the discount.  
Efficiency fell because, in the transparent tape market, companies must retain large volume 
customers to achieve economies of scale.
127
  In certain instances, 3M’s rebates to LePage’s 
customers “were as much as half of LePage’s entire prior tape sales to that customer.”  The 
loss of indispensable large volume customers can demonstrate the likely foreclosure of a 
rival.
128
 
Other evidence indicated the anticompetitive effect of that foreclosure, given that, 
although 3M held over 90% of the transparent tape market,
129
 LePage represented a viable 
and growing threat to 3M’s dominance.130  After 3M instituted the discount, LePage’s market 
share declined 35% over the next five years.
131
  As additional evidence of anticompetitive 
foreclosure, the weakening and ultimate foreclosure of LePage allowed 3M to raise the price 
of Scotch-brand tape, the linking product.
132
  The totality of the evidence suggested that “3M 
entered the private-label market only to ‘kill it’.”133 
Other evidence supporting liability included the fact that the bundling arrangement 
generated few productive efficiencies, which were, at any rate, not nearly enough to 
compensate for the millions of dollars that 3M gifted to LePage’s customers in the form of 
bundled rebates.
134
  In considering efficiencies, the Third Circuit did not attempt to balance 
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the lower prices enjoyed by packaged purchasers against potentially higher prices in the 
private label tape market.  After forcing LePage to exit that market, plaintiffs argued that the 
discounts ultimately would have compelled private label tape purchasers to buy branded tape 
from 3M. 
However, a recoupment analysis would have indicated the weakness of this claim.  Private 
label tape is a fungible product.  If 3M attempted to raise the price of either branded or 
private label tape far above competitive levels, entry barriers could not have prevented 
alternative suppliers from entering the private label tape market.   
If recoupment were possible, 3M would have done so gradually, as any drastic price 
increase would have drawn competitors into the private label tape market.  Given 3M’s 
overwhelming market share advantage over LePage, and its then-existing profitability, 
perhaps the discounts to 3M’s customers amounted to a relatively small investment, easily 
recoverable before potential rivals could have entered the private label tape market. 
If the Third Circuit had applied the discount attribution standard to 3M’s bundled rebates, 
it would not have found liability, since the sum of the rebates did not lower the price of 
private label tape below the average variable cost of 3M to produce it.  Again, this result 
highlights the extent of profit margins that 3M earned on private label tape prior to the 
bundled discount. 
Overall, the case demonstrates the difficulty of evaluating the pricing practices of 
dominant undertakings.  If the discounts were not as steep, and LePage could have remained 
viable in the private label tape market, then such price-cuts would not have substantially 
lessened competition either.  Yet if the price-cuts were not as steep, then consumers who 
bought the bundle would have benefitted less, and they likely benefitted a great deal, at least 
over the short-term, given the damage that the discounts did to LePage. 
To protect the welfare and efficiency generating attributes of competition under NPT, 
pro-competitive price-cuts essentially must lower prices without excluding rivals that restrain 
the pricing of the dominant undertaking.  Or if the price-cuts do exclude such rivals, others 
must be able to take their place.  Substantial market power means that existing rivals only 
faintly restrain the pricing of the dominant undertaking, and that price-cuts are capable of 
further weakening an already-debilitated competitive process. 
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Aside from the accuracy of its determination, and despite more thoroughly considering 
the relevant indicators of anticompetitive effects, the LePage judgment arguably does not 
abide by the rule of law.  Determining liability after-the-fact by weighing competitive effects 
represents an economic standard, not a legal one. 
D. Behavioral Economic Considerations 
People exhibit bounded rationality, meaning that they systematically deviate from 
rational decision-making and instead rely on heuristics, or mental-short cuts, under certain 
defined, predictable circumstances.
135
  Because bundling represents an attempt by dominant 
undertakings to influence consumer preferences by altering the selection process rather than 
competing head-to-head against rivals on price and quality in the single product setting, it 
could limit the ability of consumers to maximize utility beyond the short-term. 
Bundling particularly takes advantage of loss aversion and the endowment effect.  By 
purchasing a bundle, consumers do not need to give-up a desired product or lose any existing 
utility.  In fact, a bundle merely invites consumers to add to existing utility levels.  It does so 
by improving the experience of consuming the linking product, or by lowering the price of 
that product in exchange for trying another product.  This offer might appeal to consumers 
more than tying, because at least a technologically tied package more fully represents a new 
product that consumers would have to test, thereby risking lower utility levels.  With 
bundling, consumers buy an old product alongside an additional good.   
Once consumers buy the package, assuming that they like the linked product, both loss 
aversion and the endowment effect will work in favor of repeat purchases.  The bundle will 
have added to pre-existing utility levels, increasing the baseline amount to which loss 
aversion and the endowment effect applies.  Consumers now will dislike losing the higher 
utility level relative to the level existing prior to the bundle. 
Exploiting these heuristics does not necessarily raise anticompetitive concern.  Loss 
aversion and the endowment effect merely may constitute components of demand.  
Consumers may prefer certain products for both rational and boundedly rational reasons.  Yet 
their operation further demonstrates the coercive and exclusionary potential of bundled 
discounts implemented by dominant undertakings.  
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III. Recommendations 
No perfect pricing rule exists.  The approach that I proposed after examining bundling as 
a form of predation — per se legal unless the dominant undertaking also manipulates the 
individual prices of the linking or linked products — may not have found liability either in 
PeaceHealth or in LePage, even if:  
(1) entry barriers hypothetically existed in the private label tape and hospital markets;  
(2) the discounts contributed to excluding all other competitors; and 
(3) the discounts allowed the defendants to raise the price of the linked products far 
above but-for levels.   
As the sole measure of anticompetitive effects, such a test, therefore, appears inadequate.  It 
nevertheless could help establish the potential exclusionary effect of certain bundled 
discounts. 
All the tests discussed in this chapter derive from Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT).  In 
selecting the most appropriate standard, judges and competition authorities may have to 
choose between promoting short-term consumer benefit at any cost, including the risk of 
medium-term consumer harm, or instead attempting to advance medium- to long-term 
consumer benefit at the potential cost of short-term lower prices.  Administrative costs and 
the incentive effects of dominant undertakings also matter.  In the final analysis, the 
underlying choice requires a policy judgment that incorporates political considerations.  
Strictly adhering to NPT does not provide the answer. 
In the paragraphs that follow, I propose an approach that attempts to address the most 
critical issues that determine the competitive effects of bundling, while complying with the 
rule of law.  Bundling liability would hinge on market power in the linking product, 
including robust entry barriers, and the existence of separate products, similar to tying 
analysis.  In addition to these two elements, to avoid an anticompetitive foreclosure analysis, 
the dominant undertaking must establish that one of the following two safe harbors apply. 
A market share in the linked product below 45%-50% qualifies as the first safe harbor.  
Reaching the second safe harbor would require evidence that overlapping demand between 
the linked and linking products is less than 60%.
136
  By overlapping demand, I mean that less 
than 60% of linked product purchasers also buy the linking product.  In setting guidelines, 
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enforcement authorities might adjust these figures, or offer a band, to account for potential 
movement in market share figures around the time that plaintiff files suit.  
As a rule of law matter, these safe harbors depend on the dominant undertaking 
accurately defining the relevant markets prior to offering, or continuing to offer, a bundled 
discount.  Antitrust litigation often becomes bogged-down in market definition issues, which 
can involve complicated questions concerning demand and supply elasticity, or the general 
substitutability of consuming and producing goods and services.  A dominant undertaking in 
a separate product would have to focus on this issue when the discount risks instituting 
dominance in a linked market, or when the bundle protects market power in the linking 
product.   
If a court determines that the safe harbors are unavailable, the consequence would be that 
an anticompetitive foreclosure analysis would apply instead.  The court would balance 
efficiency concerns and the benefit to package purchasers against the existing and likely 
effects of the discount on competition and consumer welfare in the linked market. 
When bundling effectuates significant foreclosure and risks dominance in a separate 
market, monopolization law reasonably might place the ex ante risk of accurately defining 
the relevant markets on the dominant undertaking.  If the dominant undertaking determines 
that the prospect of antitrust damages outweighs the continued profitability of the bundled 
discount, it simply can offer the products separately.  By that juncture, it likely will have 
secured material demand and supply advantages in the linked market that could survive 
offering single-product discounts. 
As another guideline, the vast majority of bundled discounts, even offered by dominant 
undertakings, are temporary.  Depending on the relevant industry, antitrust authorities could 
refuse to review bundling claims unless the discount lasted longer than a minimum period 
generally thought necessary to produce lasting anticompetitive effects, determined by social 
scientific evidence.  I suggest one year. 
As a defense to bundling claims, dominant undertakings further might proffer evidence 
that the market share of its linking product was declining by more than 10% during the full 
year prior to the plaintiff filing suit.  Declining linking market power decreases the dominant 
undertaking’s ability to fund and sustain exclusionary discounts in the linked market. 
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Bundling could require a unique remedy.  I do not consider Professor Oliver 
Williamson’s timing remedy that recommended preventing dominant undertakings from 
raising prices again for a period of one to two years after lowering prices below a designated 
benchmark appropriate for predatory pricing.
137
  I object because the remedy interferes with 
dominant undertakings’ pricing decisions too severely, and because rivals strategically could 
manipulate the rule to avoid merit competition.   
Yet the remedy might apply more appropriately to bundled discounts.  If antitrust 
authorities prevented dominant undertakings from increasing prices only in the linked market 
for a year after finding anticompetitive foreclosure, then the remedy would prevent 
recoupment.  Because the dominant undertaking presumably earned its market power in the 
linking market through merit competition, it would retain the ability to increase prices there.  
And because consumers simply could buy the products individually if the dominant 
undertaking raised prices in the packaged market above their reservation price, the dominant 
undertaking reasonably might retain pricing flexibility in that market as well.
138
 
The timing rule more appropriately fits the bundling context because, first, investment 
incentives generally do not affect the motivation to bundle, and bundling predominantly does 
not generate the innovation that boosts productivity.  Antitrust authorities do not have to 
worry, therefore, that deflated prices in a linked market either will deter innovation or fail to 
reward previous investment.  If pro-competitive, bundling instead creates efficiencies and 
provides additional consumer choice and lower prices. 
Second, for bundling to harm consumers, the dominant undertaking generally must 
increase and maintain market power in the linked product, which requires the existence or 
transfer of entry barriers to keep prices high, at least long enough to recoup any initial 
investment in lower prices. 
Competition authorities can refrain from applying the timing rule if the dominant 
undertaking demonstrates that it has improved the linked product.  The timing rule further 
would protect linked product consumers from having to pay higher prices to fund discounts 
enjoyed by packaged consumers.
                                                 
137
 Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic & Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284, 295-302 (1977). 
138
 Linked product competitors might complain about artificially low prices in the linked market after the remedy.  
The remedy thus may serve to deter both anticompetitive bundled discounts as well as private bundling suits brought 
by competitors. 
238 
 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
I began this thesis by attempting to delineate the contours of Neoclassical Price Theory 
(NPT) as conceived by legal scholars and as originally applied by U.S. federal appellate 
judges.  At its core, NPT relies on the interaction between quantity and price depicted in the 
demand and supply curves that feature in the perfectly competitive and monopolistic models 
of neoclassical economics.  By examining market conditions and how alleged exclusionary 
practices influence the interaction of these approximations for consumer and producer 
activity, judges and competition authorities can predict whether particular acts will harm 
consumers generally by their effect on prices (and output).
1
 
Three principles discussed throughout the thesis embody NPT.  First, rationality means 
that consumers and firms interact to maximize their own utility and profits.  Second, NPT 
seeks to promote the competition that exists in the model of perfect competition, where 
suppliers respond most attentively to consumer needs.  Doing so compels suppliers to price at 
the market-wide long-run incremental costs of production, which represents the efficient 
price.  Suppliers still earn an economic rate of return.  Competition thus generates efficiency, 
the third proxy for NPT, and maximizes consumer surplus, or the difference between what 
consumers pay and what they are willing to pay for a product.  Efficient production occurs 
when sufficient competition exists to promote lower costs.  More than any other set of 
principles, rationality, competition, and efficiency have guided judges and enforcement 
authorities when evaluating whether a challenged practice will enable a dominant 
undertaking to operate more like a monopolist. 
In the first substantive chapter, I set-out to demonstrate that NPT has dictated the legal 
principles and tests applied to predatory pricing, and that enforcement levels in the United 
States have fallen through the years, most precipitously after 1993 when the U.S. Supreme 
Court decided Brooke Group.  I criticized this development at one level because reliable 
evidence should support all legal judgments, and NPT, particularly through the application of 
cost tests, often involves predicting the effects of exclusionary practices based on a 
sometimes minor component of the relevant evidence.  For the rest of the thesis, however — 
in the EU predatory pricing chapter, and in the tying and bundling chapters — I first identify 
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the NPT principles that most influence the likely effects of the challenged practices, then I 
examine how closely the relevant legal tests incorporate those principles.  I therefore open 
myself to the very same criticism that by adopting NPT as the predominant mode of analysis, 
I also conjecture without sufficient proof or evidence. 
I would respond to this potential criticism by indicating that throughout the thesis, I 
closely have considered all (so far as I know) the primary legal sources, and leading 
secondary sources,
2
 that could influence the analysis, at least as applied to predation, tying 
and bundling.  While additional secondary sources certainly could alter the evolution of NPT, 
it is supple enough to incorporate the various inputs that determine consumer welfare in a 
market economy — including lower prices, greater efficiency, strong incentives to invest and 
innovate, and greater quality and variety.  Economists have exerted tremendous influence on 
NPT through their scholarship and testimonies in court.
3
  I nevertheless have amended the 
basic tenets of NPT to accord with the principles discussed within the opinions issued by 
U.S. and EU judges.  NPT has a distinct legal bend that does not ignore the boundaries of 
judicial decision-making. 
The fundamental microeconomic tenets that partially constitute NPT adequately explain a 
great deal of economic behavior and empower foresight.  This fact particularly has aided 
enforcement.  I still have criticized predatory pricing law because, on noteworthy occasions, 
it has misapplied NPT by insufficiently weighting medium- to long-term consumer welfare.  
Existing economic evidence does not support almost eliminating the ability of plaintiffs to 
establish liability based on a proxy for anticompetitive effects that is often difficult to 
measure.  Cost tests serve important legal and economic objectives, but they only partially 
determine price levels beyond the immediate term. 
Other intra-institutional considerations also have influenced the development of legal 
rules and enforcement levels.  Judges and competition authorities have favored theoretically 
simple rules like cost tests because they supposedly promote greater transactions by reducing 
transaction costs.  If parties better understand how to abide by legal rules, such rules lower 
the costs of acquiring legal knowledge, which in turn lowers the costs of conducting 
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business
4
 — or of engaging in exclusionary practices, whether price-based or not.  In the 
context of competition law, the choice of simple rules or more complicated standards 
determines which institution, the market or the judiciary, has greater influence over the 
actions of dominant companies.  Simple rules “mean sweeping allocations of responsibility 
to other decision makers,”5 in this case the market.   
The theoretical simplicity of cost tests has undergirded their expansion.  Because of the 
data and resources required to conduct cost tests properly, however, they are anything but 
simple to implement.
6
  Cost tests thus deter claims for which they represent the primary legal 
test.
7
   
As the complexity of a legal claim increases, both the market and the judiciary will 
provide less reliable answers.
8
  The existence of significant market power casts enormous 
doubt over the reliability of the market process. 
Externalities prevent individuals or companies from internalizing the full costs and 
benefits of their actions.
9
  If clear rules allocate decision-making to the market process, and 
the competitive process fails to restrain the dominant undertaking from increasing prices 
above the competitive level, then the dominant undertaking will not fully internalize the 
anticompetitive consequences of its actions.  In such circumstances, clear rules would harm 
consumers by deferring to a faulty market process.   
A healthy market process depends on a multitude of transactions and exchanges, each of 
which bears little concern for the aggregate result.
10
  To a high degree, consumers and 
competitors must participate in the market process.  Variation in that participation affects its 
efficacy.
11
  High market shares combined with entry barriers allow dominant undertakings to 
limit the participation of rivals.  By raising prices to monopoly levels, moreover, dominant 
undertakings exclude consumers who otherwise would buy the product at the competitive 
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level.  Depending on other market conditions, the net effect can be market failure.  Monopoly 
materially reduces market participation such that consumers lack the ability to register their 
preferences, and too few competitors exist to identify and satisfy those preferences.
12
  Judges 
have little reason to defer to outcomes generated in a market characterized by dominance. 
In the context of monopolization enforcement, judges have good reason to distrust the 
adjudicative process as well.  It often will lack the expertise and information to decide 
production and distribution issues better than even a weakened market process.
13
  NPT has 
strengthened enforcement by providing analytical tools to identify when weakened market 
conditions insufficiently serve consumer needs. 
A consensus began to build in the mid- to late-1970s that because companies must price 
above variable costs to cover fixed costs, fund investments, and to innovate, the cost of 
falsely condemning pro-competitive practices was high.  In addition, because entry barriers 
often cannot withstand competitors drawn to high prices, dominant undertakings have little 
ability to sustain supra-competitive prices.  The cost of failing to penalize exclusionary 
practices is small.
14
  Restraint therefore should characterize monopolization enforcement.  
This error-cost analysis
15
 mixes principles of NPT and a political desire to promote 
investment and innovation with assumptions about the strength of entry barriers, the general 
responsiveness of the market, and the ineffectiveness of exclusionary practices. 
Take each claim in turn.  While dominant undertakings must price above variable costs to 
sustain operations, they do not need to price above average total costs (ATC) to do so.  A 
price at ATC covers all operating expenses, including investment costs.  A price at avoidable 
costs allows an undertaking to recover those costs it could have avoided by ceasing 
operations.
16
  And a price at long-run average incremental cost (LRAIC) permits the recovery 
of long-run costs required to produce an extra increment of output.
17
  Prices above these 
measures, standing alone, should not warrant liability; such prices may embody a reward for 
innovation and investment.   
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But exclusionary practices strictly designed to sustain supra-competitive prices, without 
benefiting consumers over the medium term, do not reward productive activities.  Innovation, 
for instance, does not justify indefinite profitability.  Rather, practices unrelated to merit 
competition reward exclusionary ingenuity and anticompetitive intent.  The costs to 
companies from the judicial process inaccurately condemning such practices unlikely will 
deter the desire to survive in the marketplace or to earn the sizable profits that innovation 
generates, and that the law, in so many contexts, protects.   
On the other side of the calculation, while few monopolies last indefinitely, dominant 
undertakings often persist for years and even decades, as IBM, Microsoft, and Google have 
demonstrated.  Nothing in law and economics or NPT justifies prolonging the massive 
transfer of surplus and the creation of inefficiency that dominant undertakings can perpetrate 
with exclusionary practices that do not benefit consumers.  Undertakings with market power 
“can significantly affect or determine market outcomes.”18  NPT recognizes that by 
exploiting market power to weaken competitors, anticompetitive practices actually can 
prevent rivals from lowering prices and providing more desirable products and services, 
costing consumers billions of pounds sterling in forgone surplus.  Entry barriers are factors to 
examine, not presume away. 
As a large, anonymous, and highly diffuse group, consumers often fare badly in the 
political process.
19
  Monopolists similarly have the advantage of concentrated interests and 
significant resources to expend in the administrative setting.
20
  Given dominance, consumers 
can fare badly in the market process as well, where monopolists can extract huge sums 
without consumers switching to competitors.
21
  From an inter-institutional perspective, 
consumers thus represent strong candidates for judicial protection.   
Yet judges have not intervened vigorously to guard their interests, choosing to ignore the 
potential harm of many exclusionary practices because of the complexity and the high 
administrative costs of determining whether practices that immediately benefit consumers 
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ultimately will harm them.
22
  An absolute weakness in institutional capacity, rather than a 
relative weakness, has driven judicial decision-making in the U.S. monopolization context. 
Absent judicial intervention, juries ultimately decide antitrust disputes in the United 
States, and they often favor competitors against big, successful companies.  Add in the threat 
of treble damages and a hyperactive private litigation system, and legal rules that cultivate 
expansive monopolization enforcement potentially could influence the competitive vigor of 
existing or striving dominant undertakings.  Against this concern, when operating outside of 
financial turmoil, the U.S. has deep and fluid capital markets, courts committed to enforcing 
the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and over 235 years of integrating its national 
market. 
In Europe, the Commission and EU Courts have sought to implement a different 
institutional balance.  Aside from a stronger emphasis on competition, non-existent or mostly 
underdeveloped private litigation systems and the original reality of compartmentalized 
national markets have strengthened the inter-institutional capacity of EU public enforcement 
relative to the market.  Particularly in early decisions, counteracting nationalist business 
sentiment and forging a single market were important overarching objectives to competition 
policy.
23
  More recently, the Commission has discussed enforcing competition law based on 
the principle of integrating the single market as a last resort, applicable when “the protection 
of consumers and the proper functioning of the internal market cannot otherwise be 
adequately ensured.”24   
Notwithstanding incredible strides, the EU still grapples with different languages and 
customs, sovereignty issues that sustain diverse regulatory regimes, and much longer 
histories of shifting allegiances between member states — all of which impedes market 
integration.  EU Institutions still have good reason to distrust the ability of the EU market, 
and even the desire of EU member states, to allocate capital and labor according to the 
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efficiency criterion of NPT.  For both political and institutional reasons, consumer welfare 
has encompassed broader concerns.  As another critical impetus to monopolization 
enforcement, EU-wide dominant companies have become richer from the Commission 
breaking-down barriers to trade between member states. 
Active judicial decision-making carries costs, notwithstanding the “greater 
contemplation, reason, and disinterestedness” associated with it.  The judicial process may 
not discern consumer preferences as well as an unfettered market process.
25
  Yet judges are 
not substituting freestanding opinions for that of a well-functioning market.  Rather, they are 
substituting their judgment for the uniform desire and insufficiently restrained ability of 
dominant undertakings to accumulate profits in a weakened market.  By targeting lower 
prices, while sensitive to investment incentives, NPT allows judges to counteract the 
information costs of bypassing the market process. 
The error cost framework, most commonly applied, stresses the supply-side of 
institutional competition: “the dire implications of judicial intervention,” such as “floods of 
cases, the substantive difficulty of the decisions, and the dangers of adjudicative mistakes”.26  
In the predatory pricing context, particularly in the United States, and in other areas of 
monopolization law where cost tests have expanded to anchor the analysis, this thesis has 
stressed the demand side, “asking courts to expand their role.” 
In doing so, of course, the discussion must highlight the weaknesses of the current 
system.
27
  Any adjustment required should proceed cautiously.  The ability to test different 
approaches in district courts and in state courts constitutes a material strength to a federal and 
common law system.  Focusing uniformly on cost tests as an immutable filter to liability for 
pricing practices, particularly in contexts outside of predation, could allow too many 
anticompetitive price-cuts to escape liability. 
While EU Institutions have relied on principles derived from NPT to evaluate predation 
and tying claims, which explains my comfort level with the existing state and direction of 
tying jurisprudence in both jurisdictions, EU monopolization law includes strands that 
potentially incorporate reasoning outside the scope of NPT.  As the most recent exhibit, the 
EU General Court decided in Intel that loyalty rebates (which I do not examine in this thesis), 
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when classified as exclusivity rebates, “inherently” or “by their nature” restrict competition.28  
Categorizing the conduct as an exclusivity rebate relieved the Commission from having to 
show either actual foreclosure or anticompetitive effects.
29
  An exclusivity rebate that merely 
makes access to the market more difficult for competitors establishes the requisite 
foreclosure effect.
30
  In evaluating a single-product discount in British Airways, the General 
Court similarly determined that, to find an abuse, the Commission did not have to establish 
that the rebate actually harmed consumers.
31
  But the Commission did have to show that the 
challenged conduct was “capable of” or “likely to” harm competition.32 
 NPT does not necessarily require an exhaustive effects-based approach.  It does not 
dictate the evidentiary burden for courts and competition authorities to apply.  When a court 
decides that a particular practice always or almost always harms consumers and the 
competitive process when implemented by a dominant undertaking, it still had to reason from 
NPT premises.  The court first had to apply NPT to find dominance.  The court then would 
have considered whether the practice harms competition and consumers consistently enough 
by raising prices and/or curtailing variety, quality, or innovation to avoid further 
examination.  A court might base this decision on the existing state of economic evidence, 
which might demonstrate that the practice invariably prevents merit competition from 
functioning as it customarily does under perfect competition.
33
  In the EU British Airways 
case, the General Court found likely anticompetitive effects.
34
  The treaty obligation to 
promote the undefined concept of “undistorted competition” could approximate this analysis. 
                                                 
28
 Wils, supra n.6 at 4-5.  
29
 Id. at 4-5 (discussing Case T-286/09 Intel v. European Commission, Judgment of the Court, Seventh Chamber, ¶ 
143 (12 June 2014), on appeal to the Court of Justice, Case C-413/14 P Intel v. European Commission). 
30
 Id. at ¶¶ 149-150. 
31
 Case T-219/99 British Airways v. Commission (17 Dec. 2003) Judgment of the Court of First Instance (First 
Chamber) at ¶ 293 (listed in: Lianos, supra n.23 at 187-202); see also Orit Dayagi-Epstein, The Evolution of the 
Notion of Consumer Interest in Light of the Modernisation of Article 82, in ARTICLE 82 EC:  REFLECTIONS ON ITS 
RECENT EVOLUTION 67, 70 (Ariel Ezrachi ed., 2009) (quoting Case T-219/99 British Airways, at ¶ 264). 
32
 Id. at ¶ 293. 
33
 For a discussion of the distinction between form-based and effects-based analysis, see IOANNIS LIANOS, 
Categorical Thinking in Competition Law & the ‘Effects-based’ Approach in Article 82 EC, in ARTICLE 82 EC:  
REFLECTIONS ON ITS RECENT EVOLUTION 21-36 (Ariel Ezrachi ed., 2009).  On NPT and the evolving core of 
economic content, see Ioannis Lianos, “Lost in Translation?” Toward a Theory of Economic Transplants, Jean 
Monnet Working Paper 08/09 (2009) at 9-10, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1485378.  
34
 Case T-219/99 British Airways, at ¶ 295. 
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Abandoning the as-efficient competitor test as a legal requirement to establish exclusivity 
rebates,
35
 as the Intel Court did, likewise says nothing about the general applicability of NPT 
to the practice under consideration.
36
  Throughout this thesis, I have attempted to 
demonstrate that NPT is a far broader mode of analysis than simply comparing prices to the 
costs of a dominant undertaking. 
Other readings of undistorted competition are possible.  Professor Wouter Wils has 
argued that it protects “the right to compete” and “equality of opportunity.”37  Competition as 
an instrumental device, used to ensure equal access to every market and the opportunity to 
displace successful rivals notwithstanding consumer preferences and efficiency, may nurture 
small businesses.  But such objectives unavoidably would cultivate higher prices and 
extensive misallocations of capital.  Protecting competing does not equate with protecting 
competition.  Competition generates profitability and exclusion, and the pursuit of winning 
serves consumers. 
For courts and competition authorities to target competing, they would have to enjoin 
lower prices and product improvements to create market space for more expensive and 
unpopular substitutes.  Courts and competition authorities therefore would have to replace 
consumers and producers as the primary determinants of what is produced, at what price, and 
with what quality.  To assess whether even a weakened market process sufficiently provided 
a business the right or opportunity to compete, judges and competition authorities could rely 
on little more than favored notions of fairness.  Unlike testing for perfect competition by 
considering market shares, entry barriers, and competitive restraints, decoupling undistorted 
competition from NPT eliminates objectivity from the analysis, replacing it with boundless 
discretion. 
Professor Wils also has discussed undistorted competition as equivalent to undistorted 
access to the internal market.
38
  Economic decline surely would follow if undertakings were 
not permitted to block access to markets with productive investments.  NPT supplies 
analytical tools to separate productive from non-productive investments, and pro- from 
                                                 
35
 Case T-286/09 Intel at ¶¶ 146, 151. 
36
 For instance, Professor Wils has pointed out that, for loyalty rebates, the requirement of exclusivity, not a 
particular price, causes anticompetitive effects, reducing the relevance of the as-efficient competitor test as a device 
to determine liability.  Wils, supra n.6 at 28. 
37
 For further explication on this line of argument, see id. at 12-13. 
38
 Id. at 17. 
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anticompetitive acts based on how they affect consumer welfare.  If undistorted competition 
does not aim to maximize consumer welfare or wealth creation more generally, then it no 
longer represents an economic concept.  A legal policy governing economic activity that 
lacks market restraints would destroy far more wealth and welfare than it creates. 
Whether the Commission and Courts, if presented with an appropriate dispute, would 
conceptualize bundling as closer to exclusivity rebates or tying, I cannot say definitively.  
Because of the benefits that bundling offers to package purchasers, I doubt that EU Courts 
would adopt an equally skeptical view of bundling.  Unlike exclusivity rebates, bundling also 
does not fall within a long line of case law precedent discussing the practice as severely 
anticompetitive.  Because the U.S. Supreme Court recently has expanded cost tests to other 
corners of monopolization law, it is more likely to side with the benevolent view of bundling 
advanced by the Ninth Circuit rather than the more measured view adopted by the Third 
Circuit.  Notwithstanding the ubiquity of NPT within monopolization law, it unlikely will 
produce symmetrical enforcement levels in both jurisdictions, despite the efforts of the 
Commission in the bundling context. 
In the final analysis, NPT cannot explain every subtlety of present day monopolization 
enforcement in either jurisdiction, but it explicates a great deal.  When choosing between 
NPT principles, or when deciding which tenets to emphasize, legal considerations have 
exerted notable influence.  In the early days of monopolization enforcement, when per se 
rules were more prevalent, such considerations even outweighed more indicative evidence of 
likely effects.
39
  NPT has incorporated the rule of law, which historically has confined more 
sophisticated economic tests and more expansive analyses of effects.   
While NPT incorporates the influence of investment and innovation on economic activity 
— through shifts to, and alternations in the shape of, demand and supply curves — price and 
efficiency may constitute subsidiary concerns for monopolization abuses not examined in 
this thesis, particularly refusals to deal.  When deciding such claims, courts and competition 
authorities instead may emphasize economic incentives and more explicit political 
considerations that produce results more tenuously consistent with NPT. 
                                                 
39
 Professor Wils has argued that the decision in Intel does not reflect a per se rule, as I thought, see Jay Matthew 
Strader, Post Danmark’s Recoupment Element, 10(2) COMPETITION LAW REVIEW 205, 236 (Dec. 2014), since 
dominant undertakings can justify the exclusivity rebate by demonstrating its objective necessity, or that the 
efficiency and lower prices produced outweigh any potential foreclosure effect.  Wils, supra n.6 at 5, 20. 
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Nevertheless, in the current enforcement climate on both sides of the Atlantic, and 
particularly for predatory pricing, tying, and bundling claims, NPT at least represents the 
leading mode of analysis.  It achieved that position because, when trying to promote 
competition, efficiency, and lower prices in a market economy, judges and competition 
authorities risk inapposite results by adopting legal tests that run counter to the most reliable 
set of theoretical principles available for that purpose. 
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APPENDIX TO 
CHAPTER 2: 
U.S. 
PREDATORY 
PRICING 
        
** Thanks to 
Professors 
Kokkoris & 
Jones for 
suggesting that 
I add 
information on 
         
market share, 
market 
structure, and 
basic facts 
concerning the 
alleged abuse. 
Case Name Claim Disposition 
  
Neoclassical 
Price Theory 
    
   
NPT, 
Effects Costs Profit Sacrifice Recoupment 
Market Power / 
Dominant 
Position Intent Effects 
   
Intent 
      
          
1. Mackey v. 
Sears, 
Roebuck & 
Co., 237 F.2d 
869 (7th Cir. 
1956) 
Monopolization 
& unreasonable 
conduct 
No § 2 
claim; 
NPT / 
Effects 
Below-cost 
sales 
 
Defendant must 
have dangerous 
probability of 
achieving 
monopoly 
(predict) 
Defendant 
must have 
power to 
monopolize; 
market 
insufficiently 
defined, Sears 
is  
Defendant 
must have 
intent to 
monopolize; 
intent here to 
exclude and 
discipline  
No showing 
here that 
defendant's 
actions 
threatened 
monopoly; but 
conduct  
  
founded  
    
the largest 
supplier 
suppliers and 
competitors 
(claim) 
unreasonably 
anticompetitive 
  
under RP, 
but 
       
  
no private 
       
  
right of 
action 
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2. Gen. Gas 
Corp. v. Nat’l 
Utilities of 
Gainesville, 
Inc., 271 F.2d 
820 (5th Cir. 
1959) 
Claim 
 
 
 
 
 
Unprofitable 
price-cut 
monopolizes 
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effects 
 
 
 
Costs 
 
 
Price-cut not 
below cost of 
defendant or 
several 
competitors; 
around cost  
Profit Sacrifice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recoupment 
 
Public loses 
from price-cut 
only if it 
eliminates 
competitors 
and prices again 
rise 
 
 
 
Market Power 
 
 
 
 
Price-cutter 
non-dominant 
with 25% of the 
market 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effects 
 
 
Price-cut could 
eliminate or 
lower profits of 
plaintiff and 
perhaps other 
competitors; 
    
of plaintiff 
 
  
  
public 
benefitted from 
lower prices; 
Court ordered 
amendment to 
injunction 
limiting 
    
  
 
  
  
price-cut, but 
still 
recommended 
setting a price 
that protected 
some rivals 
    
  
 
  
   3. Gold Fuel 
Serv. v. Esso 
Std. Oil Co., 
306 F.2d 61 
(3d Cir. 1962) 
Attempt to 
monopolize by 
unreasonably 
low prices No claim Intent /  
Cannot infer 
intent from 
below-cost 
bidding 
   
No evidence of 
intent 
 
   
Effects 
      
          4. John 
Wright & 
Assoc. v. 
Ullrich, 328 
F.2d 474 (8th 
Cir. 1964) 
Monopolization 
by loss-making 
bids No claim NPT 
No below-cost 
pricing Profit earned 
Recoupment 
not shown 
 
No intent to 
damage 
plaintiff's 
business or to 
eliminate a 
competitor 
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5. Utah Pie 
Co. v. 
Continental 
Baking Co., 
386 U.S. 685 
(1967) 
Claim 
 
 
 
 
 
Discriminatory 
and predatory 
pricing 
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Founded 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effects 
Costs 
 
 
Pet incurred 
substantial 
losses on sale 
of frozen pies 
in Salt Lake 
City;  
Profit Sacrifice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recoupment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Market Power 
 
 
Market shares 
of defendants 
at end of 
predation 
were: (1) 8.8%; 
(2) 8.3%; and    
Intent 
 
Intent indicates 
"likelihood of 
injury to 
competition"; 
evidence 
existed 
concerning 
Effects 
 
Price-cuts 
injured 
"competition": 
caused plaintiff 
to lower prices 
to an historic 
low 
    
Continental priced frozen pies at 
less than "direct cost plus an 
allocation for 
 
(3) 29.4%; 
plaintiff's was 
45.3%, while its 
sales volume 
steadily 
increased 
during 
the predatory 
intent of each 
defendant 
and incur 
opportunity 
costs in a 
market of 
declining prices; 
plaintiff's prices 
were    
    
overhead"; 
Carnation 
priced at a 
level "well 
below" its costs 
  
predation 
period, and its 
net worth more 
than doubled 
 
lowest in the 
market during 
the predatory 
period; price 
war made 
plaintiff "a less   
         
effective 
competitive 
force"; some 
competitors in 
the market 
continued to 
operate  
         
at a profit 
          6. Food 
Basket v. 
Albertson’s, 
Inc., 383 F.2d 
785 (10th Cir. 
1967) 
Discriminatory 
& low pricing Founded Intent /  
Pricing at 
unprofitable 
levels 
   
Intent to drive 
plaintiff out of 
business 
 
   
Effects 
      
          7. Greenville 
Publ'g v. Daily 
Reflector, Inc., 
496 F.2d 391 
(4th Cir. 1974) 
Monopolization 
by predation Founded NPT 
Prices below 
costs 
Price 
unprofitable 
 
Disputed 
market share of 
defendant, 
either 84% or 
23.34% 
Intent to 
eliminate 
plaintiff 
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8. Int’l Air 
Indus. v. Am. 
Excelsior Co., 
517 F.2d 714 
(5th Cir. 1975) 
Claim 
 
 
 
 
 
Predation: price 
discrimination, 
attempted 
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
NPT / 
Effects 
Costs 
 
 
 
 
Need price 
below AVC; 
price above 
ATC 
Profit Sacrifice 
 
 
 
 
Profit sacrifice 
actionable if 
significant entry 
barriers exist 
Recoupment 
 
 
 
 
Recoupment 
not necessary 
but implicit to 
claim 
Market Power 
 
Entry barriers 
virtually non-
existent, 
relevant 
market was 
"very 
competitive"  
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effects 
 
 
Even if price 
below AVC, no 
liability if price-
cut has 
beneficial or 
insignificant 
 
monopolization 
       
effects 
          
9. C.O. 
Hanson v. 
Shell Oil Co., 
541 F.2d 1352 
(9th Cir. 1976) 
Predation: 
attempted 
monopolization No claim NPT 
No proof price 
below marginal 
cost (MC) or 
average 
variable cost 
(AVC) 
Must prove 
defendant 
foregoing profit 
Recoupment 
required 
 
No specific 
intent 
 
          10. Pac. Eng'g 
& Prod. Co. of 
Nev. v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 
551 F.2d 790 
(10th Cir. 
1977) 
Predation: price 
discrimination, 
attempted   No claim NPT 
No inference 
from price 
below average 
total cost (ATC) 
but above AVC 
  
Only two 
competitors in 
relevant 
market 
  
 
monopolization, 
monopolization 
        
          11. Janich 
Bros. v. Am. 
Distilling Co., 
570 F.2d 848 
(9th Cir. 1977) 
Predation: price 
discrimination, 
attempted No claim 
NPT / 
Effects 
Price above MC 
or AVC legal 
Must prove 
defendant 
foregoing profit 
Recoupment 
required 
 
Defendant 
knew plaintiff 
could not 
survive after 
price-cut 
Prices adjusted 
based on 
viability of 
plaintiff 
 
monopolization 
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12. Cal 
Computer 
Prod. v. IBM 
Corp., 613 
F.2d 727 (9th 
Cir. 1979) 
Claim 
 
 
 
 
Predation: 
attempted 
monopolization,  
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
NPT 
Costs 
 
 
 
 
 
Price above MC 
and AVC 
Profit Sacrifice 
 
 
 
 
 
Profit earned 
after price-cut 
Recoupment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Market Power 
 
 
 
Market share 
contested, but 
court assumed 
market power 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
monopolization 
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13. Chillicothe 
Sand & Gravel 
v. Martin 
Marietta 
Corp., 615 
F.2d 427 (7th 
Cir. 1980) 
Claim 
 
 
 
Predation: 
attempted 
monopolization, 
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
NPT / 
Effects 
Costs 
 
Price above 
AVC, not 
protect 
inefficient 
rivals 
Profit Sacrifice 
  
 
Price above 
AVC rational, 
avoids profit 
sacrifice 
Recoupment 
 
 
 
 
Recoupment 
required 
Market Power 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effects 
 
 
Other market 
conditions than 
prices and costs 
matter 
 
monopolization 
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14. Ernest W. 
Hahn v. B. 
Codding, 615 
F.2d 830 (9th 
Cir. 1980) 
Claim 
 
 
 
Predation: 
attempted 
monopolization, 
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
Founded 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
NPT 
Costs 
 
 
 
 
Price below 
cost 
Profit Sacrifice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recoupment 
 
Court inferred 
recoupment 
from 90% 
market share 
(predict) 
Market Power 
 
 
 
 
See 
Recoupment 
Intent 
 
 
Infer specific 
intent from 
anticompetitive 
conduct 
Effects 
 
 
 
 
 
See Intent 
 
monopolization 
        
          15. Pierce 
Packing v. 
John Morrell 
& Co., 633 
F.2d 1362 
(9th Cir. 1980) 
Attempted 
monopolization Founded NPT / Intent 
Price must be 
below MC or 
AVC unless 
high entry 
barriers 
Must forego 
profits 
Cost rules not 
necessarily 
apply if 
likelihood of 
recoupment 
exists (predict) 
Defendant had 
50% of relevant 
market 
More flexible 
rules than cost 
test apply if 
proof of 
specific intent 
exists (claim) 
 
          16. SuperTurf, 
Inc. v. 
Monsanto 
Co., 660 F.2d 
1275 (8th Cir. 
1981) 
Predation: 
attempted 
monopolization, No claim NPT / Intent 
Price not below 
AVC 
  
Only two 
competitors, 
market power 
presumed 
Above AVC 
pricing, plus 
intent, could 
establish 
predation 
(claim) 
 
 
monopolization 
        
          17. William 
Inglis & Sons 
Baking Co. v. 
ITT 
Continental 
Baking Co., 
668 F.2d 1014 
(9th Cir. 1981) 
Discriminatory 
& predatory 
pricing, 
attempted Founded NPT 
Price not below 
MC or AVC, so 
not 
presumptively 
illegal; price 
below ATC,   
Price-cuts were 
profitable; 
must forgo 
short-term 
profits; legal if 
price  
Predatory to 
profit sacrifice, 
exclude, raise 
prices & recoup; 
need high entry 
barriers  
Market power 
& dangerous 
probability of 
success are 
"not 
equivalent" 
  
 
monopolization 
  
so plaintiff 
bears burden 
to prove price 
is predatory 
maximizes 
profits or 
minimizes 
losses (predict) 
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18. 
Northeastern 
Tele. Co. v. 
AT&T Co., 651 
F.2d 76 (2d 
Cir. 1981) 
Claim 
 
 
 
 
 
Predation: 
attempted 
monopolization, 
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NPT 
Costs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Price not below 
MC or AVC 
Profit Sacrifice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recoupment 
 
 
Liability 
requires 
recoupment in 
near future; 
recoupment will 
invite new entry  
Market Power 
 
 
 
 
Court assumed 
presence of 
monopoly 
power 
Intent 
 
No specific 
intent to 
eliminate 
competitors by 
unfair or 
unreasonable 
means 
Effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
monopolization 
    
(predict) 
   
          
          
          
19. Zoslaw v. 
MCA Dist. 
Corp., 693 
F.2d 870 (9th 
Cir. 1982) 
Predation: 
attempted 
monopolization,  No claim NPT 
Price not below 
AVC 
Predate if 
forego short-
term profits or 
incur 
unnecessary 
losses to  
Recoupment 
"usually, 
although not 
necessarily," 
associated with 
market power; 
Robust 
competition & 
insignificant 
market power  
  
 
monopolization 
   
eliminate prey 
10% market 
share 
incompatible 
with 
recoupment 
(predict) 
   
          20. Richter 
Concrete 
Corp. v. 
Hilltop 
Concrete 
Corp., 691 
F.2d 818 (6th 
Cir. 1982) 
Predation: 
attempted 
monopolization No claim 
NPT / 
Effects 
Pricing above 
AVC but below 
ATC; AVC test 
fails to capture 
predatory 
Predation is 
profit sacrifice 
to recoup 
See Profit 
Sacrifice 
Even at prices 
below ATC, 
defendant's 
market share 
dropped from 
40% to 30%  
Predation 
differs from 
merit 
competition in 
its motive; high 
entry barriers  
Plaintiff not 
establish that 
price below ATC 
had "any effect 
whatsoever" on 
market 
    
lending & 
subsidization 
  
to 20%; "highly 
competitive" 
market; hardly 
any entry 
barriers 
significant to 
determining 
predatory 
intent; no entry 
barriers given 
continuous  
(consumer 
welfare) 
        
entry into 
market 
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21. D&S Redi-
Mix v. Sierra 
Redi-Mix & 
Contracting 
Co., 692 F.2d 
1245 (9th Cir. 
1982)   
Claim 
 
 
 
 
 
Predation: 
attempted 
monopolization 
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Founded 
 
 
NTP, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
NPT / 
Effects 
Costs 
 
 
 
 
 
If price below 
AVC, must 
justify 
Profit Sacrifice 
 
 
 
 
 
Predation is 
profit sacrifice 
to recoup 
Recoupment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
See Profit 
Sacrifice 
Market Power 
 
 
Must prove 
anticipated 
benefits of 
price-cuts 
depended on 
its tendency to  
Intent 
 
 
Defendant set 
prices to drive 
plaintiff out of 
business, not 
to meet 
competition 
Effects 
 
Owners 
provided 
subsidiary 
favorable prices 
and credit to 
lure away 
plaintiff's   
     
  
 
discipline or 
eliminate 
competition 
and enhance 
long-term 
ability to 
increase  
 
customers & 
outlast the 
more limited 
cash reserves of 
plaintiff; where 
intent  
     
  
 
monopoly 
power & raise 
prices 
 
established, 
lower burden to 
prove injury; 
here lost profits 
and sales 
     
  
    
22. Sunshine 
Books, Ltd. v. 
Temple Univ., 
697 F.2d 90 
(3d Cir. 1982) 
Predation: 
attempted 
monopolization Founded NPT 
Presume 
proper test is 
price below 
AVC; dispute 
about 
allocation of 
costs, 
Predation is 
profit sacrifice 
to recoup 
See Profit 
Sacrifice 
 
Prices 
calculated to 
"destroy," not 
"reflect," 
competition 
are illegal 
 
    
so remand 
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23. Barry 
Wright Corp. 
v. ITT Grinnell 
Corp., 724 
F.2d 227 (1st 
Cir. 1983) 
Claim 
 
 
 
 
Predation: 
maintaining 
monopoly 
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
NPT 
Costs 
 
Lawful to price 
above 
incremental 
cost: moving 
price in right 
direction 
Profit Sacrifice 
 
Profit-
maximizing 
price depends 
on elasticity of 
demand, 
competitors'   
Recoupment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Market Power 
 
 
 
 
 
Market power 
stipulated 
Intent 
 
 
 
Intent too 
vague a 
standard 
(unimportant) 
Effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
responses to 
price shifts, and 
cost changes 
relative to 
production 
volume 
    
     
  
     
24. 
Transamerica 
Computer Co. 
v. IBM Corp., 
698 F.2d 1377 
(9th Cir. 1983)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predation: 
attempted 
monopolization,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NPT / 
Effects 
 
 
 
Predation 
possible above 
ATC, though 
rare; plaintiff 
must prove 
price  
 
 
 
Predatory when 
price not 
minimize losses 
while 
eliminating 
rivals: limit   
 
 
Predatory if 
prices create a 
market 
structure 
enabling 
recoupment; 
may be difficult 
 
 
 
 
 
Court assumed 
monopoly 
power, see also 
Effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
See Effects 
 
 
 
An exclusive 
cost-based test 
forecloses 
consideration of 
other important 
factors, 
 
monopolization 
  
unreasonably 
restricted 
competition by 
clear and 
convincing 
evidence  pricing 
to assess long-
run 
consequences 
of pricing 
policies, see 
also Costs 
(predict)   
 
such as intent, 
market power, 
market 
structure, and 
long-run 
behavior in 
    
(recoupment); 
uncertain & 
imprecise to 
calculate costs, 
especially for     
   
evaluating 
effects 
    
multi-product 
companies   
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25. D.E. 
Rogers Assoc. 
v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 
718 F.2d 1431 
(6th Cir. 1983) 
Claim 
 
 
 
 
Discriminatory 
& predatory 
pricing, 
attempted  
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
NPT / Intent  
Costs 
 
 
 
No proof price 
below AVC; 
cost test 
surrogate for 
intent 
Profit Sacrifice 
 
 
 
 
 
Predation is 
profit sacrifice 
to recoup 
Recoupment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
See Profit 
Sacrifice 
Market Power 
 
 
 
 
 
Court assumed 
monopoly 
power 
Intent 
 
Insufficient 
proof that 
defendant 
designed its 
dual-pricing 
strategy to 
discipline  
Effects 
 
 
 
 
 
Loss of business 
& profits not 
count 
 
monopolization, 
monopolization 
 
Effects 
    
or eliminate 
competition 
 
          
26. MCI 
Comm'cn 
Corp. v. AT&T 
Co., 708 F.2d 
1081 (7th Cir. 
1983) 
Predation: 
monopolization No claim NPT 
Price above 
long-run 
incremental 
costs, so no 
predatory 
intent 
Hinging liability 
on profit 
sacrifice 
"rob[s]" 
consumers of 
price 
reductions  
 
Court upheld 
finding of 
monopoly 
power 
Subjective test 
based solely on 
intent is 
incapable of 
distinguishing 
between  
 
     
  
  
pro- and 
anticompetitive 
price-cuts 
(unimportant) 
 
           
27. S. Pac. 
Commc'n Co. 
v. AT&T Co., 
740 F.2d 1011 
(D.C. Cir. 
1984) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predation: 
monopolization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim 
 
 
 
 
 
NPT / Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Price above 
ATC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Court upheld 
finding of 
monopoly 
power 
 
 
Plaintiff not 
show clear and 
convincing 
proof of 
predatory 
intent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
    
  
 
  
   28. Arthur S. 
Langenderfer 
v. S.E. 
Johnson Co., 
729 F.2d 1050 
(6th Cir. 1984) 
Predation: 
attempted 
monopolization,  No claim NPT / Intent 
Liability 
requires price 
below total 
cost; price 
above ATC 
Profits earned; 
profit sacrifice 
test would 
"rob" 
consumers of 
price-cuts; 
 
Defendant 
larger, more 
efficient 
Intent is 
distinguishing 
characteristic 
of predation 
(claim) 
 
 
monopolization 
   
administratively 
too 
cumbersome 
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29. Adjusters 
Replace-A-Car 
v. Agency 
Rent-A-Car, 
Inc., 735 F.2d 
884 (5th Cir. 
1984) 
Claim 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predation: 
attempted 
monopolization 
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NPT / Intent 
Costs 
 
 
As entry 
barriers 
increase, so 
does degree 
that price may 
exceed AVC 
and 
Profit Sacrifice 
 
 
 
 
 
Pricing is 
predatory when 
sacrifice profits 
to recoup 
Recoupment 
 
 
 
 
Low, or "slight," 
entry barriers 
prevent 
recoupment 
(predict) 
Market Power 
 
Question is 
whether 
market 
conditions 
probably 
enable 
defendant to 
control   
Intent 
 
 
 
Court unwilling 
to relegate 
intent to an 
automatic and 
irrebuttable 
inference 
Effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
still be deemed 
predatory; 
price at least 
40% above AVC 
  
market price; 
plaintiff was 
original entrant 
to the market, 
see also Costs 
  
          
30. C.E. Serv., 
Inc. v. Control 
Data Corp., 
759 F.2d 1241 
(5th Cir. 1985) 
Predation: 
attempted 
monopolization,  Founded NPT 
Enough 
evidence 
existed to 
support finding 
price 20% 
below AVC 
  
Enough 
evidence 
existed to 
support 83% 
share in sub-
market 
  
 
monopolization 
        
           
31. Nat'l 
Reporting Co. 
v. Alderson 
Reporting Co., 
Inc., 763 F.2d 
1020 (8th Cir. 
1985) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predation: 
attempted 
monopolization, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NPT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Profit sacrifice 
and 
recoupment 
define the 
offense 
 
 
 
Defendant 
lacked pricing 
power, so it 
could not 
recoup losses 
(predict) 
 
 
Even if prices 
were predatory 
& intent 
existed, no 
evidence of 
monopoly 
power 
 
 
Without 
market power, 
no need to 
consider intent 
(shift to 
objective 
intent) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
monopolization 
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32. Conoco 
Inc. v. Inman 
Oil Co., Inc., 
774 F.2d 895 
(8th Cir. 1985) 
Claim 
 
 
 
 
Discriminatory 
& predatory 
pricing, 
attempted 
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
NPT / 
Effects 
Costs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Price not below 
cost 
Profit Sacrifice 
 
 
Pricing is 
predatory if 
sacrifice profits 
to recoup; no 
proof bid 
represented   
Recoupment 
 
 
 
Because no 
profit sacrifice, 
not need to 
consider 
recoupment 
Market Power 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intent 
 
Intent to 
control prices 
or 
unreasonably 
restrict 
competition; 
intent alone 
Effects 
 
Conduct must 
produce 
benefits 
dependent on 
ability to 
discipline or 
eliminate 
 
monopolization 
   
profit sacrifice 
  
insufficient to 
establish 
predation: also 
need conduct 
competition 
and raise prices 
(consumer 
welfare) 
          33. Marsann 
Co. v. 
Brammall, 
Inc., 788 F.2d 
611 (9th Cir. 
1986) 
Predation: 
attempted 
monopolization Founded NPT 
Price below 
AVC presumed 
predatory; also 
predatory if 
price above MC 
or     
Price is 
predatory if fail 
to minimize 
losses for 
purpose of later 
recouping 
See Profit 
Sacrifice 
 
Need specific intent to control 
prices or destroy competition; 
difficult to establish  
    
AVC and if 
anticipated 
benefits 
depend on 
exclusion; AVC 
measured  
   
that 
sophisticated 
entities 
harbored 
anticompetitive 
intent, so may 
infer intent 
 
    
against costs to 
sell product to 
customer, not 
costs to 
produce 
product 
   
from below 
cost pricing 
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34. 
Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. 
Co. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 
475 U.S. 574 
(1986) 
Claim 
 
 
 
 
 
Predation: 
conspiracy to 
monopolize 
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
NPT / 
Effects 
Costs 
 
 
 
Predation is 
pricing below 
appropriate 
measure of 
cost to recoup 
Profit Sacrifice 
 
 
 
Profit sacrifice 
required, which 
is costly: 
practice self-
deterring 
Recoupment 
 
 
To be rational, 
to have motive 
to predate, 
profit sacrifice 
requires 
recoupment;       
Market Power 
 
No market 
power here, as 
the market 
share of the 
alleged 
predators were 
less 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
See 
Recoupment 
Effects 
 
 
Predation made 
no practical 
sense, as 
plaintiffs would 
have had to 
destroy  
      
substantial 
losses demand 
long 
recoupment 
period; 
predation rarely 
tried & more  
than the market leaders; their 
market share remained 
unchanged during predation 
companies 
larger and 
better 
established; no 
recoupment 
after more than 
two  
      
rarely 
successful 
(predict) period 
 
decades of 
conspiracy 
(consumer 
welfare) 
         
  
         
  
35. 
Instructional 
Sys. Dev. 
Corp. v. Aetna 
Casualty & 
Surety Co., 
817 F.2d 639 
(10th Cir. 
1987) 
Predation: 
conspiracy to 
monopolize,  Founded 
NPT / 
Effects 
Predatory if 
"unreasonably 
anticompetitive 
behavior" 
accompanies 
price  
 
Evidence creates fact issue as to 
whether short-term price-cutting 
secured long-term  
Intent present 
to obtain 
monopoly by 
exclusion, as 
defendant 
expressed 
intent 
Question 
whether tactics 
unrelated to 
increased 
efficiency, see 
also 
Recoupment 
 
monopolization 
  
above AVC; 
here price 
below ATC, 
above AVC 
 
profits; prices 
rose when 
competitors left 
the market but 
fell when 
competitors 
 
to sacrifice 
profits to win 
business from 
rival, and an 
ability to 
outlast rival in 
 
      
entered the 
market (effects) 
 
"underbidding 
situation" 
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36. Kelco 
Disposal v. 
Browning-
Ferris Indus. 
of Vt., Inc., 
845 F.2d 404 
(2d Cir. 1988) 
Claim 
 
 
 
 
 
Predation: 
attempted 
monopolization 
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Founded 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
NPT 
Costs 
 
 
 
Price below 
AVC presumed 
predatory; $65 
fee well below 
$81 AVC 
Profit Sacrifice 
 
 
 
 
Predation is 
profit sacrifice 
to exclude and 
recoup 
Recoupment 
 
 
 
 
See Profit 
Sacrifice, 
Market Power 
(predict) 
Market Power 
 
Market share 
ranged from 
55% to 100%; 
high entry 
barriers 
present; only 
two  
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
Defendant frequently reaffirmed 
goal of eliminating plaintiffs, 
which, along with  
       
competitors 
from 1981-
1987; few 
substitutes to 
relevant 
product; 
inelastic 
proof of below-
cost pricing, 
established 
specific intent 
 
       
demand 
  
          37. H. Floyd 
McGahee v. 
N. Propane 
Gas Co., 858 
F.2d 1487 
(11th Cir. 
1988) 
Discriminatory 
& predatory 
pricing, 
attempted  Founded NPT / Intent 
If price below 
AVC, 
rebuttable 
presumption of 
predatory 
intent; need      
 
Claim requires 
dangerous 
probability of 
recoupment, or 
more extensive 
proof of    
Insignificant 
entry barriers, 
but defendant 
had a 60-65% 
market share 
when 
Subjective 
intent relevant; 
for attempted 
monopolization 
claim, need 
specific    
 
 
monopolization 
  
additional 
objective or 
subjective 
evidence of 
predatory 
intent when, as    
 
market power: 
measured prior 
to 
commencement 
of predation; 
market share 
most   
predation 
began, so issue 
could go to 
jury, see also 
Recoupment 
intent satisfied by showing below-
cost pricing; other intent evidence 
included an   
    
here, prices are 
above AVC but 
below ATC; 
stronger 
supporting 
evidence    
 
critical factor 
(predict) 
 
investigation 
into plaintiff's 
financial 
position, policy 
of rent-free 
products, and   
 
    
must exist as 
price 
approaches 
ATC; if price 
above ATC, no 
predation 
   
an internal memo expressing 
desire to worsen plaintiff's 
financial position (claim) 
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38. U.S. 
Philips Corp. 
v. Windmere 
Corp., 861 
F.2d 695 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988) 
Claim 
 
 
 
 
Predation: 
attempted 
monopolization,  
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Founded 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
NPT / 
Effects 
Costs 
 
 
 
 
Jury question 
whether price 
below AVC 
Profit Sacrifice 
 
Re-introduction 
of retired 
products at 
discounted 
prices sacrificed 
profits  
Recoupment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Market Power 
 
90% market 
share and 
substantial 
entry barriers, 
including brand 
name and 
Intent 
 
 
 
Discounts 
adopted to 
eliminate 
entrant 
Effects 
 
Drastic price-
cuts in response 
to competition 
from a new 
entrant, which 
excluded   
 
monopolization 
   
by siphoning 
revenue away 
from existing 
lines 
 
advertising 
 
rival from the 
market; 
defendant then 
discontinued 
product lines 
that sacrificed  
       
  
 
profits 
          39. Stitt Spark 
Plug Co. v. 
Champion 
Spark Plug 
Co., 840 F.2d 
1253 (5th Cir. 
1988) 
Discriminatory 
& predatory 
pricing, 
attempted  No claim NPT 
Need 
predatory price 
"across" both 
primary market 
and 
replacement 
parts  
 
Predate to 
exclude and 
later raise 
prices; 
economic 
disincentives to 
predate often    
Predation is 
anticompetitive 
if it contributes 
to monopoly 
power 
  
 
monopolization 
  
market 
 
justify a 
presumption of 
implausibility; 
no proof that 
recoupment 
depended on    
   
      
excluding 
plaintiff 
(effects) 
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40. A.A. 
Poultry Farms 
v. Rose Acre 
Farms, Inc., 
881 F.2d 1396 
(7th Cir. 1989) 
Claim 
 
 
 
 
Discriminatory 
& predatory 
pricing, 
monopolization 
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
NPT 
Costs 
 
 
 
 
 
Price below 
ATC & AVC for 
a year 
Profit Sacrifice 
 
 
Price below 
cost generally 
reflects profit 
sacrifice; 
predation is 
profit   
Recoupment 
 
If a monopoly 
price later is 
impossible, 
then the 
sequence is 
unprofitable: 
consumers 
Market Power 
 
1% market 
share 
nationally; 
10.4% to 23.1% 
in Indiana; 
3.4% to 8.6% in 
the  
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
Intent cannot be basis for liability; 
almost all intent evidence shows 
both a desire 
     
sacrifice to 
exclude or 
discipline rivals 
and recoup: an 
investment in 
future  
benefit; easier 
to examine 
market 
conditions for 
possible 
recoupment 
than cost 
mid-west 
region 
to succeed and 
"glee" at 
exclusion; 
intent 
unrelated to 
whether 
recoupment is   
 
     
monopoly; 
without 
likelihood of 
success, 
conduct is self-
deterring 
evidence; cost 
evidence 
relevant only if 
market 
structure makes 
recoupment 
 
possible, and 
recoupment 
determines 
competitive 
effects 
(unimportant) 
 
      
feasible; 
persistent entry 
and market 
expansion here; 
egg production 
is 
   
      
unconcentrated 
(predict) 
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41. Ocean 
State 
Physicians 
Health Plan v. 
Blue Cross & 
Blue Shield of 
R.I., 883 F.2d 
1101 (1st Cir. 
1989) 
Claim 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predation: 
monopolization 
by buyer 
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
NPT / 
Effects 
Costs 
 
 
 
 
 
Price above 
incremental 
cost is merit 
competition  
Profit Sacrifice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recoupment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Market Power 
 
 
 
Conduct by 
monopolist 
destroying 
competition 
may be legal if 
taken without  
Intent 
 
 
 
Monopolist 
may improve 
its position 
when objective 
is not to 
"smother"  
Effects 
 
Whether 
conduct goes 
beyond 
ordinary 
business 
dealings and 
ordinary skill 
and  
       
market power; 
primary 
purpose of 
antitrust laws is 
to encourage 
competition, 
and  
competition; 
intent to 
eliminate rival 
not actionable 
in itself 
unnecessarily 
excludes 
competition 
from the 
relevant market 
       
to prevent 
monopolists 
from excluding 
on basis other 
than merit 
competition 
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42. William 
Royce 
Morgan v. L. 
Ponder, 892 
F.2d 1355 
(8th Cir. 1989) 
Claim 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predation: 
monopolization 
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
NPT / 
Effects 
Costs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When price is below AVC, presume 
predatory; when price is above 
AVC but    
Recoupment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Market Power 
 
 
Need dominant 
share of 
relevant 
market; 
evidence that 
defendant can 
earn  
Intent 
 
Because 
ambiguous and 
misleading, 
futile to 
attempt to 
identify 
predation 
solely  
Effects 
 
 
Anticompetitive 
conduct 
eliminates 
competition 
without 
legitimate 
business  
    
below ATC, strong presumption of 
legality; when price is above ATC, 
legal     
 
substantial 
profits in 
absence of 
direct 
competition 
can 
demonstrate 
monopoly  
from predatory 
intent 
(unimportant) 
purpose; 
exclusion alone 
does not 
indicate 
anticompetitive 
conduct: must 
affect   
    
per se; here 
price is barely 
above ATC; low 
incremental 
costs exist in    
  
power 
 
viability of 
equally efficient 
competitor; 
failure to secure 
legal advertising 
clients    
    
two-sided 
advertising 
market 
    
because of 
alleged 
predatory price 
had little impact 
on viability of 
plaintiff   
         
newspaper, 
whose 
circulation 
dropped by half 
soon after 
opening 
            
279 
 
43. Abcor 
Corp. v. AM 
Int’l Inc., 916 
F.2d 924 (4th 
Cir. 1990) 
Claim 
 
 
 
 
 
Predation: 
attempted 
monopolization,  
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
NPT / 
Effects 
Costs 
 
 
Predatory if 
price below 
cost to exclude 
and to 
subsequently 
charge  
Profit Sacrifice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recoupment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
See Costs 
Market Power 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff 
supplied 
vigorous 
competition 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
Intent to 
exclude not 
actionable 
Effects 
 
Injury to 
plaintiff, if any, 
is the result of 
more 
competition, 
not predation; 
must show 
 
monopolization 
  
monopoly 
prices; price 
here above 
cost 
    
monopolization 
by 
circumventing 
the competitive 
process; price-
cuts not cause 
         
plaintiff to lose 
customers or 
market share, 
just profits; 
exclusion of 
single rival does 
         
not show 
anticompetitive 
effects 
(consumer 
welfare) 
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44. Am. 
Academic 
Suppliers v. 
Beckley-
Cardy, Inc., 
922 F.2d 1317 
(7th Cir. 1991) 
Claim 
 
 
 
 
 
Discriminatory 
& predatory 
pricing, 
attempted 
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NPT 
Costs 
 
 
 
Predation is 
pricing below 
incremental 
cost to recoup; 
Court assumed 
price 
Profit Sacrifice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recoupment 
 
Without 
monopoly 
power, cannot 
recoup by 
raising price 
above 
competitive 
levels;  
Market Power 
 
 
Must show that 
lower prices 
today become 
higher, 
monopolistic 
prices 
tomorrow,  
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
monopolization 
  
below 
incremental 
cost 
 
defendant faced 
hundreds of 
competitors; 
plaintiff's 
market share 
continued to 
grow  
which requires 
existing 
monopoly 
power, even in 
attempt case; 
here defendant 
has  
  
      
despite price-
cut; the longer 
exclusion takes, 
the longer 
supra-
competitive 
pricing  
a 3% national 
market share, 
and in some 
categories, a 
regional share 
of 25%; entry 
  
      
must persist to 
recoup (predict) 
is exceedingly 
easy 
  
       
  
  45. Irvin 
Indus. v. 
Goodyear 
Aerospace 
Corp., 974 
F.2d 241 (2d 
Cir. 1992) 
Predation: 
attempted 
monopolization,  Founded NPT 
Areeda & 
Turner test: 
presume illegal 
if price below 
AVC, as here 
 
If market 
structure 
renders 
recoupment 
unlikely, then 
price not 
predatory 
Court 
presumed 
monopoly 
power 
  
 
monopolization 
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46. Liggett 
Group, Inc. v. 
Brown & 
Williamson 
Tobacco 
Corp., 964 
F.2d 335 (4th 
Cir. 1992) 
Claim 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discriminatory 
& predatory 
pricing 
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
NPT / 
Effects 
Costs 
 
 
 
 
Price must be 
below 
appropriate 
measure of 
cost 
Profit Sacrifice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recoupment 
 
 
 
Below-cost 
prices were not 
predatory 
because no 
economically 
rational basis to  
Market Power 
 
 
 
Defendant had 
only 12% 
market share; 
plaintiff alleged 
conscious 
parallelism of 
Intent 
 
Price-cuts 
designed to 
discipline 
plaintiff into 
reducing 
discount 
between 
branded  
Effects 
 
 
Since 1986, 
generic 
cigarette prices 
have risen twice 
a year, in 
tandem with 
branded 
      
recoup and 
attain 
monopoly 
power; to rely 
on an oligopoly 
to ensure 
recoupment is 
oligopoly 
instead of 
monopoly 
power 
and generic 
cigarettes 
cigarettes, 
reducing the 
price discount 
between 
branded and 
generic 
cigarettes from 
      
economically 
irrational 
(predict) 
  
a high of 40% in 
1985 to 27% in 
1989; the six 
cartel members 
raised prices in  
         
lockstep 
regardless of 
the cost of 
tobacco, 
without the 
entry of any 
significant new  
         
competitors in 
several 
decades; sales 
of generic 
cigarettes 
increased from 
2.8 billion   
         
to 80 billion; 
their market 
share increased 
from 0.4% to 
15% 
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47. Int'l Travel 
Arrangers v. 
NWA, Inc., 
991 F.2d 1389 
(8th Cir. 1993) 
Claim 
 
 
 
 
 
Predation: 
attempted 
monopolization,  
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
NPT minus 
Costs 
 
 
Price above 
ATC is legal; 
presume legal 
if price is above 
AVC & below 
ATC;  
 
Recoupment 
 
 
 
 
Recoupment 
evidence can be 
ambiguous and 
misleading 
Market Power 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intent 
 
Futile to 
discern 
predatory 
conduct by 
predatory 
intent 
(unimportant) 
Effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
monopolization 
 
Recoupment 
presume illegal if price is below 
AVC; cost test is hard to meet; 
predation is 
    
    
pricing below 
appropriate 
measure of 
cost to exclude 
& reduce 
     
    
competition; 
airline priced 
some seats 
below ATC, but 
plaintiff failed 
to 
     
    
show overall 
price structure 
was predatory 
     
          
48. The 
Vollrath Co. v. 
Sammi Corp., 
9 F.3d 1455 
(9th Cir. 1993) 
Predation: 
attempted 
monopolization, 
conspiracy to No claim NPT 
Predation 
requires price 
below 
appropriate 
measure of 
cost; no 
evidence  
 
Predation 
requires 
dangerous 
probability of 
recoupment; 
ease of entry 
into market   
No possibility 
of achieving 
monopoly 
power by 
predation 
because 
defendant  
  
 
monopolize 
  
that price was 
below AVC 
 
and number of 
potential 
participants on 
every level of it 
demonstrates 
the  
controlled only 
10% of the 
market 
  
      
impossibility of 
recoupment 
(predict) 
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49. Brooke 
Group Ltd. v. 
Brown & 
Williamson 
Tobacco 
Corp., 509 
U.S. 209 
(1993) 
Claim 
 
 
 
 
 
Predation: 
attempted 
monopolization; 
injury from  
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
NPT / 
Effects 
Costs 
 
 
 
Must prove 
price below 
appropriate 
measure of 
cost; satisfied 
here 
Profit Sacrifice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recoupment 
 
For primary-line 
price 
discrimination, 
need 
reasonable 
possibility of 
substantial 
injury 
Market Power 
 
 
 
Alleged 
predator had 
12% market 
share; price 
discrimination 
illegal only if it 
Intent 
 
 
 
Defendant cut 
prices 
intending to 
recoup; 20% of 
consumers who 
switched to  
Effects 
 
 
 
Generic prices 
went up during 
competition; 
afterwards, list 
prices for both 
branded    
 
primary-line 
price 
discrimination 
of same 
character 
    
to competition, 
which Court 
held to mean 
dangerous 
probability of 
recoupment;   
threatens 
competition; 
price-cut 
instituted to 
exclude and 
gain control 
over price 
generics 
previously 
bought 
cigarettes from 
B&W 
and generic 
cigarettes 
increased in 
lockstep, twice 
a year, for 
several years,  
 
as predation 
    
insufficiently established here; 
recoupment supplies rationality to 
profit sacrifice; it   
 
regardless of 
inflation, 
production 
costs, or shifts 
in consumer 
demand; this 
caused        
      
depends on 
extent and 
duration of 
sacrifice, 
relative 
financial 
strength of 
predator  
  
the percentage 
gap between 
the list price of 
branded and 
generic 
cigarettes to     
      
and prey, along with their 
"incentives and will"; structure and 
conditions of relevant      
 
narrow, from 
approximately 
38% to 27%; on 
the other hand, 
following 
defendant's  
      
market also critical; conscious 
parallelism of oligopoly unlikely to 
deliver recoupment:  
 
entry, the 
market share of 
generics 
continued to 
increase, 
doubling by 
more than 2%    
      
losses incurred 
exclusively by 
  
per year; after 
predation, 
284 
 
predator, 
profits must be 
shared; 
recoupment 
must   
generic 
segment 
expanded from 
4% to more 
than 15%;  
      
come from 
ability to price 
generic 
cigarettes 
supra-
competitively, 
but their output   
  
notwithstanding 
improbability of 
predation, 
actual market 
conditions 
outweigh  
      
increased; 
Court ignored  
potential 
recoupment 
from 
compressing 
the price  
  
theory 
      
difference 
between 
branded and 
generic 
cigarettes; 
notwithstanding 
recoupment,    
  
  
      
dismissal 
appropriate 
because lower 
prices benefit 
consumers over 
short-term   
  
  
      
(predict / short-
term effects) 
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50. R.W. Int'l 
Corp. v. Welch 
Food, Inc., 13 
F.3d 478 (1st 
Cir. 1994) 
Claim 
 
 
 
 
Predation: 
attempted 
monopolization 
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
NPT / 
Effects 
Costs 
 
Price was not 
below cost; 
even if so, still 
must show 
threat to 
competition 
Profit Sacrifice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recoupment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Market Power 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effects 
 
 
Price-cut on 
new product to 
expand sales 
does not harm 
competition 
          
           
51. Rebel Oil 
Co. v. Atl. 
Richfield Co., 
51 F.3d 1421 
(9th Cir. 1995) 
Discriminatory 
& predatory 
pricing, 
attempted No claim 
NPT / 
Effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predation 
requires price 
below MC 
 
 
 
 
Predation also 
requires 
recoupment, or 
pricing at supra-
competitive 
levels long    
 
Insufficient 
proof of market 
power, so 
predation 
could not 
threaten 
consumer  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reduction of 
competition 
must harm 
consumers: 
allocative 
efficiency, high 
quality & 
 
monopolization 
    
enough to 
recover initial 
losses 
welfare; while 
44% market 
share normally 
is sufficient to 
establish 
pricing power  
 
low prices 
maximize 
consumer 
welfare; 
anticompetitive 
if act lowers 
allocative 
       
in attempt 
case, no entry 
barriers 
existed; it was 
easy to convert 
full-service   
 
efficiency and 
increases prices 
or lowers 
quality 
(consumer 
welfare) 
       
stations to self-
service 
stations; 
nothing 
prevented 
rivals from 
increasing 
output  
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52. Bathke v. 
Casey’s Gen. 
Stores, Inc., 
64 F.3d 340 
(8th Cir. 1995) 
Claim 
 
 
 
 
Predation: 
monopolization 
and primary line 
price  
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
NPT 
Costs 
 
 
 
Price must be 
below 
appropriate 
measure of 
cost 
Profit Sacrifice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recoupment 
 
 
 
 
Scheme must 
pose dangerous 
probability of 
recoupment 
Market Power 
 
Insufficient 
evidence 
concerning 
relevant 
market & 
market power, 
so claim not  
Intent 
 
 
 
Defendant 
developed and 
implemented 
plan to destroy 
rivals 
Effects 
 
 
 
 
Effects 
measured by 
consumer 
welfare 
 
discrimination 
are of same 
character 
     
viable 
  
          
           
53. Advo, Inc. 
v. Phil. 
Newspapers, 
Inc., 51 F.3d 
1191 (3d Cir. 
1995) 
Predation: 
attempt to 
monopolize No claim 
NPT / 
Effects / 
 
 
 
Insufficient 
evidence price 
below 
appropriate 
measure of 
cost 
 
 
 
Insufficient 
evidence of 
reasonable 
prospect to 
recoup losses; 
low entry 
barriers: the    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
See Intent 
 
 
 
Insufficient 
evidence of 
specific intent 
to monopolize; 
cannot infer 
intent from 
 
 
Price-cuts 
prompted 
corresponding 
price-cuts; 
customers did 
not switch 
suppliers;  
   
Intent 
  
business is simple, capital 
requirements are modest, a variety 
of methods to compete 
below-cost 
pricing here; 
must have 
intent and 
market power 
(claim) 
they simply 
received lower 
prices; harm to 
competition 
means 
consumer harm 
      
exist; high 
prices would 
attract entrants 
(predict) 
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54. Cost 
Mgmt. Serv., 
Inc. v. Wash. 
Nat’l Gas Co., 
99 F.3d 937 
(9th Cir. 1996) 
Claim 
 
 
 
 
Predation: 
attempted 
monopolization,  
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
NPT / 
Effects 
Costs 
 
Predation 
normally 
requires pricing 
at least below 
ATC; regulated 
entity  
Profit Sacrifice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recoupment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Market Power 
 
 
 
 
Power to control prices or exclude 
competition; defendant has 90% 
market share;  
Effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
monopolization 
  
may predate by 
cutting price 
below the 
approved rate; 
defendant not  
  
regulated 
entity can have 
market power 
  
    
regulated 
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55. Springfield 
Terminal Ry. 
Co. v. 
Canadian Pac. 
Ltd., 133 F.3d 
103 (1st Cir. 
1997) 
Claim 
 
 
 
 
 
Predation: 
attempted 
monopolization 
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
NPT / 
Effects 
Costs 
 
 
 
 
 
Defendant bid 
for less than its 
estimated AVC 
Profit Sacrifice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recoupment 
 
Recoupment 
was not 
possible here 
because no 
evidence of 
predation 
beyond one  
Market Power 
 
Although 
defendant's 
facilities were 
among the 
largest, 29 
other plants 
served  
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
See 
Recoupment 
      
bid or within 3.5 
years of action 
commencing 
(effects) 
the market; 
defendant had 
only 10% 
market share; 
Court willing to 
aggregate  
 
  
       
market share of 
predator and 
prey in 
"exceptional 
circumstances," 
when merger   
  
       
or sale of 
assets is 
imminent, and 
when predator 
is dominant in 
another 
market,  
 
  
       
has access to 
unlimited 
financing, and 
has created a 
record of 
persistent  
  
       
anticompetitive 
conduct; 
criteria not met 
here; no 
minimum 
market share, 
even   
  
       
30%, required 
in attempt 
cases 
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56. Nat'l 
Parcel Serv. v. 
J.B. Hunt 
Logistics, Inc., 
150 F.3d 970 
(8th Cir. 1998) 
Claim 
 
 
 
 
Predation: 
monopolization 
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
NPT 
Costs 
 
Price must be 
below 
appropriate 
measure of 
cost 
Profit Sacrifice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recoupment 
 
 
 
Dangerous probability of 
recoupment must exist; insufficient 
evidence here because  
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
of low entry 
barriers and 
presence of 
stronger 
companies in 
closely 
differentiated  
   
      
markets 
(predict) 
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57. Stearns 
Airport Equip. 
Co., Inc. v. 
FMC Corp., 
170 F.3d 518 
(5th Cir. 1999) 
Claim 
 
 
 
 
Discriminatory 
& predatory 
pricing, 
monopolization 
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
NPT / 
Effects 
Costs 
 
 
 
Predation 
requires pricing 
below AVC; 
bids here were 
above AVC 
Profit Sacrifice 
 
Predation exists 
when no 
rational 
business 
purpose 
justifies price-
cut  
Recoupment 
 
Monopolist 
must have 
reasonable 
chance of 
recoupment, 
which supplies 
rationality     
Market Power 
 
 
 
 
Court assumed 
existence of 
monopoly 
power 
Intent 
 
Exclusionary if 
conduct has no 
rational 
business 
purpose other 
than its 
adverse  
Effects 
 
 
No evidence of 
exclusion or 
sales lost to 
sporadic 
predation: 60% 
of plaintiff's  
     
except 
exclusion 
to predation; 
insufficient 
proof here; 
must 
demonstrate (1) 
price-cut 
actually could  
 
effect on 
competitors 
business 
involved other 
markets; it had 
a strong 
corporate 
parent; and 
only 5 of 240 
      
exclude rivals — 
depends on 
relative 
strength of 
parties & extent 
and duration of  
  
to 400 bids 
were below 
cost; low entry 
barriers 
ensured 
consumer 
windfall; foreign 
      
alleged 
predation, and 
(2) monopolist 
then could raise 
prices to supra-
competitive 
  
entrants would 
block 
recoupment 
(consumer 
welfare) 
      
levels long 
enough to 
recoup without 
drawing new 
entrants into 
market 
(predict) 
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58. Taylor 
Publ'g. Co. v. 
Jostens, Inc., 
216 F.3d 465 
(5th Cir. 2000) 
Claim 
 
 
 
 
Discriminatory 
& predatory 
pricing, 
attempted  
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
NPT / 
Effects 
Costs 
 
 
Predation 
requires price 
below 
appropriate 
measure of 
cost; some 
Profit Sacrifice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recoupment 
 
Predation 
requires 
reasonable 
chance of 
recoupment; 
insufficient 
likelihood here; 
Market Power 
 
 
 
 
 
Defendant has 
40%-50% 
market share 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effects 
 
 
Effects judged 
at time conduct 
occurred; actual 
effects 
unnecessary to 
sustain    
 
monopolization 
  
discounts were 
below AVC 
 
must prove 
potential for 
actual 
exclusion, 
allowing 
monopolist to 
raise prices to  
  
attempt claim; 
exclusionary 
conduct 
determined by 
business 
justification 
proffered; 
      
supra-
competitive 
levels long 
enough to 
recoup losses 
before rivals 
enter the 
  
irrational 
conduct but-for 
effect on rivals 
is exclusionary; 
challenged 
pricing won 
      
market 
(predict) 
  
about 27 
customers per 
year, or two-
fifths of one-
percent of 
plaintiff's 
customer  
         
base 
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59. U.S. v. 
AMR Corp., 
335 F.3d 1109 
(10th Cir. 
2003) 
Claim 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predation: 
attempted 
monopolization, 
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NPT 
Costs 
 
 
 
 
Predation 
requires price 
below marginal 
cost or a proxy; 
all four cost   
Profit Sacrifice 
 
 
 
By increasing 
capacity, 
defendant 
sacrificed 
profits, which 
made economic 
Recoupment 
 
Successful 
predation 
requires 
exclusion & 
supra-
competitive 
pricing long 
enough to 
Market Power 
 
 
 
 
 
 
American had 
70% market 
share at DFW 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
See 
Recoupment 
 
monopolization 
  
measures were 
invalid here; 
price was not 
below AVC for 
any route as a  
sense only if 
exclusionary; 
Court unwilling 
to accept cost 
tests that 
measure  
recoup, which 
signifies 
damage to 
competition; 
once plaintiff 
ceased or 
moved its 
  
  
    
whole; ATC is 
not an 
appropriate 
proxy 
profit sacrifice 
because they 
are too 
speculative and 
competition 
inhibiting 
operations, 
defendant 
generally 
resumed higher 
prices & lower 
capacity 
(effects)   
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60. Spirit 
Airlines, Inc. v. 
Northwest 
Airlines, Inc., 
431 F.3d 917 
(6th Cir. 2005) 
Claim 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predation: 
monopolization 
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Founded 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
NPT / 
Effects 
Costs 
 
 
Predation 
requires price 
below 
appropriate 
measure of 
cost; if price is  
Profit Sacrifice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recoupment 
 
 
Predation 
requires supra-
competitive 
pricing long 
enough to 
recover initial  
Market Power 
 
Market power 
is the ability to 
raise price 
above 
competitive 
level, restrict 
output,  
Intent 
 
 
Only when high 
entry barriers 
exist will 
incentive to 
predate follow; 
NW  
Effects 
 
 
 
 
See 
Recoupment 
(consumer 
welfare) 
    
above AVC but 
below ATC, 
plaintiff bears 
burden to 
prove 
predatory   
 
investment, 
which measures 
injury to 
competition; 
actual 
recoupment 
here: within    
and exclude 
competition; 
for Detroit-
Philadelphia 
route, NW had 
a 60-75%  
controlled 
64/78 gates at 
Detroit airport; 
hub-and-spoke 
system itself    
    
rationale or effect; price was 
below AVC here; potentially valid 
claim even  
months 
following 
plaintiff's exit 
from the 
disputed routes, 
NW raised 
prices by  
market share; 
for Detroit-
Boston route, 
NW had an 
89% market 
share; NW also    
constitutes 
entry barrier; 
NW 
determined 
that 
competition 
from low fare  
 
    
if price was 
above AVC 
because of 
expanded 
capacity 
 
multiple of 
seven (effects) 
benefitted 
from high entry 
barriers; in 
such markets, 
competition 
will not exist   
carriers at its 
hubs could cost 
it $250-$375 
million in 
annual 
revenue; NW  
 
       
without 
competitors 
executive 
published 
article 
advocating 
profit sacrifice 
in response to 
low fare   
 
        
competition 
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61. Wallace v. 
IBM Corp., 
467 F.3d 1104 
(7th Cir. 2006) 
Claim 
 
 
 
 
Predation: 
attempted 
monopolization, 
conspiracy 
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
NPT / 
Effects 
Costs 
 
Marginal cost 
of using 
intellectual 
property is 
zero; the 
efficient price 
of 
Profit Sacrifice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recoupment 
 
Absent 
exclusion or 
other indicators 
of probable 
recoupment, no 
monopoly 
ensues, 
Market Power 
 
 
Goal of 
antitrust law is 
to use rivalry to 
keep prices low 
for the benefit 
of  
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effects 
 
 
When exit does 
not occur, or 
recoupment is 
improbable, no 
antitrust 
problem 
 
to monopolize 
  
an extra copy is 
also zero, "for 
that is where 
price equals 
marginal cost"; 
 
and prices 
remain low; 
rivals continue 
to enter this 
market; many 
more people 
use 
consumers, see 
also 
Recoupment & 
Effects 
 
exists; plaintiff 
does not claim 
that software 
available for 
free 
subsequently 
will  
    
donations of 
time help cover 
fixed costs; 
forcing authors 
to charge for 
 
proprietary 
software; 
healthy 
competition 
precludes 
recoupment 
(effects) 
  
lead to 
monopoly 
prices: 
legislation 
"keeps price 
low forever" 
and blocks the    
    
fixed costs 
would reduce 
efficiency and 
consumer 
welfare 
    
output 
reductions 
necessary to 
effectuate 
monopoly; 
people willingly 
pay for  
         
substitutes 
(consumer 
welfare) 
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62. 
Weyerhaeuser 
Co. v. Ross-
Simmons 
Hardwood 
Lumber Co., 
Inc., 549 U.S. 
312 (2007) 
Claim 
 
 
 
 
Predatory 
bidding: 
attempted 
monopolization, 
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim 
NPT, 
Effects, 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NPT 
Costs 
 
 
Must prove 
bidding on the 
input-side 
caused the cost 
of the 
predator's 
Profit Sacrifice 
 
 
A rational 
business rarely 
will sacrifice 
profits on the 
chance of 
earning  
Recoupment 
 
Without 
likelihood of 
recoupment, 
predatory 
bidding makes 
no economic 
sense; 
Market Power 
 
 
 
 
Monopsonist 
purchased 65% 
of the relevant 
product 
Intent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effects 
 
 
Plaintiff accused 
defendant of 
driving it out of 
business by 
bidding up input 
costs; 
 
monopolization 
  
output to 
exceed the 
revenues 
earned on sales 
supra-
competitive 
future profits 
must be able to recoup losses 
incurred bidding up input prices 
through subsequent      
 
acquiring more 
inputs usually 
leads to 
producing more 
output, which 
lowers  
     
  
input cost 
savings that 
more than 
offset the 
profits that 
would have 
been earned on 
  
consumer 
prices; 
predatory 
bidding 
potentially 
harms 
consumer 
welfare less 
than 
     
  
output sales 
(predict) 
  
predatory 
pricing because 
recoupment can 
occur without 
affecting output 
prices 
 
